

Microfilmed by Univ. of Wisconsin-Madison
Memorial Library. Collection Maintenance Office

80-18139

SHIFFERD, Patricia Allen, 1941-
TRADE, LAND EXPROPRIATION, AND CONQUEST: THE
EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN CONTACT ON THE NATIVE PEOPLES
OF AFRICA AND NORTH AMERICA.

The University of Wisconsin-Madison, Ph.D., 1980,
Sociology-Anthropology

Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

© 1980 Patricia Allen Shifferd

(This title card prepared by the University of Wisconsin)

PLEASE NOTE:

The negative microfilm copy of this dissertation was prepared and inspected by the school granting the degree. We are using this film without further inspection or change. If there are any questions about the film content, please write directly to the school.

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS

TRADE, LAND EXPROPRIATION, AND CONQUEST: THE EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN
CONTACT ON THE NATIVE PEOPLES OF AFRICA AND NORTH AMERICA

A thesis submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Wisconsin-Madison in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

BY

Patricia ^{ALLEN} Shifferd

Degree to be awarded: December 19 _____ May 19 80 August 19 _____

Approved by Thesis Reading Committee:

H. Kent Geyer
Major Professor

John W. Allen

Ben N. Adams

April 25, 1980
Date of Examination

Robert M. Bock
Dean, Graduate School

TRADE, LAND EXPROPRIATION, AND CONQUEST:
THE EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN CONTACT ON THE NATIVE PEOPLES OF
AFRICA AND NORTH AMERICA

BY
PATRICIA ALLEN SHIFFERD

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(Sociology)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN--MADISON

1980

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	Problem Development	1
	Conceptual Framework	6
	Hypotheses	
	Trade	18
	Land Expropriation	34
	Conquest	37
II.	Methodology	
	Delineation of the Regions	41
	Identification of the Population	44
	Collection and Analysis of Data	50
	Sources of Error	51
III.	The Trading Areas	56
	Description of the Trading System	57
	The Technology of Export Production	61
	The Volume and Pricing of Export Goods	84
	Organization of the Trade	110
	Changes in the Societal Order	
	Political Structure	118
	Economic Structure	138
	Stratification	148
	Changes in the Material Core	
	Technology	151
	Environment	152
	Population	157
	Conclusion	174
IV.	The Land Expropriation Areas	181
	Changes in the Societal Order	
	Political Structure	197
	Economic Structure	208
	Stratification	215
	Changes in the Material Core	220
V.	The Conquest Areas	227
	Characteristics of the Native Societies at Conquest	231
	The Conquerors	238
	The Spanish Colonial System	239
	The Portugese Colonial System	250
	The Effects of Conquest on the Native Societies	259
	Changes in the Societal Order	261
	Changes in the Material Core	287
	Conclusion	298
VI.	Conclusion	300

TABLES

I. Levels of Sociocultural Complexity	16-17
II. The Sample	41
III. Coverage of the Population	48
IV. Means of Enslavement	62
V. Volume of West African Slave Exports by Century	86
VI. West African Palm Oil Imported into England	97
VII. Quantities of Furs Traded at Albany, 1625-1633	98
VIII. Change in Political Centralization from Beginning of Trade to 1850	120
IX. Extent of Change in Political Centralization at the Beginning and End of the Trading Period	121
X. Change in Political Centralization, North American Fur Area, 1600-1850	122
XI. Average Length of Trade Period by Direction of Political Change, North American Fur Area	125
XII. Average Length of Trade Period of "Decentralizing" Societies, North American Fur Area	126
XIII. Change in Political Centralization, West African Trade Area, 1500-1850	129
XIV. Extent of Political Change, West African Trade Area	130
XV. Change in Political Centralization by Geographic Location, West African Trade Area	133
XVI. Level of Increase in Economic Complexity, West African Trade Area	145
XVII. Level of Increase in Economic Complexity by Type of Commercial Control, West African Trade Area	146
XVIII. Change in Degree of Inequality by 1850, West African Trade Area	149
XIX. Dates by which Substantial Game Depletion had Occurred, North American Fur Area	156

TABLES (continued)

XX.	Estimated African Population over Time	158
XXI.	Distribution of Land Expropriation Sample by Region and Migration	184
XXII.	Political Change, Land Expropriation Areas, Contact to c. 1820/30	199
XXIII.	Political Change of Migrant Groups, Contact to c. 1820/30	199
XXIV.	Political Change of Non-migrant Groups, Contact to c. 1820/30	199

MAPS AND FIGURES

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework	10
Figure 2: Hypothesized Effects of Land Expropriation	36
Figure 3: Hypothesized Effects of Conquest	37
Map A: Regions of North America	45
Map B: Regions of Africa	46
Map C: Approximate Locations of Societies, West African Trade Area	88
Map D: Approximate Locations of Societies, North American Fur Area	99
Map E: Southern Africa, 1800-1840	192
Map F: Locations of Societies Prior to Removal, Southeastern United States	196
Map G: Social Locations, Spanish America	232
Map H: Conquered Societies, Portugese Africa	233

CHAPTER I: PROBLEM DEVELOPMENT

In the sixteenth century Western Europeans surged out into the Atlantic, profoundly affecting the peoples of Africa and North America with whom they came into contact. Contact led to relations of trade, land expropriation, and conquest. This thesis is a study of the differing effects of these three types of contact. In it I have paid special attention to the fact that the Europeans were at the state level of evolutionary development while the native peoples varied in general evolutionary level.¹ How did the native peoples adapt to the European presence? The patterns of social change they exhibited could reasonably be expected to vary by both the type of contact experienced and the precontact nature of their social structures which were of differing levels of complexity. Thus, the premise of an interaction between contact and complexity constitutes the theoretical starting point for the study. More specifically, the question asked is whether the patterns of sociocultural adaptation which occurred with trade were different from the other two, more clearly imperialist, types of contact?

The significance of the problem is twofold. On one hand, the specific historical situation addressed here may be viewed as an instance of the general problem of what happens when societies of vary-

¹ The concept of general evolutionary level follows closely that of Marshall Sahlins in "Evolution: Specific and General" in Sahlins, *et alia*, Evolution and Culture (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), pp. 20-33. A careful reading of this essay will show that no notion of relative superiority is necessarily implied by the concept. The idea of cultural evolution suggests relative complexity and increasing differentiation.

ing levels of social complexity come into regular interaction. Accordingly, this work may make a contribution to general evolutionary theory. Although it is true the general thrust of culture change so far has been the spread and dominance of more and more complex forms of social life,² this phenomenon has occurred not through some cosmic-level evolutionary law, but as a result of real people in real material surroundings responding more or less effectively to the pressures for intensification.³ In other words general evolution occurs only through the specific adaptations of humans to their historically discrete circumstances. Therefore, by contributing to the documentation of one of the most explosive periods of intensification in history, we may gain some insight into the effects of culture contact in general and in particular into the mechanism by which high-energy societies come to replace low-energy societies.⁴

The second reason for this research is to join the debate about effects of trade between the "developed" and "underdeveloped" nations. In recent decades the stubbornly persisting gap between the rich nations and the poor nations in the modern world has, in this time of rising aspirations and rapid communication, encouraged social scientists to look for the causes of macrosocial change, particularly of economic change or "development". One of the few points of agreement is that

² Leslie A. White, The Science of Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization (New York: Farrar Straus, 1949).

³ Marvin Harris, Cannibals and Kings: The Origins of Cultures (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), p. xii.

⁴ David Kaplan, "The Law of Cultural Dominance," in Sahlins, et alia, op. cit., pp. 69-92; W. F. Cottrell, Energy and Society (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970), pp. 50-70.

the contact or interaction between nations of differing levels of technological sophistication and material prosperity is an important causal variable. However, a fundamental debate has developed over the effects of the contact, especially economic contact in the form of trade, upon the less prosperous societies. Some argue that trade is the solution for the material gap between the "developed" and "underdeveloped" nations⁵ while others contend that economic interaction is the cause of the continued poverty of the latter group of nations.⁶

The former perspective, called herein the diffusionist perspective, argues that it is through international economic interaction that the poor nations can acquire the technology, capital, and markets to overcome traditional forms of production, resulting in increased material well-being. By trading with and encouraging investment from the industrial nations, the poor nation may be able to enter a period of self-sustained economic growth. At the same time, the social structure of the society will experience some alteration in political, stratification, demographic processes, and in values as mechanization, commercial agriculture, urbanization, altered division of labor, etc. occur. The diffusionists exhibit differences of opinion about where one should start the analysis, i.e. about which features of social structure are causally prior in the process of social change. There are also differ-

⁵ This is the standard approach to trade as exemplified by federal and world agencies and also by the works of most of the scholars of the modernization school such as McClellan, Rostow, Nash, and others.

⁶ Exemplified by the works of Furtado, Gunter Frank, Magdoff, and most of the Neo-Marxian scholars in sociology and economic development.

ences about how extensive the social change and how similar the "end-products" are likely to be. Nevertheless, more or less implicit in this point of view is the idea that social change occurs through the adoption of elements of social structure and technology from the industrial nations. This model relies to some extent on the concept of acculturation.⁷

The competing paradigm, called the dependency perspective, argues that the modern international economic system, dominated by the political and economic power of the rich nations, operates to maintain or increase the disparity between the rich and poor nations. There are various explanations offered of how this works. Some contend that the rich nations dominate through their control of international finance and trade arrangements. Others suggest that the dominance is explained by the fact that the rich nations are in a position to exchange expensive manufactured goods and high technology for the relatively cheap raw materials of the developing nations. Another possibility is that the multinational corporations are able to transcend the boundaries of political sovereignty in search of the most favorable mix of the factors of production; the result may even be an outflow of capital from the poor nations to the rich ones. Finally, it is sometimes argued that the economic dominance of the industrial nations rests on the use of coercion, both covertly and overtly applied. In any case, the effects of international interaction on the "underdeveloped" nations are economic stagnation, poverty, constricted development, or social dis-

⁷ Melville Herskovits, Acculturation: the Study of Culture Contact (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1958).

ruption. The processes of social change within such a nation are affected in some measure by the nation's role in the international economy.

It is, of course, true that many of the "underdeveloped" members of the current system of international commerce carry a legacy of formal colonial domination. Much of Africa, South America, and Asia experienced varying periods of political rule by one or another European nation. Further, most of the Americas, Australia, and parts of Africa experienced permanent colonization by persons of European origin. As a later chapter will demonstrate, colonial rule can produce permanent and fundamental changes in the native societies so subjected. Therefore, the economic and political balance of power in the modern world is usefully seen, in part, as a continuation of the power arrangements between societies developed during the era of world colonialism. The dependency theorists, with their characterization of the contemporary world as "neo-imperialist" suggest that the present relationships between nations are fundamentally similar to the relationships of the colonial period. It is easy to see that many of the "new" nations have forms of economic production, technologies, class structures, systems of property, and ethnic groups brought together or developed, often coercively, during the colonial past.

Therefore, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the effects of trade between societies of varying levels of technological sophistication in today's world is not inherent in the trade relationship per se, but is a function of the fact that it is trade in a post-colonial world.

Therefore, what I propose to do is to investigate what happened to some of the native societies in Africa and North America who came

into regular social contact with representatives of the expanding European nations in the time before the natives were subjected to extensive conquest or colonization. With this strategy it is possible to inquire into the effects of trade unconfounded by a colonial past, performing a crude test between the diffusionist and dependency perspectives. Further, by comparing trading contact to the obviously imperialistic contact of conquest and expropriation of land we can assess whether the label "neo-imperialism" used to refer to trade in the modern world is appropriate for this early period. In other words, we want to see if the patterns of social change produced in native societies by trade are the same as those patterns of change produced by conquest or land expropriation.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

My approach to the problem of large-scale, long-term social change is most influenced theoretically by the neo-evolutionist perspective within anthropology and world-systems perspective in sociology.⁸ The basic assumptions adopted from these perspectives may be briefly summarized. Conceptually, a social system consists of a set of cybernetic linkages among three levels: the material core (technology, environment, and populations), basic social institutions (economy, polity, kinship), and ideology (values with associated legitimizing institutions like

⁸ Among recent scholars, the works of Marshall Sahlins, Elman Service, and Marvin Harris from anthropology and of W. F. Cottrell, Gerhard Lenski, and Immanuel Wallerstein from sociology have been most influential. And the insights of Durkheim, Weber, and Marx originally awakened my interest in large-scale social change.

religion). The first level represents the basic life energy requirement and potential; the second level organizes the extraction, distribution, and control of energy, and the third level provides the symbolic structure by which the activities of life production are made meaningful. A process of social change is a complex set of adaptations among the component parts. However, over the long term social change is likely to occur because of conditions originating within the material core. Truly revolutionary social change, i.e. change which fundamentally transforms a society, takes place very gradually over generations or centuries.

The process of societal adaptation involves not only the material conditions of the local environment, but also adjustment to conditions which originate in other societies and spread through force or peaceful contact. Inter-societal specialization, which alters the character of energy extraction and distribution, is often the result. Accordingly the contemporary world-system is the current manifestation of a process of development which is centuries old. I agree with Immanuel Wallerstein and W. F. Cottrell that the age of European exploration ushered in by the development of sail began the series of inter-societal adaptations we observe today. I have stated that the problem of this study is whether various forms of contact with Europeans produced patterned macrosocial adaptations within a group of African and North American societies. This construct refers to changes in general evolutionary level, that is in the overall level of social structural complexity. This idea, basic to evolutionary theory, refers to the degree to which the social system of a group of people is composed of internally differ-

entiated subsystems and roles. In the archetypical simple society all social activities take place within a single set of roles, the kinship system. Age, sex, and lineage position regulate all interaction between individuals and groups. As society becomes more complex, extra-kin groupings of people come into being and special roles for carrying out political, economic, religious, and educational activities are developed. The size and scope of the group increases,⁹ and kinship roles occupy only a portion of the individual's interaction. Inequality in power and access to resources¹⁰ is also a feature of increasing complexity, although the relationship is not linear.¹¹

Clearly it is not feasible to measure the multitude of changes in human activity that occur as social systems undergo increasing or decreasing levels of complexity. Rather it is necessary to define complexity in terms of a limited number of variables. I will use an adaptation of Elman Service's typology of evolutionary level (band, tribe, chiefdom, state) defined in terms of economic, political, and stratification variables. These three variables encompass only a portion of what is commonly understood as social structure or basic institutions. To avoid confusion the term the societal order will be used to refer to these three social-structural variables; the dependent variable, changes

⁹ Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: The Free Press, 1933), p. 262.

¹⁰ Gerhard Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966), p. 44; Elman Service, The Origins of the State and Civilization (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), pp. 47-102.

¹¹ Lenski, op. cit., p. 437.

in social structural complexity, is operationally confined to changes in the societal order.

Considerations of change in the rest of the social structure and in the value-system are not included. I will not deal systematically with kinship structures, family norms, socialization practices, religious belief and practices, or general social values. Part of this omission stems from the definition of complexity. Increasing complexity is defined as the differentiation of political and economic activities from the realm of kin group interaction. We would not expect this to produce more family roles or more elaborate kin networks; indeed, the opposite will be true. On the other hand increasing social complexity is associated with elaboration of the religious system, emergence of religious specialists, development of an intellectual tradition, and differentiation of value-orientations reflecting emerging inequality.¹²


The omission of religion and values does not mean I think this area is theoretically unimportant or uninteresting. Rather, the omission stems from two factors: 1) I suspect that religion and values have more "give", adapt in ways not easily operationalized, or change more slowly than the other areas, and 2) the quality of data available about changes in religion and values among the native African and North American societies of my sample is totally inadequate. Questions of religious change still need to be asked on the case study level before incorporation into an extensive or comparative study such as this.

¹² Guy Swanson, Religion and Regime (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967); Robert Bellah, "Religious Evolution," American Sociological Review, vol. XXIX, no. 3 (June, 1964), pp. 358-374.

In addition to changes in overall complexity, attention will also be given to change in the material base variables of population, technology, and environment. These three variables may be thought of as intervening variables because it is through the interaction of population, technology, and environment that the raw material--the energy from which come more complex forms of social order--is produced.

A relatively high level of population size and density, technological sophistication, and environmental resources are the necessary pre-conditions for the more complex forms of social structure such as the chiefdom or state. The question is to assess what degree of change in these three variables accompanies alterations in level of complexity. Therefore, the conceptual framework of the study may be graphically portrayed.

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework



What specific changes in the societal order are taken to constitute changes in complexity? When political systems become more complex three things happen: 1) more levels of authority evolve to encompass the greater scope of government, 2) authority and power become more centralized, and 3) ultimately a bureaucracy is formed to more efficiently ad-

minister the activities of the government. As power becomes centralized, political leadership becomes a full-time activity. Finally, with the emergence of the state the central government takes onto itself a "monopoly on the legitimate use of force"¹³ with the development of military and police power and the suppression of military initiative by private citizens or lower levels of government.

Within the economy increasing complexity consists of three things: increase in the quantity of goods and services produced and/or acquired by various means from other groups, development of occupational specialization, and expansion of the processes of exchange. The last requires some elaboration.

There are three forms of economic exchange: reciprocity, redistribution, and market exchange.¹⁴ Reciprocity, the most basic form, is symmetrical two-sided exchange (A exchanges with B, B with C, C with A, etc.). Reciprocity is not confined to transactions (completion of the exchange on the spot), but also includes giving of goods or services in expectation of future return. The reciprocating partners are usually linked in some non-economic way (e.g., kinship, ceremonial) so that the

¹³ Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy edition, 1958), p. 78.

¹⁴ Karl Polanyi developed the concepts, see Primitive, Archaic, and Modern Economies: Essays of Karl Polanyi (2nd ed., Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), but they have become standard concepts in economic anthropology and are widely used. See George Dalton, "Karl Polanyi's Analysis of Long Distance Trade," In Ancient Civilization and Trade, Sabloff and Lamberg-Karlovsky, eds. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975). pp. 91-94.

rules governing the exchange are never merely pecuniary nor reducible to price considerations.¹⁵

Redistribution is the flow of goods and services to a social center and subsequent return to the periphery. Although it is possible for the center to serve merely as a clearing house, usually the center possesses greater political power. Redistributive processes do not exhibit equivalence; that is, one does not necessarily receive back the equivalent of what one put in. Nor are they necessarily voluntary. Examples of redistribution which easily come to mind are tribute rendered to political leaders, taxes paid to a government, offerings made to temples, and so forth. The returns may be material, such as food in times of scarcity, public works, or non-material, such as protection, or intercession with the gods.

Market exchange is the flow of goods and services cut free of personal obligation. It is impersonal exchange and the terms are dictated primarily by economic considerations such as equivalence and maximization. At its most complex, market exchange is the flow of goods and services over great distances among parties completely unknown to each other through complex systems of currency and credit.

With increasing complexity redistributive and market processes are added to reciprocity, which they partially replace. Historically, economies dominated by market exchange are a relatively recent phenomenon, but it is not true that such mechanisms permanently replace redistribution in the same way that the two together (or separately) replace reci-

¹⁵ Marshall Sahlins, "On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange," in Stone Age Economics (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 185-230.

procity, Indeed redistributive mechanisms constitute a substantial portion of economic exchange in contemporary industrial society.¹⁶

Within the stratification system increasing complexity consists of increasing variance in the distribution of rewards (i.e., increased inequality), the development of multiple bases of prestige, and the crystallization of classes. The last occurs when status is assigned to the family as a unit rather than to individuals. Objections may be raised to the first because it appears to contradict certain influential ideas about the nature of stratification. For example, Lenski argues that the degree of inequality is related in curvilinear fashion to other measures of complexity. In his typology industrial society experiences a decline in inequality compared to agrarian civilizations.¹⁷ Marx, on the other hand, argued that increases in inequality would continue with evolution until socialism replaced capitalism.¹⁸ Although interesting, these ideas do not invalidate my definition because they are not in themselves definitions of stratification complexity, but theories about changes in the levels of stratification complexity caused by other variables. Further the question of what happens to levels of inequality in modern society is not relevant since all the societies in my sample are pre-industrial or pre-capitalist. Therefore, it is reasonable to define

¹⁶ George Dalton, op. cit., p. 94; James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973).

¹⁷ Lenski, op. cit., p. 437.

¹⁸ Karl Marx summarized in Robert H. Lauer, Perspectives on Social Change (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1973), p. 67.

increasing complexity of the societal order in part by increasing inequality within society.

It is possible to use the interplay of economic, political, and stratification processes to define several different general levels of sociocultural complexity. Our scholarly forebears in sociology and anthropology proposed many such typologies, some referring primarily to subsistence activities, others primarily to political structure, still others to other aspects (e.g., solidarity or ideology) of social structure. To be satisfactory a typology should: 1) be fairly widely recognized and relatively objective, 2) draw our attention immediately to the variables posited as central, and 3) be elaborate enough to cover the full range of phenomena being considered. This paper uses a modified form of Elman Service's widely used typology.¹⁹ By drawing our attention to political or organizational processes, the Service categories suggest a central variable of societal evolution. While the society-nature interaction (the technoeconomic system) provides the necessary raw material (the surplus energy) out of which complex societies are made, the coordination, internal security, adjudication, and legitimized coercion required to transform that raw material into a somewhat coherent whole are by definition political. Succinctly, the material surplus is the necessary and effective political intergration the sufficient condition for the evolution of complex societies from simple

¹⁹ Band, tribe, chiefdom, state. Elman Service, Primitive Social Organization (2nd ed., New York: Random House, 1971) and Origins of the State and Civilization.

ones. Therefore, four basic levels of sociocultural complexity may be defined.

A band is the politically autonomous local segment of a broader cultural or linguistic group. No formal political offices other than headman/chief exist; this leader may be chosen by achievement or ascription, but possesses only persuasive power over the members. Bands are most commonly hunters and gatherers²⁰ or perhaps simple village agriculturalists, but very little surplus for exchange is produced; exchange of goods is by reciprocity and there is no full-time specialization of labor other than sexual. There is little inequality in wealth or life style. Certainly no class system exists.

A tribe is a group with no more than two levels of political authority (local and regional/national). Local authority is based on kinship ties (real or fictive); higher authority is exercised by either a chief and council of elders or by some other organization crossing kinship lines, such as a secret society or age set. Economic exchange and stratification systems are similar to those of bands.

A chiefdom is a pyramidal structure of political authority of at least three levels (local, regional, paramount). The paramount chief possesses substantial authority, but this authority rests on a symbolic or sacred base, not on a purely civil or coercive one. Citizenship is based on kinship as in bands and tribes or upon a combination of kinship and clientage. Redistributive exchange processes validate and reinforce the political hierarchy. Market exchange may also be present.

²⁰ But all hunter/gatherers are not organized as bands.

Definite inequalities in wealth and life style are present; i.e., a class system exists.

A state possesses the authority, exchange and stratification systems present in a chiefdom. But a state also possesses a bureaucracy directly in the service of the ruler, i.e., not subject to the regional authorities, to administer governmental activities. In addition, the central government of a state has control of mechanisms to coerce compliance with its policies. An important indicator of coercive ability is the existence of a national army or police controlled by the ruler, not by chiefs or lords.

These definitions may be summarized as follows:

Table I: Levels of Sociocultural Complexity

	Band	Tribe	Chiefdom	State
Political:				
Levels of Authority	1	2	3 or more	3 or more
Bureaucracy	No	No	No	Yes
Centralized Coercion	No	No	No	Yes
Basis of Citizenship	Kinship	Kinship	Kinship/ Clientage	Territorial
Economic:				
Internal Exchange*	A	A	A, B, and maybe C	A, B, and C
Surplus	Very small	Some	Substantial	Very large

	Band	Tribe	Chiefdom	State
Division of Labor (other than sexual)	No	Some part-time	Some	Extensive
Stratification:				
Noticeable Inequality, a class system	No	No	Yes	Yes

*A) reciprocity B) redistribution C) market exchange

The defining difference between a band and tribe is the existence in the latter of some extra-local political structure. The difference between a tribe and chiefdom is the existence in the latter of two characteristics: 1) a paramount political authority with redistributive power, and 2) noticeable inequality. Finally, states possess two characteristics not present in chiefdoms: 1) a bureaucracy and 2) a coercive force controlled by the ruler. In the cases of change of a society from a tribe to a chiefdom or from a chiefdom to a state, it is presumably true that both of the defining characteristics do not necessarily develop together or overnight. It is theoretically possible for four separate intermediate forms of social structure to occur: tribe & paramount, tribe & stratification, chiefdom & bureaucracy, chiefdom & force. In fact my study of the historical development of the 166 societies of my sample shows that only one of these, chiefdom & bureaucracy, is an empirically common and fairly stable kind of structure.

In addition to the four basic and one intermediate levels of societal complexity defined, I will occasionally use two other terms to describe

variant forms of political organization. A confederacy is a voluntaristic association of tribes or chiefdoms with a central organization for public discussion but no obligatory power and no ability to tax. Both forms occur in the sample and since each represents an extension of integration level, they will be noted. However, a confederacy is not fundamentally more complex than a tribe or chiefdom. The leading example of a tribal confederacy is the League of the Iroquois. The Ashanti started out as a confederacy of chiefdoms, but the Kumasi section came to dominate the others. We might think of an organization like the United Nations as a confederacy of states, but this type will not be encountered in this study. Second, I will use the term empire to refer to the political subjection, but not incorporation, of a group of political units (tribes, chiefdoms, or states) by a central power (a chiefdom or state) for the purpose of economic expropriation. An empire is established and maintained by military force.

The basic typology of band——→tribe——→chiefdom——→state with intermediate levels of confederacies and chiefdom & bureaucracy constitutes a scale of increasing societal complexity. Although the scale as I have defined it rests heavily on the nature of the political system, the economic and stratification variables empirically perform in rough scale-wise fashion with the political structure.

HYPOTHESES

It is now appropriate to discuss the kinds of changes in the societal order and in the material core that might be expected in societies of varying levels of complexity in association with each of the three

forms of contact, trade, land expropriation, and conquest.

Trade is the relatively peaceful two-sided exchange of goods over distance.²¹ The interaction of trade is clearly less coercive than the final type, conquest. Here a European society through its representatives established political control over a native society for the purpose of directly expropriating the material resources and labor power of the indigenous peoples. The other form of contact, land expropriation is intermediate between trade and conquest. In this instance Europeans expropriated the land base but not the labor power of the people; rather the indigenes were displaced and obliged to either subsist on a more restricted territory than formerly or to migrate out of the contested area. However, formal political independence and control of labor were maintained within the native social structure, at least for a time. Little attention has been paid to land expropriation specifically. Although we may think of this as conquest, in fact the patterns of social change associated with land expropriation are substantially different from those associated with formal conquest.

In order to trace the patterns of social change in the societal order and the material core, a region in Africa has been paired with a region in North or Central America for each of the three types of contact situation. The sample consists of individual societies within each regional pair. Accordingly, the effects of trade will be traced within the societies of the fur-trading region of northeastern North America

²¹ Karl Polanyi, "Traders and Trade," in Sabloff and Lamberg-Karlovsky, eds., op. cit., pp. 133, 136.

and the slave-trading area of West Africa. Conquest will be analyzed by comparing Spanish Mexico with Portuguese Angola and Zambesia, and the changes associated with land expropriation will be exemplified by South Africa and the area of southeastern United States affected by the removal policy.

Trade

1. The Societal Order. Scholars have paid good deal of attention to the supposed effect of trade upon the political and economic systems of a society. A most widespread hypothesis is that trade may produce political centralization or "state-formation".²² Many anthropologists, seeking explanations for political intensification in various historic and prehistoric civilizations, have noted that such rising civilizations were often in a position to benefit from trade between regions. The large amounts of wealth introduced into a society through trade may be controlled directly by an elite or may increase the taxable surplus of the population. If the wealth is great enough a political leader may be able to consolidate his power and break free of the bands of recipro-

²² The bibliography in this area is very large. For just a small sample see Malcolm Webb, "The Flag Follows Trade: An Essay on the Necessary Interaction of Military and Commercial Factors in State Formation," Colin Renfrew, "Trade as Action at a Distance: Questions of Integration and Communication," and other papers in Sabloff and Lamberg-Karlovsky, ed., op. cit.; Karl Polanyi, et. alia, Trade and Market in the Early Empires (New York: the Free Press, 1957); Roland Oliver and J. D. Fage, A Short History of Africa (2nd ed., Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966); Richard Gray and David Birmingham, eds., Pre-colonial African Trade (London: Oxford University Press, 1970); papers in T. P. Culbert, ed., The Classic Maya Collapse (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1973).

city and obligatory redistribution which characterize the tribal and chiefly forms of government.²³

Among Africanists this idea is also widely accepted. Fluctuation in trade routes and expansion and contraction of the volume of trade have been hypothesized to be a cause of the fluid character of sub-Saharan African political history, marked as it is by expansion and contractions of kingdoms and empires. The growth of foreign commerce, in particular, placed "new demands" that "purely kinship systems of organization" could not fill.²⁴

Sometimes this widespread empirical association between trade and political centralization is stated as a simplistic causal proposition, trade produces states. Although it is empirically true that cases of successful political centralization are often accompanied by extensive trade, it is impossible to conclude therefore that trade is either a partial or complete cause of that centralization. Such reasoning stems from the methodological fallacy of sampling on the dependent variable. It is obviously true that trade between groups is much commoner than complex political systems. Therefore, it must be that if there is a causal connection, 1) trade produces political centralization only in the presence of certain other factors, or 2) only certain types or quantity of trade produces this effect, or 3) some combination of these. A further problem is that most studies of the effects of trade do not deal explicitly with whether the effects of trade operate all along the

²³ Marvin Harris, op. cit., pp. 113, 121.

²⁴ J. D. Fage, States and Subjects in Sub-Saharan Africa (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1974), pp. 12-13.

range of social complexity. For example, will centralization be just as common at the band end of the continuum as at the chiefdom end? Or to phrase the question differently, will a trading band evolve into a tribe as commonly as a trading chiefdom will evolve into a state?

Malcolm Webb, in the essay already cited, makes some concrete hypotheses. He suggests that trade "in relatively massive amounts or which involved a higher order of luxury and craft production"²⁵ may be a sufficient condition for the evolution of chiefdoms from tribes. This is so because the volume of wealth overcomes "tribal mechanisms inhibiting stratification". I think the "tribal mechanisms" implicitly refer to bands as well as tribes, and therefore trade, if it has the effect Webb suggests, should affect both bands and tribes. However, since the transformation of a band to a tribe entails organizational innovation in the political sphere, it seems unlikely that the addition of wealth, even large amounts, would be sufficient to produce the integration required for an increase in overall complexity. Therefore, I think that trade is more likely to result in the evolution of tribes to chiefdoms than of bands to tribes.

However, there is a problem with the Webb formulation in that it implies that the increased wealth will be unequally distributed within the population, laying the way for the development of a stratified social order. But suppose that the proceeds from trade were widely distributed and available to everyone in the society. Under these conditions even the introduction of massive amounts of wealth would not

²⁵ Malcolm Webb, op. cit., p. 181.

necessarily have the evolutionary effect hypothesized. If the commodity to be traded is abundant, if the population in general has unrestricted access to it, and if the procedures for production are known to all, then I see no reason why even massive amounts of trade goods should necessarily transform the social structure of a band or tribe. If, on the other hand, control over the trade resources and of the profits of trade are restricted to a segment of the population, then substantial trade may very well result in the development of chiefdoms from the less complex forms and in particular of chiefdoms from tribes.

Webb also makes some concrete suggestions about the role of trade in producing states from chiefdoms.²⁶ Trade is not by itself one of the specifically state-forming "factors". However, since "the existence of large and prosperous chiefdoms is apparently a necessary precondition"²⁷ for the operation of these specific factors, trade may play a role by increasing the power and wealth of the chiefly class. The specific conditions required for the evolution of such a chiefdom into a state are environmental circumscription, high population density, and military force. Further one of the conditions which may be at issue in a military struggle within a circumscribed environment is control of trade wealth or routes. Therefore, although trade by itself is not a sufficient condition for the evolution of chiefdoms into states, extensive trade may provide the material stimulus in the presence of the other three factors.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 184-190.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 181.

What changes in economic structure may we expect to accompany trade? It appears that the controversy between the diffusionist and dependency theorists pertains most directly to this issue. A review of each perspective will provide a set of competing hypotheses.

In general the diffusionist school argues that intersocietal trade produces economic benefits. In this they agree with established wisdom in international economics. Myint summarizes the three general types of trade theories proposed by the classical economists--the "vent-for-surplus" theory, the theory of comparative advantage, and the developmental theory.²⁸ In the first case trade may provide a profitable outlet for some commodity for which the producing country has little or no domestic use, or for a surplus above domestic consumption. While the goods received in trade in this situation may improve the material well-being of the population, trade of the vent-for-surplus type may scarcely alter the basic technology and economic system. The beneficial effects would be confined to an improved standard of living. This effect would, of course, not occur if the profits of trade were monopolized by a few members of the society.

The second theory states that countries may derive a comparative advantage or saving by specializing in the production of some commodity, trading the surplus from domestic consumption for some other commodity produced elsewhere. The theory, which appears to be the basic model

²⁸ Hla Myint, "The 'Classical Theory' of International Trade and the Underdeveloped Countries," Economic Journal (June, 1958), pp. 317-37, cited in Gerald M. Meier, The International Economics of Development (New York: Harper,), p. 219.

accepted by bourgeois economists,²⁹ suggests that a greater efficiency of factor utilization is likely through trade and that, therefore, both countries can receive a favorable return from such exchange. The main motive for and explanation of trade is the "more efficient employment of the productive forces of the world".³⁰ This point of view suggests that the specialization should create expansion in the production of the traded commodity; perhaps also a shift in the division of labor might be expected as some of the population concentrate on producing the traded commodity. For example, some of the people may find it advantageous to no longer produce all their own food, clothing, etc. and instead become commercial farmers or specialized craftsmen.

Another kind of economic specialization may occur if the society occupies a middleman role in the trading system. The society which becomes substantially oriented to merchant activity may very well require more sophisticated communal structures. Therefore, the coordination problem attendant upon the middleman role may be best solved by those societies that are relatively complex to begin with or may result in increasing complexity of social structure.

Finally, trade may be developmental in that it can provide a stimulus to further dynamic economic change. Technological innovation, widened markets, expanded division of labor, and increased productivity lead to self-generating development, to improved material well-being,

²⁹ Meier, *ibid.*, Chapter 2, pp. 10-40; Paul Ellsworth, The International Economy (London: 1969), pp. 79-144.

³⁰ John Stuart Mill quoted in Meier, *ibid.*, p. 217.

and to expanded motivational horizons.³¹

Therefore, if the diffusionist perspective fits the effects of trade in my sample, at the very least we should see an improved standard of living among the people of a society and we might expect economic transformation with technological innovation, new occupations and the rest of the effects of the developmental model.

The dependency theory, on the other hand, argues that no such beneficial effects may be expected in a society which trades with an economically and technologically more advanced one. A technologically underdeveloped society usually has only raw materials or primary products to exchange for the manufactured goods of the advanced country. This system of trade may operate to exacerbate the gap between the rich society and the poor one. The most compelling reasons advanced to explain this hypothesized situation are capital flows unfavorable to the poor nations,³² and a deterioration of the terms of trade of primary products for manufactured goods.³³

In the first case, capital accumulation is retarded or even negative because the service charges and repatriated profits on foreign capital grow faster than the increase in domestic production.³⁴ The presence of large blocks of foreign capital in industries oriented to

³¹ Meier, ibid., p. 219.

³² Celso Furtado, Economic Development of Latin America (Cambridge: ath the University Press, 1970), pp. 251-52.

³³ Luis DiMarco, ed., International Economics and Development: Essays in Honor of Raul Prebisch (New York: Academic Press, 1972), pp. 5-6.

³⁴ Raul Prebisch, Change and Development--Latin America's Great Task (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), pp. 281-93.

export may have the effect of isolating this developing sector from wider societal economic processes, creating the so-called dual economy.³⁵ This will also happen if native entrepreneurs or the beneficiaries of trade do not invest in the "native" economy but instead invest solely in the export sector or, worse, do not reinvest at all, but instead consume the profits of trade in luxury goods or conspicuous consumption. If a dual economy develops, technological change and division of labor will be confined to the export sector and the profits of trade will have little effect on this material well-being of the general population. Indeed, the native sector may stagnate as persons of initiative are attracted out of indigenous productive systems into production for export.

In the second case, the purchasing power of the primary-product nation falls because the prices of their exports fall relative to manufactured goods and/or the demand for the export falls.³⁶ The theory appears to suggest that this price disparity is inherent in the nature of such trade. Prebisch agrees with the classical view that trade produces international specialization, but disagrees that the specialization into raw material supplier produces a comparative advantage.³⁷ Although Prebisch suggested that both the cause of this situation and its remedy lay within the operation of international and domestic market forces, more recent writers have stressed the role of coercion in maintaining the unfavorable position of the poor nations. In such a view trade,

³⁵ Furtado, op. cit., p. 252; Ellsworth, op. cit., p. 533.

³⁶ DiMarco, op. cit., p. 7.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

even very carefully monitored trade, is unlikely to have the effect of increasing the rate of economic development.

Therefore, if the dependency theory fits the data of this study, we expect to see one or more of the following effects: little or no capital accumulation, formation of a dual economy, technological and occupational innovation confined to the export sector, stagnation of the indigenous economy, or declining price of the export commodity relative to the cost of manufactured goods.

The changes to be expected in the stratification system with trade are implicit in the political and economic changes already suggested. Trade, by introducing new wealth into the society, seems likely to be associated with increasing inequality within the population. This will happen if the wealth from trade is monopolized by a segment of the population. If, on the other hand, nearly everyone has access to the trade goods, then increased inequality will not result. It may be that the development of trade will introduce new sources of prestige. The skills and wealth of the trader may allow such persons to rival the traditional elite whose prestige is usually based on lineage rank, on access to sacred knowledge, or on political power. If this happens, the stratification system will become more fluid even while undergoing increased inequality.

2. The Material Core. It was argued earlier that population, technology, and environment are the basic set of variables upon which social structure is built because they supply the basic energy of biological and social life. No complex social system can exist without a

large dense population and a technology to produce a surplus of energy from the environment over and above the basic needs of subsistence. Therefore it follows that large-scale alterations in the material core will be accompanied by alterations in the societal order. Let us take a hypothetical society in isolation to demonstrate how this works. If a population grows without any more efficient technology to extract energy from the environment, then one of two things will happen -- either the people will spread throughout the available land, or if spreading is impossible, environmental depletion will result. If the latter occurs, one of two things will happen--either the population will decline (through lowered fertility, increased mortality, or both) or technological innovation allowing for a greater and more efficient use of environmental resources will be developed. If the latter occurs, the population will grow and the cycle of intensification will begin again. Technological intensification beyond a certain point requires coordination of effort and may entail coercion. If the society lives in a circumscribed environment, the process of intensification will result in a more complex societal order. Conversely, population decline, environmental depletion, or technological simplification inhibit the ability of the people to support a complex social order and will result in devolutionary trends such as social breakdown or decentralization.

What effects may trade have upon the material core which will alter the direction or degree of evolutionary change in the societal order? A substantial decline or growth in population will almost surely affect the societal order. Insofar as trade produces changes in technology or environmental resources, an indirect effort upon population

would be expected. In terms of direct effects of trade upon population, two possibilities exist: 1) the slave trade might very well directly cause a substantial population decline resulting in social devolution, and 2) population migration toward routes or trade centers might occur leading to increase of population size and density in some societies.

Another possibility is that any type of contact of native peoples with Europeans may introduce new diseases or facilitate the spread of disease which may result in population decline. In fact, as all students of Native American cultural development are aware, European contact in the Americas introduced a number of diseases to which the Indians had no immunity, resulting in substantial population decline. European disease produced population decline in all three North American areas of this study. As will be seen, this population decline is a variable of major importance effecting the ways the Indians were able to adapt to trade, land expropriation, and conquest.

It seems likely that trade contact will provide both opportunity and motivation for substantial technological change, both because the native society will be exposed to some of the technological devices of the Europeans and because the expanded activity required to produce goods for trade may encourage technological innovation. However, this common-sense notion may be too simple. Trade of the "vent-for-surplus" form described earlier may be maintained through indigenous technology. Another point which is widely stressed by students of the fur trade³⁸

³⁸ Calvin Martin, Keepers of the Game (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); the studies in North American Indians in Historical Perspective, Leacock and Lurie eds., (New York: Ransom House, 1971.)

is that adoption of European manufactured goods in substitution of native manufactures may result in the loss of native skills. This creates a dependence upon continued trade, since the native person is no longer capable of providing for his/her needs. Therefore, several possibilities exist: 1) contrary to common sense, little technological change may occur in the native trading societies who continue to produce the traded commodity through traditional methods, 2) substantial technological change may occur, expanding production and allowing for a more efficient use of resources, a generally beneficial effect consistent with the diffusionist perspective, or 3) although technological change may be substantial, it creates a dependence upon further trade by replacing native skills, an effect consistent with the dependency perspective.

However, there is another aspect of the technological problem of producing goods for trade which may affect not only the degree of technological change, but also perhaps the basic nature of social structure. That aspect is efficiency. Although we tend to implicitly think of expanded production as requiring more complex techniques, more coordination of productive units, and elaboration of systems of transport and distribution, it is by no means true that the more complex is the invariably more efficient means of energy capture in any specific context.³⁹ It may instead be true that a given trade product is most efficiently extracted by simple techniques and simple social organization. For example, it has been noted that for some Indian societies involvement in the fur trade "meant that initially large agricultural villages broke up into

³⁹ David Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

small trapping and trading bands.⁴⁰ David Baerreis argues that this was so because setting and tending of traps (usually for beaver) is best done by a solitary hunter able to travel widely. This led to a more simple social structure as the cooperative social structures of agriculture and/or herd-hunting were no longer suitable.⁴¹

On the other hand, the items traded by the West Africans would seem to entail a different kind of social organization. Of the slave trade, for example, J. D. Fage notes:

the practice of enslaving men for crime or debt became more common, and was often done with the deliberate intent of selling the slave for profit...But of course the extent to which some members of any one tribe could enslave other members was limited if the tribe were not to perish. So increasingly the tendency was to secure slaves from other tribes. . .neighboring tribes were attacked with the deliberate purpose of taking captives for the slave trade.⁴²

Now the first method surely implies a fairly elaborate political and judicial system. However, the continual mounting and provisioning of war parties and the transport, "storage", and maintenance of the slaves until traded also implies a society with substantial economic surplus and perhaps a fairly differentiated political system. Therefore, the capture and trade of slaves may have lead to an increasing complexity of social system, as elites became more powerful and differentiated.

Mining of gold seems at first consideration to require somewhat less centralization, although the miners would still have to be fed by

⁴⁰ Eleanor Leacock, "Introduction," in Leacock and Lurie, op. cit., p. 19.

⁴¹ Baerreis, lecture, University of Wisconsin, 1975.

⁴² J. D. Fage, Introduction to the History of West Africa (3rd ed., Cambridge: The University Press,), p. 79.

someone else. Hunting for ivory could probably be done by small and simply-organized peoples. If this turns out to be true, the pre-existing level of social organization may be related to the kind of trade a group took up as well as changes in social structure after contact.

Finally, trade may produce substantial change in environmental resources and their utilization. Trade may alter to some extent the basic orientation of a people to their environment. I think it is true that thinking of a certain aspect of the environment not as a direct source of food, shelter, clothing, etc. or as the domain of powerful spirits, but as a resource to be sold to foreigners in exchange for other things entails a perhaps subtle but immensely significant change. However, trade not only subtracts resources from an environment; it may also add resources by introducing plants and animals or techniques allowing utilization of previously unaccessable resources. Therefore we will want to see if trade is associated with the depletion or expansion of basic resources, such as food sources, fuel, minerals, and fibers. The introduction of new crops, extinction of animal species, deforestation, discovery of mineral lodes, and so forth are all important because they alter the ability of the group to feed itself, to enter profitable trading relationships or avoid exploitative ones, to support a chiefly class, etc. We should expect depletion to be associated with population decline or migration to other regions in which resources are more abundant, unless the people are able to respond to the depletion by technological innovation allowing intensification. Expansion of basic resources should be associated with population growth and perhaps increasing complexity of the societal order.

Land Expropriation

The nature of social change hypothesized to be found in the land expropriation case follows from the basic insights of cultural ecology.⁴³ I defined land expropriation as a situation in which a native society loses its land to Europeans and is either obliged to subsist in a more restricted environment than formerly or migrates out of the contested area into a new territory. In the first instance, unless the displacement is accompanied by substantial population decline, something we may call societal impaction will occur. That is, it seems likely that the people will find inadequate resources to support themselves--I expect to see the classic instance of overpopulation and environmental depletion. As lifestyle deteriorates we might expect one or more forms of social disruption, especially if the society as a whole has no means of expanding its territory. Population decline, societal tension and factionalism, migration of individuals or families out into more favored societies, perhaps even into the European communities as dependents, personal disorganizations of various kinds--some or all of these are to be expected unless the society is able to discover some dramatically more productive techniques for survival.


In the second instance, migration of a society out of the contested area into a new territory, the direction of change will be determined by the characteristics, both physical and human, of the new environment occupied. If the society is displaced from "good land" to marginal land,

⁴³ This portion of the evolutionary perspective ("specific evolution"), see Sahlins in Sahlins and Service, op. cit., pp. 23-33, has become widely adopted in anthropology and stems out of the work of Julian Steward.

decreasing complexity should occur. This is simply because the new environment does not provide abundant enough resources to support the population and its social structure. This effect, of course, could only occur in tribes, chiefdoms, or states. Bands, by definition the most simply organized form, should be able to adapt to the requirements of even very marginal environments if that new environment is not radically different from the one they came from. If, on the other hand, a society is displaced onto good land it should be able to maintain itself or even increase in complexity. It is improbable, however, that a beneficent environment will be uninhabited. If the society has to compete with others for land, the advantage lies with the more complex society because of the greater population, more centralized political structure, and most important the potential for concerted military action. In fact, we might hypothesize that successful migration will result in increasing complexity of the societal order as leadership institutionalizes control over the military. So, for example, the trek of the Boers in South Africa displaced many tribes. It appears that the societies who were most successful in withstanding this disruption were those, such as the Zulu, who had or developed differentiated political systems and redistributive economies while simpler peoples tended to be destroyed or forced onto marginal land.⁴⁴ Therefore the migration model may look like this.

⁴⁴ Oliver and Fage, op. cit., pp. 163-64.

Figure 2: Hypothesized Effects of Land Expropriation



In short, I hypothesize that the environmental characteristics of the new territory will be a variable of great importance influencing the course of consequent change in the societal order. Marginal land will result in devolution and good land will allow chiefdoms and states to successfully gain control and then consolidate their social structure. Does the ecological perspective suggest any particular hypotheses about changes in economic structure and technology in the land expropriation case? It seems reasonable that movement into a new territory will entail substantial adaptation of these structures. A new territory entails different resources or at least a different distribution of resources. The soil, vegetation, climate, and so forth may require different techniques and different productive and distributive organization. New skills may require a new division of labor, while old skills may be obsolete. Of course, the specific kinds of economic and technological changes will be dependent on the character of the new territory.

Hypothesized changes in population and in stratification systems likewise follow from the requirements of ecological adaptation. Migration onto marginal land will produce declining population and decreased inequality while successful establishment on good land will produce stable or increasing population and maybe increased inequality. Migra-


tion may have the effect, however, of upsetting the old bases of stratification. The new land may offer opportunities for mobility, especially if the old systems of property and wealth could not be transferred in the move.

It seems to me that neither the dependency or diffusionist perspectives have much to offer in an analysis of land expropriation. The latter is not appropriate to the question and the former would probably treat this kind of contact as a kind of conquest. Accordingly, if we reasoned from this point of view we should expect land expropriation to produce the social disruption, devolution, and dependency of conquest. My view is that land expropriation is a distinct form of contact and hence will not produce the same kinds of social change as conquest. Rather I hypothesize that the ecological perspective outlined above will fit the data of land expropriation better than a more straight forward imperialist orientation.

Conquest

1. The Societal Order. In a conquest situation the direction of change in the societal order will be inverse to the evolutionary level of the native society.

Figure 3: Hypothesized Effects of Conquest



The societies which are complex at conquest will be politically subjugated by their conquerors. The native elite will be replaced, native military units will be eliminated, native judicial processes will be replaced by those of the conquerors. Probably the expropriation of wealth from the native societies will level the native society economically and reduce the range of inequality within it. The societal order of the more simply organized peoples, on the other hand, will become more complex as the people are forced into the conquest productive system as laborers and into the more complex political and judicial system the conquerors will impose. The mechanisms causing these inverse movements of societal complexity are of course, the direct and essentially conscious imposition of force--military, judicial, and economic--by the conquering society. How long the process of construction of a colony from a group of conquered peoples will take I suppose depends primarily on the coercive efficiency of the conquering society, but the process should, I would guess, take something like a generation or two.

Economically, the native society will be strongly affected by the productive processes introduced and controlled by the European conquerors. Since conquest is mainly a process of economic expropriation for the benefit of the conquering class and the mother country, economic processes--production, distribution, property, etc.--will become integrated into the markets of the home country and its international context. Accordingly, new productive activities, occupations and organizations will be developed by the conquerors. The native people will be drawn into this both voluntarily and involuntarily, but presumably at the lower levels of prosperity and authority. Probably this will mean

general impoverishment and declining material well-being of the native people.

2. The Material Core. The population of the native society will probably decline somewhat initially through war, economic disruption, demoralization and disease. How long this decline will continue and how great it will be is an empirical question this study will address. Presumably the population will stabilize and perhaps begin to grow at some point in the development of the colonial society.

Technologically, conquest should produce substantial technological change as European tools, techniques, and items of material culture spread replacing native methods. The European way of doing things may even be enthusiastically adopted by a portion of the native population, because such techniques may carry prestige or make the individual more acceptable to the Europeans.

Finally, it is difficult to predict the extent of environmental change that will accompany conquest. I hypothesize it might very well be substantial, considering we are dealing with a pre-industrial period. The resources of the native environment viewed as valuable by the conquerors, such as timber, minerals, food crops, or animals, will be exploited. European commercial agriculture may monopolize the best farm land. Therefore, it seems likely that plant and animal ecosystems will be altered; whether these hypothesized changes will result in serious environmental depletion, however, seems unlikely for these pre-19th century examples of imperialism.

In the chapters to follow the methodology of the study will be described and then the changes in the sample societies of Africa and

North America associated with trade, land expropriation, and conquest will be described in turn. The focus will be upon whether pre-colonial trade systems fit the diffusionist or dependency models better and whether the effects of trade are really, as implied by the dependency perspective, essentially similar to the other two, more obviously imperialistic forms of contact.

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

The unit of analysis in this study is the society; the population consists of all societies which existed in the test regions of Africa and North America in the historical period under consideration, c. 1500 to 1850. The final sample consists of 166 societies divided as follows:

Table II: The Sample

Type of Contact	Region		Total
Trade	West Africa/ 59 societies	N.E. North America/ 32 societies	91
Land Expropriation	South Africa/ 18 societies	S.E. United States/ 18 societies	36
Conquest	Central Africa/ 4 societies	Mexico & S.W. United States/ 35 societies	39
	81	85	166

The data consist of information about the societal order and material core of these 166 societies beginning at first contact with Europeans and throughout the period to its end. Data were, when possible, classified by 25-year intervals. The following procedures were used to develop this data base.

DELINEATION OF THE REGIONS

I wanted a large number of societies to get the analysis firmly out of the case study approach, and to obtain enough variance in pre-

and post-contact social structure to allow a test of the various propositions. Furthermore, I wanted societies from more than one continent so that the results would reflect more than one environmental and cultural context. Therefore, Africa and North America were chosen arbitrarily because I possessed more ethnographic and historical knowledge of these areas than any other. This general knowledge and preliminary analysis convinced me that three distinct types of contact experience existed and that the two continents provided regional examples of each appropriate for comparison.

The first problem was to define the regions exactly. Each region was defined so that it does not overlap with any other; therefore, a particular society can appear only once. The delineation of mutually exclusive regions provides a rough control on the confounding influence of other forms of contact and upon geographical variation. An alternative would have been to sample on the independent variable (type of contact) independent of region. For example, trade preceded or accompanied conquest and land expropriation in three of the four regions; and, of course, European conquest eventually encompassed all of the trading and land expropriated peoples. However, this latter procedure would have required a subjective judgment on which societies were most influenced by trade, and which were most influenced by the other forms of contact. Further, to make such a judgment would require more detailed advance knowledge than is reasonable to expect. The regional approach allows a closer approximation to a random sampling model.

The same reasoning led me to delineate the time periods to be considered. Roughly similar centuries were required for a minimal con-

trol on historical development in both Europe and Africa/America. For example, Ashanti traded for almost two centuries and then were conquered by the British. I might have used them as an example of both. However, that Ashanti's response to conquest might have been affected by their trading past seemed likely. So the time controls required consideration of the period before worldwide colonialism, and each society appears in only one group. The time limits observed are: trade regions 1500-1850, conquest regions 1500-1850, and land expropriation 1650-1875.

To define the regions and the population of societies within them, I began with the Atlas for Anthropology,¹ generally following culture area boundaries as indicated therein. For example, West Africa was initially defined as Culture Area IV Guinea Coast and IIIA Western Sudan as shown on the map of Africa, pp. 24-5. From the initial boundaries thus defined, the regions were finally specified as shown on the accompanying maps, pages 45-46.

The boundaries of the trading areas had to be somewhat arbitrary because trading networks do not confine themselves to societal boundaries. The final definitions were very close to the original rough outlines, however. The biggest change was to cut off the far eastern edge and northeastern extension of Nigeria. This cut 22 societies I had originally thought to research out of the population. The eastern edge was cut off at the Cross River because it seemed that area more appropriately to belong to the Cameroon trading area. The northeastern extension was cut off because it appeared to belong to the Lake Chad drainage.

¹ Robert F. Spencer & Eldon Johnson, Atlas for Anthropology (2nd ed., Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown Publishers, 1968).

The final boundaries of the land expropriation areas were altered somewhat as research showed which groups were actually displaced. South Africa had originally been defined to include modern South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. In fact the Kalahari served as a boundary against displacement, so the Namibian peoples were not really affected by the Zulu invasions and the Afrikaaner Trek. The boundary of the southeastern United States was slightly redrawn to coincide with Charles Hudson's definition of the southeastern culture area.²

The largest alteration of boundaries was in the African conquest area. I knew initially that the Portugese were the first conquerors of Africa, exerting political control in Angola and Mozambique. I thought perhaps Portugese control had extended all across Central Africa. In fact before the late Nineteenth Century Portugal actually conquered only a very small region in western Angola and controlled a fluctuating region a few miles deep either side of the Zambezi River. Thus the original region was drastically reduced to the area shown. Spanish America was arbitrarily limited to the Mexican border on the south and by the apparent limit of effective political control on the north.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE POPULATION


Using Murdock's Outline of World Cultures,³ I copied the names of

² Charles Hudson, The Southeastern Indians (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976).

³ George P. Murdock, Outline of World Cultures (5th ed., New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1975).



MAP A: Regions of North America



MAP B: Regions of Africa

all culture groups which appeared to lie within the areas on 3x5 cards; this constitutes the sampling frame of the population. Accordingly, a "society" is operationally defined as a cultural group listed by the OWC. Whenever possible the list of names in OWC was checked against maps, lists, and indices found in writings by specialists in the area. By this means, the original group of societal names was expanded. From time to time in the course of the research this file was added to, subtracted from or rearranged. I will give examples of each alteration. Additions were made if names of discrete peoples were found in my reading which were not listed in OWC. This source, found to be invaluable throughout the study, was remarkably complete except for Mexico. Here OWC was supplemented by the materials in the Handbook of Middle American Indians.⁴ In other cases additions to the "tribal file" were made when research showed that societies grouped by Murdock could appropriately be considered separately. Subtractions occurred primarily when societal names found in the reading proved, upon further study, to be alternate or archaic spellings of groups already listed. Another subtraction (actually merger) was made when I discovered that one group was apparently subject to another throughout the period of interest. Some few groups were found to not be in existence during the time period.

The major rearrangement was the moving of two groups from Central Africa to South Africa; the Ndebele and Ngoni crossed the Limpopo as a result of the political and military conditions in South Africa before 1850. Therefore, they appropriately belong with the land expropriation

⁴ Handbook of Middle American Indians, Robert Wauchope, gen. ed., 16 vols., (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976).

group, and I accordingly moved them from the Central African group to the South African group.

I decided not to draw a sample from this sampling frame, but to collect data on as much of the population as possible. I knew that some of the groups could not be documented in the historical period defined. The actual population (the knowable societies) is some portion of the sampling frame listed in my "tribal file". However, I did not and could not know in advance which societies belong to this knowable population.

In Appendix A is a listing of the names of the societies in the final sample. The following table summarizes the proportion the sample is of the total population of the "tribal file".

Table III: Coverage of the Population

	Number in population	Sample	"Unknown"	% Sample of Total
Trade Areas:				
West Africa	102	59	43	58%
N.E. America	44	32	12	73%
Land Areas:				
So. Africa	21	18	3	86%
S.E. U.S.	35	18	17	51%
Conquest Areas:				
Central Africa*	4	4	0	100%
Spanish America	46	35	11	76%

* As will be shown in Chapter 5, the Portugese actually controlled a very limited area in Central Africa before the 19th Century. As far as I can determine they actually conquered only parts of 4 cultural groups; therefore although 76 names were in the original "tribal" file, I soon realized that only four of these were suited to my analysis, i.e. were conquered in the 17th or 18th Centuries.

The "unknown" group includes that portion of the population that is unknowable using these methods plus some portion probably knowable but for the constraint of reasonable time and research effort. In any case, the portion for which some data were discovered constitutes a large majority of the population.

The reader will note from Table III that two areas, the West African trade area and the Southeastern United States land area, have sample sizes proportionately less adequate than the other areas. The latter is not a cause for concern since I am sure that the sample includes almost all of those groups who survived the impact of European land expropriation to migrate out of the area. The unknown group includes a number who became extinct very early in the period, some of whom nothing is known about except their name.⁵

After the initial stage of bibliography collection I was concerned about the relatively large proportion of "unknown" groups in the West African trade area. Therefore, I spot checked their names in the Library of Congress Catalog: Books--Subjects (the first 21 in the 1965-69 edition and the last 20 in the 1970-74 edition) for published materials. The discrepancy between the 43 reported in the table and the 41 checked by this method is that late in the data analysis process, two groups were shifted out of the sample group into the unknown group. For 29 of the 41 I found no entries of any kind; of the remaining 12, 7 had sources in other languages and 5 had one English source each. I had already checked the Journal of African History from its inception and found no material. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that something

⁵ See Hudson, *op. cit.*

over half of these 41 are unknowable using published data sources.

COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

This paper is, of course, a library study and uses standard bibliographic methods. The data collection rule that I ultimately adopted was secondary sources in English. My original plan was to begin with general reading in secondary sources and then proceed to the primary materials. In addition, I had planned to use the Human Relations Area Files. Unfortunately I found the coverage of the files to be disappointingly sparse. Instead, I found that there are so many recently published, outstanding secondary works available that I decided for my purposes use of primary materials was unnecessary and concentration on the Files would be unproductive. The books I read were written by historians, anthropologists, ethnohistorians, archaeologists, sociologists, and other social scientists. For many of these works, the authors spent years in the field or in the archives of several countries. This wealth allowed me to concentrate on extensive coverage; had I been obliged to enter the primary materials research time would have multiplied and coverage would have narrowed. Instead of nearly two years research, I would have spent some unknown multiple of that. Therefore, that this study is even possible is due to the careful compilation of basic historical information by scholars in many disciplines and in many countries. Notes were categorized by society, variable, and date and filed according to society and region.

The problem then was to organize the mass of notes into a form in which change over time could be detected. Although I had originally

thought to perform the actual analysis by coding the data into computer-readable form, I could devise no coding scheme that did not require an unacceptably large sacrifice of historical detail, cultural uniqueness, and a sense of the whole. Therefore, I purchased a large artists' tablet and summarized the information on the six variables for each society in columns representing 25-year intervals. This turned out to be a most satisfactory organization since the adequacy of data for a particular society, change in a variable over time, and comparisons between societies could all be made by scanning the columns. Accordingly, important historical events were not lost. The nominal and ordinal character of the data necessitated that numerical analysis be confined to frequency and contingency tables.

SOURCES OF ERROR

This kind of study is of necessity subject to substantial measurement error. I am not so foolish as to claim any great precision; results described in this paper can only be viewed as tentative suggestions of possible associations between variables. I do claim, however, that the broad comparative design represents a successful step beyond case study-type methods usually employed with the questions I am raising. The large sample allows a rough test of some of the generalizations that have been suggested by these studies. It also represents a methodological advance in that it does not sample on the dependent variable as is often done.

This work is subject to two categories of error. The first is the usual problem of using historical records as sociological data, com-

pounded by the fact that the majority of the societies considered were non-literate at this period. Most of the information we have is what European travelers and traders happened to record about the culturally and linguistically different peoples they encountered. Fortunately, these accounts can be supplemented from the vigorous historical traditions of most of the African peoples, from the written and oral traditions of the high civilizations of Mesoamerica, and from the findings of archaeological work, relatively extensive in North America, less extensive but no less significant in Africa. I tried to counter this problem by reading multiple accounts of the various peoples when possible. This problem of historical data is manifested in coverage of the dependent variables. The larger, more complex societies are more likely to be well-documented in the historical record than are the simple ones. Not only were the European chroniclers more likely to be interested in the complex societies; these peoples are also more likely to have useable historical traditions and to have left extensive archaeological remains. There is no remedy for this bias that I can see.

The second type of potential error lies in the lack of analogy in the contact experiences of the various peoples. Any time a comparison is made, we do so because it seems that the phenomena under consideration are sufficiently similar to warrant it. There is always the possibility that unperceived factors are sufficient to negate the perceived similarities. I, of course, believe that given my theoretical orientations the similarities in the contact experiences documented in this study are sufficient to warrant the comparisons made. However, an analogy can never be an identity. These are different peoples on different continents,

after all. All I can do is describe what appear to be the main differences in the contact experiences themselves. The reader will have to decide, according to his/her own theoretical perspective, whether these differences or others in culture, geography, etc. are sufficient to invalidate the conclusions.

The main difference between the trading areas is the fact that Europeans penetrated inland further and faster in North America than they did in West Africa. Faced by formidable African societies and disease organisms, the European traders were virtually confined to the coast until well into the nineteenth century. In North America the disease organisms operated in the opposite direction, wiping out large proportions of Indian peoples and sapping their ability to resist. Europeans were able to man trading expeditions, trading posts, and then garrisons at the leading edge of a westward-advancing frontier. The result was that the Indians were sooner and more effectively subject to European military pressure. I have dealt with this by dropping the various societies from the analysis as they lost political independence; the result is that the trading period for individual Indian societies was shorter than for the Africans.

For conquest, I have already noted the much less extensive penetration of Portugese control in Africa compared to Spanish rule in Mexico. The reasons for this are in part the same as those that allowed or prevented penetration of Europeans in the trading areas. In addition, the amount of control the Portugese authorities exerted over the peoples they did rule was less than the remarkably efficient conquest bureaucracy of the Spanish. An important reason for this was the political structure

of Portugal itself, at home and in the other colonial commitments throughout the world. At times, Zambesia slipped from effective supervision by Lisbon and the crown-appointed landlords and officials were able to go their own way. Control was more effective in Angola. I have defined this as "conquest" mainly because economic expropriation proceeded apace even when political control slipped. And, of course, the Portugese never abandoned political claims to either territory.

In the land expropriation areas, I see two main differences in the contact experiences. In both South Africa and the Southeastern United States some of the societies underwent substantial internal reorganization as population pressure on the land built in the period immediately before the massive dislocation from lands. In the United States the population pressure and the form the reorganization took were directly influenced by the presence of European settlers. In South Africa, on the other hand, the population pressure was indirectly due to European presence and the form the reorganization took was not affected by European example, as far as anyone knows.⁶ The second difference is that the migration out of the contested area was done "voluntarily" in South Africa and under direct political coercion by the United States government in the United States. The Indians removed to Oklahoma were under the military supervision of the United States and were only quasi-independent nations. Nevertheless, in both the regions groups of people left their lands under pressure, traveled to new territory, and settled

⁶ For further discussion of this see Chapter 5 and the sources cited therein, especially John Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1969).

there, using their own resources and facing hostile neighbors before and expanding Europeans behind. It was a time of crisis calling for creative leadership and extensive sociocultural adaptation. Let us now turn to the detailed analysis of each of the three types of contact experience.

CHAPTER 3: THE TRADING AREAS

INTRODUCTION

The evidence to follow is designed to answer the questions raised in Chapter I about the impact of pre-colonial European trade upon the sample of African and North American societies. The main problems are: 1) to see if trade is accompanied by political centralization and increasing complexity of the societal order, 2) to see whether the diffusionist or dependency model fits the data better, and 3) to describe the associated effects of trade on the material core. In the first portion of the chapter the system of trade established within the native societies will be described. This description includes 1) the technology for producing the items the Europeans purchased, 2) their volume and pricing, and 3) the social organization of the trade. The purpose of the description, beyond providing needed information about these societies' economic activities, is to allow an assessment of the character of the trade, the motivating factors for it, and the apparent technological, material, and developmental effects of trade in pre-industrial, pre-colonial context.

The second portion of the chapter will contain a delineation of the degree of change in the societal order and the material core of the participating native societies. Although there is substantial variance within the sample in terms of how particular societies adapted to trade, I believe the reader will agree that overall the dependency model is a somewhat better predictor of these adaptations than the diffusionist model.

DESCRIPTION OF THE TRADING SYSTEM

In the last half of the fifteenth century Europeans began a period of exploration. Although those who sailed on the ships had many motives, one of the leading ones was the expansion of commerce to those hitherto unknown peoples and regions. Although some of their preconceived notions of trade potential proved erroneous, the Europeans succeeded over the next four centuries in establishing commercial ties with a large number of people throughout the world. Accordingly, an intricate trade network developed allowing the extensive movement of resources and produce. The pivotal role of the European nations in this trade network made possible the economic and political domination of the world by Europe and populations of European origin.

The exploration of Africa was begun by the Portugese with voyages along the west coast slightly before the mid - 15th century.¹ As they proceeded along the coast, they established Elmina Fort in present-day Ghana in 1482,² and by the end of the century trading contacts had been established along the coast from Senegambia south to Elmina.³ By the mid - 16th century, English and French ships were attracted by the commercial possibilities. The English traders had succeeded in breaking the Portugese monopoly by the mid - 1580's, and by 1600 the Dutch had

¹ Walter Rodney, A History of the Upper Guinea Coast 1545-1800 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 71.

² Ivor Wilks, The Northern Factor in Ashanti History (Legon?: Institute of African Studies, University College of Ghana, 1961), p. 10.

³ Martin Klein, "Sine-Saloum 1847-1914: The Traditional States and the French Conquest" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of History, University of Chicago, 1964), p. 48.

joined the English and French.⁴

Although we associate Africa with the slave trade, in fact for the first century or so this trade was very diverse. For example, at the end of the 16th century, the region later known as the Slave Coast (modern Togo, Dahomey, and W. Nigeria) provided a regular supply of native cloth, peppers, and ivory.⁵ The Vai people of modern Liberia traded ivory, gold, camwood, rice, peppers, mats, fruits, and animals.⁶ The peoples of the Senegambian Coast and its hinterland sold gold, beeswax, gum arabic, cattle and hides, and ivory.⁷ The peoples of Ghana (the Gold Coast) produced gold and ivory also.⁸ The Portugese served as transporters, buying cloth, slaves, and other items in Benin and selling them in Ashanti.⁹ But from the very beginning the Europeans bought people -- slaves -- as well. As time passed, this trade surpassed and partially replaced all others. Not all areas were equally

⁴ Svend Holsoe, "The Cassava-leaf People: an Ethnohistorical Study of the Vai People" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1967), pp. 101-102; Rodney, op. cit., pp. 122-51.

⁵ Colin Newbury, The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 17.

⁶ Holsoe, op. cit., p. 103.

⁷ Philip Curtin, Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975), pp. 197-224.

⁸ K. A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti (Human Relations Area Files, FE12 Twi), p. 79.

⁹ Ivor Wilks, "Land, Labor, and Capital and the Forest Kingdom of Asante: a Model of Early Change," Evolution of Social Systems, ed. J. Friedman, and M. J. Rowlands (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978), p. 518; J. K. Fynn, Asante and Its Neighbors (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 9.

sources of supply nor were all other commodities completely supplanted. Nevertheless, in time all other trade became secondary to the increasingly specialized production of human beings for shipment to the Western Hemisphere. Only with the suppression of the slave trade in the mid-19th century did other items of trade, especially palm oil and peanuts,¹⁰ dominate commercial contacts. Thus in the four hundred years of the overseas slave trade, at least 11 million people were sold (or stolen) out of Africa, perhaps 7 million of those from the area of this study.¹¹ In spite of the fact that the European traders were largely confined to the coast and the large majority of the African people never laid eyes on a European, all of the 59 societies in this study were affected to some degree. Only a few of the most remote did not themselves participate in trade, but these peoples were faced with intermittent raids in which kin folk would be taken away, never to return. Although these raids by themselves probably had no particular effect on political and economic structure, the associated sense of insecurity that must have developed undoubtedly had subtle effects on the people. The large proportion of the sample is the group of societies for whom the production and sale of slaves or other products became the mainstay of the

¹⁰ A. J. H. Latham, Old Calabar, 1600-1891: The Impact of the International Economy Upon a Traditional Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 56-57; Charlotte Quinn, Mandingo Kingdoms of the Senegambia: Traditionalism, Islam, and European Expansion (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), p. 9.

¹¹ This minimum was derived by adding 15% to Curtin's estimate of 9.56 million slave imports for mortality in transit and multiplying by .64 for my estimate of the proportion of the total Atlantic slave trade which came from West Africa. The estimate does not take account of mortality before shipment. Philip Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), pp. 106-107, 122, 129, 150, 157, 166, 168, 200, 211, 258, 277, 279, 280.

of the political economy.

In North America, the trade between Europeans and Indians was always very specialized. The Indians sold furs and sometimes food to provision the European traders. These commercial contacts began in the first quarter of the 16th century. The Norman, Breton, and English fishing fleets that plied the coast from the early part of that century learned that the Indians along the shore would trade fur pelts for metal tools, and by the time Jaques Cartier arrived in the mouth of the St. Lawrence in 1534, the Micmac along the shore held up furs on sticks to attract the French to trade.¹² For at least three hundred years the trade between Europeans and Indians in the northeastern part of North America was organized around fur -- beaver primarily. The Indians' security and social organization became tied to beaver and were affected by the supply, distribution, and habits of that animal. As each society entered the trade system, acquisition, preparation, and transport of the pelts came to occupy a substantial portion of the time of the productive adults. Thus, each society became integrated into the international market until sooner or later one of two things happened -- the society was destroyed and its people dispersed or their resource base, the land and its animals, disappeared and they became economically and politically dependent peoples. For some of the societies this process

¹² Ted Brassler, "The Coastal Algonkians," North American Indians in Historical Perspective, ed. Eleanor B. Leacock and Nancy O. Lurie (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 66; Alfred Goldsworthy Bailey, The Conflict of European and Eastern Algonkian Cultures, 1504-1700: A Study in Canadian Civilization (New Brunswick Museum Monographs; Sackville, New Brunswick: The Tribune Press, 1937,) p. 6.

was completed in two generations; in others it took two or more centuries.

Therefore, the first somewhat surprising conclusion is that the net cast by the European trade system caught, or at least touched, all the peoples in this study from the Niger bend to the Canadian prairie. The inter-dependence among peoples so characteristic of the modern world has been in the process of developing for a very long time.

The Technology of Export Production

The second surprising conclusion is that the processes of production were almost entirely indigenous and that these processes did not undergo substantial change either at all or until quite late in the period. Let us see how this was so by first describing the production of slaves and other commodities in Africa and then the production of furs in North America.

1. Slaves. The production of slaves for sale ultimately relies on force, either warfare or the legitimized force of the judicial system, such as condemnation for crime or servitude to repay debt. Since no one enters slavery without compulsion, the technologies of slave production are military strategy and judicial proceeding. Then the captives may be sold to slave merchants from other societies or directly to the European ships. Many of the slaves who were shipped from Africa had passed through several hands until ultimately reaching the coast. It appears from my data that as the centuries of the slave trade proceeded, the major source of supply came from further and further inland.

Of the 59 African societies in my sample, 46 (78%) are explicitly stated to have sold slaves while the remaining 13 (22%) are mentioned

primarily as victims or said to be opposed to the slave trade. The latter group, those opposed to the slave trade, consists of only 4 societies (7%).¹³ From my research I have identified four ways by which the 46 "seller" societies obtained the slaves they sold: war, raid, judicial proceeding, and purchase from another society. The difference between war and raid is that former is officially sanctioned combat in pursuit of primarily political ends (e.g. the acquisition of territory) while the second, often carried out by small groups of raiders, is designed primarily to acquire captives for internal use or sale. Judicial proceeding includes all internal means of generating captives, such as condemnations for crime, pawning for debt or tribute payments.

In a Sierra Leone sample of liberated slaves of 1850, 34% were enslaved in war, 30% were taken in raids, and 18% were condemned.¹⁴ In my sample the following frequencies were found:

Table IV: Means of Enslavement

War	13
Raid	30
Judicial Proceeding	25
Purchase	17

Many of the 46 used multiple ways to acquire captives.

¹³ They are Balanta, Diola, Futa Toro, and Malinke/Bambuhu. This is not to say that they never sold any slaves, but rather that the society or its leaders rejected the idea of slave trading and that slaves were sold only very occasionally if at all. Rodney, *op. cit.*, p. 109; Curtin, *Economic Change . . .*; p. 183.

¹⁴ Philip Curtin, "The Atlantic Slave Trade 1600-1800," *History of West Africa*, ed. J. F. A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), I, 253-54.

Although war was the least frequently found means of enslavement, it produced greater numbers of captives at one time than the others. War of course, is a means used primarily by the larger polities, often in the course of imperial expansion and this resulted in hundreds or even thousands of captives.

Although over half of the seller societies used the judicial system to produce captives for sale, it is obvious that this means is limited by the need of the rulers to maintain political legitimacy and by the processes of demographic replacement. Rodney argues persuasively that the slave trade saw a corruption of the judicial process as many more offenses became recognized and punishable by enslavement. In many of the societies he studied (the upper Guinea Coast, especially the modern countries of Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone) judicial process was in the hands of the male secret society, Poro. As the ranks of this group came to be dominated by men whose wealth derived from the slave trade, enslavement became the punishment for more and more trivial offenses.¹⁵ On the other hand, although many of the societies had or developed institutions of domestic slavery or indenture, all or most of these had rules prohibiting the sale of persons born within the society and guaranteeing them certain rights. These rules applied to native-born slaves as well as to freemen. Meillassoux notes this prevented the breeding of slaves for sale.¹⁶ Although presumably these rules might have been ignored or

¹⁵ Rodney, op. cit., pp. 106-108.

¹⁶ Claude Meillassoux, "Introduction," The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa, ed. Claude Meillassoux (International African Institute Series; London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 54.

discarded, my data does not indicate that this indeed happened.

Therefore, the other three means, war, raid, and purchase, were much more important than intrasocietal processes in generating the millions of captives who were shipped from West Africa during the period. It is to war and raid that we look for the bulk of the captives; the technology of production is accordingly military techniques. In some areas the use of direct force was enhanced by the import of firearms from Europe. Ashanti armies used guns in their wars of imperial expansion,¹⁷ and Ijo war-canoes were outfitted with armament during the 18th century.¹⁸ However, Isichei believes whatever advantage this offered was primarily psychological, an advantage subject to diminishing returns. Further, other important suppliers of slaves, such as the Bambara during their imperial wars, used traditional armament.¹⁹ Were it possible to calculate a correlation between the number of guns imported and the number of slaves exported, the result would be positive but low. Usually established military practices were sufficient to acquire the captives.

The transport of slaves to the coast took place by canoe or on foot. The canoes used by some societies for raid and transport do represent a technological change of some magnitude. These canoes, used mainly in the Niger Delta, were much larger than those which had been made

¹⁷ Fynn, op. cit., pp. 153-54.

¹⁸ Elizabeth Isichei, The Ibo People and the Europeans: the Genesis of a Relationship to 1906 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), pp. 51-52.

¹⁹ Curtin, Economic Change . . ., p. 325.

before the slave trade. Owned by individual trading families, they were armed, manned by household dependents or slaves and were large enough to transport 20-30 slaves in addition to the large crew of rowers/raiders.²⁰

The other means of transport, walking, was of course no innovation. Trading caravans had been a feature of African trade for centuries. Although it took a long time for a caravan of slaves organized in the far interior to reach the coast, these caravans were fairly efficient in economic terms because each slave, besides being self-propelled, could carry his/her own food and a load of other objects (such as ivory, cloths) for sale. The merchant societies (called herein Dyula) who dominated the trade of the interior organized these caravans and provisioned them with food and other manufactures produced in their own villages or acquired in trade along the way.²¹

2. Other African Trade Commodities. A consideration of the production of some of the other items exported from Africa—gold, ivory, forest products, and foodstuffs—once more shows that almost all were produced throughout the period by techniques developed indigenously and probably prior to European contact. In some cases the organization of production or transport was altered to produce greater supply, but the techniques of production were substantially native. African gold was the first lure that attracted European traders along the coast. The Portugese trading fort at Elmina (modern Ghana) was built in the

²⁰ Isichei, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

²¹ Curtin, Economic Change . . ., pp. 169-73.

late 15th century to gain access to the gold produced in the Akan states.²² Although the volume of gold produced was substantial, the gold fields are geographically quite restricted. Of 14 societies specifically mentioned in the literature as traders of gold, nine were probably middlemen in this trade and not actual producers. There were two main sources of gold, the Ghanian forest/Volta valley and the Bambuhu region of the upper Senegal river drainage.²³ It was in search of the latter that led the Portugese on an expedition into the interior in the early 17th century.²⁴

In general the first European traders were only marginally familiar with the sources of gold and the techniques used in its production. Three mining techniques were used in the gold-producing regions—panning, surface mining and shaft construction. The shafts, although not deep by modern standards represent a fairly sophisticated use of technology, but one which was indigenous, not learned from Europeans. The shafts, timber-reinforced with horizontal tunnels running off, ran to around 65 feet in Bambuhu²⁵ and to 200 feet in Ashanti.²⁶ In the Akan area (Southern Akan & Ashanti) from at least the 17th century on, any person could pan or surface mine with the general rule that gold

²² Ivor Wilks, "The Mossi and Akan States, 1500-1800." Ajayi and Crowder, op. cit., p. 360; Curtin, Economic Change . . .,

²³ See maps in Wilks, ibid., p. 361, and Curtin, ibid., pp. 200-

²⁴ Curtin, ibid., p. 199.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 203.

²⁶ Wilks, "Land Labor, and Capital. . .", p. 520.

dust was the property of the finder and nuggets were turned over to the central government.²⁷ This work took place in the agricultural off-season. The deep mines, organized and controlled by the paramount chiefs, utilized slave labor.²⁸ The development of gold mining in probably the 15th century allowed the Southern Akan peoples, including the proto-Ashanti, to purchase slaves in the north. These slaves contributed a supplement to the labor force necessary to expand the agricultural system. Thus mining allowed an expanded labor force, an expanded food supply and then more mining.²⁹ This process of intensification it should be emphasized, preceded European contact.

In Bambuhu, on the other hand, all of the mining operations were carried out by groups of kinsmen under the general direction of a hereditary "chief of the goldfield." As in Ashanti, the people did this work during the slack season of the agricultural cycle. The gold each group found could be sold to Dyula merchants passing through. Therefore the extraction of gold entailed practically no special costs, and the scattered thin deposits could be made to yield an important supplement to the farmer's income.³⁰ Therefore, gold mined for sale to Europeans

²⁷ Kwame Y. Daaku, "Trade and Trading Patterns of the Akan in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in Meillassoux, op. cit., pp. 171-72.

²⁸ Wilks, "The Mossi and Akan. . .," Ajayi and Crowder, op. cit., pp. 358-59; Fynn, op. cit., p. 19; Madeline Manoukian, Akan and Ga-Adangme Peoples of the Gold Coast (Ethnographic Survey of Africa: West Africa, part 1; London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1950), p. 18.

²⁹ Wilks, "Land, Labor, and Capital. . .," p. 520.

³⁰ Curtin, Economic Change. . ., pp. 202-205.

did not entail any particular technological change nor alteration in the division of labor.

Ivory, reported as sold by 19 societies, was acquired by traditional hunting methods throughout most of the period. Firearms became widely used in elephant hunting only in this century. Elephant hunting is a very dangerous activity, and therefore it was pursued by only a few persons in any given society. The means used were pitfalls, fire circles, spear or poisoned arrows; hunting was done by a single individual or small groups.³¹ In some of the societies, hunters formed a special caste whose activities were associated with various taboos.³² In many of the hierarchial societies the chief or king received in tribute one tusk from every elephant killed in his territory. Ivory apparently had a symbolic or religious association with the political elite prior to European contact; therefore the sale of ivory was controlled by these elites.³³ Both the large bush and small forest elephants and the hippopotamus were killed for their "teeth" as the Europeans called the tusks; since tusks were sold by weight, the huge tusks of the bush elephant brought the best price.³⁴

³¹ Rennie Bere, The African Elephant (New York: Golden Press, 1966), pp. 90-92.

³² Joseph Henry, L'ame d'un Peuple Africain; Les Bambara, leur vie Psychique, Ethique, Sociale, Religieuse (Human Relations Area Files, FA8 Bambara), p. 140, 240; Robert Rattray, Ashanti Proverbs (The Primitive Ethics of a Savage People) (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1916), pp. 64-65.

³³ Kwame Daaku, Trade and Politics on the Gold Coast, 1600-1720 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 27 for one example.

³⁴ Bere, op. cit., p. 33; Rodney, op. cit., p. 157.

The forest, which stretches in a band of varying widths just inland from the coastal swamps from Guinea to Nigeria, provided several products of commercial value to the African peoples. The three of greatest significance during the period of this study are kola, camwood, and oil palm. All grew wild.

Kola was undoubtedly the most important of the three throughout the period from the African point of view. The nuts were greatly in demand among the Moslem peoples of the Savannah and desert regions to the North. Production is apparently simply a collection process since the trees grew wild and fruited abundantly. Although the nut has several uses, including ceremonial and political ones, its most noteworthy feature is that when chewed it acts as a stimulant, one moreover not forbidden in Moslem religious practice.³⁵ Enormous quantities were transported north from the forest regions, often through several middlemen, and exchanged for several products, including slaves, which could be kept (females usually) or sold (males usually) to the European slavers. Twelve societies are specifically mentioned in my notes as producers or traders of kola in two areas: modern Ghana and inland, and upper Guinea (Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia) and inland. Production and trade of this item became the economic mainstay of the commercial system of the Akan region of Ghana, especially during the time of Ashanti Empire. Ivor Wilks has shown that the demand for kola rose sharply with the expansion of Moslem influence in the early 19th century, and that Ashanti commercial policy encouraged development of this

³⁵ Fynn, op. cit. pp. 5-6; Rodney, ibid., p. 206.

profitable trade in place of the declining slave trade.³⁶ The Europeans, of course, did not consume kola, but the Portugese did transport kola by sea from the upper Guinea region north to Gambia River region.³⁷ However, in spite of its great commercial significance, there is no evidence that kola production techniques were altered throughout the period.

Camwood was harvested mainly in the 17th century, in the Sierra Leone region. This tree, which yields dyes, was purchased by the English for their textile industry. In my notes four societies are mentioned as being extensive suppliers of this material, to the virtual exclusion of slaving, at least during the century mentioned.³⁸ Although I do not know whether the people utilized camwood in their domestic economies, its production for trade did not entail any dramatic change in social life. The trees were felled, barked, and transported to the rivers where they were floated down to the coast or loaded on sloops sent by English or mulatto traders.³⁹ This entailed a substantial labor input, but like gold mining, it was done by the farmers only in their agricultural off-season.

The oil palm became an important item of international commerce in the nineteenth century, especially the second half, and remains an

³⁶ Ivor Wilks, "Ashanti Policy towards the Hausa Trade in the Nineteenth Century," Meillassoux, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-132.

³⁷ Rodney, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-207.

³⁸ Rodney, *ibid.*, pp. 162-67.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 160-61.

important export today. The oil, obtained from the fruit (both pulp and seed kernel), is a nutritious food and is used for making soap. The oil palm is a succession species in areas of high rainfall, seeding itself on land that has been cleared of virgin forest. Furthermore it rapidly begins to bear fruit (5 years).⁴⁰ Thus land which has been cleared for agriculture and left to fallow often grows up to dense stands of this valuable tree. Since shifting cultivation is the standard agricultural technique in these tropical regions, the oil palm must have been viewed as one of nature's gifts to man.

As the need for commercially produced oils grew in industrializing Europe, a trade in oil developed. The oil was produced as follows: after climbing the tree and breaking loose the large clusters of fruit (2-6 bunches per tree per year),⁴¹ the workers would extract the oil by some combination of pounding, boiling and squeezing. The kernels were often sold whole. The barrels of oil had then to be transported either by humans on foot or, more commonly, by canoe to the coastal ports.⁴²

It is not hard to see that the labor requirements for this kind of production were great, and the eleven societies who are mentioned in my notes as oil producers met this requirement in one of two ways:

⁴⁰ Robert McC. Netting, "Maya Subsistence: Mythologies, Analogies, Possibilities," The Origins of Maya Civilization, ed. Richard E. W. Adams (School of American Research Advanced Seminar Series; Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977), pp. 306-307; Oxford Book of Food Plants (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 20.

⁴¹ Oxford Book of Food Plants, ibid.

⁴² Isichei, op. cit., pp. 68-69.

independent households and plantations. A single household could produce enough oil for its own food needs and perhaps a small number of barrels for sale. However, such a household could not produce large amounts of oil. Yet much of the tens of thousands of tons of oil exported from Africa each year in the second half of the nineteenth century was produced by independent peasants and sold in small quantities to merchants who brought their canoes up the river systems, collecting oil as they went. Another way the increased demand for oil was met, however, was through the development of oil plantations by wealthy merchants, the labor being provided by their dependents and slaves. Thus as the export slave trade declined, captives from the interior who "piled up" in the coastal trading societies were profitably employed for their owners in extracting oil and manning the trade canoes which transported it.⁴³

The final group of items in the African trade inventory to be considered consists of a variety of foodstuffs. The European traders had to buy food not only to feed themselves, but also to provision the slave ships for their Atlantic crossing. These foods—millet, maize, rice, yams, peanuts, fish, and livestock—are specifically mentioned as being sold to Europeans by twenty-two of the societies, either as producers or middlemen. This number includes 13 of the 18 coastal societies. Another 9 societies in the far interior traded foodstuffs

⁴³ Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, "L'exportation de L'huile de Palme au Dahomey: XIXe Siecle," Meillassoux, *op. cit.*, p. 123; A. J. H. Latham, "Currency, Credit, and Capitalism on the Cross River in the Pre-colonial Era," *Journal of African History*, XII, No. 4 (1971), pp. 599-605; P. C. Lloyd, "The Itsekiri in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of African History*, IV, No. 2 (1963), pp. 207-231.

in the trade networks which existed in that region. These networks were traveled by many groups including the Dyula merchant communities who organized the caravans of slaves and ivory, some of which eventually were sold to Europeans. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to count the full twenty-two, fifty-three per cent of the sample, as participating provisioners in the Afro-European trade system. With a few exceptions these foods came out of the surplus produce of individual peasant households. In one instance a favorable set of environmental conditions for yam growing, combined with their technical skill, social cohesion and (importantly) access to the coastal markets down the Cross River allowed the Northeastern Ibo to greatly expand at the expense of their less fortunate neighbors.⁴⁴ In Ibibio and Fanti, and probably elsewhere, wealthy traders established large scale agricultural operations worked by slaves. Although Latham argues these operations in the former did not really constitute capitalist production,⁴⁵ Daaku's description of the provisioning system of certain Fanti merchants leaves no doubt that it indeed was capitalist or commercial agriculture.⁴⁶

Peanut production, which developed in the second half of the nineteenth century primarily in the Senegambian region, is analogous to palm oil. The peanut, introduced into Africa from the New World,

⁴⁴ G. I. Jones., "Ecology and Social Structure among the Northeastern Ibo," Africa, XXXI (1961), pp. 117-134.

⁴⁵ Latham, "Currency, Credit, and Capitalism. . .," p. 604.

⁴⁶ Daaku, Trade and Politics. . ., pp. 111, 120-26.

came to be grown and exported to Europe as a source of oil.⁴⁷ The effects upon the traditional Senegambian agricultural system, however, were more extensive than in the case of the oil palm. The peasant households and Dyula communities who began to grow peanuts for sale to the Europeans were participants in a transformation of the system from basically subsistence to a commercial one.⁴⁸ The peasants became part of the international economy, something which had not happened to them during the slave trade.

We have seen that although the slave trade with its peculiar problems of production dominated the trading system, many other items were produced as well. For the most part this expansion of production was effected through techniques and productive organizations already present in the various societies. The changes which did occur—large war canoes, firearms, plantation-like productive organization—were not widespread enough to create a productive revolution in most societies. Only in the few Niger Delta societies where all three are found together was the overall technological impact substantial. In most societies native skills and productive groups persisted throughout the period. Therefore, the conclusion is that the trade in West Africa produced only minimal changes in the technologies of the native Africans. In technological terms, trade was not developmental nor did it result in a specialized labor system as suggested by the idea of comparative

⁴⁷ Martin Klein, "Social and Economic Factors in the Muslim Revolution in Senegambia," Journal of African History, XIII, No. 3 (1972), pp. 419-441; Curtin, Economic Change. . ., pp. 14-15.

⁴⁸ Klein, ibid.

advantage. Rather the technological effects of West African trade are best seen in terms of the "vent-for-surplus" idea; the trade allowed disposal of goods which were naturally abundant without demanding special investments, labor costs, or technological innovation. This point has been made for the slave trade by Gemery and Hogendorn,⁴⁹ but it appears to apply even better to the other items traded. It was not until the development of peanut and oil palm production at the very end of the period that trade produced the specialization suggested by the comparative advantage idea. Later we will ask whether this "vent-for-surplus" was nevertheless beneficial by improving the standard of living of the people.

3. Fur Production. The extent of technological change and of productive activities among the Indians who participated in the fur trade was somewhat larger than that associated with African commerce. The Indian trappers became specialized producers of fur in the European system of clothing manufacture. Although most Indians continued to produce all or most of their food, shelter, and means of transport, participation in trade produced the materials for clothing, basic tools, and weapons for the Indian people. Therefore, it seems appropriate to think of the fur trade in terms of the theory of comparative advantage outlined above. At the same time, the fur trade was almost totally non-developmental in its effects. Indeed the integration of the Indian people into international markets as specialized hunters in effect "froze" them into place technologically. This had serious

⁴⁹ Henry A. Gemery and Jon Hogendorn, "The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Tentative Economic Model". Journal of African History, XV, No. 2 (1974), pp. 223-246.

long-term effects.

Before demonstrating these points by a description of the procedures of fur production, some general observations about technological change in the fur trading societies may be helpful. Every student of North American Indian culture knows that the skills of metallurgy—smelting, forging, and alloying—were unknown at the time of contact. Native copper was pounded into tools, but otherwise tools were made from stone, bone and wood. Therefore, the metal tools offered in trade by the Europeans were eagerly sought by the Indian peoples and were the single most important stimulus to the fur trade. All of the Indian peoples traded furs in order to obtain these metal tools as well as the other trade goods (decorative objects, cloth, liquor). Knives, axes, guns and metal pots became standard equipment in every Indian society. In turn it is commonly argued that these items made the capture of fur-bearers much easier, thus stepping up the cycle of trade.

Now the technological advantage of a metal axe over a stone one lies not only in its efficiency, but also in its durability. A stone axe (knife, arrowhead, etc.) can be made very sharp; however, it loses its edge faster, is more difficult to resharpen, and is more easily broken than its metal counterpart. Similarly the metal cooking pot, needle, fishhook, etc. were more durable than the native items they replaced.

There are two other factors which explain this rapid technological change: defense and convenience. Although guns produced in the early part of the period were technically imperfect (they were hard to load,

they did not always fire, they sometimes blew up), they gave an initial advantage to their owners in combat. Therefore society after society needed to obtain them to defend themselves against their enemies. A final stimulus to the acquisition of trade goods was their convenience. Time not spent in chipping or grinding stone, hafting tools, making pottery, sewing skins with awl and sinew, hammering copper, and so forth, could be used for a variety of other activities—e.g. religious ritual, art, politics, or leisure. In many cases the technological changes I have been describing produced a great efflorescence of the decorative arts and of religion. The Indians traded furs for European trade goods for the same reason we buy manufactured items instead of making them ourselves—it releases our time for other activities. In addition, the Indians, like modern Americans, traded for things they could not themselves produce simply because they wanted or liked them (e.g. compare beads and silver to coffee and chocolate).

In the process of the technological transformation some native skills fell into disuse and were forgotten. Stone tool and pottery manufacture seem to have been the biggest casualties in the fur region. Almost every analyst of the fur trade makes the point that the Indians became dependent on the trade goods, necessitating continued participation in trapping. Most even imply that the substitution of trade items for those of native manufacture represented a net loss for Indian culture, making them less authentically "Indian" than before and less independent. I agree they were less independent both individually and societally, but there my agreement ends. Economic change inevitably entails changing patterns of production and trade and new

interdependencies. For example, today we are all, individually and societally, "dependent" upon the industrial system and the international market. Although some individuals are trying to lessen that dependence through conscious life-style choices, most people do not know the survival skills of the pre-industrial era.

This economic and technological interdependence is not by itself problematic. Interdependence becomes "dependence" when trade resources run low or when some groups monopolize the terms of production or trade so to lead to the impoverishment of other groups. The real "dependence" of the Indian people came, not from the fur trade, but when, at the end of the period, their land base was so reduced by European settlement that they could not support themselves at all.

As stated previously, many kinds of animal fur were traded to the Europeans, varying by region and over time. From the woodlands of the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence drainage and north, came the most valued pelt, beaver; but otter, mink, marten, fisher, bear and fox were also trapped for sale. In the southern part of the trading region where beaver were not as numerous, deer skins were the most common trade commodity, but muskrat, lynx, raccoon were also common along with a few beaver, otter and fox. In the western regions buffalo robes were sold. In general as time went on beaver became scarce and other furs were substituted. This is especially true of muskrats, which constituted

the bulk of traded furs in the 19th century.⁵⁰

Up until the end of the eighteenth century when steel traps became widely used, beaver were hunted in their lodges with axe, club, knife and net. The method used in winter hunting, when the prime pelts were obtained, was to walk out on the frozen pond to the lodge, breaking it open and either reaching in and clubbing the beaver or capturing the animals in nets rigged around the opening as they attempted to escape. They could also be killed, I presume with arrow or spear, as they came to their breathing holes. In the other seasons of the year, the procedure was to break the dam and kill the exposed animals as the water drained away.⁵¹ These methods were apparently the same as those used in the precontact period, except that early observers thought the metal axes and other weapons made hunting easier.⁵² It was not until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that steel traps, often baited with castoreum, a substance extracted from female beavers which had an

⁵⁰ For example in 1816, 20,000 muskrat pelts were traded at northeastern Illinois posts compared to 5400 of all other kinds put together. David Baerreis, Indians of Northeastern Illinois (American Indian Ethnohistory: North Central and Northeastern Indians; New York: Garland Press, 1974), p. 166. For the upper Mississippi valley as a whole in 1836, muskrats constituted 95% of the furs shipped. Rhoda Gilman, "The Last Days of the Upper Mississippi Fur Trade," People and Pelts: Selected Papers, 2nd North American Fur Trade Conference, Winnipeg, 1970 (Winnipeg: Peguis Publishers, 1972), p. 104.

⁵¹ Thomas E. Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 1686-1776 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), pp. 27-28; W. Vernon Kinietz, The Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 1615-1760, p. 237.

⁵² Nicholas Denys in Harold McGee, ed., The Native Peoples of Atlantic Canada: a History of Ethnic Interactions (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), p. 39; Calvin Martin, "The European Impact on the Culture of Northeastern Algonquin Tribe: An Ecological Interpretation," William and Mary Quarterly, series 3, XXXI (January, 1974), pp. 9, 24.

attractive scent, came to be used.⁵³ Lists of trade goods assembled by Quimby do not include traps until the early nineteenth century.⁵⁴

Other animals were hunted variously depending on the habits of the animal, its abundance, and the accepted technology of the moment. Deer were hunted either collectively, with the surround or drive methods, or individually, with bow or gun. Bear were trapped or shot. The small game—mink, muskrats, marten, etc.—were hunted before the era of steel traps by a variety of native methods such as snares, nets, or cages.⁵⁵ The season for hunting was, of course, fall and winter because of the quality of fur at that time of year, but also because of the temperament of the animals at various phases of their reproductive cycle. All of these techniques, except steel traps, are adaptations of indigenous hunting knowledge and skills to production for trade.

Similarly, the social organization of hunting varied by resource availability and technology. Two kinds of hunting groups were found—a group of men or individual families. I have evidence for the former type for the Micmac, Ottawa, Neutral, Montagnais, and Iroquois among the woodland peoples and, of course, communal hunting was the standard procedure among buffalo-hunting peoples. The buffalo robe trade is

⁵³ Norton, op. cit., p. 28; Arthur Gast, "The Impact of the Fur Trade Upon Chippewa-American Culture and Education" (unpublished PhD. dissertation, School of Education, Indiana University, 1974), pp. 52, 194.

⁵⁴ George Quimby, Indian Culture and European Trade Goods: The Archaeology of the Historic Period in the Western Great Lakes Region (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), pp. 64-67.

⁵⁵ Norton, op. cit., p. 28; Kinitz, op. cit., pp. 20, 238.

only a small and late part of the entire fur trade, however. In the woodlands groups of men were organized in situations where communal hunting methods were beneficial or when long distance travel was required to trap or trade. As the game populations declined and traps and guns became widely used, communal hunting by groups of men were replaced by the family winter hunting camp(s). The Montagnais, who were trapper/traders for a longer time period than any other group in my sample, developed family-owned trapping territories to stabilize and regulate access to the fur resource.⁵⁶

The Iroquois were faced with a unique situation which favored the communal hunting group. First, fur animals became very scarce in their territory after about 1640;⁵⁷ however, since they were an agricultural people settled in fairly large semi-permanent villages and since their territory occupied a strategic position in economic and political terms, they chose not to migrate into regions possessing fur animals. Rather groups of warrior/hunters would travel from Iroquois country into areas many hundreds of miles away to trap, trade, or raid for furs. These expeditions would last for months or even

⁵⁶ Eleanor Leacock, "The Montagnais-Naskapi Band," Cultural Ecology: Readings on the Canadian Indians and Eskimos, comp. Bruce A. Cox (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), p.

⁵⁷ George T. Hunt, The Wars of the Iroquois: A Study in Inter-tribal Trade Relations (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940), pp. 33-34.

years.⁵⁸ The women, children, and elder men would remain at home seeing to the ongoing farming, craft, and political affairs of the League.

On the other hand, hunting by individual families was probably always more common and it became the dominant form of productive organization with declining game populations and technological change. The precontact seasonal round of the northern peoples surely included the dispersal of people into such groups during the winter, a time of resource scarcity. The techno-environmental requirements of the fur trade fit nicely into this pattern. However, it is debatable whether such groupings were present before the fur trade among the buffalo-hunting/farming peoples of the southwest part of the region of this study. It is difficult to see why groups such as the Illinois and Miami would undergo the discomfort and isolation of a winter hunting camp when they had large quantities of corn and dried buffalo meat at home in their towns. Probably Blasingham's suggestion that individual hunters would go out occasionally in the winter to hunt to supplement the dried meat supply is accurate.⁵⁹ However, the fur trade required a greater emphasis on winter trapping. It seems likely that the desire for trade goods led the people to spend greater amounts of time in the hunting camps. Women were needed at this time to dress the skins and so hunter/husband and preparer/wife made an efficient productive group.

⁵⁸ Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28; Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), p. 89; A. F. C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca (New York: Vintage Books, 1972) p. 28.

⁵⁹ Emily Blasingham, "The Illinois Indians, 1634-1800: A Study in Depopulation" (unpublished PhD. Dissertation, Dept. of Anthropology, Indiana University, 1956), p. 52.

The preparation of the skins was an important part of the process, because the trade value of the pelts depended in part on the skill with which the stretching and tanning were done.⁶⁰ The Indian women, either in camp or in the village, did the work of fleshing, stretching, preserving with various substances, and perhaps shaving and softening. The most valuable beaver skins were those which had undergone another process—being stitched together and worn, fur side in, as a robe for approximately a year. This process wore off the longer outer hairs of the pelt, leaving the felted short inner hairs which European hat-makers and hatwearers found so stylish.⁶¹ This same process, coincidentally, led the Indians to question the good sense of a people who would give away a great number of valuable tools for a few old, worn-out skins.⁶² The immense numbers of pelts that were traded, of course, meant that this last process could have been applied to only a small number of skins.

Traditional skin preparation techniques apparently persisted throughout the period because they worked well, capable of producing

⁶⁰ For example "Indian Drest" deerskins brought more than three times as much as ordinary ones in Pennsylvania in the mid-eighteenth century. Jennings, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² For examples of the native point of view see the Relation (1634) of Father LeJeune, quoted in Zimmerman, "The Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," Delaware Indian Symposium (Anthropological series, no. 4; Harrisburg, Pa.: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1974), p. 60; Father LeClerq's New Relation of Gaspesia (1691) excerpted in McGee, *op. cit.*, p. 48; and Mackenzie's record of an Hidatsa chief's attitudes (1800) quoted in John Milloy, "The Plains Cree; A Preliminary Trade and Military Chronology, 1670-1870" (Ottawa: National Library of Canada, 1973), p. 140.

a superior product for trade. Hunting techniques remained fairly stable also, the technological changes of metal, gun and trap having the primary effect of making the quest somewhat simpler. The hunter still needed to know extensive woodlore, perseverance and accuracy of aim. The most important changes were those in the productive organization from communal forms toward greater emphasis on the individual.

As will be demonstrated later in the chapter this shift toward the individual family at the expense of communal cooperation was a very important contributing factor to the generally devolutionary patterns of change in the societal order of the fur-trading societies. Therefore, the conclusion we must draw about the technology of export production among the fur-trading societies is that although economic specialization occurred as predicted by the theory of comparative advantage, this specialization resulted in a general simplification of the productive process. This kind of specialization had no developmental effects on the Indian societies. It did not produce the kind of change in technology and productive organization which could be applied to other profitable tasks when the market for fur declined and when the Indians' lands were expropriated by European invaders. The "comparative advantage," if it existed at all, was temporary.

Next let us consider the quantities of goods produced and the process of negotiation whereby these societies of greatly differing standards of value arrived at a price for the goods.

The Volume and Pricing of Export Goods.

One cannot but be impressed by the great quantity of goods which

the "primitive" techniques of the African and Indian peoples produced for export. The economic stimulus which European trade produced led to a great expansion in productive effort. In this section we will demonstrate the point by describing the volume of the various trade goods produced. Then it will be possible to investigate the problem of pricing. In particular we will want to see if the native peoples suffered a deterioration in the relative return for their efforts over time. Such a deterioration would accord with the assumptions of the dependency theory of trade. The quantities produced of each trade item will be considered in turn.

1. Slaves. I have already estimated that seven million persons were shipped from West African over the course of the slave trade. The question of "how many slaves?" has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention in the recent past. This attention is understandable given the pressing moral and ethical issues which are inherent in the question of human enslavement. The civil rights movement in our society raised our consciousness of this aspect of our past to the point that it seems almost that by coldly assessing or counting the extent of the sin, we could lance the wound.

In addition, however, "How many slaves?" is an important question because the alteration of population size and composition that slaving entails may affect the ability of a society to survive and to develop its social structure. The seven million people were not distributed uniformly over time or space. Factors which influenced the numbers and sources of slaves sold were, from the European side, ease of harboring, political conditions within Europe, and preferences of the purchasers

for particular ethnic groups over others. From the African side the influential factors were political conditions within and between the various societies, population density, the existence or development of trade routes (which were, of course, affected by the distribution of geographical features such as rivers and mountains), and European demand. The single most important of all these factors was the political conditions within Africa, although many thousands of persons were enslaved simply as a response to demand.⁶³

Generally, as time progressed, the volume of enslavements increased and the main sources of slaves shifted in accord with local supply conditions, very generally from west to east. Reasoning from the data presented by Curtin⁶⁴ I estimate that the West African portion of the Atlantic slave trade was distributed across time as follows:

Table V: Volume of West African Slave Exports by Century

<u>1450-1600</u>	<u>1601-1700</u>	<u>1701-1800</u>	<u>1801-1870</u>
250,000	1,000,000	4,250,000	1,500,000

Total: 7 million exported from West Africa.

It should be noted that this estimate is only that portion of the African slave trade which found its way into the holds of the European slave ships. It does not take account of mortality between enslavement and shipping (such as en route to the coast or in the coastal areas before shipment) nor does it include those people who were part of the internal

⁶³ Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, pp. 226-28.

⁶⁴ Ibid.


slave trade. The latter component must surely have been substantial. The number of persons in domestic slavery increased in many societies during the period;⁶⁵ for one thing, slaves began to "pile up" in the coastal societies as the Atlantic slave trade declined. For another, since the Europeans preferred male slaves, the women were often kept by (and married into) some of the trading societies. Finally, some slaves were traded (or kidnapped) to the north throughout the entire period. I have no good basis to make a reasonable guess as to how many persons these internal factors may have entailed, but I would not be surprised if the total enslavements were double the exports.

If the region as a whole is divided into areas following Curtin and as marked on the map on the following page, some further insight into the supply of slaves may be gained.

a. Senegambia: This region was the first to lose many of its people to the trans-Saharan and European slave trade. In the first of the four periods (1450-1600), Senegambia was an important source of slaves, even though the total number of slaves exported at this time was small compared to later centuries. This is not simply because this area is closest to Europe, because Angola far to the south was another supplier.⁶⁶ The existence of cross-Saharan slave routes plus the political instability associated with the breakup of the Jolof empire into component parts meant that, Wolof people composed a substantial

⁶⁵ The evidence for this point will be discussed later in the chapter when I consider changes in the system of social stratification.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 101.



MAP C: Approximate Locations of Societies, West African Trade Area

- I. Senegambia
- II. Sierra Leone
- III. Windward Coast
- IV. Gold Coast
- V. Bight of Benin
- VI. Bight of Biafra

portion of the slaves sent to America by the mid - 16th century.⁶⁷ Curtin estimates 250 - 1,000 slaves per year were being sent from the coastal regions at this time.⁶⁸ During the great expansion of the slave trade in the 18th century, Senegambia provided an approximate average of 2500-3000 slaves per year in the first half of the century, declining to 1,000 or less per year in the second half. This decline was in the face of sharply rising prices being paid for slaves in Senegambia.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, about the same number (250-1,000 per year) were being drawn from the coastal peoples (Wolof, Serer, Gambia Mandinga). The balance came from the interior, a movement which began after the mid - 17th century. Sporadically throughout the 18th century many slaves were sent to the coast as a kind of grisly by-product of the process of political consolidation, civil war and imperialist expansion of the Bambara people.⁷⁰ Although the French called any slave from the interior "Bambara", probably most were, if not Bambara themselves, enslaved as a result of Bambara activities.

The expansion of the slave trade elsewhere meant that Senegambia's contribution to the entire slave trade "dropped from about 25 per cent

⁶⁷ Curtin, Economic Change. . ., pp. 12-13.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 177.

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 166-67; Curtin in Ajayi and Crowder, op. cit., p. 277.

⁷⁰ Curtin, Economic Change. . ., pp. 177-80; Viviana Paques, Les Bambara (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), pp. 59-61, 78; John Ralph Willis, "The Western Sudan from the Moroccan Invasion (1591) to the Death of al-Mukhtar al-Kunti (1811)," Ajayi and Crowder, op cit., pp. 455-458, 478.

to less than 1 percent of the whole."⁷¹

b. Sierra Leone: This region along with the next, the Windward Coast, underwent a period of substantial slaving in the second half of the 16th century. In the main this was a result of the so-called "Mame" invasions which shook the entire area of modern Liberia, Sierra Leone, and part of Guinea.⁷² Additionally, the northern part of the area established trading relationships with the Portuguese at this time, giving rise to numbers of Afro-Portuguese traders.⁷³ The slave trade in the southern half of the area declined from c. 1625-1725,⁷⁴ but revived again after that period and persisted throughout the first half of the 19th century. The end of the legal slave trade may have actually seen a temporary increase in slaving because illegal slavers could find refuge from the patrol squadrons in the area.⁷⁵ The revival is associated in part with the growth and political reorganization of Futa Djallon during the second quarter of the 18th century and beyond.⁷⁶ This expansion of the slave trade in the area had some truly remarkable effects on the social life of the native peoples.

⁷¹ Curtin, Economic Change. . ., p. 177.

⁷² Rodney, op. cit., pp. 39-70, especially p. 61.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 76-83.

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 167-68.

⁷⁵ John Davidson, "Trade and Politics in the Sherbro Hinterland" (unpublished PhD. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1969), p. 68.

⁷⁶ Joseph Harris, "The Kingdom of Fouta Diallon" (unpublished PhD. dissertation, Northwestern University) p. 23; Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, p. 226; Rodney, op. cit., pp. 236-39.

Nevertheless in either absolute or relative terms the region was not a major source of slaves; although Rodney and Curtin disagree about the total numbers, both agree that relative to other areas the Sierra Leone region supplied relatively few slaves.⁷⁷

c. Windward Coast: This region presents something of a contradiction. Poorly documented overall, the region was not, with the possible exception of the Vai region on the northern fringe, the site of any large-scale trading societies. Further, although the researchers of those groups which have been documented note their participation in the slave trade, their contribution is not seen as extensive.⁷⁸ Nevertheless Curtin's analysis of Anglo-French exports during the 18th century shows an average of nearly 4000 slaves per year, greater than either of the two previous areas.⁷⁹ Regular slave trading did not resume after the initial 16th century encounters until near the end of the 17th century.⁸⁰ Like Sierra Leone this area continued or increased the sale of slaves in the 19th century after the major sources further east declined in the first half of that century.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Rodney, *op. cit.*, p. 252; Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, p. 224.

⁷⁸ Ronald Davis "Historical Outline of the Kru Coast, Liberia, 1500 to the Present" (unpublished PhD. dissertation, Indiana University, 1968), p. 53; Marc Auge, "Le Commerce pre-colonial in Basse-Cote d'Ivoire," pp. 165-67, Meillassoux, *op. cit.*; Emmanuel Terray, "Commerce pre-colonial et organisation sociale chez les Dida de Cote d'Ivoire," Meillassoux, *op. cit.*,

⁷⁹ Curtin, in Ajayi and Crowder, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

⁸⁰ Holsoe, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 120-22, 133-37.

The remaining three regions were the home of the large-scale slave trading societies which supplied over three-fourths of the West African portion of slave exports in the 18th century.⁸²

d. Gold Coast: Trade relationships between the peoples of the gold coast and Europeans were nearly two centuries old by the time slaves became the "dominant exportable commodity" in the second half of the 17th century.⁸³ By 1700 the people were reluctant to sell much more gold and the Europeans wanted slaves. At this time the Akan people were engaged in a process of political expansion, which continued throughout the 18th century, culminating in the Ashanti empire. This expansion was essentially an internal political process, but the fact that the extra war captives could so profitably be exchanged for firearms and other items certainly facilitated the imperial design of metropolitan Ashanti. However, by the early part of the 19th century Ashanti had come to the end of its growth, having established its hegemony over an area larger than modern Ghana.⁸⁴ Coincidentally the legal slave trade was ending and Ashanti chose to concentrate her commercial energies toward the northern markets.⁸⁵ But the imperial wars produced huge numbers of slaves. The English and

⁸² Curtin, in Ajayi and Crowder, op. cit., p. 267 and The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, pp. 227-28.

⁸³ Daaku, Trade and Politics. . ., p. 28.

⁸⁴ Fynn, op. cit., p. 125.

⁸⁵ Wilks, "Asante Policy. . .," pp. 130-31.

French alone carried away one-half million persons in the 18th century;⁸⁶ in addition the Dutch, Danes, and others were active on the Gold Coast. It is safe to assume that something in excess of three-quarters of a million persons were sold in this area, many coming from far in the interior. Nevertheless the political and economic fortunes of this region were never linked exclusively to the slave trade. Commercial activities remained diverse.

e. Bight of Benin: This region supplied a large proportion of slaves throughout the entire period. Portuguese trade with Benin itself in the early century, the emergence of the Aja ports of Allada and Whydah in the 17th century, followed by the commercial and political imperialism of Dahomey and the Oyo Yoruba in the 18th century gave good reason for this area to be called the Slave Coast. The English, French, and Portuguese exported over one million people from the Bight between 1711 and 1810,⁸⁷ and traders from other nations, were also eager to buy. Nevertheless only of Aja/Dahomey can it be said that the society was a creature of the slave trade. Benin reduced contact with Europeans in the 18th century and Yoruban political development cannot be understood purely in slave trading terms.

f. The Bight of Biafra: This region was the last to enter the slave trade in a substantial way. Only a few thousand slaves were sold before the second quarter of the 18th century. However, from 1750 on the societies of the Niger Delta sold far in excess of 10,000 slaves

⁸⁶ Curtin, in Ajayi and Crowder, op. cit., p. 267.

⁸⁷ Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, p. 267.

per year. For example, although the English and French purchased only 4500 slaves in the area between 1721 and 1730, in the decade following 1761 they purchased at least 139,200.⁸⁸ Dike reports that the one Ijo trading city of Bonny produced 20,000 annually in the last years of the 18th century.⁸⁹ The large majority of those enslaved were Ibos,⁹⁰ although some came down the Niger from the interior. The latter area increased in importance with the upheavals accompanying the Fulani jihad above the Niger in the first half of the 19th century.⁹¹

How shall we react to the fact that so immense a number of human beings were "produced" for sale? If the trade commodity were anything else, we would not hesitate to emphasize the organization skill, the extension of cooperation from society to society, and the enterprise which could produce such a quantity of goods for export. As it is, we must be astonished, even after so long a time, at the incredible power of rationalization of the human mind, both African and European, that could justify their behavior as the millions were marched out in chains.

2. Other African Exports. The volume of the other African exports cannot be calculated with the same degree of thoroughness that

⁸⁸ Curtin, in Ajayi and Crowder, op. cit., p. 267.

⁸⁹ K. Onwuka Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885 (Oxford Studies in African Affairs, London Oxford University Press, 1956)

⁹⁰ Isichei, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

⁹¹ Michael Mason, "Population Density and 'Slave Raiding'--the Case of the Middle Belt of Nigeria," Journal of African History, X, no. 4 (1969), pp. 551-64.

researchers have expended on the slave trade. That is probably because the question of "how many people" carries a more impelling moral tone than the question of "how many elephants." Nevertheless the scattered data on the amount of gold, ivory, palm oil, and so forth exported cannot but impress one with the productivity of humans in preindustrial societies.

Ivory was exported in large enough quantities to severely reduce the elephant population.⁹² For example, over five metric tons of ivory were shipped from the Senegal River in 1786 and 1788; moreover, this represented a decline over available supplies of a century earlier.⁹³ In the mid-16th century the Portugese on Cape Verde had amassed a stock of eighty quintals, and the English were exporting 300 quintals annually from the area north of Sierra Leone around 1664.⁹⁴ Meanwhile in the fifteen years from 1621 to 1634 the Dutch exported over one million pounds of ivory from the Gold Coast.⁹⁵

Gold was the other early trade item of high value. Suret-Canale reports that of 28,200 kilos of gold in use in Europe from 1493 to 1580, 9,400 kilos or 1/3 was African gold.⁹⁶ As previously described,

⁹² Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 67; Rodney, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-56; Curtin, *Economic Change. . .*, p. 224.

⁹³ Curtin, *ibid.*, pp. 118, 224.

⁹⁴ Rodney, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-55. A modern quintal is equal to 100 kilograms or about 220.5 pounds.

⁹⁵ Daaku, *Trade and Politics. . .*, p. 14.

⁹⁶ J. Suret-Canale, "The Western Atlantic Coast 1600-1800," in Ajayi and Crowder, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

the bulk of this supply came from the Akan/Volta region of modern Ghana. This gold was the reason for the very early establishment of regular coastal trade at Elmina by Portugal. The annual Portugese export by 1500 of at least 20,000 ounces eventually attracted the attention of other nations. It is estimated that this Elmina gold was equal to one-tenth of the world supply and was worth £100,000.⁹⁷ However by 1700 the gold producing peoples of this area had apparently become concerned about their supply, because they occasionally insisted upon payment for the slaves and ivory in gold.⁹⁸

As the slave trade finally diminished in the 19th century, the production of other products grew, especially palm oil and peanuts. Colin Newbury summarizes this growth:⁹⁹

For our purposes, here, the more striking feature of West African trade, 1820-50, is not so much the rise in values at European price levels, but the staggering increase in the quantities of imports and exports handled in the West African markets. This can be seen in the well-known examples of British imports of West African palm oil (1820: 17,456 cwt. rising to 1850: 434,450 cwt.), French imports of groundnuts (1845: 66,802 quintals rising to 1849: 134,500 quintals). This kind of rapid increase in quantity is also present in United Kingdom imports of West African 'teak' (African oak) which rose from 297 loads (50 cubic feet) in 1817 to 23,251 loads in 1837, while the tonnage of barwoods, camwood, ebony, and mahogany tripled from 1.7 thousand tons over the same period. Other important increases in bulk commodities took place for hides and rice. More traditional products--slaves, ivory, gums, indigo, and possibly gold, remained steady or declined.

Palm oil imported into England showed the following increase during the first half of the 18th century.

⁹⁷ Ivor Wilks, "The Mossi and Akan. . .," in Ajayi and Crowder, *op. cit.*, p. 360; Daaku, *Trade and Politics. . .*, p. 8.

⁹⁸ Daaku, *ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

⁹⁹ Colin Newbury, "Prices and Profitability in Early Nineteenth Century Trade," in Meillassoux, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

Table VI: West African Palm Oil Imported into England¹⁰⁰

<u>Year</u>	<u>Annual Average (in tons)</u>
1800-1804	321.8
1821-1816	1201.25
1825-1829	5851.4
1837-1841	15606.6
1849-1853	26313.2

The Niger Delta societies, the Ijo, Ibibio, Itsekiri, etc. supplied the majority of this production, turning their immense commercial energies from collecting tens of thousands of humans to tens of thousands of tons of oil. As the production of oil continued to increase throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, the Delta merchants held their own; this region supplied over half the total African export.¹⁰¹

Peanut production presents a similar pattern of rapidly expanding volume in response to European demand, this time primarily in the Senegambian region to the northwest. From a small export of around one thousand kilos in 1841, Senegalese exports exploded to around five million kilos in 1850.¹⁰² Unlike the Niger Delta, however, this pro-

¹⁰⁰ Calculated from A. J. H. Latham, Old Calabar. . ., p. 57.

¹⁰¹ Ebiegberi J. Alagoa, The Small Brave City-State: A History of the Nembe-Brass in the Niger Delta (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p. 61

¹⁰² Klein, "Sine-Saloum. . .," p. 64

duction and trade was not controlled by the same groups who had organized the trade in slaves and other products.

3. Fur. North American fur production, like African production, was very large. The earliest reports of quantities of furs traded are for the Dutch fort at Albany, New York in the period immediately following 1625:

Table VII: Quantities of Furs Traded at Albany: 1625 - 1633¹⁰³

1625	5,295 beaver	493 other
1626	7,250 beaver	800 other
1628	10,000 skins	
1633	c. 30,000 skins	


This production, largely by the Iroquois and Mahican, was matched in the region, now Pennsylvania, to the south. The main outlet for the trade of the Susquehannocks and others was on the lower Delaware River. In 1621 Susquehannock country produced 15,000 beaver skins,¹⁰⁴ while the Dutch felt that their replacement on the Delaware by the Swedes in 1638 cost them 30,000 pelts that year.¹⁰⁵

In the 18th century when the fur trade encompassed the entire region, hundreds of thousands of pelts were produced annually. Furs

¹⁰³ Hunt, op. cit., p. 33.

¹⁰⁴ Henry Eshleman, Lancaster County Indians: Annals of the Susquehannocks and other Indians tribes. . .from about the Year 1500 to 1763, the date of their extinction. (Lancaster, Pa.: 1909), p. 16.

¹⁰⁵ Zimmerman, op. cit., p. 5.



MAP D: Approximate Locations of Societies, North American Fur Area

were often sold in ninety-pound packs, each consisting of 60 or more beaver (and accordingly fewer bear skins or more muskrats).¹⁰⁶ In 1757 Louis Antoin Bougainville published estimates of the annual fur intake of the various trading posts throughout the western part of the region (Montreal is not included).¹⁰⁷ Using the midpoints of his estimates for posts in the area of this study, we can say that 5075 packs of furs came into French hands from the sample societies in a year. If we assume an average number of pelts per pack of 60, it appears that 304,500 pelts came out of the western part of the region annually. The take at English posts, such as York Factory, was also very large.¹⁰⁸

The first half of the nineteenth century saw a continuation of this immense production. At the Chicago post alone 25,400 skins were traded in 1816,¹⁰⁹ while in one year around 1820 Schoolcraft reported that the American Fur Company at Michilimackinac bought the following quantities of pelts:¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ Gast, op. cit., p. 55.

¹⁰⁷ Douglas Dunham, "The French Element in the American Fur Trade, 1760-1816" (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1950), Appendix B.

¹⁰⁸ Arthur Ray shows the value of furs received at York Factory in made beaver to have been between 30,000 and 40,000 annually between 1719 and 1750 and between 20,000 and 30,000 from 1750 to 1775. Arthur Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Trappers, Hunters, and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of Hudson Bay, 1660-1870 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), p. 58.

¹⁰⁹ Baerreis, op. cit., p. 166.

¹¹⁰ Reported in Gast, op. cit., p. 56.

106,000 Beaver	500 Buffalo
2,100 Bear	6,000 Lynx
1,500 Fox	600 Wolverine
4,000 Kitt Fox	1,650 Fisher
4,600 Otter	100 Raccoon
16,000 Musquash (muskrat?)	3,800 Wolf
32,000 Martin	700 Elk
1,800 Mink	<u>1,950</u> Deer
	183,300 Total

The Hudson's Bay Company, which controlled the northern part of the trade after 1821 sent 109,448 Beaver, 1,332,491 muskrats, 5,599 bear and "many thousands" of other furs to London in 1828-9.¹¹¹ In 1836, the American Fur Company, who controlled the southern part of the trade, shipped around 300,000 pelts.¹¹² It can be seen that the quantity of furs traded over the two and one-half centuries of this study must total over a hundred million. This activity led to a decline in the game populations, although the fur trade did not come to an end for this reason. The point here is the efficiency of the Indian men and women who produced skins for export.

4. Pricing. Now attention may be turned to the very important question of what and how much was paid to the native producers for their efforts.

The process of pricing in a trade involving many different products and many different economic systems was no simple affair. Although on both continents the trade itself remained essentially a process of barter, certain customary practices evolved to regularize the exchange

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 57.

¹¹² Rhoda Gilman, op. cit., pp. 103-104.

and certain standards of value came to be accepted more or less by both European and native traders.

On the two continents three interesting similarities in the exchange process developed. First, the trading process was often accompanied by gifts to native traders or political authorities. This practice was consistent with indigenous customs of reciprocity and generosity. In some cases these gifts, usually a prelude to the actual trade, came with time to be looked upon as a regular toll or duty. Nevertheless a certain ceremonial quality was maintained and the degree of satisfaction the gifts produced certainly affected the trade itself.

Second, the actual European goods paid had to be an assortment of various items. Ryder makes the point for Benin:¹¹³

Slave prices had to be paid in an assortment of goods that varied according to demand and supply, and also the bargaining powers of the merchants on both sides. The list of goods needed for the purchase of one male slave given in the Portugese document shows that the assortment had come to include the whole range of items carried by a European trader; a merchant who lacked one essential item might find his whole trade ruined.

Likewise a French or English fur buyer whose assortment of goods lacked certain crucial items or the requisite proportions of various goods of high quality would find the Indians refusing to trade: they would seek out his competitors instead.¹¹⁴

The third similarity was development of credit arrangements be-

¹¹³ Alan Ryder, Benin and the Europeans: 1485-1897 (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), p. 210.

¹¹⁴ Ray, op. cit., p. 143.

tween the European and native traders. The use of credit became more common as time went on, even though it carried substantial risk in the absence of enforcement mechanisms. In the African trade, credit involved the advance of trade goods to coastal middlemen to finance trading expeditions up country. By the 19th century the native merchants in the Niger Delta were using this credit in good capitalist fashion, taking advantage of credit when possible in order to keep their own capital liquid.¹¹⁵ In the American trade toward the end of the fur trading period, credit usually took the form of advances to each hunter and his family of the tools, clothing, and so forth necessary to tide them over the trapping season. Many Indian families engaged in trapping apparently fell fairly deeply into debt. The fur trade did not result in capitalist modes of operation within Indian societies.

The economics of the African trade was more complex than the American because of the existence of several native currencies in the region, because goods often passed over long distances through many middlemen, and because of the diversity of the trade itself. Nevertheless both continents developed standards of exchange by which calculation of gain could be made on both sides.

5. Standards of Exchange and Trade Currencies. The most interesting point here is that the exchange values and currencies evolved predominately out of indigenous practices. European standards and practices had only minimal impact on the system. The adaptation was

¹¹⁵ Latham, "Currency, Credit, and Capitalism. . .," p. 605.

done by the European traders as they learned to translate their own conceptions of price into native expectations. The pricing systems which evolved even had an impact on European manufacturing as the type of goods demanded by the native traders began to be made in Europe.

a. Africa: In Africa standards of exchange developed from certain native currencies, which then spread from society to society as the European trade developed. There were several of these currencies. The most widespread one was the iron bar. The Africans manufactured their own iron in the precontact period, but there was still a great demand for the European article. The Europeans began to manufacture a more-or-less standard iron bar in response to this demand. The bars could be forged into tools by African smiths, and they also served as a familiar item by which the value of various imports and exports could be reckoned. European bookkeeping procedures adopted the iron bar as a standard of value, even though a particular native African society did not trade in bars.

A brief summary of the currencies used by the Africans from Senegambia in the west to the Niger Delta in the east will demonstrate the business situation the Europeans were obliged to adapt to.

Iron bars were used as currency throughout Senegambia, Sierra Leone, and the upper part of the Windward Coast. The Kru on the Windward Coast purchased iron bars as raw material but perhaps did not think of them as a medium of exchange. They also purchased cowrie shells, a currency common to the east.¹¹⁶ The Dida and Lagoon peoples of modern

¹¹⁶ Davis, op. cit., p. 65.

Ivory Coast used the manilla, a brass, copper or bronze coil used as an anklet or footrest,¹¹⁷ as a medium of exchange as well as to acquire wives.¹¹⁸ The Europeans apparently manufactured these following native designs.

In addition to iron bars, Senegambia, Sierra Leone, and the Windward Coast all also used certain native cloths, called country cloths by the English and pagne by the French, as currency. The Europeans imitated these cloths, manufacturing them on the Cape Verde islands and later importing a standard cloth, called a piece de Guinee, from India.¹¹⁹

On the Gold Coast, gold was, of course, the standard of exchange and was measured in a complicated series of weights. In internal markets gold dust was actually used for payment, but with Europeans a system of equivalences for exchange of commodities was worked out in terms of gold;¹²⁰ but the gold itself did not exchange hands. In the northern markets, e.g. at Salaga, cowrie shells were the currency. Ashanti traders exchanged their kola for cowries and then purchased slaves, or whatever, with them.¹²¹ On the Slave Coast the most common

¹¹⁷ E. J. Alagoa, "The Niger Delta States and their Neighbors, 1600-1800," in Ajayi and Crowder, op. cit., p. 293; Eugenia Herbert, "Aspects of the Use of Copper in Precolonial West Africa," Journal of African History, XIV, no. 2 (1973), pp. 179-194.

¹¹⁸ Terray, op. cit., pp. 147-48.

¹¹⁹ Curtin, Economic Change. . ., pp. 237, 260-61; Rodney, op. cit., pp. 181-82.

¹²⁰ Daaku, "Trade and Trading Patterns. . .," pp. 178-9.

¹²¹ Robert Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution (Oxford: the Clarendon Press, 1929), pp. 109-111.

currency was cowrie shells, but other valuable items, such as coral played an exchange role. Dahomey used gold and cowries at a fixed rate of exchange (1 oz. = 32,000 cowries); the latter was the common coin in internal markets. Cowries were a standard of exchange and occasionally a means of payment on the coast.¹²² Copper or brass bracelets or manillas also were a standard in Yoruba and Benin.¹²³ Iron bars and cloths were also used in this region.¹²⁴ Finally, in the Niger Delta copper wires and rods (the first reckoned as a subdivision of the latter) were the favored currency, functioning as a general medium of exchange in internal markets and as a standard of value in the trade with Europeans.¹²⁵

One can imagine the subtleties of the negotiation process as each side attempted to maximize the return from the bargain in terms of his own cultural standards of value. The European trader would try to get his native counterpart to accept a trade goods assortment with greater quantities of goods cheap in pounds, francs, guilders, or whatever, while the native trader would attempt to bargain for an assortment including greater amounts of items valued by his culture. The

¹²² Karl Polanyi, Dahomey and the Slave Trade: an Analysis of an Archaic Economy (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), pp. 40, 140-169; Johannes Postma, "The Dutch Participation in the African Slave Trade: Slaving on the Guinea Coast, 1675-1795" (unpublished PhD. dissertation, Michigan State, 1970), pp. 88-89.

¹²³ Robert Smith, Kingdoms of the Yoruba (London: Methuen, 1969), p. 75; Ryder, op. cit., pp. 40, 53, 59-60.

¹²⁴ Ryder, ibid., pp. 98, 208.

¹²⁵ Latham, "Currency, Credit, and Capitalism. . .," pp. 599-605.

negotiation process often took a very long time.

b. North America: The indigenous systems of exchange were less complex in this region and accordingly the problem of adaptation of the European trader was less complex also. Nevertheless, European traders and manufacturers were obliged to adapt their practices to Indian standards of beauty and quality.

In North America the closest thing to a native currency was wampum, a shell bead, which may have been used in trade transactions as a standard.¹²⁶ Over most of the region, however, barter was direct. The concept of the "made beaver," equivalent to one prime beaver skin, came to be applied as a standard of exchange. The system of equivalences developed for various furs and trade goods is still found today in the description of Hudson's Bay blankets according to points, each "point" being one made beaver.¹²⁷ In general the Indians were very particular about the quality of the goods they received. Their preference for certain colors and qualities of goods affected the competing trading companies and also manufacturing industries in Europe as special goods for the "Indian trade" were ordered.¹²⁸ Although the Hudson's Bay

¹²⁶ Zimmerman, op. cit., p. 8 gives wampum equivalents for pelts; Carrie Lyford, Iroquois Crafts (Publications of the U. S. Indian Service, Indian Handicrafts Pamphlets, No. 6; Lawrence, Kansas: Haskell Institute, 1945) says the Iroquois used wampum for currency, but William Fenton in The Iroquois Eagle Dance, An Offshoot of the Calumet Dance (Bureau of American Ethnology, no. 156; Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953) says that wampum was never used as currency.

¹²⁷ John C. Ewers, "The Influence of the Fur Trade on the Indians of the Northern Plains," in People and Pelts, p. 8.

¹²⁸ Ibid.; Norton, op. cit., p. 31; Jennings, op. cit., p. 99.

Company used a double standard of trade to allow for mark-up, the Indians bargained in terms of customary amounts and discrete items; once customary payments had been established the Indians were very resistant to changes the Company tried to make in response to market conditions, such as labor costs in Europe or the price of furs.¹²⁹

6. Changes in Price Over Time. The prices paid to the native traders in Africa and America were, of course, not constant over the two and one-half centuries. The question of the relative terms of trade is a complex one and all the data are not available. However, for slaves and most other African produce, the price received from the Europeans went up quite dramatically during the period.¹³⁰ In Benin the price of slaves rose four-fold between 1520 and 1700, but remained steady throughout the 18th century; however since customs payments the "gifts" mentioned earlier, rose substantially during the latter period, the effective cost to the European of slaves continued to rise.¹³¹ The same stability of price for slaves held at a range of 60-90 iron bars during the 18th century in the Sierra Leone/Windward Coast area. However, by 1807 the price had risen to 120 bars.¹³² Postma notes that the Dutch who traded primarily on the Gold and Slave

¹²⁹ Ray, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-65.

¹³⁰ Curtin, Economic Change. . . demonstrates this statistically and in detail for Senegambia, pp. 328-342.

¹³¹ Ryder, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-11.

¹³² Holsoe, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-16.

Coasts were paying five times as much for slaves in 1791 as they had in 1680.¹³³ Certainly the Africans were not experiencing a deterioration in the terms of trade.

It is much less clear whether prices paid for furs in North America underwent the same inflation. At times of competition between rival European trading companies, the prices Indians received went up. The last part of the 18th century and first part of the 19th to 1821 was such a time. Ray shows a very consistent relationship between the value of furs received and the value of goods traded at York Factory from 1720-1775. However, competitive conditions after that led to greatly declining profits for the Hudson's Bay Company. The value of goods traded fell much less than the value of furs received.¹³⁴ However, the effects of lower prices for trade goods on the Indians were not always beneficial. The point made for the Assiniboine and Cree could fairly be applied to all the fur trading peoples:

"However, although increasingly intensive company competition was making it easier for the Indians to obtain trade goods, their demand for utilitarian and ornamental items did not rise at the same rate as prices fell. . . In effect, the consumer demand of the Indians continued to be inelastic on a short-term basis and this had serious repercussions in the new setting in which the fur trade was conducted after 1763. Most important, it favored a rapid increase in the consumption of alcohol and tobacco. . .reinforced by the addictive nature of these two commodities. Moreover because the Indians could satisfy their needs for other trade goods with less effort due to the falling prices demanded for them, they spent much more of the free time which they gained at the local trading posts

133 Postma, op. cit., pp. 196-98.

134 Ray, op. cit., p. 58.

drinking and smoking. . .In this way competitive conditions further strengthened the tendency toward greater addiction.¹³⁵

It is certainly fair to say that over the entire fur trading period there was no general worsening of the terms of trade from the Indian side. At times the terms the Indians received were better, at times worse. The period immediately prior to the collapse of the fur trade was a time of good trade terms. The non-capitalist nature of the Indian economics meant that favorable trade terms were not utilized for developmental ends, however.

We may conclude that overall the changes in price did not constitute a worsening trade situation for the native societies and that the dependency model, therefore, is not supported by the data at this point. Yet, as will be demonstrated later in the chapter, beneficial trade terms resulted in what we commonly think of as "economic development" in a portion of the African societies, but not at all in the Indian societies. Therefore, the diffusionist model is supported only minimally.

Organization of the Trade

We have considered the production processes and quantities of trade exports from West Africa and Northeastern North America. Before considering the effects the trade had on the material core and societal structure, we have yet to describe the social organization of the trade within the native societies. It is important to consider what groups within society controlled the trade with the Europeans and regulated the distribution of the wealth obtained from it. This is

¹³⁵ Ibid., pp. 141-42.

so because the accumulation of trade wealth, insofar as it occurred, has great potential for altering or reinforcing established structures of power. The control over the returns from trade has, therefore, direct bearing on changes in the societal order.

The organization of trade was substantially different in Africa than in North America. In the former a variety of corporate groups and political elites controlled the trade and regulated the distribution of the goods obtained. In North America, on the other hand, the control of trade was in the hands of individuals or nuclear families. In Africa it was very often true that the groups producing the various exported commodities were distinct from the trading groups. It is thus possible to speak of merchant classes in Africa but this concept has no applicability in the fur trade area. With few exceptions the individual hunter/trapper and his pelt preparer wife were also the traders. One or the other carried the furs to the trading post or to individual fur buyers and bargained for price and credit. The fact that Indian women often were fur traders has not been very widely noted. However, apparently it was quite common for women to do the negotiating because they seem to have had a better chance of getting a fair price. There are several scattered references to this practice throughout the geographic and chronological spread of the trade.¹³⁶

¹³⁶ For example approximately 20% of the Indians trading at Albany from 1695-1726 were women. Norton, op. cit., p. 28.

The only exception to this pattern of individual control of trade that I am aware of was found among the Huron. There the Rock Clan, the most easterly and the first to meet the French, initially had a trading monopoly.¹³⁷ It seems doubtful, however, whether this monopoly lasted until the Huron were dispersed by the Iroquois Confederacy in 1649. Some groups, such as the Cree and Assiniboine at the end of the 18th century exhibited a loose organization of groups of hunters under the leadership of a trading captain or band chief. Although these leaders received extra gifts from the Europeans, each individual hunter still apparently made his own bargain. The band leader did not control the trade, or receive payment from the Indians for his services.¹³⁸ Therefore, in North America participation in trade was available to everyone, and each individual controlled the goods received, governed of course by customs of reciprocity to kin. Therefore, trade wealth did not accumulate. In fact, access to trade goods was so equally distributed that the power of traditional leaders declined. The basic equalitarian structure of Indian society was reinforced and intensified.

In Africa, on the other hand trade in any given society was ordinarily controlled by one or more of five kinds of corporate groups: the nobility, the lineage, the trading corporation which was an outgrowth of the lineage, religious cult, or foreign merchant class. A

¹³⁷ William Noble, "Iroquois Archaeology and the Development of Iroquois Social Organization (100-1650 A.D.): A Study in Culture Change based on Archaeology, ethnohistory, and Ethnology," (Ottawa: National Library of Canada, 1968), p. 257.

¹³⁸ Ray, op. cit., pp. 138-141.

description of the role of each of these groups in the trade of the fifty-two sample societies shows that control over trade had strong implications for the power structures of the African peoples.

Wherever there was an aristocracy, it was involved in controlling trade. This control was exercised a variety of ways including regular custom duties paid to the King, royal or aristocratic monopoly on foreign trade, special prices paid to noble traders, and rules permitting the king or noblemen to be the first to trade. In some cases by law or simply in practice commoners were effectively excluded from foreign trade; in others any person could trade with the European or middleman. Of the fifty-two societies who appear to have carried on regular trade, thirty-eight (73%) had some form of aristocracy and in all of these societies the elite participated in trade. In two societies (Ijo and Ibibio) the elite was not properly an aristocracy, but an upper class of achieved wealth. In the other thirty-six, however, the elite was composed of persons of noble birth. Many of these, of course, absorbed those persons of humble origin who became wealthy through trade.

In most cases the nobility was a warrior group, often of foreign origin, strongly analogous to the origin and character of the medieval European aristocracy. Since the most common means of enslavement was through military action, it is not surprising that these warrior aristocrats became very integrally associated with the slave trade. In several societies found primarily in the far interior but extending to the Wolof on the Senegambian coast, the military class spent most of its time in recurrent slave raids. It was not unusual for these raids

to be directed against the peasants of their own society, surely a cruel inversion of their traditional role of protectors of the peasants.¹³⁹ The exploitative character of the nobility was much less flagrant in other societies; the elite in these cases was integrated into the agricultural and commercial structures of society, providing military, ritual and administrative leadership.

The lineage or kin-based compound is, of course, the basic unit in all West African societies. Therefore, much of the trade in the unstratified societies both short and long-distance, was carried out by individuals on behalf of the kin-group. Often women traded on their own account, but usually in local markets. Long distance trading was more often organized by men on behalf of the extended family, family labor and property serving as the labor and capital for trading ventures of varying degrees of magnitude. The various dispersed mercantile groups (which I am for the sake of shorthand calling Dyula) were organized in this way. For example, Amselle shows that among the Kooroko (one such group in the Ivory Coast/Mali region) the eldest male controls the wealth of the extended family—he makes economic decisions and sees to the material well-being of his dependents. In return they turn the returns from their labor over to him. He uses the family wealth to provision trading expeditions carried out by his sons, nephews, and brothers. In time the younger men receive a share

¹³⁹ For a similar evaluation see Claude Meillassoux's comments on the military class in his "Introduction," *op. cit.*, Meillassoux, ed., pp. 65-66.

of the returns and eventually may be able to head a lineage themselves.¹⁴⁰

In several of the coastal societies in the Bight of Biafra and Gold Coast (and probably elsewhere), some of the lineages developed into business houses. At the core were the members of a successful kin-group, surrounded by their clients and dependents from weaker lineages, their retainers and slaves. Called in Ijo, Ibibio and Itsekiri the house, canoe-house, or ward, these groups seem analogous to the House of Medici or House of Rothchild as economic organizations. On the Gold Coast these trading organizations were sometimes founded by merchant-adventurers who had migrated to the coast in response to economic opportunity.¹⁴¹

The main example of control of trade by a religious cult was the oracle system of some Ibo groups. The agents of the oracle would travel throughout Iboland, dominating trading and raiding of slaves, conducting supplicants to the oracle for consultation and so forth. Supported by supernatural sanctions and armed mercenaries, the agents of the oracle were able to exert their economic influence widely and controlled much of the trade in Iboland.¹⁴² On the upper Guinea coast the secret religious and judicial society Poro had a role in producing slaves but was not active directly in controlling trade. Its functions were primarily political as were those of secret societies elsewhere, and as

¹⁴⁰ Jean-Loup Amselle, "Parente et Commerce chez les Kooroko," in Meillassoux, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 263-64.

¹⁴¹ Fynn, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

¹⁴² Simon Ottenberg, "Ibo Oracles and Intergroup Relations," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, XIV (1958), pp. 295-317.

such served to reinforce the position of the ruling elite.

The final kind of trading group was the foreign merchant community. The Dyula groups were the most widespread, dominating the trade routes across the entire interior. The other example of a foreign merchant class is the many mulatto groups who emerged along the coast in the western half of the area. In the 16th century from the Gambia to the Rokelle rivers many private Portuguese traders, called lancados, settled and traded in opposition to the laws of Portugal. By the 17th century their mulatto decedents, called filhos da terra, were carrying on the trading activities.¹⁴³

Immediately south of the lancado area around the Sherbro river region the traders were instead Afro-English.¹⁴⁴ Foreign merchant groups of all types were invariably middlemen, assembling and transporting the slaves and other exports to the coast. Their settlements were located in, but not of other societies. The Dyula usually established the right to govern their own villages according to their own, usually Moslem, political and legal standards. The various chiefdoms and states within which they resided tolerated this failure of sovereignty because of the indispensable economic service the merchants provided.¹⁴⁵ The mulatto communities usually were subject

¹⁴³ Rodney, op. cit., pp. 73-77, 200-204; Curtin, Economic Change..., pp. 95-100.

¹⁴⁴ Davidson, op. cit., pp. 55-62.

¹⁴⁵ E. g. see Curtin, Economic Change. . ., pp. 75-83; Jean Louis Boutillier, "La Cite Marchande de Bouna dans l'ensemble Economique Ouest-Africain pre-colonial," Mellassoux, op. cit., pp. 240-252.

to the jurisdiction of the various societies in which they lived, but again their economic role gave them some independence of action, and occasional political dominance.¹⁴⁶

In society after society those who controlled trade wealth acquired or consolidated political power and came to play an influential role in societal decision-making processes.

Of the fifty-nine African societies in this study, seven (12%) participated little in foreign trade. In twenty-eight (47%) the control of trade was in the hands of indigenous groups. In thirteen of this twenty-eight, trade was for the most part monopolized by the nobility. In eight more the noble lineages or "houses" did not monopolize the trade and in these groups commoners participated extensively. The remaining nine societies were relatively unstratified and trade was organized by the lineages and, in the Ibo example, the oracle.

In the remaining twenty-four (41%) societies foreign merchant groups were present, purchasing the goods from the nobility or ordinary households which were sold, often many transactions later, to the Europeans. Eight of these societies dealt with mulatto traders and fourteen societies with Dyula. In the two remaining groups, Susu and the Gambia Mandinke, trade was carried out by the indigenous nobility and by both mulatto and Dyula groups.

Later we shall see that these differences in the controlling groups are associated with differing levels of economic development.

¹⁴⁶ Rodney, op. cit., pp. 212-15/

Thus was the trade arranged. What changes in the social life of the various peoples were occurring during the period?

CHANGES IN THE SOCIETAL ORDER

Although the process of social change is a continuous one, it is only gradually and occasionally that changes accumulate to the point that the structure is transformed. In the following discussion of changes that occurred in the societal order of the sample societies we will see that increasing complexity of the societal order, in spite of the great infusion of material wealth that European trade brought, is a relatively rare event.

Political Structure

The relationship of trade to processes of political centralization was noted in chapter 1 as a key hypothetical question of this study. The answer to that question is that political centralization does occur with trade but so much less commonly than might be supposed that we may fairly question the usefulness of the generalization itself. The following table shows the distribution of level of political centralization in the sample societies at the beginning of the trading period (generally 1500 for Africa, 1600 for North America, or prior to first contact) and in 1850. Note that in all the tables to follow the early date is to be interpreted to stand for that year or the date at which trade relations were established. Similarly the date 1850 is to be interpreted to stand for that year or the date at which the society lost its independence to Europeans, was absorbed or became extinct. Absorption means the society became politically part of another native

society, but continued to exist with a degree of cultural and/or political independence. Extinction means the group disappears socially and politically, its remaining members joining other groups.

TABLE VIII: Change in Political Centralization from Beginning of Trade to 1850

Political Structure: Beginning	Political Structure, 1850							Total Beginning #	Total Beginning %
	State	Chiefdom + Bureaucracy	Chiefdom	Tribal Confed.	Tribe	Band	Sub-band		
State								0	0
Chiefdom + Bureaucracy	2	1	1					33	36.2
Chiefdom or Chief Confed.	3	5	10	1	3	1		6	
Tribal Confed.	2			2	1	1		1	38.5
Tribe					12	2		11	
Band				1	3	16	3	23	25.3
Totals 1850									
#	7	20		23	23			91	
%	7.7	22.0		25.3	25.3			100	
% Change over Period	+7.7	-14.2		-13.2	0			+19.7	

If we compare the number experiencing increased centralization (to the left and below the diagonal) with those experiencing decreased centralization (to the right and above the diagonal) as well as those remaining the same the following results are apparent:

Table IX: Extent of change in Political Centralization at the beginning and End of the Trading Period

	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
Centralizing Societies	19	21
Stable Societies	41	45
Decentralizing Societies	31	34
Total	91	100

It is obvious that in this sample involvement in trade is by itself much less likely to produce more centralized political systems than it is to produce stable or decentralizing ones. However, these figures, although useful as an overview, are much too gross. What we need is a consideration of the conditions under which trade involvement is accompanied by changes in political centralization. As a first step toward desentangling this problem each continent will be considered separately; first North America and then Africa. Table X on the following page presents the data on political centralization for the North American portion of the sample.

TABLE X: Change in Political Centralization, North American Fur Area, 1600-1850

Level of Political Centralization, 1600	Level of Political Centralization in 1850						Totals, 1600	
	Chieftdom	Tribal Confed.	Tribe	Band	Sub-band	Extinct	#	%
Chieftdom	2			1			3	9.4
Tribal Confed.		1	1	1		1	15	46.9
Tribe			3	2		6		
Band		1	3	7	3		14	43.7
Totals 1850								
#	2	9		14		7	32	100
%	6.2	28.1		43.7		22.0		
% Change Over Period	-3.2	-18.8		0		+22.0		

Several things are to be noted from Table X. First, the North American peoples had relatively decentralized structures to begin with and were heavily clustered in the lower half of the classification scheme. Second, overall the North American sample experienced substantial decentralization during the fur trading period. Only four societies (12.5%) are coded as having experienced increased centralization, while fifteen (46.9%) experienced decentralization or became extinct. Thirteen (40.6%) finished the period with the same level of centralization as at the beginning.

Because Table X classifies political structure at two points in time, it implies that political changes were linear. However over such a long period of time a society could undergo some curvilinear pattern of change, for example, initial centralizing tendencies followed by decentralization. A society might be coded as showing no change in Table X while actually having undergone some combination of change in political structure. In fact, one society in the North American sample, the Southern Ojibwa, shows such a pattern of curvilinear change. According to their leading ethnohistorian Harold Hickerson,¹⁴⁷ in 1600 the proto-Ojibwa were structured into patrilineal bands clustered around Sault St. Marie. The fur trade produced economic opportunities leading to population dispersion to the north of Lake Superior into the area between Hudson's Bay and Lake Winnipeg and to the south of Lake Superior through northern Michigan, Wisconsin and ultimately around

¹⁴⁷ Harold Hickerson, The Southwestern Chippewa: An Ethnohistoric Study (American Anthropological Association Memoir, no. 92; 1962); and "The Chippewa of the Upper Great Lakes," Leacock and Lurie, op. cit., pp. 173-82.

the western tip of the lake. This dispersion, which resulted in the division I am calling the Northern and Southern Ojibwa, took place around 1650. The northern group was characterized by slow devolution to sub-band status by 1825.¹⁴⁸ The southern group, however, occupying the position of middlemen between the French and western groups, coalesced into a tribal structure unified by a common religious organization and periodic councils of the constituent groups. This tribal structure was centered at Chequemagon Village (now La Pointe in the Apostle Islands) in far northern Wisconsin, and dates from approximately 1675-1750. In the 1730's their favored economic position collapsed as French traders travelled directly into the lands west of Lake Superior. The population dispersed inland after this, seeking more bountiful trapping areas. Gradually the various groups came less regularly to Chequemagon, established their own medicine lodge organizations, and generally pursued a more independent course of action. Thus they returned to a band structure, albeit not the patrilineal ones of old but rather what Service has called composite bands.¹⁴⁹ Thus, the Southern Ojibwa ended the period at the same general level of complexity at which they began it and accordingly appear in Tables VIII and X as a band at both beginning and end. However, with this one exception, all the other societies of North America experienced linear change or continuity of structure throughout the period.

¹⁴⁸ Charles A. Bishop, The Northern Ojibwa and the Fur Trade (Montreal: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston of Canada, Ltd., 1974).

¹⁴⁹ Elman Service, Primitive Social Organization (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 47, 73-75.

Overall Table X is a conservative statement of the devolutionary processes experienced by the North American peoples. While all the African societies remained independent of European political control until after 1850, only a small number of the most western and northern Indian groups still possessed anything resembling political independence at that time. The rest had been reduced to dependent status or had disappeared. For some groups the trading period was only two generations long; for others it was over two centuries. For about half of the sample (15 societies) the trading period was 150 years or less, seven of these trading for 75 years or less. For example, the two chiefdoms in the upper left hand cell of Table X both lost their independence by the third quarter of the seventeenth century, and had trade periods of only 59 years for the Wampanoag and 100 years for the Narragansetts. The latter survived as an independent people only 30 years after trading posts were established on the ground in New England.

I have roughly estimated the length of the trade period for each society and have averaged these estimates according to the direction which changes in political structure took, thinking that perhaps those experiencing centralization would have longer periods of independent economic interaction, giving them time to adapt. The results of that inquiry are as follows:

Table XI: Average Length of Trade Period by Direction of Political Change, North American Fur Area

	\bar{X} years	s	N
Centralizing Societies	172.5	58.52	4
Stable Societies	160.77	59.75	13
Decentralizing Societies	141.3	86.72	15

Unfortunately the neat relationship shown in Table XI breaks down when the "Decentralizing" are divided into those who became extinct and those who survived but at simpler levels of political organization.

Table XII: Average Length of Trade Period of "Decentralizing" Societies, North American Fur Area

	\bar{X} years	s	N
Societies who became extinct	78.6	35.6	7
Societies experiencing political decentralization	196.25	81.1	8

The surviving "decentralizers" had an even longer average than the centralizing groups. From Tables XI and XII we may however, conclude that those who remained independent the longest were the most likely to experience change in political structure. However, time does not predict the direction that change took.

Since centralization is the least common event, a closer look at the four peoples who experienced it is warranted to detect possible explanations. The four societies divide into two groups. In the first group are the Mahican (band to tribal confederacy) and the Miami (band to tribe). It is perhaps not coincidental that both occupied a frontier of sorts -- the border region between the French and Dutch/English sphere of trade dominance in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This border was controlled militarily by the League of the Iroquois. It has been suggested that the League itself was a response to political pressures generated by the early trade on the coast. Even if this idea is true, the formation of the League occurred so early in the period and clearly before the main impact of trade that it seems

best to treat the League as a pre-trade development. Thus the Mahican and Miami were obliged to deal with both Iroquois power and the competition between the Europeans. The Mahican, however, were not as successful at maintaining themselves (for the most part because their Iroquois neighbors were so imminently successful) as the Miami. In addition, neither undertook major migrations and both continued to invest substantial energy in agricultural systems. That is they did not abandon farming for hunting. The Mahican and the Miami along with the Iroquois appear to be the only societies to whom all three conditions apply.

The second group consists of the Assiniboine and part of the Western Cree. Their development from band to tribe took place when they abandoned the Canadian woodland/parkland region in the early 19th century for the prairies and a life as buffalo-hunting horse nomads. This major ecological shift brought the more centralized social structure required by the plains life style. Additionally and interestingly, both groups became less involved in the fur trade although they took up the role of provisioners.¹⁵⁰

Although plausible hypotheses explaining centralization in these five societies can be drawn, the fact remains that the main changes in political structure which accompanied the fur trade were devolutionary. Why that is so, I believe, resides in two factors: 1) the technology and structure of the trade emphasized mobility and individual effort over stable residence and communal effort and 2) all the groups

¹⁵⁰ Ray, op. cit.

experienced massive population decline from the introduction of European disease. The first factors have been dealt with already and the second will be presently. Simply put, you cannot have a centralized political structure when you have no division of labor, few people, and unstable residence. Therefore, the conclusion is that the fur trading region offers no support at all for the general proposition that trade produces political development. Perhaps the proposition will fare better in a closer consideration of Africa.

Table XIII presents political change in the same form as Tables VIII and X for the West African sample alone.

TABLE XIII: CHANGE IN POLITICAL CENTRALIZATION,
West African Trade Area, 1500-1850

Level of Political Centralization Beginning	Level of Political Centralization in 1850							Total Beginning		
	Empire	State	Chiefdom + Bureaucracy	Chiefdom	Tribal Confed.	Tribe	Band	Absorbed	#	%
Chiefdom + Bureaucracy		2	1	1						
Chiefdom Confed.	1							1	30	51
Chiefdom		2	3	10	1	3		5		
Tribal Confed.		2			1					
Tribe						9		5	20	34
Band							9		9	15
Totals 1850										
#	7		18		14		9	11	59	
%	12		30.5		24		15	18.5		100
% Change over period	+12		-20.5		-10		0	+18.5		

From Table XIII we can summarize the extent of change in political structure as follows:

Table XIV: Change in Political Centralization:
West African Trade Area

	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
Centralizing Societies	13	22
Stable Societies	30	51
Decentralizing Societies	16	27
TOTAL	59	100

Compared to the North American group, the African sample exhibits somewhat more centralization (9.5% more), much less decentralization (about 20% less), and somewhat more stability (10.4%). Yet political centralization is still the least frequent outcome.

The pattern of political change in West Africa was, however, more complex than can be portrayed completely in tabular form.

First, it should be noted that none of the African societies are classified as becoming extinct. This is somewhat surprising since slavery was a major economic activity. This is not to say extinction did not occur — documentation for the interior peoples in the early years is very sparse and the records of the earliest contacts are subject to ethnographic interpretation. Nevertheless I found no reference to any particular group of people disappearing completely as happened so frequently in North America.

Second, the West African region exhibited many fairly centralized political systems to begin with — just over one-half the sample was

some type of chiefdom. Further, the more centralized societies were most likely to undergo further centralization. The 51% of societies which were chiefdoms include eight of the thirteen (62%) centralizing societies. The rest of the political development occurred among the tribes; no bands developed more complex systems.

Third, there is the question of those eleven societies who were politically absorbed by another native society during the period. From one perspective of course, being overrun by or laid under tribute to a more powerful neighboring society entails, by definition, some curtailment of sovereignty and is properly classified as political decentralization. However, empire in the pre-modern period did not necessarily entail great change in the internal political structure of the tributary groups. In some cases internal self-government under the indigenous leadership continued relatively undisturbed. On the other hand, other societies who lost their independence did so because their political system had become unstable, leaving them easy prey to their imperialist neighbors. Still others were subjugated by their conquerors to some degree or other. Of the eleven, six (54.5%) became part of the Ashanti Empire.¹⁵¹ At first Ashanti left the indigenous systems intact for the most part as long as tribute was rendered on schedule (with the army to serve as a collection agency). Over time, however, as the political institutions of metropolitan Ashanti developed, their rule

¹⁵¹ The six with their dates of absorption are: Ga-Adangme (absorbed by Akwamu, one of the southern Akan around 1677), Southern Akan (Denkyira 1701, the two Akyems 1742, Akwamu), Northern Akan 1730's, Gonja 1740's, Dagomba 1740's, Fanti chiefdoms 1816.

over the provinces became more efficient and direct. Military training, economic regulation, and tax collection were carried out by the bureaucrats sent from Kumasi. The result might have been a process of cultural incorporation or national development had not the advent of the colonial era frozen the existing cultural and political divisions into place. In any case the expansion of Ashanti certainly did not entail political collapse in the provinces. In the other five cases, a greater loss of sovereignty was entailed. The most extreme case was the subjection and virtual enslavement of the Baga by a ruling class from Susu and/or Futa Djallon.¹⁵²

Fourth and finally, to understand more fully the processes of political change in Africa, instances of curvilinear development must be considered. I have identified six societies whose political development exhibited such a pattern. All six underwent an initial period of political centralization and later experienced some degree of decentralization. It might be said that all failed the ultimate task of state formation, monopolization of the legitimate use of force by the central government. Four began the period as chiefdoms and gradually developed toward the state form. One, Dagomba, was absorbed by Ashanti. The other three were unable to permanently centralize military power and were subject to the internal instability such failure entails. The other two societies began the period as tribes. The southern Akan developed chiefdoms, but warred with each other and were absorbed by Ashanti. The other, the Bambara developed into a state but

¹⁵² Rodney, *op. cit.*, pp. 229, 266; Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

could not permanently control the warriors; internal instability in the Bambara chiefdoms left them prey to the Toucouleur jihad in the 1850's.¹⁵³

With these further explanations of the data in Table XIII, we can turn to the problem of isolating the conditions associated with political centralization in West Africa. The question of length of the trading period does not have the relevance it did for North America because this factor lacks sufficient variance to be an explanatory variable. However, the distance of the society from the coast and direct interaction with Europeans looks more promising. The bigger, more powerful groups seem to have been located in the hinterland, away from direct European contact of the coast but closer than those in the far interior above the river/forest boundary. Dividing the area into coast, hinterland, and far interior as shown on the map, page 88. Table XV shows the relationship between location and political centralization.

Table XV: Change in Political Centralization by Geographic Location: West African Trade Area

	Centralizing Societies	No Change	Decentralizing Societies	Total	
				#	%
Coast	3 (16.7)*	8 (44.4)	7 (38.9)	18	100
Hinterland	7 (30)	13 (57)	3 (13)	23	100
Far Interior	3 (16.7)	9 (50)	6 (33.3)	18	100
Totals	13	30	16	59	

*Figures in parentheses are percentages.

¹⁵³ Paques, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-63; Willis, *op. cit.*, pp. 455-59.

Table XV definitely shows a pattern of change in the hinterland different from that of the coast and interior. However, calculation of the chi-square statistic for goodness of fit yields a non-significant result. It is important to note that five of the seven states which evolved were in the hinterland; in other words, hinterland societies which are 39% of the sample exhibit 71% of the states.

There are three characteristics of the hinterland which may have allowed for its somewhat greater level of political development. First, and most obviously, the societies in the hinterland were removed from direct and continuing interaction with the Europeans. The several European nations were in competition with each other along the coast and each tried to monopolize the trade of various ports. This had political implications in that the presence of various power groups—the Europeans, mulatto traders, indigenous traders, traditional elites—tended to create shifting factions. No one group seemed able to dominate the rest. Since the Europeans did not go inland, the hinterland peoples could trade when and where they chose. They were under no direct pressure.

Second, and I believe more significantly, environmental differences between the coast and hinterland created different resource bases. The coast south of the Gambia is a narrow strip—often swampy, tidal, full of lagoons, etc. Not only were the main trade products—gold, people, kola, oil—not found there, but also agricultural land and population were limited. Further, much of the agriculture was based on farming techniques different from those used in the forest region of the hinterland. These characteristics meant that agricultural productivity had

limited potential for growth; hence the region was generally not self-sufficient in food, especially after it had experienced substantial population growth with the development of trade. Expansion for the coastal peoples would have entailed movement into a different kind of environment against neighbors who were powerful enough to resist such imperialism. Many of the societies in the hinterland, on the other hand, had (or developed) excess land, surplus-producing agricultural systems, relatively larger populations, tradable resources, and as a result, developed sufficient military power to resist imperialism.

The final relevant characteristic of the hinterland is that the northern edge of the forest functioned as a boundary in more than an environmental sense. The savanna and desert in the interior are, of course, more arid so that agriculture becomes a more risky pursuit. The interior peoples adapted to this by developing pastoral economics, either exclusively pastoral or combined with agriculture. A common pattern in the interior was the domination of a peasant community by warrior aristocracies of pastoral origin. Military tactics, therefore, were based on cavalry. But the forest is the home of tse-tse, literal death to horses and cattle. This provided protection for the hinterland peoples from imperialism originating in the interior.

In addition to being an environmental and political boundary, the forest edge served as an economic boundary as well. Trade between the two regions was a natural result of the environmental differences and was very ancient. The interior trade networks of the savanna were dominated by the various merchant peoples I have called Dyula. These peoples seldom entered the forest region, however, probably because

before European trade was established on the coast there was no economic benefit in doing so. The development of the slave trade provided the economic motivation, but even so their penetration of the trade system between forest and coast was partial, confined in general to the northwestern regions. In the southeastern areas, from the Gold Coast east, a cultural reaction to their predominantly Moslem ideology and life-style developed. One Asantehene was destooled in the late 18th century for being too friendly with Moslems,¹⁵⁴ and in Yorubaland the first half of the 19th century saw a similar rejection.¹⁵⁵ In effect, then, the hinterland served as a boundary between the trade spheres of the Dyula-dominated interior and the European-dominated ocean. The hinterland could trade with either one.

It should be noted that the Senegambian region has been implicitly excluded from the foregoing discussion. Senegambia is wholly within the savanna region and the environmental boundaries among coast, forest, and interior are not present. There was accordingly cultural, as well as environmental continuity from the coast inland. The hinterland possessed no superiority in agricultural production. Although the factionalizing effect of Europeans on the coast was not present there, the hinterland did not have the economic advantage of mediating between the Dyula and Europeans. The Dyula caravans came all the way to the coast in Senegambia and elites in the various societies merely collected

¹⁵⁴ Fynn, op. cit., pp. 137-38.

¹⁵⁵ G. O. Gbandamosi, "The Growth of Islam Among the Yoruba 1841-1908" (unpublished thesis, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 1968), pp. 26-31.

tolls from their passing. Therefore, it is not surprising that the overseas trade produced little political development in Senegambia. This region has substantially complex political systems when the period began and these were adequate to the economic demands of the European trade.

What of the hypothesis that trade produces political centralization? Another way to attempt to answer this question is to judge to what extent the European trade was an important influence in the political development of those thirteen societies which experienced centralization. This judgment clearly requires a somewhat more subjective assessment than we might prefer. Nevertheless, it seems to me that in six of the thirteen societies participation in the European trade was definitely a very important influence in the course of political development. In four others such participation probably had some influence. These ten are all on the coast or in the hinterland. In the remaining three instances, all interior societies, political development seems to have been independent of economic forces created by the European trade, although indigenous trade routes may have been influential. In two cases, Mamprussi and Mossi, this was clearly true. In Hausa, the Fulani conquest of the 19th century may have been influenced indirectly by the European trade.

If we turn the question around, we can ask how important the European trade was to the changed political status of the sixteen classified as decentralizing societies. Of the five who became more decentralized without being absorbed, four were strongly influenced by economic pressures stemming from the European trade and the fifth may have been. Of the eleven who were absorbed, eight were incorporated by

societies whose expansion can be directly and strongly linked to the trade. In the other three cases, the economic forces generated by the European trade were probably influential to some extent in their absorption. Therefore, we can say that eighteen societies underwent political change that was strongly influenced by the European trade. However, there remain the thirty who did not exhibit change in political centralization even though over twenty of these were quite actively involved in trading in one form or another.

The hypothesis clearly cannot be sustained in its boldly-stated form. Under certain conditions it retains some explanatory value. Trade is clearly not a sufficient condition for political centralization. At best, it may make a contribution to the process. It does this by generating an economic surplus which may then be expropriated or controlled by elite elements. My data shows that it is by no means inevitable that this latter process will occur.

Economic Structure

In Chapter 2 increasing economic complexity was defined as increase in the quantity of goods and services, development of occupational specialization, and expansion of the processes of exchange. The last has already been implicitly considered in that the classification of a society as a chiefdom or state implies the presence of redistributive and market exchange; while tribe or band implies their absence. Indeed markets and marketing were widespread in West Africa throughout the period. It is time now to turn our attention to the first two indicators. In doing so we want especially to be alert to changes in the material well-being of the people associated with trade. Whether people's

lives were improved has a direct bearing on our assessment of the claims of the dependency or diffusionist schools.

1. Economic Change in the Fur Area. In the fur area, there is no question that the trade in its initial stages increased the quantity of material possessions and that almost everyone in the society had access to the new goods. The material culture became more elaborate; although no attitude surveys were done at the time, scattered references seem to indicate that the people felt they were living in an age of prosperity. Later in the period as game became scarce and the credit system developed, the Indians more often complained to the traders of their poverty, their nakedness, their fear of starvation. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that such statements are proof of a declining standard of living. Partly they indicate a changed perception of what material goods were necessities. Partly they reflect attempts by the Indians to acquire larger amounts of credit or a better price for their furs. We should not dismiss these evaluations entirely--perhaps the later part of the period did see some decline in the Indian's standard of living. However, it will be remembered that by the end of the period the Indians in some areas were actually receiving higher prices for their furs, although higher prices do not imply an improved quality of life.

The fur trade produced little or no occupational specialization within the Indian societies. Almost all adult males trapped and almost all adult women dressed skins. This work was easily done in conjunction with their usual roles as hunter/warrior and gatherer/household supervisor.

Among those groups who occupied the position of trade middleman, a merchant class did not emerge. The Indian trader usually remained a hunter/trapper. Although a group like the Narragansetts among whom Roger Williams noted craft specialization¹⁵⁶ might appear to be an exception, it is unlikely that the division of labor there was due to the fur trade. One case of an incipient division of labor was found among the Huron. There the Rock Clan, the most easterly and the first to meet the French, enjoyed a trading monopoly in around 1600.¹⁵⁷ However, it is unknown how long this monopoly lasted, and in any case, the Hurons were dispersed by the Iroquois in 1649.

The Ottawa and Potawatomi were known as traders especially in the second half of the 17th century after the destruction of the Huron and before the French had firmly extended their trade lines into the region bordering the western Great Lakes. This middleman position does not seem to have resulted in any great occupational transformation within those societies. Most other instances of tribal middlemen were of similarly short duration, and perhaps that is the reason that greater economic specialization did not occur.

A possible exception is the western Cree and Assiniboine, who occupied a middleman role for around a century. Here there are some indications that occupational specialization may have been developing. Milloy argues:

"Like their participation in war, Cree participation in carrying goods to the Blackfoot would have been an indi-

¹⁵⁶ Jennings, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

¹⁵⁷ Noble, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-58.

vidual decision. As some competed more vigorously than others for leadership in war and displayed more talent and liking for it, so in trade some individuals would have been more ambitious or better qualified than others."

He believes trade leaders would have developed in this way.¹⁵⁸ Ray says that in this period many Cree did not do their own trapping,¹⁵⁹ but Milloy disagrees, saying that the Cree "insisted on occupying and exploiting the fur resources of the northern area themselves."¹⁶⁰ They also undoubtedly continued to hunt for their food.

Such incipient specialization did not, however, result in a clearly differentiated merchant group and Cree and Assiniboine economic behavior remained pre-capitalist in nature. Although they were considered sharp traders, attempting to get the best price possible from the Europeans and trading their goods to the west at very respectable rates of mark-up,¹⁶¹ they remained more concerned with use-value than surplus-value. Ray shows this to be true.

Prior to the 1750's, there is little evidence that the Assiniboine and Cree acquired many goods at York Factory specifically for trade with the latter (western) tribes. Rather, they bartered their furs for the items that they intended to use themselves. After a year or two of usage, they then passed them on to these other groups, as used or second-hand trade goods.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁸ Milloy, op. cit., pp. 73-74.

¹⁵⁹ Ray, op. cit., p. 69.

¹⁶⁰ Milloy, ibid., p. 28.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 65-69.

¹⁶² Ray, ibid., pp. 68-69.

Similarly the mark-up was not for the purposes of sustained profit. The fur trade from the Cree side was marked by a total lack of capital accumulation; the increased quantities of goods (furs) produced and goods consumed seems to have had very little backward linkage effect on their economy. This conclusion is applicable to the Indians in the fur trade in general. Indian economics remained pre-capitalist and exhibited very little of what we would call economic development. Yet all the Indian groups in this study were very clearly integrated into the world economic system by 1700. They remained pre-capitalist appendages, albeit essential ones, to the evolving world system. Thus although the Indians probably experienced improvement in their standard of living, the specialized character of their participation in the world economy with its associated lack of economic development fits the dependency model of center-periphery relations.

2. Economic Change in the Slave Area. The processes of economic change were somewhat more complex in Africa. First and similarly to North America, there appears to be no question that the trade increased the quantity of goods and services available in the various societies, particularly those on the coast and in the hinterland. However, it is not obvious that this increase represented an improvement in the material well-being of the mass of people. The quantity of iron imported may have had beneficial effects on the lives of the ordinary persons by making basic tools cheaper or more available.

The fact that large amounts of native currencies were also imported must also have had substantial economic impact throughout the economies of the various groups. These imports seem in some cases to

have had inflationary effects, e.g., on bride price. My impression is that the impact of inflation on the economy in general or on the life-chances of the common folk was not severe. However, this point might fruitfully be pursued further by someone equipped to deal with it specifically.

Beyond these things, however, most of the new products were enjoyed primarily by the ruling class in stratified societies. The merchant elites purchased all manner of consumer goods—furniture, clocks, dishes, tableware, etc.—to furnish their households. Much of this appears to fall into the category of conspicuous consumption. In other words, the material benefits of the trade were spread very unevenly throughout the population. Improvements in the standard of living of the ordinary people must have been limited in such societies. Nevertheless, except, of course, for those unfortunate persons seized and sold into slavery, the trade does not appear to have produced material impoverishment for any sizeable number of people.

The trade system in West Africa was associated with increased occupational specialization in many societies. Besides traders and merchants, many other occupations developed—canoe paddlers, seamen, mercenaries, carpenters, and masons for example. In addition, I would guess that traditional specialties like goldsmiths, blacksmiths, and griots increased in numbers. My data is explicit on increased occupational specialization for 24 societies.

The most interesting case of occupational specialization is that of the Kru in modern Liberia.¹⁶³ Since their region of coast is with-

¹⁶³ The following discussion is taken from Davis, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-17, 50-60.

out good harbors, they developed into handlers of the lighter traffic between the European ships and coastal provisioning and slaving stations. Gradually their dealings with the European ships turned into employment as mariners during the coastal operations. By the early 19th century most trading ships plying the coast from Sierra Leone east would first stop along those parts of the Kru coast known to produce seamen and take aboard a crew. Often the Kru would bring their canoes aboard. When the ship was ready to leave Africa the Krumen would be put ashore and with their pay in trade goods and they would gradually work their way back home, trading as they went. Their knowledge of the coast and its peoples and of the Europeans and their ways, made them valuable intermediaries in the trade. They also participated in the abolition of the slave trade by their employment as seamen on the blockade ships. Kru folklore maintains that they were never enslaved because their particular scarification pattern over the bridges of their noses identified them to the Europeans and hence protected them. To travel this way was a means for a young man to acquire wealth for a bride, experience and respect. After a few voyages a seaman was in a position to settle down as a respected member of the community.

It is possible to consider the issue of "economic development" more fully. I have identified five factors which might appropriately be considered as indicators of increased economic complexity in the West African context: expansion of agriculture in terms of land and cultigens (one non-agricultural group, the pastoral Fulani was given credit for this since it seems that the size of their herds increased),

development of commercial agricultural enterprises, increase in the division of labor, decrease in the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture, and technological innovation in productive processes. The fourth one, decrease in the agricultural labor force, calls for the most subjective evaluation. Nevertheless, keeping in mind that the measures refer to the existence or non-existence of these changes and not the degree of change, it is possible to construct a rough measure of the increase in economic complexity in the sample societies. A group is considered to have experienced a high level of increasing economic complexity if it exhibited three or more of the indicators, and a low level if it exhibited two or fewer of the five. Accordingly, the sample of West African societies breaks down as follows:

Table XVI: Level of Increase in Economic Complexity;
West African Trade Area

Societies	High	Low	Total
Number	11	48	59
Percent	19	81	100

It might be of interest to simply note that there is some overlap on the list of 11 "developing" societies and the 13 "centralizing" societies, but the two lists are far from identical. Just four societies—Ashanti, Ibibio, Ijo and Serer—appear on both. Three additional societies classified as exhibiting a high level of economic change—Ga-Adangme, Fanti, Southern Akan—were absorbed in the Ashanti empire. There is some limited support for the idea that political and economic development go together.

What explanation may be offered for the variation in changes in

economic complexity? Conventional economic wisdom would indicate that "free" economies should "develop" faster than regulated ones. What constitutes a "free" economy varies in contemporary economic thought. Sometimes an economy is called free if it is capitalist as opposed to socialist. To a dependency theorist an economy not dominated by foreigners might be considered free. Finally a free economy might be one in which there is little or no monopoly over production and distribution. The first of these three usages is not relevant to a pre-modern era. However, the other two ideas can be adapted. It will be recalled that participation in trade in the various African societies was sometimes monopolized by foreign merchants and/or indigenous rulers and sometimes widely permitted to commoners. I will call the former regulated economies and the latter free economies. Table XVII cross-tabulates the two variables--change in economic complexity and commercial control--in order to see if there is any association. If conventional thinking is correct the free economies should show greater economic development. The seven societies who did little or no trading are excluded.

Table XVII: Level of Increase in Economic Complexity by Type of Commercial Control, West African Trade Area

Commercial Control	Increase in Economic Complexity		Total
	High	Low	
Free Economies	8	9	17
Regulated Economies	<u>3</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>35</u>
Total	11	41	52

$\chi^2 = 10.14$, 1 df, 7.63 with Yates' Correction, significant at .01.

The chi-square statistic for goodness-of-fit calculated with Yates' Correction for the one low cell is 7.63. This figure is significant at better than the .01 level of probability. Therefore, the idea suggested previously has some validity in this data. However, a note of caution is in order. Only about one-fifth of all the societies showed substantial economic change and only around one-half of the "free" economies exhibited such change. The Guttman's Lambda for strength of association is a modest .18. This is not an economic revolution by any stretch of the imagination.

If revolution does not describe the economic changes which had taken place by 1850, evolution does. Several of the societies, particularly in the Gold Coast and Niger Delta, were involved in a capitalist transformation. Capital was accumulating, a capitalist class was emerging, and the expansionist manner of reckoning was beginning. However, these changes were most thorough in commercial life. The social relations of production remained pre-capitalist. Although plantation agriculture worked by slave labor had supplemented lineage-organized forms, wage labor was nowhere the rule.

A larger number of societies had become integrated into the world market system. The slave trade affected the position of the ruling groups primarily, but trade of the other products affected the common people as well. The coastal people and some of the hinterland groups were part of the European world system by 1850. The interior peoples in general remained outside of the system.

There was some degree of economic development in Africa associated with trade, supportive of the diffusionist idea. However, the limited

material gain and the role of foreign and elite domination in stifling economic innovation is supportive of the dependency perspective. The data on economic change in Africa do not clearly fit either perspective. The conclusion about West Africa must be that although trade can contribute to economic development, it is far from inevitable. Only under conditions marked by lack of restraint on enterprise does such development occur. On this point classical laissez faire economics and modern dependency theorists would agree.

3. Systems of Property. My consideration of economic change will close with a brief reference to systems of property. When I began this study, I believed that trade would have the effect of undermining the traditional systems of property. However, my data show that rules of property and inheritance were quite resistant to change. It is probably safe to conclude that the trade on both continents produced a somewhat greater emphasis on private as opposed to communal property, but this emphasis was largely confined to personal property, not land tenure. The evolution of family-owned trapping groups among the Montagnais-Naskapi that has been so widely discussed by anthropologists was not widespread; in their case it was an adaptation to a long-term trapping economy within a stable territory. In Ashanti, a matrilineal people, trade produced certain patrilineal pressures but did not transform the basic system. Otherwise, established rules of property were adequate to incorporate the increased quantity of goods and new economic transactions.

Stratification

Patterns of change in the degree of inequality within the sample

societies divide clearly by the two continental groups. Within North America there was very little inequality at the beginning of the period and none developed during the time of this study. Trade wealth was spread throughout the societies; no tendencies of class formation are evident. Those few societies that were stratified probably became less so over time. The fur trade was organized so that no group monopolized access to it. Further, traditional patterns of reciprocity within kin groups or other social groups continued to operate. Many American Indian peoples placed a strong value on generosity--leaders validated their position in terms of how much they gave to their followers. Therefore, there was pressure against accumulation and this custom remained viable throughout the period.

In Africa, on the other hand, the trade was accompanied by definite increases in the degree of inequality in the large majority of societies for which I have enough information to judge.

Table XVIII: Change in Degree of Inequality by 1850:
West African Trade Area

Nature of Stratification System of Beginning of Period	Increased Inequality	No Change	Decreased Inequality	Inadequate Data	Total
Stratified	22	1	2	8	33
Unstratified	6	8		12	26
Total #	28	9	2	20	59
Sample %	47.5	15.2	3.4	33.9	100
Sub-Sample					
#	28	9	2		39
%	71.8	23.1	5.1		100

Of the six societies unstratified at the beginning who became more stratified over time, four increased their levels of inequality to such a degree that a class structure of complexity and substantial range had emerged. In other words, these four would be called stratified societies at the end of the period. In most of the societies experiencing increased inequality, there was either the development of domestic slavery or an increase in the proportion of the population in that status. Another common occurrence was for the wealth of the nobility to increase greatly, widening the gap between nobility and peasantry.

Some groups allowed for upward mobility, even while the class structure was differentiating. It is, of course, impossible to measure the rates of upward mobility; however, certainly they were not great. Many societies apparently permitted very little such mobility, while only a few societies allowed for the advancement of substantial numbers of individuals. The Ashanti and their associated cultures was one area in which upward mobility was encouraged. The king of Ashanti sometimes let sums from the royal treasury out to promising individuals to serve as working capital; after a period of time the sum was returned to the king but any profit belonged to the individual.¹⁶⁴ This surely created movement within the class structure.

These changes, great and small, in the societal structure took place in an environmental and demographic context. Within each society, there were sometimes changes in technology, in the physical environment and in population. The various peoples were also subject to popula-

¹⁶⁴ Busia, op. cit., p. 82.

tion migrations and war from neighboring peoples. It is to these changes we now turn.

CHANGES IN THE MATERIAL CORE

Technology

Although the changes in the societal structure were greater and more diverse in Africa than North America, changes in technology were more significant in the latter. In neither case, however, was technological change revolutionary. We have already described how rapidly and completely stone tools were replaced by metal in the fur area. In addition, military tactics and trapping were changed greatly by firearms and steel traps. Although a few Indians developed metal working skills, most gun repair and blacksmithing services were provided by Europeans at the trading posts. Woolen and cotton clothing largely replaced skin garments so sewing skills were changed. Decorative arts and carving skills flourished. However, basic farming skills remained the same as did house construction and canoe manufacture.

In Africa, technological change seems to have been mainly confined to the introduction of firearms into military operations. The larger war canoe was another innovation useful for slaving. The peoples of West Africa already possessed metallurgy and native blacksmiths were quite capable of transforming the imports of iron into the tools needed for agriculture and other work. The bulk of trade goods were consumer items and these did not appear to cause much change in production. For the common folk, agricultural techniques, house construction, transportation, and other features of daily life apparently continued

as before, although the introduction of new cultigens must have entailed some adaptation of agricultural practice. A few merchant princes and mulatto traders on the coast began building and furnishing their houses in European style. Presumably local carpenters employed new techniques in this construction, but such change was very limited in scope. All in all, the data gives the impression of technological stability in Africa. However, a note of caution is due here; since archaeological work has not been nearly as thorough in Africa as in North America and since few Europeans saw the people away from the coast, perhaps the actual level of technological change was greater than my impressions suggest.

Environment

Changes in the physical environment were quite dramatic in both Africa and North America. Both continents underwent substantial alterations in its resource base as plant and animal populations were altered. For the African peoples these changes can be considered a net gain, but for North America fur trading peoples, they probably must be calculated as a net loss. The changes in Africa strengthened the ability of the people to pursue their own style of life. The changes in North America, on the other hand, created a set of conditions which ultimately made the Indians' style of living untenable, necessitating far-reaching cultural adaptation.

In West Africa, the size of the elephant population declined under pressure of hunting for ivory. The region had two varieties of elephant, a smaller forest elephant in the forest and coastal regions

and a larger bush elephant in the interior,¹⁶⁵ The former, always less numerous, became depleted in the immediate vicinity of the coast fairly early, certainly by the beginning of the eighteenth century in Senegambia, Sierra Leone, and probably elsewhere.¹⁶⁶ Ivory supplies came from one-hundred miles or more inland by the early nineteenth century.¹⁶⁷ Increased hunting in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to a depletion of the interior herds as well.¹⁶⁸ It is difficult to evaluate the effects of the loss of a wild animal species in environmental terms. In social terms, however, the amount of socio-economic adjustment the change entailed was probably minimal.

However, the trade period produced another change in the African resource base which was of very great social significance and that was the introduction of a number of new world cultigens, including maize, manioc, beans, sweet potatoes, cocoa and peanuts. Alfred Crosby makes this evaluation:

"The importance of American food in Africa is more obvious than in any other continent of the Old World, for in no other continent, except the Americas themselves is so great a proportion of the population so dependent on American foods."¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ Bere, op. cit., p. 33.

¹⁶⁶ Curtin, Economic Change. . ., p. 224; Rodney, op. cit., pp. 155-56.

¹⁶⁷ Curtin, ibid.; Davis, op. cit., p. 67.

¹⁶⁸ Bere, op. cit., p. 22.

¹⁶⁹ Alfred W. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 (Contributions in American Studies, no. 2; Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972), p. 185.

The main grain staples of West Africa were millet and sorghums, which grow best under relatively dry conditions. Maize, manioc and yams, on the other hand, grow well under the wetter conditions of the rain forest. Indeed, maize and manioc can tolerate a wide range of climatic conditions, and so they spread into many parts of Africa long before any Europeans penetrated the interior. Peanut production became commercially important in the nineteenth century and cocoa in this century. The main importance of the new crops, however, was that they greatly increased the food supply of the native peoples.

The Portugese brought the most important crops in the sixteenth century. In addition, they introduced Asian varieties of rice. Although I can not document the spread of these valuable foodstuffs chronologically, several of the early 19th century European explorers in the interior give us clues that the crops were well established in the interior by then.

The maize not only served to improve the diet of the native Africans, it also was grown in the coastal regions in large quantities to provision the slave ships with their cargoes of captive Africans. By the end of the 17th century such commercial agriculture had developed on the Gold Coast.¹⁷⁰

These agricultural introductions surely had demographic effects. They allowed great population concentrations in the coastal and forest areas, and they may have caused overall population growth. Probably this population growth contributed to the division of labor and to

¹⁷⁰ Daaku, Trade and Politics. . ., pp. 120-22.

political centralization. And certainly it compensated in part for the immense population loss of the slave trade. As Crosby notes:

As for the influence of these crops before 1850, we might hypothesize that the increased food production enabled the slave trade to go on as long as it did without pumping the black well of Africa dry. The Atlantic slave traders drew many, perhaps most, of their cargos from the rain forest areas, precisely those areas where American crops enabled heavier settlement than ever before.¹⁷¹

Although the ethical questions raised by the exchange of food plants for people are exceedingly troublesome, demographically and socially the effects upon the African societies were indirectly to allow for stability or increasing complexity of social life.

Environmental change in North America was even greater than in Africa and included both animal and plant resources. The most direct of these alterations was the decline of beaver and other fur-bearing animals. It is obvious that the trade led to the killing of many times more animals than were required for subsistence. This overkill was a departure from the traditional practices of most of the Indian people; moreover such excesses were by and large in violation of native value systems.¹⁷² Nevertheless, it is important to be reminded that the new hunting practices were not directly forced on the Indians by the European traders.

¹⁷¹ Crosby, op. cit., p. 188.

¹⁷² Many analysts have noted the overkill and the economic and political factors behind it. For an attempt to explain the overkill in ideological terms, see the work of Calvin Martin, especially his recent Keepers of the Game: Indian-Animal Relationships and the Fur Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). I see this work as a plausible hypothesis as to how ideology may have adapted to the fur trade, but I think the causative role ascribed by Martin is overdrawn.

Beaver populations were totally depleted in the eastern and southern part of the region quite early in the period. The western and northern regions experienced this depletion later or to a lesser extent. My notes give the following dates for depletion of beaver and other game in the lands of the various people.

Table XIX: Dates by Which Substantial Game Depletion Had Occurred, North American Fur Area

Huron	1635
League Iroquois	1640
Micmac	1672
Delaware	1682
Mascouten	1750
S. Chippewa	1800
Cree and Assiniboine	1820

The southern and eastern regions did not naturally possess as large a beaver population as did the northern area. Deerskins, muskrat and other furs were substituted for beaver in some areas. Other groups extended their trapping range by migrating, sending hunting parties further and further from home, or by warfare. The last was used by the League Iroquois from 1640-1700 in an attempt to consolidate their middleman position in the trade.¹⁷³

The other environmental transformations which contact induced had much less effect on the people of the fur region. Domesticated animals--horses, cattle, pigs and sheep--were introduced. Horses transformed the life style of the Plains people, and we have already seen that the

Hunt, *op. cit.*, is the classic statement of the thesis that the wars of the Iroquois were beaver wars. Hunt's thesis is quite generally accepted by students of this era.

Western Cree and Assiniboine were involved in this transformation in the late eighteenth century. In effect, they were opting out of the fur trade, however. In Illinois and Indiana some groups acquired horses but their lives were not altered to a great extent. For the most part, the fur area remained a region of canoe transport. Furthermore, the Indians in this area did not generally adopt domestic stock-raising as a part of their economy. The Iroquois are a partial exception; they kept pigs and poultry and also added certain European cultigens such as cabbage and fruit trees to their farming activities. However, this probably did not take place to any large degree until the mid-18th century at a time when their fur-trading days were largely over.¹⁷⁴

The Europeans introduced many of their favorite crops, but their major grain--wheat--did not replace corn as an Indian crop. Later as social dislocations and land loss hampered Indian subsistence efforts, wheat flour became widely used among the native people. However, they seem to have traded for it, not to have produced it themselves.

Population

First change in population size and composition will be documented for each continent separately. Then migration will be considered.

1. Population Size and Composition in West Africa. My main conclusion regarding changes in the size of the West African population is counterintuitive, and that is that the slave trade did not produce

¹⁷⁴ F. W. Waugh, "Iroquois Foods and Food Preparation" (Canada Dept. of Mines, Geographical Survey Memoir 86, no. 12, Anthropological series; Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1916) and Lyford, op. cit.

widespread or wholesale depopulation. The quality of population data for the various individual societies is so inadequate that I cannot unfortunately say anything about fluctuations in particular societies or even regions. Overall there may have been population decline. Crosby gives Dennis Wrong's population estimates for Africa as a whole:¹⁷⁵

Table XX: Estimated African Population Over Time (in millions)

1650	1750	1800	1850	1900
100	95	90	95	120

According to this estimate, the net population loss of ten million people was recovered during the second half of the nineteenth century. Suret-Canale states the recovery was made by the end of the eighteenth century, but he does not give a guess as to the size of the loss,¹⁷⁶ nor does he tell anything about the evidence on which this statement rests. Curtin argues that "it seems possible and even probable that population growth resulting from new food crops exceeded population losses through the slave trade."¹⁷⁷

J. D. Fage has attempted to guess what the West African population was and how it was effected by the slave trade; by projecting backward

¹⁷⁵ Dennis Wrong, Population and Society, cited in Crosby, op. cit. p. 166.

¹⁷⁶ Suret-Canale, op. cit., p. 391.

¹⁷⁷ Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, p. 270.

from estimates made in this century, he suggests a figure of 20 million in West Africa in 1500 and 25 million in 1700. He hypothesizes that natural increase and slave exports produced a roughly stable population during the eighteenth century, followed by accelerating rates of growth in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. On the basis of Curtin's export estimates of 40,000 a year from West Africa in the period 1701-1810, Fage notes that in an hypothesized population of 25 million this represents an average annual loss of 1.6 per 1000, not a huge decline by any means.¹⁷⁸

The area of the biggest export was, as noted previously, the eastern area called the Bight of Biafra; this area was apparently quite densely populated then and it continues so today. This probably allowed for greater elasticity in supply of slaves than was true elsewhere.¹⁷⁹ Certainly the extensive slaving did not produce demographic collapse in the Bight.

Finally, mention should be made of the Michael Mason's analysis of the effect of slave raiding in the 19th century on the population density of hinterland and interior Nigeria. His conclusion after careful evaluation of the evidence is that the low population density of the region is not due to slave raiding except for limited areas, although he is unable to show definitely what factors are responsible. It seems likely to Mason, and to me, that environmental constraint in

¹⁷⁸ J. D. Fage, "The Effect of the Export Slave Trade on African Populations", The Population Factor in African Studies, ed. Rowland P. Moss and R. J. A. R. Rathbone (London: University of London Press, 1975), pp. 17-18.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

the region has always kept population low.¹⁸⁰

Part of the reason that the export of so many millions of slaves did not produce more extensive population decline is to be found in the sex ratio of the exports in combination with African marriage customs. Rodney argues that slave exports from Sierra Leone were consistently composed of one-third women,¹⁸¹ and Curtin uses the same proportion for the import of slaves into the Americas.¹⁸² This would create an excess of women in Africa. Of course, demographic potential is always measured in reference to women. Under a monogamous marriage rule, the extra women remaining in Africa would not contribute to fertility. But almost all West African societies are polygynous; accordingly the reproductive potential of the "extra" women was probably not lost.¹⁸³ The effect would be that a greater proportion of men could have plural wives or that wealthy men could have greater numbers of wives.

Fortunately we can document how this worked in more detail for one area--the Gold Coast. It will be recalled that the Ashanti purchased many slaves from the northern market town of Salaga. They exchanged kola for cowries and cowries for slaves. A male slave was worth around 9,000 nuts but a female slave cost about 14,000 nuts.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁰ Mason, *op. cit.*, pp. 551-564.

¹⁸¹ Rodney, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

¹⁸² Curtin, in Ajayi and Crowder, p. 257.

¹⁸³ J. D. Fage has also noted this point, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹⁸⁴ Robert Rattray, *Ashanti* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923).

However, on the coast a male slave usually sold for more than a female and was more in demand. Economically it was more profitable by far to sell males. Therefore, it appears that female slaves were purchased not primarily for sale; female slaves were often kept and married, either by the master himself or to a member of the household either slave or free. Since Ashanti was a matrilineal society, a man's children by his Ashanti wives belonged to their mother's families and were subject to the authority of their maternal uncles. A man's children by his slave wives, however, belonged to his own household and family and so there was undoubtedly motivation to marry slave women.¹⁸⁵ Demographically the result must have been a substantially high sex ratio in this area. There is no data as to what the sex ratio was of the slaves the Ashanti purchased. Enslavement in the interior was usually a result of war or raid; presumably the former would result in a greater proportion of women. Therefore, it is impossible to say that one sex predominated over the other in the interior, or in slave exports from that area.

In his essay on the demographic role of polygyny in Africa, Dorjohm presents sex ratio data from the early censuses and shows that women did outnumber men in Nigeria, the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone in the early 20th century. He unfortunately does not realize the historical reasons for this (he makes no mention of the slave trade), and instead assumes this sexual imbalance is general throughout Africa and is due to higher male mortality rates. He also argues that polygyny has the effect of lowering fertility, but I am unclear about the basis of this

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

statement except perhaps in comparison to a purely hypothetical monogamous system.¹⁸⁶

The composition of the population in the various African societies also underwent some change. One feature of the increasing social inequality was the increase of domestic slavery. In a few cases the data indicate that by the early 19th century the slave population outnumbered the free. The increase in the slave population was most characteristic of the coastal and hinterland groups but was by no means confined to those areas. In the nineteenth century the interior was rocked by a series of Islamic wars and increased enslavement was a feature of most of these.

This changing composition of slave and free implies increased ethnic diversity, especially in some of the coastal and hinterland regions. In the interior Dyula communities spread into many societies. Therefore, overall the societies become more ethnically diverse, at least in the larger more centralized areas. This trend presented problems of assimilation in some of the societies. The most successful solution to this problem of integrating foreign slave elements was found in the Ijo societies of the Niger Delta. There the large numbers of slaves from the interior who were to be kept were integrated in two ways. First, only very young ones were kept; they were symbolically adopted into the family as "children" and were given a "mother", one of the household women, to look after them. It was forbidden to refer

¹⁸⁶ Vernon R. Dorjahn, "The Factor of Polygyny in African Demography," Continuity and Change in African Cultures, ed. William Bascom and Melville Herskovits (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 87-112.

to slaves as such in public.¹⁸⁷ In practice, of course, this kinship idiom was more genuinely applied to slaves who were diligent and loyal to their households. Upward mobility and accumulation of wealth were quite readily available to ambitious slaves. A second form of assimilation operated through the activities of various secret societies. The Ekine society put on elaborate masquerades which called for detailed knowledge of the history and culture of the Ijo. There was great pressure to join and so a slave who was upwardly mobile was highly motivated to become thoroughly acculturated. Another group, the head-hunters association, held forth the threat of loss of life to persons who were slow or unwilling in learning the language and customs.¹⁸⁸

The Ibibio (Efik), on the other hand, never successfully bridged the gulf between slave and free. Before the mid-19th century, the upper levels of the governing secret society, Ekpe, were closed to persons of slave origin, no matter how wealthy, although after 1850 the social order began to loosen up a bit.¹⁸⁹ Further, a group of rural slaves, the Blood Men, organized and successfully intervened in the mid-19th century to prevent the customary funeral sacrifice of numerous slaves.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ Robin Horton, "From Fishing Village to City-State," Man in Africa. ed. Mary Douglas and Phyllis Kaberry (London: Tavistock Publications, 1969), p. 48.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 53-54.

¹⁸⁹ Latham, Old Calabar. . ., pp. 96-97; D. Simmons in C Forde ed, Efik Traders of Old Calabar (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 16.

¹⁹⁰ G. I. Jones, "The Political Organization of Old Calabar," ibid., pp. 154-57.

The North American Indians were decimated by the introduction of European diseases to which they had no immunity. This did not happen in Africa. Although disease environments were more distinct than they are now, the African and Eurasian land masses shared many diseases. Apparently the San and "Hottentot" populations at the Cape were crippled by disease; whether this happened elsewhere is unknown, but epidemics do not seem to have increased in intensity for sub-Saharan Africa generally.¹⁹¹ In particular, there is no mention in the literature I have read of large-scale epidemics and mortality among the West Africans.

Indeed, it was the Europeans who suffered increased mortality from their contacts with the Africans. The reason is that West Africa is the home of a group of tropical diseases, including malaria and yellow fever, that the European visitors were unfamiliar with. As Curtin notes:

West Africa and Europe shared many of the diseases common to the whole Africa-Eurasian land mass, but some West African diseases like yellow fever were limited to the tropics. Thus Africa had a wider range of disease than Europe.¹⁹²

The result was an immense rate of mortality among Europeans on the slave ships and in the coastal trading posts. Curtin points out a seldom-mentioned fact:

Europeans newly arrived at trading posts on the Gulf of Guinea usually sustained a death rate of about 50 percent in the first year of residence. Fortunately for the sailors, their stay was shorter and their death rates lower, but the slave trade was dangerous nevertheless. . . The death rate per voyage among the crew was uniformly

¹⁹¹ Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, p. 270 and in Ajayi and Crowder, op. cit., p. 252.

¹⁹² Curtin, in Ajayi and Crowder, p. 252.

higher than the death rate among slaves in transit at the same period. The data are so consistent and regular in this respect that this can be taken as a normal circumstance of the eighteenth century slave trade. Even more unexpectedly, the death rate of slaves in transit fell progressively through the period, but that of the crew remained nearly at the same level. Apparently the slave traders discovered ways to improve health conditions for slaves in transit, but they were less successful in meeting the dangers of malaria and yellow fever, the principal killers of strangers to the West African Coast.¹⁹³

Therefore, the conclusion is that population remained relatively stable in Africa in spite of the loss of millions to the slave trade. This stable population together with an inhospitable disease environment confined the Europeans to the coast and allowed the African peoples to preserve or change their social structures without coercion from European settlers. The North American Indian peoples were not so fortunate.

2. Population Size and Composition in North America. The introduction of Old World diseases into the Americas was a disaster of incalculable proportions for the native inhabitants. The questions of the size of the native Indian population before contact and of the course and magnitude of the mortality which contact produced have attracted substantial scholarly interest in recent years. Estimates of the scope of mortality for the hemisphere range from 3 out of 4 to 19 out of 20. It is inappropriate to even attempt a review of that literature at this time.¹⁹⁴ I want to restrict my consideration here

¹⁹³ Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, pp. 282-283.

¹⁹⁴ See The Native Population of the Americas in 1492, ed. William Denevan (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976); Henry Dobyns has prepared an annotated bibliography which gives the major works. Henry Dobyns, Native American Historical Demography (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).

strictly to what I have been able to learn about population decline among the societies of the fur trade region.

It is obvious that mortality rates from communicable disease are likely to be highest in areas of greater population density. Therefore, we can hypothesize that the nomadic hunter/gatherer has an advantage over the settled agriculturalist in an epidemic situation. I have encountered various estimates of the size of the groups over time. These are summarized in Appendix B. All except two show either population decline or decline and partial recovery. The estimates for Ojibwa and Ottawa suggest population growth, but I would venture to guess that these two groups incorporated many of the refugees from the upheavals further east. If these estimates are at all accurate, the growth probably came from migration, not natural increase. The biggest declines were among the agricultural peoples as expected. (See the appendix for Huron, Illinois, Mandan, Narragansetts, Susquehannock, and Wanpanoag). The Iroquois, also an agricultural people, declined much less dramatically. The reason for this is that their adoption of war captives and refugees was a conscious social policy. In fact, one of the major reasons for war was to get a captive to replace a slain kinsman.¹⁹⁵ These captives constituted a large part of the population. However, apparently the Iroquois were able to overcome any problems of cultural integration this may have presented for one never sees any reference to failures of social solidarity or fifth column movements from foreign elements.

¹⁹⁵ Wallace, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

One can imagine the terror and demoralization the smallpox, measles, and other epidemics must have produced in the native communities. The despair of the individual at the loss of most of his own kinsmen, the frustration of the shaman at being unable to stop the dying, the disruption of economic and political life and of religious tradition, the flight of the survivors into unknown areas with unknown enemies, the wonder of Indian and European alike that the priests and traders were largely untouched by the illness -- all of these effects can be imagined. One has to conclude that the amazing thing is not that so many died but that the survivors were able to adapt to the changes without total social disruption.

The priests, traders, and settlers interpreted the massive decline of the Indian population as a sign of Providence. How the Indians interpreted the events is more difficult to know. It seems that some at least also sought supernatural explanations, since the ideology of many Indian people contained the idea that ill health resulted from a violation by man of the proper order of things.¹⁹⁶ Others believed that the Jesuits used their black robes and crucifixes to bewitch the Indians.¹⁹⁷ Neither group, Indian or European, of course, understood the germ theory of disease. In the early 19th century some of the western groups were vaccinated against smallpox and escaped the horrible

¹⁹⁶ See Calvin Martin, Keepers of the Game. . . for an excellent analysis of the Indian response to the mortality.

¹⁹⁷ Robert Conkling, "Legitimacy and Conversion in Social Change: The Case of the French Missionaries and the Northeastern Algonkian," Ethnohistory, XXI (winter, 1974), p. 13.

death rates that disease produced.¹⁹⁸

In evolutionary terms, the decline of population, especially in the more complex societies, must be evaluated as a strong causal variable in the devolutionary process many of the Indian societies experienced. Increasing complexity and declining population, especially massive decline, do not go together. It would be difficult to overestimate the effect population decline had on the native societies of the Americas.

I have suggested that various groups merged or consolidated and that members of one group were often incorporated into another. In addition, Quimby believes that cultural differences among groups were reduced during the fur trading period.¹⁹⁹ This is reasonable, for not only did groups merge, but there was more travel and trading centers were sites of interaction among societies. And, of course, all shared a common place in the social relations of production. Therefore the Indian cultures, like their African counterparts experienced changes in composition of their populations.

This analysis of changes in population will close with consideration of another demographic process -- migration. There are two patterns of migration evident in the data, one characteristic of Africa and one of North America. In Africa there was very little migration of whole peoples; rather migration consisted primarily of the

¹⁹⁸ Gast, op. cit., p. 246; Ray op. cit., p. 188.

¹⁹⁹ Georgy Quimby, Indian Life in the Upper Great Lakes: 11,000 B.C.-1800 A.D. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 147-48.

movement of warrior elites and merchant classes. In the former case, the movement was, in general, from the interior Niger Bend area toward the coasts. One push factor was the changing balance of power created by the development and then breakup of the Songhai empire in the 15th and 16th centuries. This area gave off waves of warriors and traders who pushed further and further south. Probably the trade contacts which were developing on the coast with the Portugese served as a pull factor, perhaps weak at first but certainly growing in strength over time.

The merchant groups, of course, moved almost entirely under the pull of trade possibilities. They spread throughout the interior savannah regions; for some reason the southern forests remained by and large on the margin of their settlements. Dyula groups reached the coast and direct trade with Europeans primarily in the Senegambian drainages and adjacent areas. It is interesting that they saw the close similarity between their lives and that of the European traders. In 1620 a Dyula merchant named Bokar Sano attempted to drive a better bargain with Richard Jobson on the Gambia River by appealing to this similarity. Curtin quotes Jobson's report of the conversation:

In our time of trading together, if it were his owne goods he bartered for, he would tell us, this is for my selfe and you must deale better with me, than either with the Kings of the Country or any of the others because I am as you are, a Julietto, which signifies merchant, that goes from place to place, neither do I as the Kings of our Country do which is, to eate and drinke, and lye still at home amongst their women but I seeke abroad as you doe. ²⁰⁰

²⁰⁰ Jobson, The Golden Trade, or a Discovery of the River Gambia, quoted in Curtin, Economic Change. . ., p. 83.

These communities of merchants were often the kernels around and from which spread Islamic influence, culminating in a series of militarist revolutionary movements in the 19th century.

Migratory movements in North America included whole societies and were very extensive. The movement of people was very obviously and directly the result of the fur trade. Only a few societies remained continuously in the same territory throughout their trading period. These movements were undertaken for one of three closely related reasons: to flee under military pressure, to seek more productive trapping lands, or to settle near a trading post. The aggressive policy of the Iroquois League in the 17th century created a veritable tidal wave of peoples out of Pennsylvania, Ontario and Michigan into Wisconsin and surrounding area. As the Iroquois threat subsided after 1700, these peoples began to filter back to the east and south. Included in this upheaval were the Potawatomi, Miami, Mascouten, Fox and Kickapoo, plus, of course, those destroyed or dispersed at this time -- the Erie, Petun, Neutral, Susquehannock and Huron. The Ottawa and Chippewa also moved at this time, although fear of the Iroquois was not as clearly their motive. And, of course, the Winnebago, Menomini and Illinois were affected by the invasion of their lands by the refugees. The Ottawa, Northern and Southern Chippewa, Cree and Assiniboine drifted west and north in search of middleman profit and more productive trapping lands. And most of the tribes who survived tended to shift their points of congregation to the various trading posts. The French, in particular, actively encouraged this settlement among their allies to serve their economic and military interests over against the British. Of course,

not all the Indians were "French Indians", but parts of the more independent groups also tended to shift toward forts or posts for part of the year.

The development of trade affected migration on both continents. Although we can not conclude that the European trade resulted in an increased rate of migration in West Africa, there is little doubt that the tempo of movement picked up in North America.

This analysis of the role of trade in a pre-colonial setting will end with the consideration of one final consideration, the incidence of war among the native societies. Since trade is defined as the relatively peaceful exchange of goods between societies, we could fairly ask whether the development of trade resulted in increased intersocietal cooperation and the expansion of peaceful ties. Unfortunately, my data show exactly the opposite.

In both West Africa and North America the European trade resulted in a greatly increased incidence of war. In North America this war took three forms. In the first the traditional blood feud exploded under competition for fur resources and favorable trade position. The Iroquois wars in the 17th century, and the Chippewa-Sioux wars in the late 18th and early 19th century were instances of this.

In the second form the Indians formed alliances and fought in the interest of one or the other European powers. The French and Indian War is the most obvious example of this, but there were many instances in which Indian allies assisted the Europeans in establishing their spheres of influence on the continent. The vendetta of the French and their Indian allies against the Fox Indians fits this type. Often the

Europeans used the Indians as a military buffer. Sometimes the Indians were exploited for European political ends, but often the Indian leaders entered these alliances with an open-eyed assessment of their own interests. The Iroquois were masters of this ability to use the European power struggle to their own advantage.

The final form was the wars of conquest where the Indians fought to defend their lands from the European invaders. The Pequot War, King Philip's War, and numerous incidents and skirmishes between the Indians and (usually) English on the colonial frontier are examples.

The intensifying conflict which the European contact brought to North America was manifest in a disruption of the internal equilibrium of the Indian societies. The motives of the young warriors for glory and revenge could find almost unlimited occasions for expression. The militarism of the young men escalated into higher and higher levels of recklessness and aggressiveness. Accordingly the elders found it more and more difficult to restrain the young men, and as warfare became a constant feature of life, the peace chiefs lost influence to the war chiefs; ultimately the authority of the peace chiefs was undermined.²⁰¹

As already explained, war was an integral feature of the slave trade in West Africa. Military action was the ultimate means of production. Therefore, it is not surprising that the frequency of war and raids increased. However, all military actions were not merely slave

²⁰¹ David Baerreis, "Chieftainship among the Potawatomi: An Exploration of Ethnohistoric Methodology," The Wisconsin Archaeologist, LIV, no. 3 (1973), pp. 114-135; Harold Hickerson, The Southwestern Chippewa. . ., pp. 27-28, 52-53.

raids. West Africa exhibited three kinds of warfare: slave raids, wars of imperial expansion, and the Moslem holy wars. The last was quite similar to the second in organization and effects if not in motivation.

Slave raiding was, of course, very widespread and directly linked to the presence of Europeans on the coast. The most remarkable social effect of the increase in raiding occurred in the area of contemporary Liberia and Sierra Leone. There several of the societies were transformed in the late 18th and 19th century into fortified military camps, led by war chiefs, in which the continual raids became the main source of wealth (slaves and booty) and prestige.²⁰² The decline of the overseas slave trade did not alter the pattern established thereby. The raiding had become an integral feature of the social organization.

In the other two kinds of war slaves were a useful by-product, but not the motivating force. Wars of imperial expansion were carried out by the Ashanti, Yoruba, and Dahomeans. Moslem holy wars occurred in Senegambia, in Hausaland, and elsewhere in the interior. Of course, such movements might well have occurred even if there had been no European trade outlet for the captives. The effects of the European presence were indirect: the alteration of the flow of resources which allowed for the movement of political processes in new channels.

The occurrence of warfare in both Africa and North America lends little credence to the common sense notion that trade is a peaceful

²⁰² Kenneth Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone (New York: Humanities Press, 1967), pp. 28-30, 37-38; Davidson, op. cit., p. 47.

pursuit. In both cases trade produced competition over resources and increased militarism. The pursuit of war brought material and other rewards while the rewards for the pursuit of peace probably remained the same or declined. In moral terms, this was an insidious effect.

It is an interesting irony that the extension of European colonial control over the peoples of this study at the end of the trading period was justified in part by reference to the very qualities of the native societies which the trading period had produced. As the fur trade had produced increased nomadism, warfare, political upheaval and decreased emphasis on agriculture, so those who wanted to "civilize" the Indians spoke of their wandering life style, their savage warfare, their failure in the arts of government, and their reliance on the chase rather than the tillage of the soil.²⁰³ As the slave trade produced increased warfare, domestic slavery, political centralization in some areas, perversion of justice, and a decrease in the regard for human life, so those who wanted to "civilize" the Africans spoke of their bloody savagery, their trafficking in human beings, their autocracy, and their moral degeneracy.²⁰⁴ This so-called civilizing process was to take place, of course, in a context of European economic and political control.

By 1850 all of the Indian societies and many of the African societies had become incorporated into the international market system

²⁰³ For examples see the many Indian agents' and missionaries reports in the Report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

²⁰⁴ For example, see Mason, op cit., p. 553 and Philip A. Igbafe, "The Fall of Benin: A Reassessment," Journal of African History, X, no. 4 (1969), pp. 551-564.

centered in western Europe. The incorporation process entailed certain adaptations consistent with the role each society was playing in the system as a whole. The Indian societies had become specialized in fur production and then gradually lost their ability to function independently as their lands became more valuable as farm, timber, or mining land than as fur-producing lands. The great population decline and disruptions they had experienced loosened their communal institutions and their hold on their resources.

Many of the African groups had adapted their political and economic institutions to the task of producing, transporting, and selling themselves to fulfill the European demand for a labor supply suited to tropical conditions. This specialization in slave production entailed the consolidation of hierarchial social structures in some areas while in others the requisite social institutions were already present. They remained producers of people and of agricultural products until the evolution of labor and productive institutions in Europe made the direct exploitation of African land and labor resources appear more efficient to the Europeans.

The specialized role that the various Indian and African peoples came to play did not entail a revolutionary break with their past social institutions. The technological, institutional and ideological character of these societies provided the core out of which the overseas trade was supplied.

CONCLUSION

What, finally, may we conclude from these data about the hypothetical effects of trade suggested in Chapter 1?

It has been demonstrated, first of all that trade is associated with political centralization in only a minority of the sample societies. As I suspected, scholarly claims about the role of trade in "state-formation" are exaggerated. Political centralization was the least common outcome.

I suggested that either trade produces political centralization in the presence of certain other factors or that only certain kinds or qualities of trade will have that effect. It is clear that the fur trade in general was not associated with political centralization, but with the opposite. The four Indian societies who became more centralized did so for reasons not inherent in the fur trade. The devolutionary effects the fur-trading societies experienced are due in large part to the population decline they suffered but also to the techno-economic demands of trapping/trading. These demands -- individual effort and mobility -- made centralized social structures untenable. The quantity of trade goods received had no impact in the fur trading area since the goods were widely distributed and available to all. Therefore no elite groups could use control over this wealth to consolidate a power position.

The slave trade was somewhat more likely to produce the hypothesized centralizing effects. Some groups, especially those located in the hinterland were able to translate the wealth and power gained from trade into more centralized social structures. Although control of trade was an important empirical regularity, it was by no means sufficient to produce the hypothesized effect. The slave trade did import "relatively massive amounts" of goods of "a higher order of luxury and craft production" as suggested by Malcolm Webb and yet this was not a

sufficient condition for the evolution of chiefdoms from tribes.

Another look at Table XIII will show that just as many tribes devolved as evolved in Africa (5 each). Yet the Webb hypothesis is not rejected because the five devolving tribes were all absorbed by other expanding societies. They did not become bands.

I hypothesized that trade is more likely to result in the evolution of chiefdoms from tribes than tribes from bands. This hypothesis is sustained by the African data, for no bands became tribes (or changed at all) but 25% of the tribes evolved more complex social orders.

Finally, Webb suggested that while not a sufficient condition, trade might provide an important stimulus for change within chiefdoms. The data sustains this hypothesis. Trade did produce relatively more change in the African chiefdoms; 36.67% remained unchanged, compared to 50% for tribes, and 100% for bands. Further if the six chiefdoms who were absorbed are overlooked, evolutionary trends were more common than devolutionary ones are among chiefdoms. Nevertheless state-formation was less common than stability among the chiefdoms. As already noted the leaders of many chiefdoms could not overcome the forces resisting the centralization of military power. Therefore, Webb is correct that trade is not a sufficient condition for the evolution of states from chiefdoms.

What overall conclusions do the data permit about change in economic structure which pertain to the debate between the diffusionist and dependency perspectives? For the fur trade, we saw that while those who survived the diseases did experience an improvement in their ma-

terial well-being and that this benefit was widely shared, the specialization as trapper/traders produced few or no developmental effects on their economic systems. The increase in mobility, warfare, debt and the decreased attention paid to agriculture did not result in capital accumulation, reinvestment, occupational diversification or improved ability to effect the market in their interests. On the other hand, the terms of trade did not consistently deteriorate. Overall the dependency model fits the fur trade better than the diffusionist one.

For the African trade, we saw that the improved material well-being was less general than in North America. The slave trade did not produce a deterioration in the terms of trade; indeed the opposite seems to have occurred. In most African societies little or no economic development took place and the dual economy idea has relevance. Elites often either invested capital and energy only in the export sector or did not reinvest at all, but instead engaged in conspicuous consumption. Most technological change and division of labor was confined to the export sector. Nevertheless, native productive systems were enhanced by the introduction of productive new crops. In a few societies substantial economic development took place; this effect was most apparent in the "free" economies where the benefits from trade were not monopolized by foreign or indigenous elites. Therefore, some of the economic effects predicted by the dependency model occurred and some did not. The most common condition in the African sample was no change in political and economic systems. Although the dependency viewpoint would assess this stability as "stagnation", it is just as

reasonable to conclude that the social systems in Africa were quite adequate to the political, economic, and technological requirements of extensive trade. It appears that the effects of trade in Africa were neither so "good" as predicted by the diffusionists nor so "bad" as predicted by the dependency model. It appears that the dependency model requires some revision if it is to be successfully used for this historical period.

My hypothesis about the effects of trade on systems of stratification are sustained: trade wealth monopolized by a segment of the population resulted in increased inequality and consolidation of class structures. Trade wealth widely distributed had no such effects. Increased prosperity does not necessarily cause increased inequality.

In some African societies the wealth and skill of the trading class attracted increased prestige for this activity and occasionally led to rivalry with the traditional elite. However, traditional elites in Africa did not generally remain aloof from trade, and therefore they often consolidated their privileged position with the benefits of trade.

Changes in population size was a variable of major importance as I hypothesized, especially in North America. However, counter to my prediction, the slave trade did not result in population decline on a scale requiring technological or socio-political adjustment. Trade produced migration and changing population composition on both continents.

The technological change accompanying trade was much less significant than hypothesized. Generally, indigenous techniques persisted and no technological or productive revolution took place. This fact is

probably an explanation for the generally low levels of economic development already discussed. The lack of technological innovation represents a strong critique of the diffusionist model.

We have already reviewed the fact that the technological requirements of the fur trade resulted in a simplified productive and social system in the fur trading societies. It is true that in comparison the technical requirements of the slave trade necessitated a somewhat more complex social order. Generally, the Africans were already equipped with such social structure before the Europeans came and were capable of producing slaves in large numbers for sale. Gold mining and the production of the other trade goods did not require as elaborate a technical and social system as I thought they would. These goods were produced by a variety of indigenous techniques within varying productive systems. Participation in the non-slave trade was determined almost completely by the environmental distribution of resources, and was not related to technical or social complexity.

Finally, my hypotheses about environmental change were also sustained. Environmental depletion in North America was associated with migration and population decline in North America. Calvin Martin argues that population decline caused environmental depletion by making the Indians give up their traditional conservation practices. Although this hypothesis is plausible, I prefer the idea that population decline and resource depletion were not causally related at the beginning of the trade period although they may have been at the end. In any case, migration is directly related to game depletion.

On the other hand, the Africans experienced expansion of resources, and accordingly were able to counter the population loss of the slave trade by a stable population and some increase in social complexity.

Now let us turn our attention to the effects of land expropriation.

CHAPTER IV: THE LAND EXPROPRIATION AREAS

INTRODUCTION

Trade was only one of three forms of contact between Europeans and the peoples of Africa and the Americas. The focus of this chapter is the second of these--land expropriation. We take this concept to mean a situation in which a society loses its land or territory to an invader, but is able through migration or withdrawal to remain politically and economically autonomous. This type of societal experience is interesting theoretically because, in terms of some scale of imperialism or coercion, it is intermediate between the predominantly economic linkages of trade discussed in the last chapter and the formal coercion of conquest to be discussed in the next chapter. The question to be asked is: Are there patterns of social change which differentiate the experience of land expropriation from trade on one hand and conquest on the other?

The literature on imperialism offers little guidance in predicting patterns of change since most writers have not distinguished between conquest and land expropriation. Insofar as the latter is seen as simply a variant of the former, land expropriation should produce general devolutionary trends similar to those produced by conquest. However, this approach is too simplistic. Although forced withdrawal may produce social disruption, I hypothesized that the ultimate outcome of such an experience would not be fundamentally similar to conquest at all. Rather my view when I began this study was that the insights of cultural ecology would predict the outcomes of land expropriation better

than an imperialist framework. My view was that a resolution of potential social disruption would be made by a migrating people in their new land and that this resolution would be strongly influenced, perhaps even determined, by the environmental characteristics of that new land. Agricultural potential, water supply, natural resources, and the presence of other societies would, I predicted, be prime factors influencing the adaptation of migrant groups. In fact, as will be demonstrated, I was correct in predicting that an imperialist framework would not predict accurately the course of social change undergone by a migrating society. Land expropriation is not just a variant of conquest. However, I was wrong in hypothesizing that exogenous environmental variables would predict the course of social change. These exogenous variables were much less significant than the endogenous factors of political structure and leadership in shaping the adaptation of the migrant groups. The migrant groups are strongly associated with increasing political centralization, but in the period prior to the dislocation from their land. Therefore, the migration itself, although always socially traumatic and accompanied by immense individual suffering, was not characterized by massive social breakdown or by extensive social change in the period following the migration.

I made reference above to the "migrant groups." Unfortunately not all of the peoples in the areas studied were able to maintain enough social coherence to migrate and hence avoid conquest. Some of the sample societies became incorporated into the expanding European societies as dependent subcultures; others deteriorated socially and

entered the European or other native societies as individuals or social fragments. Therefore, a second question of this chapter is why some survived and others did not. In other words, what factors differentiate the "migrants" from the "non-migrants?"

The variables to be considered are the same as those of the analysis of trade: overall changes in levels of sociocultural complexity in the societal order (politics, economics, stratification) and in the material core (technology, population, environment). The sample, as outlined in chapter II, consists of 36 societies in the North American and African regions in which the land hunger of European settlers was the dominant fact of social adaptation in the early nineteenth century. South Africa is the best example in Africa of this phenomenon. For North America the Southeastern culture area was chosen, because it was the home of several groups who were forced to migrate out in the nineteenth century. However, this area is not a "pure" case of land expropriation because the period of migration was preceded by a period of trade with the Europeans. This trade, nevertheless, did not permeate the economic system in the way it did in the fur areas, and therefore, with this caution, we may accept the Southeast as an example of land expropriation. The sample, divided evenly between Africa and America, breaks down into migrants and non-migrants as shown in the following table:

Table XXI: Distribution by Region and Migration

	Migrants	Non-migrants	Total
South Africa	9 ^a	9 ^b	18
Southeastern U.S.	7 ^c	11 ^d	18
Total	16	20	36

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF MIGRATION

The land expropriation process in South Africa and the Southeastern United States took place, of course, in a set of historically unique conditions and events. A short description of these events will demonstrate the context out of which the migrations grew.

- ^a Gaza, Makololo, Ndebele, Ngoni, Swazi, BaSotho, Hlubi, Ngwane, Tlokwa. The last three were impermanent refugee groups who were eventually absorbed by one of the others. The first four are the true migrants, moving out of the area as geographically defined. The Swazi and BaSotho (Mosheshwe's Sotho) migrated but within the area to a location defensible for a time from native and European incursion.
- ^b Kgalagadi, Khoi, Cape Nguni (Xhosa, etc.), Pedi, San, Transvaal Ndebele, Tswana, Venda, Zulu. The Pedi were briefly dislocated from their land by the Ndebele, but returned after the latter moved on.
- ^c Alabama/Koasati, Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, Seminole, Tuscarora. A part of each of the so-called Five Civilized Tribes remained in the Southeast after removal of the main body to Oklahoma. The Seminole are themselves a creation of the land expropriation process, being formed from segments of various other groups, mainly Creeks and Hitchiti, attempting to escape European domination.
- ^d Apalachee, Calusa, Catawba, Guale, Houma/Chitimacha, Lumbee, Natchez, Tequesta, Timucua, Yamassee, Yuchi. The Catawba, Houma/Chitimacha, and Lumbee survived in reduced numbers in the Southeast. The rest became socially extinct or joined other groups. The Lumbee, like the Seminole, are a composite creation of the land expropriation process.

In South Africa a set of economic and demographic trends which had been underway for several centuries was contained during the eighteenth century. The result in the first half of the nineteenth century was an explosion of war and social upheaval, a tumultuous whirlwind of peoples flying helter-skelter across the land, called the Difigane (or Mfecane).¹ The proximate cause for this social movement was the transformation of the northern Nguni peoples from the loose, continually fissioning chiefdoms characteristic of the South African Bantu into a highly centralized, garrison state dominated by the Zulu subgroup. This process of centralization is sometimes ascribed to Shaka, the authoritarian ruler of the Zulu kingdom. Although there is no question that the military innovations he introduced in the early nineteenth century made the Zulu a fearsome military machine, the process of political centralization actually began in the late eighteenth century with the expanding power of three of the northern Nguni chiefdoms. Their increasingly militaristic structure was further strengthened by competition with one another. The military activities of the Zulu and other northern Nguni groups sent shock waves throughout the region.

¹ Many sources deal with this period but the best and most concise is J. D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth Century Revolution in Bantu Africa (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969).

² John Omer-Cooper, "Political Change in the Nineteenth Century Mfecane" African Societies in Southern Africa, ed. Leonard Thompson (New York: Praeger, 1969) pp. 214-215.

³ op. cit., p. 213.

A more anterior cause for the Difiqane can be found in basic economic and demographic forces. For several centuries prior to this time, South Africa had been the scene of a migration of a less dramatic sort--the gradual movement south and west of cattle-herding, farming Bantu speakers from the northeast.⁴ These people, differentiating into the Sotho-speakers of the interior veld and the Nguni-speakers east of the mountains to the coast, gradually spread throughout the region, displacing, incorporating, and diffusing their lifestyle to the local hunter/gatherers. The South African pastoral lifestyle is very land extensive, requiring continual adjustment of people and animals over the land in response to supplies of forage and water.

Politically this adjustment was affected by the fissioning of junior segments from senior chiefly lineages. These new chiefdoms and their followers could spread into the frontier, incorporating or displacing the aboriginal inhabitants as they went.⁵ This process works very well as long as there is sufficient suitable land for expansion. However as Robert Carneiro has hypothesized,⁶ continued population growth under environmentally circumscribed conditions results in poli-

⁴ H. A. Innskeep, "The Archeological Background," Oxford History of South Africa, vol. 1, ed. M. Wilson and L. Thompson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 39; and cf. William Lye, "The Distribution of the Sotho Peoples after the Difaqane," African Societies in Southern Africa, ed. L. Thompson, pp. 191-192; and cf. John Omer-Cooper, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

⁵ Lye, op. cit., p. 191; and Omer-Cooper, op. cit., p. 12.

⁶ Robert Carneiro, "A Theory of the Origin of the State," Science, 169: 733-38, cited in Malcolm Webb, "The Flag Follows Trade," Ancient Civilization and Trade, eds. J. Sabloff and C. C. Lamberg-Karlovsky, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975), pp. 184-185.

tical centralization. This appears to be exactly what happened in South Africa during the eighteenth century. The Kalahari Desert in the west and the mountains and ocean in the east directed the flow of population expansion. However, by the early eighteenth century, the European presence at the Cape with its own expansionist tendencies cut off the possibility of further movement south and west. The Europeans, armed and mounted Boer and Briton, were not so easily pushed aside as the San and Khoi had been. Therefore, the conditions were right, especially in the Nguni corridor between the mountains and the sea, for some form of response to the growing population pressure.⁷ The leadership abilities and ambitions of Dingiswayo, Shaka, Mzilikazi and others found expression in galvanizing the northern Nguni of Natal into a number of political organizations capable of taking by force the cattle, land, and people needed to survive.

The chronology of events and peoples was as follows, and as summarized on Map E. By 1800, population growth and perhaps secondarily trade with the Portugese had led to a gradual consolidation of political power and increased warfare in Natal among the many segments of the northern Nguni.⁸ Three groups had emerged to whom the rest were either tributary or only precariously independent; these three were the Ndwandwe

⁷ Omer-Cooper, op. cit., pp. 169-170; and cf. M. Wilson, "Cooperation and Conflict: The Eastern Cape Frontier," Oxford History of South Africa, vol. I, pp. 252-255.

⁸ Leonard Thompson, "Cooperation and Conflict: The Zulu Kingdom and Natal," Oxford History of South Africa, vol. I, pp. 337-341.

under their chief Zwide, the Ngwane under Sobhuza, and the Mthethwa under Dingiswayo.⁹ Two of the tributary groups of note were the Kumalo, subject to the Ndwandwe, and the Zulu, subject to the Mthethwa. Military pressure had put the societies in a state of permanent mobilization by the transformation of the traditional circumcision schools into age-graded military regiments.

In the period between 1800 and 1820 military competition among the groups led to a fundamental reordering of power. In 1816 the usurper Shaka seized the chieftainship of the Zulu and, although continuing his vassalage to Dingiswayo, introduced certain military and organization innovations which greatly centralized the society. In 1818 the Mthethwa were defeated in a war with the Ndwandwe and Dingiswayo was killed. The Zulu absorbed the remaining Mthethwa into their state. Meanwhile conflict between the Ndwandwe and Ngwane over land led the latter to withdraw to the north. There Sobhuza established his dominance over the local people; this new society eventually became known as the Swazi.¹⁰

As the decade came to a close the two remaining power centers, the Zulu and Ndwandwe, were inevitably led into conflict. In the ensuing confrontation the Ndwandwe were defeated and broke into segments; two of these, the Gaza under Shoshangane and the Ngoni under Zwangendaba,

⁹ John Omer-Cooper, "Aspects of Political Change in the Nineteenth Century Mfecane," African Societies in Southern Africa, ed. L. Thompson, p. 213.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 214.

fled north across the Limpopo River.¹¹ The remaining Ndwandwe coalesced under Zwide for a time. The Kumalo, who had been tributaries of Zwide, were led at this time by their young chief Mzilikazi into an association with the Zulu.

In 1822 Mzilikazi refused to turn over some raided cattle to Shaka; this act of treason led the Kumalo to flee across the mountains into the Sotho area.¹² Mzilikazi's followers, henceforth known as the Ndebele (or Matabele), embarked on a circuitous course of conquest which eventually led them into Rhodesia in the late 1830's. On their way in 1826 they defeated the remaining Ndwandwe, who disappear as an organized group. A portion of the Ngwane and another group, the Hlubi, also crossed the mountains into the Sotho area in the early 1820's.¹³ These two groups were absorbed by others in the general upheaval of the 1820's in the interior. The Sotho were, of course, thrown into conflict with these invaders and with each other. As people fled their homes, groups formed and reformed under this chief or that. Out of this social cauldron emerged three "new" groups, while others like the Tswana chiefdoms were able to continue with some continuity. Part of the

¹¹ P. R. Warhurst, "The Scramble and African Politics in Gazaland," The Zambesian Past: Studies in Central African History, eds. R. Brown and E. Stokes (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1966), p. 47; and cf. Thomas T. Spears, "Zwangendaba's Ngoni, 1821-1890: A Political and Social History of a Migration," Occasional Paper #4, African Studies Program, Madison, Wis., 1972, p. 9.

¹² R. K. Rasmussen, Ndebele Wars and Migrations c. 1821-1839 (Ph.D. Thesis: U.C.L.A., 1975), pp. 47-60.

¹³ Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath, pp. 86-91.

Fokeng were led north in the late 1820's by their chief Sebitwane. They crossed the Zambezi, established themselves over the local people, and are henceforward known as the Makololo.¹⁴ The Tlokwa eventually settled on a mountain in transorangia where they remained a focus of power until defeated by the BaSotho in 1852. Finally the Monaheng, a minor segment of one of the Tswana chiefdoms, were led by their chief Mosheshwe to a mountain stronghold in 1824. There Mosheshwe forged a group capable of withstanding attack. Refugees by the thousands joined them and they became known as the BaSotho (or Basuto).¹⁵

At the same time these events were taking place in the interior, the growth of European population at the Cape and the sociopolitical conflict among the British, Boers, and Coloured (the Griquas, e.g.) was leading to a second explosion of people. The so-called "Great Trek" of the Boers into the interior in the early 1830's was really only the climax of movement which had been going on throughout the eighteenth century. The Boer and Coloured cultures were even more segmentary and land extensive than the Bantu because they were more heavily pastoral and more individualistic than the latter. The trek was simply a better organized, explicitly political manifestation of the basic expansionist character of this lifestyle.¹⁶ The success of the Trekkers in wresting control of vast quantities of land from its African owners was primarily

¹⁴ William Lye, op. cit., p. 193.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 196-197.

¹⁶ Leonard Thompson, Cooperation and Conflict: the High Veld, Oxford History of Southern Africa, pp. 406-307.

due to the immense will of the Boers and the military advantage that guns and horses offered over spear-carrying foot soldiers. The Boers had no particular advantage over the natives in political or social organization.¹⁷ No doubt the fact that the Trek came on the heels of the Difiqane helped the Boer cause.

Most of the native societies learned that the missionaries and the British could be used to protect themselves from the threat posed by the Trekkers. The history of South Africa from 1830 to 1890 is a melange of action and reaction among Briton, Boer, and Bantu. That analysis is not the purpose of this study, however. The point is that the expanding presence of European settlers shaped the course of migration for all the dislocated people. For example his concern about the Trek along with his usual fear of the Zulu was what led Mzilikazi to abandon the region and lead the Ndebele north into Rhodesia in 1837-9.¹⁸ Those who were strong enough to migrate away from the Europeans remained independent for a few more generations; those who were not came under the ideological, economic, and political control of European rulers. They were conquered peoples.

The dislocation of the Southeastern Indians was much more typical of the direct pressure that European settlement exerted on native peoples in many locations. Sustained European contact began in the latter half of the sixteenth century in Florida with the extension of

¹⁷ Leonard Thompson, "Cooperation and Conflict: The Zulu Kingdom and Natal," Oxford History of Southern Africa, pp. 355-356.

¹⁸ Rasmussen, op. cit., pp. 253-290.



MAP E: Southern Africa, 1800-1840

- Migrations:
- BaSotho
 - - - - - Makololo
 - Swazi
 - o Gaza
 - - Ngoni
 - . - . - . - . Ndebele

Spanish control from the Caribbean in the form of mission/military outposts. The European presence grew during the seventeenth century with the establishment of English and French settlements on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. The early eighteenth century saw the spread of European power through increasing numbers of settlers anxious to push inland for land and through the development of trade ties to the interior Indians.¹⁹

The fur trade in the Southeast consisted primarily of deerskins traded to South Carolina and other traders. Although this trade was substantial for several decades in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, it did not have the extensive effects of the fur trade in the north,²⁰ at least among the societies of the interior. Rather, fur trading was annexed onto the existing economic system of the Indians, and as game populations diminished, was replaced by greater emphasis on agriculture and stockraising.

A greater effect of European contact on the Indians of the Southeast was found in the power struggles of the Spanish, French, English, and Americans over control of the area. The Indians were caught up in this power struggle as each European power attempted to extend its sphere of influence over the various Indian groups by alliance or force.²¹

¹⁹ Charles Hudson, The Southeastern Indians (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), pp. 434-436.

²⁰ Charles Hudson, The Catawba Nation (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1970), pp. 32-34.

²¹ Angie Debo, The Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republic (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), pp. 27-28.

The English/American system was the most land hungry; therefore, the groups within that sphere of influence, especially those near the coast, were displaced or destroyed in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.²² As the English political and economic system came to predominate during the eighteenth century, all of the Indian societies felt pressure on their land.

The political triumphs of the colonists in the American Revolution and the economic triumph of the slave-worked plantation system along with the rapid growth of the Euroamerican population intensified the pressure on the remaining Indian societies to relinquish their land. This pressure culminated in the 1830's with the passage and ultimate enforcement of the Indian Removal Act. By the provisions of this law the Indians were to cede their southeastern homelands in exchange for money and lands in the newly established Indian Territory, the present state of Oklahoma. The sovereignty of the Indians over this new territory was to be perpetual. Basically the law was intended to finish by treaty what war and disease had begun--get rid of the Indians so their land could be used by European settlers. The removal question not surprisingly created intense conflict within the several surviving Indian societies.²³ The Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, and Chickasaw were forced

²² Charles Hudson, The Catawba Nation, pp. 42-43.

²³ D. England, A Demographic Study of the Cherokee Nation (Ph.D. Thesis: University of Oklahoma, 1974), p. 81; and cf. James Pate, The Chickamauga: A Forgotten Segment of Indian Resistance on the Southern Frontier (Ph.D. Thesis: Mississippi State University, 1969), p. 225.

more or less violently to migrate to Oklahoma in the late 1830's.²⁴

The Seminoles, a group of mainly Creeks and Hitchiti refugees who had fled to Florida during the previous century, were also forced to remove to the west during the 1840's. Part of all these groups, sometimes called the Five Civilized Tribes, managed to avoid removal and still survive in the southeast along with remnants of the Houma/Chitimacha, Catawba, and another composite group, the Lumbees.²⁵

Two other groups migrated out of the area before the Removal Act; the Tuscaroras went north and joined the Iroquois Confederacy after 1713,²⁶ and parts of the Alabama/Koasati eventually drifted into Texas during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.²⁷

The remaining eight societies in the sample became extinct socially through war and disease, their remaining members joining other Indian groups. Map F shows the location of the sample societies before removal or extinction. The four large groups (Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek) forced to migrate to Oklahoma under the removal policy were faced with the task of reestablishing their social structures in the new land. They, like the migrant groups of Africa, were quite successful at this task as will be shown. The political independence

²⁴ Grant Foreman, The Five Civilized Tribes (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1934), pp. 282-284.

²⁵ Charles Hudson, The Southeastern Indians, pp. 478 and 493-494.

²⁶ James Pate, op. cit., p. 26.

²⁷ John Swanton, Early History of the Creek Indians and their Neighbors (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of American Ethnology, #73, 1922), pp. 198-99 and 203-206.



MAP F: Locations of Societies Prior to Removal, Southeastern United States

of the migrants continued until the end of the nineteenth century. Then once more the imperial impulse of Euroamerican culture caught up with them and they joined the many other groups as conquered peoples.

CHANGE IN THE SOCIETAL ORDER

Throughout the following analysis of the societal order (politics, economics, stratification), the focus will be on a comparison between the migrants as societal survivors on one hand and the non-migrants as conquered groups on the other. The analysis will show that the process of migration itself was not accompanied by extensive social change. However, the migrants were marked by certain political and sometimes also economic innovations in the period immediately prior to the migration itself. These innovations, almost invariably accompanied by a marked increase in the degree of inequality within the societies, appear to have provided the societies with the organizational resources needed to survive the trauma of dislocation and migration.

Political Change

Let us turn to political structure first. In documenting the political change associated with trade in the previous chapter, I demonstrated how slowly and uncertainly political centralization (or its opposite) occurred. In considering political change under conditions of land pressure, therefore, it is surprising to note how rapidly substantial structural changes in politics took place. For the most part, a single generation was sufficient to allow the political centralization process to occur among those who experienced it. A more conservative estimate of the time required would be about fifty years.

The tables which follow show changes in political structure from precontact to the eve of the actual dislocation (c. 1820 for Africa, c. 1830 for North America) among the sample societies. Table XXII is for the sample as a whole; tables XXIII and XXIV divide the sample into migrant and non-migrants. The general pattern of change for the sample as a whole is similar to that observed with trade--about equal occurrence of centralization (11), stability (13), or decentralization (12). However, Tables XXIII and XXIV show clearcut differences in the political development of those who later migrated and those who did not. Comparing these two tables, it can be seen that all but one of the societies who underwent a process of political centralization migrated out of the area or to a more secure territory within the area. The one exception is the Zulu state which was in effect the prime mover of the migratory process in Africa. The Zulu in their process of consolidation either absorbed or drove out all the native peoples of Natal. The incursions of the Boers into Natal caused the Zulu to falter politically and demographically in 1838-40, but after that their basic strength allowed them to survive as an independent people until their defeat by Britain in 1879.²⁸

On the other hand, all but one of the societies who experienced decentralization were non-migrants. This one exception is a portion of the Alabama/Koasati who detached themselves from their affiliation with the Creek Confederacy (this affiliation itself probably came about during

²⁸ Leonard Thompson, "The Zulu Kingdom. . .," pp. 362-64; and Colin Webb, "Great Britain and the Zulu People, 1879-1887," in Thompson, ed., p. 302.

Table XXII: Political Change, Land Expropriation Areas,
Contact to c. 1820/30

Level of Complexity at contact	Level of Complexity, 1820/30					Total at contact
	State	Chiefdom	Tribe	Band	Extinct	
State						0
Chiefdom	9	10	1	1	4	25
Tribe		1	1	2	2	6
Band			1	2	2	5
Total 1820/30	9	11	3	5	8	36

Table XXIII: Political Change of Migrant Groups, Contact to 1820/30

Level of Complexity at contact	Level of Complexity, 1820/30					Total at contact
	State	Chiefdom	Tribe	Band	Extinct	
State						0
Chiefdom	8	4				12
Tribe		1	1	1		3
Band			1			1
Total 1820/30	8	5	2	1	0	16

Table XXIV: Political Change of Non-migrant Groups, Contact to 1820/30

Level of Complexity at contact	Level of Complexity, 1820/30					Total at contact
	State	Chiefdom	Tribe	Band	Extinct	
State						0
Chiefdom	1	6	1	1	4	13
Tribe				1	2	3
Band				2	2	4
Total 1820/30	1	6	1	4	8	20

the land expropriation process) and drifted into Texas. Many tribal fragments joined the Creeks during the eighteenth century. I have no explanation for why the Alabama detached themselves while other similar groups within the confederacy (e.g. the Natchez and Yuchi) remained allied to the Creeks throughout the removal crisis. In passing it should be noted that the Hitchiti (or Mikasuki), not included in the sample, are analogous to the Alabama. After allying with the Creek Confederacy for a time, they moved into Florida and became one of the basic constituents of the Seminole.

To get a better idea of just how strongly a process of political centralization is associated with the ability to survive the land expropriation process, consider the five societies who are coded as having remained stable in political structure up to and through their migration to a new land.

Three of the chiefdoms coded as having maintained a stable structure are the Hlubi, Ngwane (not Sobhuza's), and Tlokwa mentioned before. These peoples were in effect only temporary societies, being dispersed or absorbed by other groups in the years following the Difiqane. The first two were gone by 1830; the Tlokwa remained an independent chiefdom until 1852. The remaining group coded as a stable chiefdom is the Creeks. The Creek Confederacy did come through the migrations relatively unchanged. They maintained the typical southeastern pattern of town chiefs and officers loosely grouped into two chiefdoms throughout the period. However, the crisis period before removal did see some centralization of authority in the society. Observers thought the paramount chief of the Creeks between c. 1780 and 1800 (McGillivray) had

tremendous authority, associated with the dominance of the war chiefs over the customary power of the civil chiefs. Nevertheless, the Creeks did not form a true state until 1867, after they had been in Oklahoma for thirty years.

The other case of a group who maintained their traditional political structure up to and through migration is the Tuscarora. I have coded them a stable tribe. Even though they joined the League of the Iroquois in New York as a junior member, this did not constitute a substantial forfeiture of sovereignty because the League members maintained almost total autonomy in internal governance. The members did coordinate their actions in foreign affairs, however.

Earlier I noted that the process of political centralization took a surprisingly short time. The main structural changes in the case of all eleven centralizing societies took place between c. 1780-1830. Change was particularly intense in the African societies between 1815 and 1825 and in the southeastern cases between 1820 and 1830. This is in contrast to political centralization in the trade areas which took much longer to develop.

The eight chiefdoms who became states (nine including the non-migrating Zulu) are worthy of further consideration. Three of these are the southeastern Indian groups of Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw. The rest are African: Zulu, Gaza, Ndebele, Ngoni, Swazi, and Makololo. The three southeastern groups were similarly organized politically up to around 1775 in a chiefdom pattern quite common throughout the region

before the disruption of contact (cf. the Creeks).²⁹

The basic political unit in these southeastern groups was the local clan or lineage segment. The heads of these kin units along with respected elders formed the council of a town. Each town was headed by dual chiefs, with the civil chief (Mico) holding dominant authority. The civil government consisted of a number of officials who assisted the Mico with administrative tasks, such as organizing communal labor and so forth. In addition, the military organization consisted of the war chief, his assistants or officers, and age-graded sets of warriors. This structure was repeated at the national level with town heads and elders forming national councils and the head of the "capital" town serving as Mico for the nation. Chieftainship was ideally hereditary in certain clans. Often towns were grouped into regional units--the Cherokees had four "districts," the Creeks two, the Choctaw three or four, while the Chickasaw apparently had no districts. It is important to point out that the most significant political unit was the town with the authority of "district" or "national" chiefs being quite loose and varying strongly with external conditions and the personal charisma of the paramount chief. The system, a good example of Indian democracy, favored individual freedom and local autonomy.

²⁹ Frederick Gearing, Priests and Warriors: Social Structures for Cherokee Politics in the Eighteenth Century (Washington: American Anthropological Association Memoir, #93); and John Swanton, Social Organization. . .of the Creek Confederacy, 249-51, 276-307; and Arrell Gibson, The Chickasaws (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971), pp. 21-22; and Debo, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

As interaction with (including substantial intermarriage) and pressure from Europeans increased during the latter eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw political systems were reorganized along state lines.³⁰ The Revolutionary War had disrupted governmental processes to varying degrees in the several societies. The Cherokees were most affected and therefore the political changes they adopted were more extensive than the other two groups. All three outlawed blood revenge and established a national police force and independent judiciary. National and district councils greatly increased in power and the elective principle was adopted with varying degrees of success by Cherokee and Choctaw. Legislative actions were recorded in written form. These changes took place in Cherokee between c. 1810 and 1827 and in the other two between c. 1820 and 1830.

The trauma of the removal process split the societies into bitter factions. After settlement in Oklahoma, it took some time before a stable government was able to function. Each group had somewhat different problems: different treaty provisions, factional issues, environmental problems, etc. which affected the speed with which they were able to establish themselves politically. The main body of Cherokee removed in 1838 and adopted a constitution and Act of Union with those Cherokee who had migrated a decade earlier in 1839. However, factionalism and violence continued throughout the early 1840's until a treaty among the parties in 1846 reduced conflict to tolerable limits.³¹

³⁰ Foreman, op. cit., p. 355; Gibson, op. cit., pp. 137-38; Debo, op. cit., pp. 45, 48-9.

³¹ Foreman, op. cit., pp. 299, 303, 349-51.

The Chickasaws, also removed in 1838, had been forced by the United States treaty commissioners into a union with the Choctaw. From 1840-55 they experimented with various kinds of structure, including the one they had been using in the southeast along with elected commissioners to supervise their property. This dual system of government was not effective, nor was the fact that they were organized as the fourth district within the Choctaw nation satisfactory to anyone. In 1855-56 they finally negotiated a separation from the Choctaws and established a constitution allowing them self-government.³²

The Choctaws were the first to arrive in Oklahoma, 1833, and they settled in their traditional three districts. In 1834 a written constitution was adopted and was revised to include the Chickasaws in 1838. New constitutions were adopted in 1843 and again in 1857-60.³³ The final constitution of all three societies was a thorough adaptation of Euroamerican governmental forms found in the various states and territories with elected leader, bicameral legislatures, and an independent judiciary of local and appellate courts.

The biggest change the migration process created was to diminish the political role of the clans by mixing up the people. Basically, however, the process of political evolution in these three southeastern societies was a gradual response to external power sources and changing internal cultural and political needs. After a period of warfare with the Europeans in which the Indians were generally the losers, the people

³² Ibid., pp. 100, 106-7, 124-25, 130-31.

³³ Debo, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

learned to rely on civil political processes--negotiation and diplomacy--in the period immediately prior to and after their removal to the west. They tried to protect their interests through treaty rather than through force.

This is in distinction to the several South African states who were all strongly militaristic prior to and through their migration. It may be that as pastoral peoples the South African groups were always more militaristic than their southeastern counterparts. The basic political form in South Africa before the Nguni revolution was a kin-based, unstable tribe/chiefdom. Leaders of certain influential lineages attracted followers through successful raiding, generous clientage arrangements, or benevolent conditions of population growth (of both people and cattle). Eventually the scope of the chiefdom would reach a peak and processes of fissioning and dispersion would take place. The proximate causes of this waning process might include succession disputes among the sons of a deceased chief, political ambitions of junior chiefs, unsuccessful raiding, predation by more powerful neighboring chiefdoms, natural disasters such as drought, desertion of clients to stronger leaders elsewhere, and so forth. A new segment would usually start off fairly small with basically a tribal structure. The successful ones would attract other segments and clients and become chiefdoms. The goal of ambitious leaders was many cattle and many followers. In all of these chiefdoms governance was relatively loose. The paramount chief held authority because of his charisma, his control of the redistribution of cattle, and/or the traditional seniority of his lineage. However, the chiefs of the various segments (the

Zinduna, singular induna) had power also and had the right to participate in the "national" councils (pitsos). And, of course, the paramount risked desertion by his followers if he lacked generosity and even-handedness. Often the men and sometimes the women were age-graded.

These cattle-keeping chiefdoms were linked to the hunter/gatherers of the region also, as Richard Elphick's excellent analysis shows.³⁴ Not only were the San and Khoi hunters often linked to the chiefdoms as clients; in times of ecological or military disaster, cattle-keepers could take to the hills and become hunter/gatherers. Thus pastoralism and hunting were not mutually exclusive lifestyles, especially in the arid conditions of the far south and west.

The main changes effected in this system by the state-forming northern Nguni were the transformation of the young men's age-grade into permanently mobilized military regiments directly responsible to and dependent on the paramount chief. In its most militaristic form (Zulu and Ndebele) the warriors (and in Zulu the young women) resided in barracks towns scattered throughout the territory in a state of ready alert. The heads of these regiments were also the provincial governors (Zinduna). The regiments were structured to eliminate lineage or local loyalties. For example, men from all over the state were joined in particular regiments which had distinctive emblems, etc. and the men were not allowed to marry. The king "owned" all the cattle and the young women, so that after their period of active duty, the warriors

³⁴ Richard Elphick, Kraal and Castle: Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

would be given wives and cattle by the central government and allowed to settle in villages. Sometimes these villages were former regimental associates.³⁵ Often the female kin of the king had a substantial political role as a counterweight to the power of the military commanders.

At its most militaristic end, the military structure of the society was the government; in other cases the military structure predominated but civil government by kin, local, or ethnic groups was also permitted. In any case, the king had almost total authority, especially compared to the traditional power of a Sotho or pre-revolution Nguni chief.

Consideration of the societies who survived the land expropriation process focusses our attention on the crucial role of leadership in successful political action. The histories of these times and peoples are full of dynamic, aggressive, charismatic men who led their people through the traumas of dislocation. The politics of the African societies, always affected by dynamic individuals, are dominated at the time of this study by a group of exceedingly daring and insightful leaders.³⁷ To many historians the early nineteenth century history of South Africa is the history of Dingiswayo and Shaka, of Mzilikazi and Mosheshwe, of Shoshangane and Sebitwane, and of course of Retief, Pretorius, Moffat, Shepstone, and Livingstone. In particular the personalities of Mzilikazi and Mosheshwe stand forth as the force

³⁵ J. D. Omer-Cooper, "Political Change. . .," pp. 214-15.

³⁶ William F. Lye, "The Ndebele Kingdom South of the Limpopo," Journal of African History, X (1969), p. 99.

³⁷ Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath, p. 180.

which held the Ndebele and BaSotho respectively together through the many challenges they faced.

The southeastern Indians traditionally placed less emphasis on the individual leader, but during the crisis of removal a group of leaders-- Ross, McGillivray, Colbert, Pitchlynn, McIntosh, and so forth--emerged who were able to guide the people through the morass of treaty negotiation and migration. We don't hear much about the leaders of the losers, but that is undoubtedly a result of the bias of historical memory. Certainly the last Great Sun of the Natchez and his brother, Tattooed Serpent, appear to have been leaders of distinction.

This point should not be taken as espousal of a great man theory of history, however. The crisis of land expropriation called for decisive action. All these leaders stand out because they were able to adapt to conditions not of their own making and to provide the impetus needed to help their people overcome cultural inertia and venture on new paths.

Economic Change

Although the precontact, premigration, and postmigration economic systems of the African and southeastern Indian societies were quite different from one another in basic structure and contact experience, all are similar in that the fact of migration by itself did not entail drastic changes in basic economic processes. The migration caused varying degrees of economic disruption among, for the most part, the Indians, but the economic structures that they established in their new homes were, as among the African societies, basically the same as those they had before removal. A description of the economic systems of the South

Africans and southeastern Indians in turn will demonstrate this point.

1. South African Economic systems. All the societies in the South African sample were cattle-keepers and farmers except the hunter/gatherer San (Bushmen). In addition, the Venda were basically farmers and kept only a few cattle of a northern variety because tsetse was a problem in their land. All the rest placed great value on cattle. Accordingly, in crude economic terms we can say that those who were able to keep their cattle and get more survived while those who lost their cattle did not survive. Getting and keeping cattle is a matter of two factors: raiding potential and adequate water and forage. In an outstanding piece of ethnohistory, Elphick has shown how a combination of political and ecological factors led the Khoi people of the Cape to lose their cattle and hence their independent social existence to the Dutch in the last half of the seventeenth century.³⁸

The Cape Nguni also lost their cattle. They are a particularly tragic case of what happens with the kind of population pressure I called social impaction. The land base of these peoples was progressively whittled away up to the mid-nineteenth century. The Xhosa, one of these groups, pressed by the Europeans on the south and the Zulu on the north, in desperation accepted the prophecies of a millenarian religious movement that if they killed all their cattle the whites would be swept away, all the people would be renewed to wealth and youth, and the dead heroes would be resurrected. Many Xhosa killed all their cattle. The mass starvation and social disorganization caused by the Cattle Killing

³⁸ Elphick, op. cit.

of 1857 destroyed the independent existence of many Xhosa groups. Many thousands of refugees were forced to seek food in the Cape Colony. The Xhosa lost their cattle and the European colony gained a labor supply.³⁹

There are other examples less dramatic. Some of the Tswana chiefdoms, pressed by Ndebele raids on the east and the Kalahari Desert on the west, developed a survival strategy that worked fairly well as an ecological holding action. When the raids intensified to the point of serious loss of cattle and people, some chiefs would send part of their people and cattle west to certain desert water holes. When the raids lessened they could return.⁴⁰ Ultimately the Boer expansion entailed a more permanent shift west in order to maintain sufficient land for the herds. The Tswana in general survived through these means.⁴¹

On the other hand, the migrant societies picked up cattle like a rolling snowball picks up snow. The Ndebele and other groups grew strong because they were able to acquire, generally by military means, enough cattle and pasture land to support themselves and their captives. The basic economic system remained pastoral. Cattle were the main riches and economic processes were structured around the acquisition and distribution of these animals. It was only much later, in the second half of the nineteenth century, that European economic activity--trade, quest for mineral concessions, etc.--began to affect the economies of the migrant peoples to a significant degree. This latter economic

³⁹ Monica Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 256-68.

⁴⁰ Rasmussen, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

⁴¹ Leonard Thompson, ". . .The High Veld," pp. 438-9.

penetration was, of course, the prelude to conquest.

2. Southeastern Indian Economic Systems. The economic systems of the southeastern Indians underwent much more substantial change than that of their African counterparts in the generation prior to removal. The precontact economies of these Indians were closely associated with the environmental zones of the region. The people of the coastal area emphasized hunting and gathering while the societies of the interior emphasized agriculture. Although pressed by Europeans, the Indian societies did not suffer social impaction because their populations declined from European disease. Accordingly the coastal groups were destroyed and the white settlers established in their stead. But, of course, the Europeans were not hunter/gatherers; they were a commercial people, tied to the productive systems of Europe, and they extended trade ties to the interior Indians. This trade led to an increase in deer-hunting in the interior to the point of diminishing returns. The Revolutionary War is a turning point, for after that the interior Indians began to reemphasize agriculture, but of a somewhat different type than they had practiced earlier. Although most of the Indians remained subsistence farmers, the desire for certain European items entailed some sale of produce at the trading post. Some of the Indian families became thoroughly incorporated into the developing commercial agriculture of the South, raising stock, cotton, or other crops primarily for sale, often with slave labor. In general after 1775, the productive systems of the four interior societies (Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw) were indistinguishable from that of the Europeans, although traditional land tenure remained. Individuals could use as

much of the communal land as they wished, although in some cases registration was required. The permanent "improvements" made on the land belonged to the individual. The adaptation to European market systems seems to have been associated with a decline in communal labor, however. Communal land tenure arrangements, which the Europeans found anathema, continued until the end of the nineteenth century with the eventual conquest of the Indians.

The removal of the Creeks, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Cherokees disrupted their economic life. Although many of the Indians, both rich and poor, took some of their possessions with them to Oklahoma, they were forced to leave their houses, barns, mills, cleared fields, and so forth behind. This was unlike the migrating Africans whose wealth was on the hoof and therefore self-propelled. The four Indian societies made different arrangements with the American government for the sale of their lands, and indeed individual Indians varied in how much return they were able to realize from their southern property. One strategy used by the wealthy was to convert some portion of the money they received for their improved lands into another kind of self-propelled wealth--slaves. Overall the Indians received only minimal compensation for their individual property, and in addition the people were horribly defrauded by government contractors over the costs of the removal itself--the transportation, provisions, etc. Even if this had not been true, time was still required to clear new fields, build homes, establish businesses, etc. Five years seems to have been the minimum amount of time required for stable economic processes to be reestablished, the early 1840's for the Cherokee and Creeks and the late 1830's for

the Choctaw. The economic recovery of the Chickasaws was held up by the fact that the lands they purchased from the Choctaw were unsafe because of raids by Texans and western Indians. Most of the Chickasaws lived near the forts on their annuity payments until their agricultural economy began to stabilize in the early 1850's and up to the Civil War.⁴²

The Civil War undermined Indian economic life once more. All became involved in the conflict. The Cherokee and Creeks suffered direct destruction of their property by the armies. The Choctaw and Chickasaw, especially the former, were overrun by refugees from Cherokee and elsewhere. Once more the Indians had to pick up the economic pieces and once more they were quite successful in the early 1870's. The liberation of their slaves meant a shift of gears for the wealthy Indians, but stock-raising, oil leases, and other activities brought money both to individuals and to the societies as groups. However, the post-Civil War period also saw the infiltration of the Indians' land by Euroamerican settlers and speculators. As this infiltration turned to a flood, the federal government presided over the end of the remaining political sovereignty and the liquidation of the communal estates of the Oklahoma Indians.⁴³ The promises of perpetual independence were not kept.

The Seminoles were required to alter their economic system much more drastically. The movement into the swamps of Florida entailed a much greater reliance on fishing/hunting/gathering. The conditions faced by those Seminole who were removed to Oklahoma in the 1840's

⁴² Arrell Gibson, op. cit., pp. 186-88, 191.

⁴³ Englund, op. cit., p. 116.

were so fraught with political upheaval and hostility between the Seminole and Creeks that stable agriculture was next to impossible. Most Oklahoma Seminole farmed some, but hunting was their main support. The separation from the Creeks in 1855 allowed the beginnings of a stable agricultural economy, but the Civil War disrupted these efforts.⁴⁴

The other two migrating groups, the Tuscarora and Alabama/Koasati, had not altered their traditional economic systems substantially by the time they moved. The Tuscarora were absorbed into the farming/hunting/trading system of the Iroquois. The Alabama/Koasati maintained a marginal subsistence pattern combining hunting with a little farming and trapping as they drifted west.

Of the non-migrants we need only consider the three groups in the sample who survived in the southeast along with the parts of the five removed groups who remained. None of the groups which became extinct underwent dramatic change before being wiped out. At the most some of them had entered trade with the Europeans to some degree as an adjunct to their traditional economies. All of the Indians who remained in the southeast except the Seminole became marginally incorporated in the southern economy as subsistence or "dirt" farmers. The Catawbas got some additional income from leasing their land; later many became sharecroppers.⁴⁵ One interesting sidelight in southern Indian economic life was the emergence of a "Robin Hood" type group,

⁴⁴ Foreman, *op. cit.*, pp. 226, 242-43, 246.

⁴⁵ Hudson, The Catawba Nation, pp. 63-71.

the Lowry gang, among the Lumbees in the late nineteenth century to protect Lumbee land and people from the Ku Klux Klan and other predatory southerners.⁴⁶ The Florida Seminole, on the other hand, were more independent economically because of their isolation.

Change in Stratification

None of the sample societies, except perhaps the Natchez, exhibited an extensive degree of inequality in the precontact period. The chiefdoms of the southeast and South Africa were, of course, characterized by some inequality. In both regions certain chiefly lineages or clans were more prestigious, constituting an aristocracy of sorts. In Africa the institution of clientage buttressed this system in that the owners of cattle clearly had higher rank than the clients. In the southeast the redistributive system was likewise controlled by the chiefly group, but the thoroughgoing communal property and work systems meant that the chiefs were merely trustees of the public wealth, not its owners. It is doubtful whether these bases of inequality resulted in marked differences in lifestyle or consumption patterns within the populations. The differences between the "rich" and "poor" were probably small in this regard. Furthermore, there must have been substantial individual mobility, because in both areas individual initiative and achievement were rewarded both materially and with prestige and influence.

In the period covered by this study, the late eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries, eleven of the societies in the sample became substantially more stratified. These were all, except the Zulu,

⁴⁶ Hudson, The Southeastern Indians, p. 495.

among the migrant groups. In other words, of the sixteen migrant societies, ten (62.5%) experienced increased inequality and three (18.75%) remained relatively unstratified. The remaining three groups were either short-lived or are insufficiently documented. Of the twenty non-migrant groups, only one (Zulu) clearly became more stratified and another one (Tswana) may have become somewhat more stratified. The rest (18) either experienced no change, are insufficiently documented, or definitely experienced decreasing inequality (at least 6) as their social existence became more tenuous.

The increased inequality among the four southeastern societies (Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw) occurred before migration in the late eighteenth century in the form of two closely related developments, the growth of class differences and the growth of slavery. First, there began to be an internal differentiation of wealth. Part of the reason for this was that a portion of the people were more accepting of European business values and were willing to participate in market processes. Often, but not always, these people were the offspring of European traders who had married into the community. As a few families became wealthy, they invested in slaves. Since access to the societal land was unrestricted, a few families in each society established extensive farms worked with slave labor. Of the four societies, the Cherokees developed in this way the most and the Creeks the least.

This stratification process resulted in marked differences in lifestyle among the Indians. The upper class live in large European style houses, had much personal property, and engaged in commercial ventures of various kinds. The rest of the Indians lived in double log

cabins patterned after pioneer ones and raised crops mainly for subsistence purposes with some surplus for trade. Although a good deal has been written about the mixed-blood character of the upper classes and their assimilation to European culture, it should be pointed out that they considered themselves and were considered by others to be "Indians," i.e. Cherokee, etc. When removal came, the Rosses, Pitchlynns, Colberts, and many others were removed along with the rest.

Removal did not obliterate the class distinctions that had developed up to 1830. The wealthy Indians appear to have saved enough of their assets to get a start in Oklahoma. I am unable to say exactly how the various families protected their fortunes during removal--to do so would require detailed examination of family papers. Some sold their personal property in the south and bought slaves with the returns. The slaves were removed along with the rest of the people. They then provided the labor to clear, plant, build, herd, and so forth.

The proportion of the Cherokee population which was slave increased over the years. In 1809 the North Carolina Cherokee owned 583 slaves (4% of the population). In the 1820's and 1830's, this proportion grew to 8-9% of the population. In the 1859 census 4000 Negroes were counted for over 15% of the population.⁴⁷ The other three groups had somewhat fewer slaves per capita.

The slavery issue was exceedingly troublesome for the Indians at the time of the Civil War; it affected their involvement in the war and

⁴⁷ Foreman, op. cit., pp. 355-56, 418-19.

the settlements forced on them by the victorious Union created dis-sension. Generally the Indians were required to "adopt" their freed slave into their society and grant them a portion of their land to live on. Of course, many freed slaves from throughout the south flocked to the Indian Territory when word of this got around. The Cherokees, Chickasaws and Creeks did make provision for their freed slaves. The Choctaw, however, were very recalcitrant on this point. The Choctaws wanted the federal government to remove the freed slaves as had been threatened, but when this did not occur, the freed Choctaw slaves remained in limbo until 1883. In this year they were finally "adopted," but many legal restrictions were placed on them by Choctaw law.⁴⁸

The increasing stratification of the South African societies is clearly related to the migration process itself. As the movements proceeded more than cattle was acquired. "Layers" of captives or refugees also became attached to the core population. The best example of this is the Ndebele. Only around 300 warriors and others escaped from Natal with Mzilikazi, but by 1830 this redoubtable man had between sixty and eighty thousand followers, including captives and tributary communities.⁴⁹ The original Ndebele (Kumalo) had higher status than the Sotho/Pedi/Tswana captives. By the time the group was established in Rhodesia around 1850, another layer of Shona etc. conquered peoples had been added below the Nguni elite and Sotho/Tswana middle. This

⁴⁸ Debo, op. cit., pp. 99, 102, 105.

⁴⁹ William Lye, "The Ndebele Kingdom. . ."

basic ethnic stratification was not castelike, however. The warriors were awarded wives from many groups and Mzilikazi himself had many such wives. In addition since all young men served a term in the regiments, individuals from whatever background who distinguished themselves were rewarded with wealth and honor.⁵⁰

The Gaza, Makololo, Ngoni, and Swazi all similarly became more stratified during and after migration; further all made some distinction between the original core and the various ethnic groups later incorporated. The Swazi made only a slight distinction between the original Nguni and "those found ahead," but of course they did not travel as far and pick up as many layers of captives as did the others.

The BaSotho were also stratified, but it is not clear that ethnic distinctions served as the basis for prestige. Most of Mosheshwe's followers were refugees who became clients, not war captives. It is probably true, however, that Mosheshwe's original kin and followers had some predominance, and certainly the BaSotho were more stratified in 1840 than had been true in 1820.

It should be pointed out in passing that none of the South African native societies owned slaves nor did they sell slaves to the Europeans. Only the Makololo began to sell some slaves to Portuguese traders in the 1850's in order to get arms.⁵¹ Clientage ties, which were widespread, were not slavery by any stretch of the imagination. The Dutch colonists and their Boer descendents, however, kept slaves

⁵⁰ Omer-Cooper, "Political Change. . .," pp. 219-20.

⁵¹ M. Mainga, Bulozi Under the Luyana Kings (London: Longmans, 1973), pp. 82-85.

which they imported from elsewhere in Africa or imposed on individual natives.

In summary it is obvious that the changes experienced by the successful migrants are very clearly different from those of the unsuccessful groups. Those who strengthened their political institutions and expanded or protected their productive systems were able to hold themselves together, migrate out of the path of the advancing Europeans, and reestablish their societies in their new land. All of the successful migrants were located some distance away from the initial European settlement. They were not the first societies to feel the thrust of European expansion. This gave them some time within which to adapt their societal systems. The native societies at the coasts unfortunately did not have that opportunity.

Now let us conclude this chapter by a brief consideration of the material core variables of environment, technology, and population.

CHANGE IN THE MATERIAL CORE

Originally I had hypothesized that environmental differences in the new lands the migrants entered would necessitate adaptation of the societal order to meet the new conditions. Actually fourteen of the sixteen migrant groups moved into lands sufficiently like their homelands to allow the persistence of established economic and political patterns. In addition all of the groups had either sufficient military power themselves or the sponsorship of powerful groups to force the native inhabitants of the region into which they moved to give way before them. Two societies--the Makololo and the Seminole--were faced with a substantially different set of environmental conditions. The

Makololo failed to make the necessary social adjustments while the Seminole were quite successful.

The main environmental problem faced by the South African migrants was locating sufficient tsetse-free pasturage for their cattle. South African proper was free of tsetse at this time, so the BaSotho, Swazi, Hlubi, Tlokwa, and Ngwane did not have to fear the fly. Their main problem was finding a site for residence which would be defended from the raids and social disorganization of the Difaqane. Accordingly the Tlokwa, BaSotho, and Swazi acquired mountain strongholds. The Gaza, Ndebele and Ngoni found tsetse-free regions. In particular Mzilikazi had sent scouts ahead looking for suitable land and the Rhodesian plateau where they ultimately settled down was dry and tsetse-free. The Ngoni threaded themselves up through the tsetse-free corridor of East Africa, although they suffered some losses. These migrations were environmentally successful because they knew the kind of land they needed and had the military capability to take it by force.

Only the Makololo faced environmental problems that eventually contributed to their undoing. In 1840 the Makololo invaded and conquered Bulozhi in southern Zambia. They replaced the Lozi at the head of a tribute state. However, the Makololo remained concentrated in the southern part of the region for two reasons: they feared the Ndebele and the floodplains of the Zambesi River where most of the Lozi and the tributary groups lived required agricultural techniques very different from those used further south. Further the land does not seem to have been suited to cattle--the seasonal flooding when the people migrated into the foothills would have created problems

with the herds. The tsetse fly may also have been present. In any case the area where the Makololo settled was swampy and malarial. Furthermore they could not efficiently control the subject peoples. Accordingly the Makololo population declined and in 1864 the Lozi rebelled, killed the Makololo men, distributed the women as wives, and placed control of the state back in the hands of the Lozi royalty. A few Makololo who had accompanied Livingstone down the Zambezi survived in a small community in Malawi.⁵²

The four main Southeastern migrant groups (Cherokee, Creek, Chickasaw and Choctaw) had been settled along river valleys in the hills and mountains of Tennessee, North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. When the pressure to remove intensified, several times groups of Indians went to look over the prospective lands. Although they would have preferred not to leave their homes, the land of eastern Oklahoma where they eventually settled was not radically different. There are several rivers, the land was wooded at least in part and there was adequate rainfall. They built their towns along the rivers as they had always done. To the west the woodlands became the dry prairies. The Indians looked upon these prairies as uninhabitable; fortunately, the buffalo Indians — the Kiowas, Comanches, etc. looked upon the wooded portions of eastern Oklahoma in the same way. Therefore, conflict over resources was minimized. Raids by the western Indians were some problem, especially for the Chickasaws, but these Indians also provided a market for Indian traders from all four societies. It is

⁵² Ibid., pp. 90, 95-97.

probably true that stockraising came to play a more important role in the economies of the Oklahoma Indians than it had in the Southeast. This affected mainly the upper class or commercial farm segment of the population, however.

As for the other migrants, only the Seminole experienced a dramatic change of environment. The Alabama/Koasati settled along rivers of eastern Texas. And although upstate New York is different from North Carolina, the Iroquois followed the same basic agricultural style to which the Tuscarora were accustomed. Furthermore the Tuscarora were incorporated into a functioning, indeed prosperous, economic system. They didn't have to fend for themselves while learning the vagaries of climate and hunting grounds.

The Seminoles had to adjust to the swamps of Florida, withdrawing further and further in as the American government tried to defeat them. We know they learned how to hunt, fish, garden, and so forth in their new environment because they live there today. Unfortunately, the process of adaptation itself is not very well documented. The Seminoles removed to Oklahoma had some difficulty adjusting. Stuck on the dry western part of Creek land, between the hostility of the western Indians on one side and the Creeks on the other, the Seminoles had to fight to defend themselves and learn new hunting and farming techniques. Government annuity payments surely made the transition possible, although not easy.

The population of all the migrant societies had become ethnically quite diverse by 1840. They had all acquired captives or accepted refugees from other groups. The latter process is what permitted the Southeastern Indians to emerge from the onslaught of European disease

sufficiently numerous to maintain a strong social order. Their populations did not grow until late in the nineteenth century, but they did not decline drastically either. The Creeks especially incorporated many societal fragments into their confederacy.

The South African groups grew rapidly from a few hundred to tens of thousands. This presented problems of assimilation and economics. Spears has suggested that the Ngoni were an "ecologic monster" and that they had to keep moving and raiding in order to find enough food to feed themselves and their cattle. Warfare also provided the means by which captives were assimilated. The Zulu murdered all children and elders of a captive group, sparing only the young adults. The males were incorporated into the regiments and the females became Shaka's wards, given in marriage to demobilized warriors. In Zulu society a foreign male captive had two choices: fight or die. The other Nguni groups followed a basically similar pattern with the reward of wealth and honor held out for loyalty.

This chapter will close with a brief consideration of technology. The technological changes experienced by the South African societies were not great but the innovations adopted were very significant to their survival. The only big changes in technology that I am aware of were in the realms of military technology. The short stabbing spear, improved shields and changed formations and tactics which Shaka introduced to the Zulu altered the balance of power and were rapidly imitated throughout Natal and the interior. The guns and horses introduced by

⁵³ Spears, op. cit., p. 14.

the Europeans produced some further changes. Armed mounted men had a great strategic advantage and both Boer and Griqua (mixed Khoi/Dutch generally) groups used this advantage. Mzilikazi was slow to acquire horses and guns for the Ndebele; he preferred to migrate away from the menace. Mosheshwe, on the other hand, determinedly modernized his own army and by 1858 he had 10,000 armed mounted men of his own to face the Boers with.⁵⁴ The Makololo resorted to selling slaves to get arms to use against the Ndebele but apparently that did not help them very much.

The technological changes adopted by the Southeastern Indians were very extensive as has been noted already. Almost all the items of basic material culture--houses, clothing, utensils, weapons, transport--were affected by European culture. And of course, almost everyone is aware of the syllabary invented for the Cherokee by Sequoyah, and the newspapers, written laws, and elaborated economic exchanges which followed after it. The Southeastern Indians who survived European contact were thoroughly technologically transformed by that contact. These changes all took place before removal. Probably the technological innovations contributed something to the ability of the Indian societies to survive the removal process; since their economies were not self-sufficient, they could look from Oklahoma to the United States as a source of goods and markets.

To summarize, of all the variables considered, the one of greatest importance by far in predicting the course of the land expropriation process is political structure and leadership. Those groups who were

⁵⁴ Thompson, ". . .The High Veld," p. 443.

able to forge strong central governments were almost invariably able to survive the expropriation of their land for a time while those groups who did not fell as conquered peoples. The ecological model which I had hypothesized would fit the data actually had very little explanatory power.

In addition, the dependency model carries very little predictive power in a land expropriation situation. "Dependence" on European dominated economic processes does not differentiate the non-surviving societies from the successful migrants. Most of the South African migrant groups remained almost completely outside the European market system until well after the events of the early nineteenth century. On the other hand the Indian societies were heavily integrated into American economic processes both before and after removal. Certainly the elites in the two groups of societies were structured differently because of this and the decisions they made were affected by their economic interests. However, we cannot conclude that the dependency of the Indians affected the relative success of their adaptation to removal compared to the non-dependent Africans.

Finally, we must conclude that if social survival is valuable then it is better to move out of the way of powerful land expropriators than to try to accommodate them. Those societies who were absorbed into the expanding European colonies enjoyed no peaceful coexistence. They suffered social breakdown and exploitation. At least the migrant groups avoided these sad consequences for a few more generations.

CHAPTER V: THE CONQUEST AREAS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is about conquest and colonization, about how native peoples shape and are shaped to the situation of having ultimate political power rest in the hands of representatives of a dominant foreign power. More specifically this chapter asks how were certain native societies in Africa and North America affected by direct conquest while others on their continents were trading with or being ousted from their land by Europeans?

What is conquest and colonization and why does it occur? Conquest is defined as a situation in which one society extends political control over another by military force, or the threat thereof. Insofar as representatives of the conquering nation continue to be governed by policies established in the home country, the conquered territory and its people are a colony. Although the authority of the conqueror is built upon force, over time patterns of economic interdependence and cultural blending may emerge which lend a certain legitimacy to the rulers so that daily applications of force are not required.

Why is one society motivated to expend force to conquer another? Obviously the answer to that question varies somewhat from subgroup to subgroup within the imperial society. However, at its most general level, conquest is undertaken because it is perceived that the resources of the native society may be beneficially expropriated. The most important of these resources to be expropriated, and indeed that which

distinguishes conquest from land expropriation, is the human population of the native society. In the case of European imperialism, a movement awesome in its scope and power, the different segments of the European societies who participated in conquest and colonization saw this human resource somewhat differently. While military leaders saw armed manpower, missionaries saw souls to be "saved." While civil rulers saw tax and tribute payers, private economic interests saw a labor supply to be sold or organized. Sometimes these groups came into conflict over which view would predominate. Nevertheless, all these groups expected to control the conquered peoples so that their labor power could be directed toward the support of the conquerors and the fulfillment of various imperial goals, whether that be the glorification of god or the monarch, the defense of the realm or the extension of "civilization," filling the coffers of the king or the pockets of private entrepreneurs.

In practice the populations of the conquered societies provided the main labor force to extract the other resources the territory had to offer its conquerors--food, fiber, minerals, forage, timber, and so forth. In addition, the conquered people provided labor in native or introduced industries and in transport. And finally they provided a market for commodities produced in the colony or elsewhere; sometimes they themselves became commodities and were sold as slaves. The defining feature of conquest is, therefore, the expropriation of some portion of the labor of the subject people.

The purpose of this chapter is not to write a treatise on imperialism in general or even European imperialism in particular. Rather, its

purpose is to trace the processes of social change which certain native societies experienced as they received political, economic, and ideological pressure from their European conquerors. How were their social structures altered by conquest? Did societies of different levels of sociocultural complexity respond differently to conquest situations? The reasons for this enquiry are twofold. The first and theoretically most relevant is to provide a standard of comparison by which the effects of the less obviously imperialistic forms of contact--trade and land expropriation--may be assessed. If we want to ask whether the effects of trade are really any different from formal imperialism, we need some data on this latter type of contact to provide, loosely speaking, a control group.

The second reason is curiosity about the effects of conquest itself. It seems that in the twentieth century the libertarian tradition has spread so far and wide that the thought of being ruled by a foreign power is anathema to most people. In addition, our political histories often treat conquest as the end, not the beginning, of a process of social change. But we want to ask, "And then what happened?" Our first impressions are that conquest is a terrible thing, that awful alterations come to individuals and social structures. Yet we know that sometimes a group survives years of conquest with a remarkably intact social structure and a resilient cultural tradition. How is this possible? Therefore, the question of the effects of conquest has intellectual appeal of its own, although the research reported here must be viewed as a very small contribution to this latter problem.

What effects do we expect conquest to have on a native people?

In general I hypothesize that conquest produces devolutionary trends in the more complex societies. These social structures should become progressively less complex as they become subordinated economically and politically to their conquerors. In its most extreme form we might expect the native social structure and culture to disappear, while individual survivors become assimilated to the culture of the conquerors at a disadvantaged level. The more simply organized native societies would, on the other hand, become more complex as the people are forcibly integrated into wider political and economic networks. When I began dealing with this chapter, I would have guessed that these changes would take place quite rapidly, perhaps within a generation or so after the conquest. I assumed that social structural change would be caused by the political coercion and economic exploitation that conquerors consciously exert over the subjugated natives. In fact we shall see that although change in native societies inverse to their pre-contact level of complexity is a feature of conquest, it is not an inevitable one. And the social change, where it occurred, was neither so rapid nor so planned as I had supposed.

In order to be consistent with the methodology employed in the other chapters, regions in America and Africa were chosen to provide a sample of societies who were conquered by European powers without first having experienced extensive trade or land expropriation. Accordingly, Mexico and parts of the southwest United States, which were conquered and ruled by Spain from the early sixteenth through the early nineteenth centuries, were chosen for North America. The Portugese established colonies in central Africa--Angola and Mozam-

bique--and ruled, albeit extremely tenuously, from the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century on. Thus the Portugese holdings in central Africa are included.


Documentation for the peoples of these areas at this time is extremely uneven, especially for Spanish Mexico. The sample for this area consists of thirty-five societies known to have been in the area of the Spanish empire and for whom some documentation could be found. Of these, twenty-one are satisfactorily documented; for the other fourteen only the bare outlines of social structure and conquest events are known. Not all of these thirty-five can be said to have been conquered by the Spanish. The government tried to control them, but probably ten of these were never effectively brought under the various forms of imperial control.

The Portugese conquest of central Africa was a much more modest affair. Not well-organized or financed with links to Lisbon tenuous as best, the territories and peoples that were conquered before the nineteenth century were very small and few. The sample for this area consists of four social groups (Kimbundu, Kongo, Marave, Shona) who came to some extent under the vassalage system of Angola or the prazo system of Mozambique.

The maps on the following two pages show the location of the sample societies.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NATIVE SOCIETIES AT CONQUEST

How were these thirty-nine societies organized immediately prior to conquest? The North American sample may be divided into two groups: the Mesoamerican cultures, a group of chiefdoms and states which shared



MAP G: Social Locations, Spanish America
 - - - - Mesoamerican Culture Area Boundary



MAP H: Conquered Societies,
Portugese Africa

a similar social structure and cultural tradition, and the rest of the sample, tribes and bands found mainly north of the Mesoamerican region (the Gran Chichimeca¹) but also in environmentally marginal areas within the sphere of Mesoamerican civilization.

The characteristic Mesoamerican civilization had dominated the region from the Valley of Mexico south through Yucatan for many centuries before the Spanish conquest. Specific manifestations of this social structure had risen to political dominance and fallen or been surpassed by others for around two millenia when 1519 dawned. These risings and fallings are a source of endless fascination to Mesamericanists and indeed to students of social development in general. At the time of the Spanish conquest the big powers were the Triple Alliance dominated by the Mexica, called the Aztecs² and the Tarascan empire of Western Mexico.³ These two exacted tribute from a wide area, but other Mesoamerican societies remained independent of imperial interference from either Tenochtitlan or Tzintzuntzan.

¹ Charles C. DiPeso, The Gran Chichimeca: Casas Grandes and the People of the Southwest, sound filmstrip (Norwalk, Conn.: The Reading Laboratory, 1974); R. E. W. Adams, Prehistoric Mesoamerica (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977), pp. 241, 341.

² Charles Gibson, "The Structure of the Aztec Empire," Archaeology of Northern Mesoamerica, Part I, (Vol. 10, Handbook of Middle American Indians, hereafter HMAI, Robert Wauchope, gen. ed. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), pp. 376-394.

³ Donald D. Brand, "Ethnohistoric Sythesis of Western Mexico" Archaeology of Northern Mesoamerica, Part II, (Vol. II, HMAI), pp. 632-656; Ralph L. Beals, "The Tarascans," Ethnology, Part II (Vol. 8, HMAI), pp. 725-730.

The basic features of Mesoamerican civilization may be summarized:

- 1) an agricultural village economy, with hunting and gathering providing only small amounts of food or luxury goods.
- 2) Urban centers with monumental architecture in stone, including (usually) pyramidal temples and palaces, plazas, ball courts.
- 3) a stratified social order dominated by an hereditary aristocracy who ruled and controlled a redistributive economy, and one or more classes of commoners such as peasants, merchants or craftsmen. Sometimes there were one or more under-classes of serfs or slaves.
- 4) religious beliefs and practices centered around astronomical bodies and sacrifice, supported by an elaborate calendar, hieroglyphic writing and a priesthood.
- 5) a system of markets for trade and commercial exchange within and between centers.

The basic political structure of a Mesoamerican society is often called a city-state,⁴ although I prefer to call it a chiefdom. This consisted of a political and religious center and associated villages and hamlets ruled by its hereditary lord, his family, and related nobles. The aristocracy received tribute in goods and labor from the peasantry working their own lands or lands of the nobility.

In return the nobility saw to the building of public works, administered justice, provided for defense and supported the religious system. These small chiefdoms could expand through intermarriage, military expansion, or alliance into large chiefdoms, states or empires. Even the larger empires with elaborate bureaucracies and standing armies were, however, organized as tribute networks sent from tributary centers to the dominant imperial city. Trade networks linked

⁴ Adams, op. cit., p. 12.

them together as did intermarriage between members of the ruling class.⁵

Of the sample of thirty-five societies, sixteen are Mesoamerican in structure; I have classified two as states and the other fourteen as having a chiefdom structure. (Sometimes a group was divided into multiple chiefdoms as the Yucatecan Maya at conquest.)

Sixteen of the remaining nineteen societies were located in the mountains and arid regions north of the Mesoamerican region, the "barbarian" north, according to the Aztecs and other "civilized" societies. Although the Indians of the south and their Spanish conquerors referred to all these people as Chichimecans, there were, of course, substantial cultural and linguistic differences among them.

They ranged from the hunter-gatherer band to settled tribal peoples for whom agriculture was the main economic support. The most common pattern in this northern region was a mixed farming/hunter-gatherer economy practiced by people dispersed into small, locally autonomous settlements called rancherías by Spicer.⁶ Although they experienced influences from and interaction with the southern peoples, their social and religious systems were not Mesoamerican, the most notable difference being their equalitarian, unstratified social order. The remaining three societies, Chol, Mixe, and Trique, lived within the Mesoamerican area and were heavily influenced by it, but because of their mountain

⁵ Ronald Spores, The Mixtec Kings and Their People (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), pp. 6, 11-13.

⁶ Edward Spicer, Cycles of Conquest (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1962), p. 12.

environment did not fully adopt the Mesoamerican style of life. All three were agricultural people.

The African peoples were organized into chiefdoms of greater or lesser extent. The kingdom of Kongo may have been a state. These fairly centralized social structures appear to have evolved in the region in the several centuries prior to European contact. Hence they were not of the same antiquity as their Mesoamerican counterparts; they were further strongly rooted upon the soil of extended kinship ties like the African societies we have encountered elsewhere. Extended kinship networks were, on the other hand, fairly unimportant in Mesoamerican society.

Chiefdoms, as pointed out by Webb,⁷ have the ability to expand and contract by joining similarly structured segments in ties of tribute or clientage. In Mozambique the basic political hierarchy was lineage elder, village chief (fumo), and paramount chief (mambo). This structure was often expanded, however, by conquest, religious prestige or seniority, or the charisma of a particular chief. Then extensive chiefdoms with many sub-chieftaincies could emerge. Eventually, rival chiefs, succession crises, or other events could lead to the segmentation of the paramountcy into its component chiefdoms once more. Occasionally one of these extensive chiefdoms would begin to centralize administrative and military power, to begin to develop into a state.

⁷ Malcolm Webb, "The Flag Follows Trade" in Jeremy Sabloff and C. C. Lamberg-Karlovsky, eds., Ancient Civilization and Trade (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975), pp. 162-63.

This appears to have been the case with the Kongo,⁸ although undoubtedly its statelike characteristics were enhanced by the early years of Portugese alliance.⁹ The kingdom or empire of the Monomotapa (Shona) in Zambesia, on the other hand, was probably an elaborately-structured chiefdom.¹⁰

The African societies were based upon agriculture, but because of lower population density, shifting fields, and so forth, there was substantial bush area to provide game and fish. Gold and ivory were precious commodities associated with chiefs. My impression is that trade and commerce were less important than in Mexico, but that local or regional exchanges of salt, food, craft items, and so forth took place. The most important crafts were iron working and weaving.¹¹

THE CONQUERORS

The nature of imperial rule which Spain and Portugal imposed upon their respective conquests were different in several important respects. The peoples and environments which received this rule differed as well.

⁸ David Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola: The Mbundu and Their Neighbors Under the Influence of the Portugese, 1483-1790 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 1-5.

⁹ James Duffy, Portugese Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 10-11.

¹⁰ M. D. D. Newitt, Portugese Settlement on the Zambesi: Exploration, Land Tenure, and Colonial Rule in East Africa (London: Longman, 1973), pp. 22-24; D. P. Abraham, "The Roles of 'Chaminuka' and the Mhondoro Cults in Shona Political History" in E. Stokes & R. Brown, eds., The Zambesian Past (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1966), pp. 39-42.

¹¹ Allen F. Isaacman, Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution: The Zambesi Prazos, 1750-1902 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972), p. 72.

The interaction of these two factors in association with the character of the internationally evolving political economy meant that the development of Angola, Mozambique, and New Spain followed different paths.

In order to understand the adaptations the native peoples made to the new world they faced, it is necessary to compare Spanish and Portuguese colonial rule in Mexico and Central Africa. Who were the conquerors and what did they want? What beliefs and values motivated them? What economic and political functions did the colony play and what administrative structures were instituted to carry them out?

Although Spain and Portugal are close neighbors who share a similar cultural tradition, the overall nature of their colonial systems were quite different. The conquest of New Spain was well organized and deliberate, while the conquest of Angola and Mozambique seems somewhat haphazard by comparison.

The Spanish Colonial System

The conquest of Mexico was launched in 1519 from Spain's Caribbean possessions. By 1521 Cortez and his followers, aided by large numbers of native warriors (e.g. from Tlaxcala, conquered in 1519), had secured the surrender of Tenochtitlan, the Aztec capital.¹² With it came the de facto conquest of all the lands tributary to the Aztecs. These lands formed the core from which Spanish imperial control was pushed north and

¹² Charles Gibson, Tlaxcala in the Sixteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 22-23, hereafter Tlaxcala; Alfred Crosby The Columbian Exchange (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972), pp. 48-50.

south in the following decades. The Mesoamerican peoples had all been subordinated by the 1540's.¹³ The tribes and bands were much more difficult to conquer; some were not firmly controlled at Mexican independence in the early nineteenth century.¹⁴

There were three groups of Spaniards who participated in the development of New Spain—the clergy, the secular administrators, and private citizens. Each group, of course, had its own interests, and in the New Spain these interests often were in conflict. The clergy were concerned with conversion of the Indians to Christianity. Their vision was of peaceful communities of Indians organized around the mission.¹⁵

The flock of bureaucrats who were sent to New Spain were there to assure that the interests of the central government were served and that the colonies remained firmly under the control of the crown. The conquered Indians would, of course, pay tribute to the central government; in addition, one-fifth of the precious metals of New Spain

¹³ The Maya were the last, formal Spanish rule effected in 1545. However armed resistance and withdrawal were characteristic of some Maya into the mid-nineteenth century. Ralph L. Roys, The Indian Background of Colonial Yucatan, publication 548 (Washington: The Carnegie Institute, 1943), p. 134; Nelson Reed, The Caste War of Yucatan (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1964); Charles Gibson, Spain in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 29.

¹⁴ E.g. see Spicer, op. cit., and Henry Dobyns, Spanish Colonial Tucson: A Demographic History (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976).

¹⁵ Eric Wolf, Sons of the Shaking Earth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 164-65.

belonged to the king.¹⁶ Further, the king did not wish the conquistadores to become an independent political force, a new nobility that could not be controlled. Accordingly, the bureaucrats brought with them an elaborate administrative structure and code of laws which were designed to maintain the political control of the crown over private interests.¹⁷

The goals of the conquistadores were quite straightforward--wealth and honor. They expected to become the new nobility in a wealthy and populous empire. The reward for their imperial efforts was to be the right to receive tribute and labor from the Indians, just as the seignuerial class in Spain was supported by the peasantry.¹⁸

Although this particular vision was ultimately thwarted by the crown, the clergy and demographic collapse of the Indians,¹⁹ the conquistadores were succeeded over the generations by a long line of people for whom the colony represented the opportunity to become rich.

We might argue that these varying motives made no difference to the conquered Indians. They were required to give their labor and the products of their labor in a degree far in excess of their obligations

¹⁶ James Lang, Conquest and Commerce: Spain and England in the Americas, Studies in Social Discontinuity (New York: Academic Press, 1975), p. 10; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, Studies in Social Discontinuity (New York: Academic Press, 1974), p. 170; Eric Wolf, op. cit., p. 162.

¹⁷ Lang, op. cit., pp. 25-45 describes the administrative structure of the colony.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 11-16.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 22.

under native rule. This was true whether they were under the control of a missionary, an imperial tax collector, an encomendero or haciendado. In fact, however, it did make a difference which group was doing the exploiting. Generally an ascending order of exploitation would be missionary, civil servant, and conquistador. And some Indian societies were more exploited than others—a number of the tribes and bands never paid tribute to or were forced to labor for anyone.

1. Spanish Policy in the Mesoamerican Culture Area. In the Mesoamerican area changing conditions over time required changing solutions to the problems of extracting wealth from the land and its people. These "solutions" were in turn encomienda, repartimento, and hacienda.²⁰

Cortez began to assign the conquered Indians in encomienda to his followers as soon as the conquest of Central Mexico was complete. This system allowed the holder to receive tribute and labor from the Indians of the communities included in the grant. Encomienda did not imply property rights over either the land or its people; the grant was inalienable during the life of its holder and was in theory non-inheritable. A grant of encomienda was made for the life of the holder, or sometimes for a specified number of lives, after which it reverted to the monarch. The Indians could then be administered directly by the crown or

²⁰ The best and most detailed description of these systems as they affected the Indians of central Mexico is Charles Gibson, The Aztecs Under Spanish Rule: A History of the Indians of the Valley of Mexico, 1519-1810 (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1964). Hereafter The Aztecs.

reassigned to an encomendero.²¹ The grants made by Cortez and others were initially recognized by the royal bureaucracy, and the assumption of the conquerors was that they would be reassigned to the holder's heirs indefinitely. Unfortunately for these heirs, the Spanish crown was undergoing a process of state-building. Therefore, during the second half of the sixteenth century more and more of the encomiendas reverted to the crown and were not reassigned.²² Increasingly the Indians were supervised by corregidores, local magistrates.

Initially there was no limit on the amount of tribute and labor an encomendero could demand from the Indians.²³ The extreme exploitation this entailed was a cause for concern to both the clergy and the crown. Accordingly from 1530-1550 regulation of the system of encomienda was instituted by the colonial administration at the urging of the clergy. Although the most vigorous attempt to regulate the system—The New Laws of 1542—was so opposed by the colonists that the code was suspended,²⁴ the crown did succeed in establishing regular tribute schedules and fixed labor quotas.²⁵ These laws were of course, difficult to enforce, especially in the areas away from Mexico City.²⁶

²¹ Ibid., p. 58.

²² Ibid., pp. 61-62.

²³ Spores, op. cit., p. 76.

²⁴ Lang, op. cit., pp. 13-17.

²⁵ Spores, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

²⁶ J. H. Parry, The Audencia of Nueva Galicia in the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), pp. 29-31.

Furthermore, civil administration, especially at the local level provided opportunity for illegal, but widely tolerated, exactions from the Indians and for commercial activities.²⁷

Concern over the control of Indian labor led to the establishment around the mid-sixteenth century of repartimento, a system of politically administered, rotational, compensated labor affecting both encomienda and non-encomienda Indians.²⁸ This concern had several sources: humanitarian concern over the sufferings of the Indians under encomienda, the threat to the tribute system created by the fact that Indians were sometimes forced to neglect their own fields, and the demands of non-encomenderos for a share of Indian labor.²⁹

In theory the assignment of Indian laborers was supposed to be to projects which were in the public interest, but these were not limited to public works; over the years many types of private enterprise, including agriculture, received labor through the repartimento system. Some of the types of work performed by the Indians under repartimento were agricultural work of all kinds, mining, building of churches, road-building and repair, flood control, building of houses and public buildings in the towns, and portage.³⁰

Gibson describes the system:

²⁷ Gibson, The Aztecs, pp. 92-97.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 223-24.

²⁹ Ibid.; Parry, op. cit., p. 29

³⁰ Gibson, ibid., pp. 231-33, 242.

"Population records were first collected for every contributing community, and from there a percentage quota, at first approximating two percent of the tributaries, was computed. Each community was then expected to furnish its assigned number of workers each week."³¹

Of course, the system was characterized by widespread abuse and fraud, and was continually under attack by the clergy. What brought repartimento to an end in the first part of the seventeenth century, however, was the precipitous decline of the Indian population. As the number of Indians decreased as epidemic followed epidemic, the Indian community governments simply could not fill their quotas. The decades surrounding the beginning of the seventeenth century were characterized by default on the part of the Indians, rules requiring increased percentages on the part of civil administration, and increased coercion on the part of the Spanish recipients of repartimento labor.³² Eventually repartimento was abolished in the 1630's for all uses except flood control, but by then most Spaniards had already turned to the final stage of colonial organization, the hacienda, based upon wage labor.³³

At this point it is essential to point out that the policy of the Spaniards, officially and for the most part unofficially, was to respect the basic prerogatives of the Indian societies at the local level. Land tenure, local self-government, and the privileges of the native nobility were all guaranteed in law, and in some degree in practice to the native communities.

³¹ Ibid., p. 226.

³² Ibid., pp. 232-33.

³³ Ibid., p. 236.

Nevertheless by the beginning of the second century after the conquest a large amount of the land was in Spanish hands and the survival of the local Indian communities and their traditional elites was in doubt. Elaboration of this point follows in the last section of the chapter.

It is enough to say that as the seventeenth century progressed it was in the interests of many Spaniards and Indians to establish a wage labor connection. The hacienda arose as an agricultural institution in which the Spanish land owner attracted and held a labor force by a combination of patronage and debt peonage.³⁴ Although the hacienda is the prototypic economic institution of pre-revolutionary Mexico, other economic enterprises such as mines and crafts also rested on wages and debt.

We tend to view debt peonage as an extremely exploitative system and certainly its persistence into the late nineteenth century was, at the very least, an economic anachronism. Nevertheless, Gibson argues convincingly that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the central Mexican region the coercive and exploitative reputation of hacienda is not deserved.³⁵ Many gananes had no debts and the average levels of debt were quite small.

The shortage of workers meant that pressure was exerted by the peons for larger amounts of debt; further, the hacienda provided a secure living for the Indians. Compared to encomienda and repartimento, the hacienda was a less exploitative institution. However, it was a con-

³⁴ Eric Wolf, op. cit., pp. 202-205.

³⁵ Gibson, The Aztecs, pp. 254-56.

quest institution; the Spanish and Indian societies and cultures met on the hacienda and merged, the Spaniard on top and the Indian on the bottom. Thus we see the development of Mexican culture.

2. Spanish Policy in the Gran Chichemeca. The contact between the Spaniards and Indians in the areas to the north was much different from that already described. The peoples of this region were much more simply organized and they had little in the way of "wealth" that could be expropriated. Furthermore, the aridity of the environment made large-scale agriculture impossible. Although the initial explorations into the region during the mid-16th century had yielded no great civilizations to be plundered, as the seventeenth century approached various groups of Spaniards were attracted to the frontier. Foremost among these were the missionaries whose "plunder" consisted of saved souls. The second major group consisted of individual Spaniards seeking riches. The discovery of silver deposits in the area north of Mexico City from the mid-16th century on exerted an irresistible pull ever-northward to a variety of fortune-seekers. The civil authorities were drawn along providing the military and civil administration required by the mining settlements and missionaries. The characteristics of the native societies in the north were such that the official program of tribute and labor exactions were applied to none of the northern peoples except the Eastern Pueblos.³⁶

The frontier gradually was pushed north throughout the 17th and 18th centuries although the connection of Mexico City with the colonial outpost of New Mexico was never firm through the arid region of modern

³⁶ Spicer, op. cit., p. 390.

Sonora and Chihuahua.

Not subject to encomienda or repartimento (exception: Eastern Pueblos), the main systematic influence on the native peoples was the mission program. The missionaries who gradually moved from society to society got the central government to agree to a ten-year exemption to tribute payments on the grounds that the tribal and band peoples were not yet capable of paying tribute. All except the Eastern Pueblos were granted extensions to this grace period, so that tribute was never collected.³⁷ In any case the continued military insecurity of the frontier would have made collections of tribute next to impossible.

The missionaries, who were often initially received enthusiastically by the native people, were intent on establishing compact, industrious, and prosperous communes of Christians. Once they were initially established and the Indians baptized, they set about encouraging the Indians, who often had a very dispersed settlement pattern, to move close to the mission. Then the missionary would introduce livestock, European cultigens, and crafts. The Indians would be encouraged or coerced to learn European skills (weaving, blacksmithing, tanning, etc.), to assist in building the church and mission buildings, and to farm in the European manner.³⁸ Civil and religious offices were introduced. In other words, the missionaries attempted to replicate European peasant communities with church (and themselves) at the center.

This program met with varying degrees of success depending on the

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 292-93.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 48-49, 292.

social structure of the Indians, the amount of coercion applied, and the proximity of Spanish miners and colonists.

While the imperialism of the missions was on occasion fairly benign, the contacts between the colonists/miners and the Indians were initially brutal. It is probably true that frontiers attract people who wish to escape the orderly and peaceful routine of established civilization. In an expanding society, the frontier tends to outdistance the ability of the state to assure the protection of the citizens and enforce the laws. Accordingly the Indians in the vicinity of the mines were met with naked coercion; many were seized, enslaved, and forced to work in the mines for no pay.³⁹ Their possessions were confiscated, their women were violated. These initial encounters produced such high mortality and hostile reactions from the Indians, and opposition from the missionaries that with time the most flagrant coercion receded. Even after many of the surviving Indians settled into a permanent or intermittent wage situation, the actions of the Spaniards continued to provoke social disorganization and hostility in the Indian communities. Revolts against all Spaniards were a recurrent feature on the northwest frontier. The colonists were further often opposed to the mission program because of the social solidarity in defense of their resources such communities engendered, because the formidable political power of the clergy was usually arrayed on the side of the Indians, and because the mission absorbed Indian labor needed for the mines and towns.⁴⁰

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 305; Parry, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁴⁰ Spicer, *op. cit.*, pp. 306-307; Edward Dozier, The Pueblo Indians of North America, *Case Studies in Cultural Anthropology* (New York: Holt Rinehart, and Winston, 1970), pp. 54-55.

All this was taking place at a time when the Spanish government was weakening. Accordingly the civil authorities had neither the financial resources, nor the will to impose effective government on the frontier.⁴¹ The Spanish imperial impulse was petering out.

The Portugese Colonial System

The acquisition of Angola and Mozambique by Portugal stands in stark contrast to the Spanish experience in New Spain.

While the conquest of Mexico was well organized and deliberate, the political acquisition of Angola and Mozambique seems almost accidental. While the central government of Spain effectively used its power to maintain control over its possessions, the Portugese government, weak and over-extended, did not maintain firm control over the activities of its citizens in Mozambique and to some extent in Angola. While Spain established the administrative and legal system of a modern state, Portugal relied on basically feudal legal forms to maintain its claim in Africa. While thousands of Spaniards became permanent residents of Mexico, the European population of Portugese Africa was, before the current century, extremely small. While the Indians under Spanish rule all were Hispanized to some extent, the Portugese in Africa all became Africanized to some extent. While the clergy in Mexico often found themselves at odds with the private citizens over the exploitation of the Indians, the clergy in Angola and Mozambique, were, after the initial Kongo experiment, not troubled by any such lofty moral sentiments.

Angola also offers an interesting comparison to the material on the

⁴¹ Lang, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

slave trade presented in Chapter 3, for the primary economic raison d'etre for the Angola colony was as a supplier of slaves (in immense numbers) to that star in the imperial crown, Brazil. The curious fact is that Portugal thought it necessary to exert direct political control over the native Angolans rather than acquiring the slaves through trade as was every where else the case.

The initial contacts between the Portugese and the Central Africans began in the last two decades of the fifteenth century as part of that explosive surge of explorations which led the Portugese navigators around Africa and into Asia.⁴² Although these contacts were initially animated from the Portugese side by the same combination of religious, political, and economic motives that we saw with the Spanish, in fact, except for the early years of the Kongo experiment, a curiously pure strain of economic exploitation soon characterized the Portugese presence in Central Africa. By the mid-16th century the growing demand for slaves in Brazil and the tantalizing prospect of gold and silver mines in the interior had resulted in the spread of traders, adventurers, and occasionally missionaries to several of the peoples along the Congo and Kwanza Rivers in the west and the Zambezi River in the east.⁴³ Except for the Kongo, these contacts were not formally organized by the Portugese Crown. Individual traders made alliances with, fought for, or paid tribute to various African chieftains. However, around the last quarter

⁴² Roland Oliver and J. D. Fage, A Short History of Africa (5th ed., Baltimore: Penquin Books, 1975), pp. 115-16.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 128-30, 133-34; James Duffy, Portugal in Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 83.

of the 16th century, Portugese policy for various reasons turned toward the goal of formal conquest.⁴⁴ This was more easily wished for than accomplished. The African environment was literal death to large numbers of the members of various Portugese expeditions; furthermore there was no large, fabulously rich empire like that of the Aztecs to form the core of Portugese Africa. Finally, the gold and silver deposits proved to be small or non-existent. Nevertheless, during the last part of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries, Portugese rule was extended tenously, chiefdom by sub-chiefdom, into the interior along the Kwanza and Zambezi Rivers.⁴⁵

These conquests were carried out by individual conquistadores with their Portugese and native followers. They were formally recognized by the Portugese government by the granting of fiefs.⁴⁶ In theory, the conquered chiefs swore an oath of vassalage to the Portugese king or conqueror;⁴⁷ part or all of the conquered land was awarded to the Portugese conqueror, usually in emphyteusis.⁴⁸ This system, an outgrowth of Roman law, made grants in perpetuity of agricultural land, subject to the condition that the grantee promised to protect the land from destruction or to keep it under cultivation. This grant did not necessarily

⁴⁴ Duffy, Portugese Africa, p. 53.

⁴⁵ Birmingham, op. cit., pp. 40-63; Duffy, Portugal in Africa, pp. 84-85.

⁴⁶ Duffy, Portugese Africa, pp. 53-54.

⁴⁷ Douglas Wheeler, The Portugese in Angola, 1836-1891: A Study in Expansion and Administration (Ph.D. dissertation: Boston University, 1963), pp. 41-42, 89-90.

⁴⁸ Newitt, op. cit., p. 61.

entail tribute or tax payments to the crown. Other conditions were sometimes attached to the grant, such as the promise to settle a certain number of Portugese farmers on the land by a certain time, the promise to make certain payments to the royal treasury, or limitations on the size of the grants. The lands of Mozambique, called prazos da coroa or crown grants, were all structured this way from their earliest acquisition (early 1600s) to the end of the nineteenth century. Some of the lands of Angola were granted this way; others were crown lands.⁴⁹

It is important to point out that the conditions associated with land grants in Africa were almost never carried out. Furthermore, laws made over the centuries to regulate the colonials were seldom enforced.⁵⁰ One big reason for this is that the resources of Portugal were simply stretched too thin to provide effective rule to its many possessions. It did not have enough manpower to maintain bureaucratic and military control over its subjects. Zambesia became a forgotten backwater, Portugese in name only. The prazero families on their lands were virtually autonomous, maintaining their own armies. The few colonial officials were appointed from among their members.⁵¹

Furthermore, the effect of the official ban on slaving in the nineteenth century was to increase the slave trade on the more remote,

⁴⁹ Duffy, Portugese Africa, pp. 82-83; Birmingham, op. cit., pp. 46, 55-56.

⁵⁰ Newitt, op. cit., p. 111.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 117-21.

less easily policed East African coasts, including Zambesia.⁵²

Angola was more closely linked to Lisbon and was ruled through a military, not civil structure; Douglas Wheeler describes the concept:

From the beginning, the territory of Angola was in Portuguese legal terminology, a Conquista, or "conquest." Originating in Roman and then in Spanish and Portuguese law, this term implied the existence of "heathen" populations or infidels. The structure of administration in the 16th century Angola was peculiarly Iberian and medieval in many senses. The Portuguese who founded the interior fortresses, as in the reconquista against the Arabs in Spain, were a military caste, penetrating infidel territory by a series of conquistas or islands of control. The society was a military society which traded in slaves, ivory, and wax. Using the concept of 'vassalage', the Portuguese recognized the status and influence of native chiefs. . .in exchange for alliance or 'vassalage' with the Portuguese authorities and merchants.

Variations of this system of vassalage remained part of Angolan politics until the early 20th century.⁵³

The official policy statements emphasized the need for Portuguese settlement and agricultural development. But in Angola everyone--governor, missionary, military officer--was so busy selling slaves to South America that they did not have time for mundane affairs such as agriculture.⁵⁴ Around 1700, the colony did not even grow enough food to feed its own residents; rather food was imported in the empty slave ships returning to Luanda for a refill.⁵⁵ Furthermore, the king of Portugal received an export duty on each slave shipped. The result was

⁵² Ibid., pp. 222-23.

⁵³ Wheeler, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

⁵⁴ Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm (New York: Doubleday, 1972), pp. 86-88; Birmingham, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

⁵⁵ Duffy, Portuguese Africa, p. 71; Wheeler, op. cit., p. 66.

that the political power of the private citizens was never restrained by the central government, as Spain had done with its conquistadores. Indeed Duffy describes the Angolans as "a feudal caste resisting change and authority." 56

The relationship between the Portugese conquistadores and the native society was that of lord and tributary. In Mozambique the native chiefs continued to rule at the village and regional level. These natives, called colonos, paid tribute in food, cloth, or slaves to the overseer of the prazo. This tribute supported the prazero and his slaves. The slaves formed the army and also had their own structure of officials.⁵⁷ In Angola the vassal chiefs (sobas) paid their tribute in the form of peca da India (West Indian pieces), a young adult slave.⁵⁸ Some chiefs also provided labor: porters and military contingents.

Wheeler explains the latter:

Troops, given to the Portugese by sobas or forcibly raised, became organized in large units, often called guerra preta. By the early 17th century, the guerra preta was an established institution in Angola.⁵⁹ . Most of the leaders of this corps were Negroes.

These armies were used to capture slaves from societies in the interior. Although slave wars were forbidden by the crown, they were justified by the governors as punitive expeditions against chiefs "who

⁵⁶ Duffy, Portugal in Africa, p. 57.

⁵⁷ Isaacman, op. cit., pp. 32-34; Newitt, op. cit., pp. 175-77, 187.

⁵⁸ Birmingham, op. cit., p. 25.

⁵⁹ Wheeler, op. cit., p. 42.

had given refuge to runaway slaves or had failed to pay tribute."⁶⁰

The number of Portugese settlers was always very small. Although the government was always officially in favor of colonization and intermittently tried to get Portugese citizens to come to Angola and Mozambique, this policy was a failure. In desperation the crown would send shiploads of criminals and other exiles, descriptively referred to as degradados, to Africa.⁶¹ The climate was simply too deadly to Europeans to attract settlers in large numbers. Of course, hardly any Portugese women came to Africa with the military officers, slave traders, and degradados.⁶² The inevitable result was the birth of large numbers of mulattos. In Angola these people constituted a separate social category. In Zambesia, however, the distinctions that were drawn were different because of the presence of Hindus from the Portugese Asian possessions; the great prazero families were, with time, physically practically indistinguishable from the African population.⁶³

Duffy estimates that the Portugese population of Zambesia was around 1000 in 1650, and that figure did not grow until the current century. Wheeler gives a figure of 1700 whites in Angola in 1778, while the maximum number in the year 1900 was 9000 people.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Birmingham, op. cit., p. 25.

⁶¹ Duffy, Portugese Africa, pp. 79-80.

⁶² Newitt, op. cit., p. 185.

⁶³ Wheeler, op. cit., p. 62; Newitt, op. cit., pp. 141, 152.

⁶⁴ Duffy, Portugese Africa, pp. 43, 102; Wheeler, ibid.

It should be obvious that there was very little conflict between the private Portugese citizens and the civil officials. Usually they were drawn from the same social groups and had the same interests--the regular flow of slaves and other profitable goods. Perhaps a word should be said about the clergy. For reasons that are not completely clear to me, the missionaries in Angola and Mozambique were almost totally ineffective in spreading Christianity. It is not even very clear that conversion was a priority with the few missionaries who lived there. Although the initial years of the Kongo experiment were marked by vigorous missionary activity, the growth of the slave trade was accompanied by a decline in these activities. The Angola clergy by 1800 "all. . .were supported to some extent by slavery--by revenue, that is, from dealing in slaves by one means or another."⁶⁵ The conduct of the missionaries in Zambesia was the same. The Dominicans there were part of the prazero class, holding huge tracts of land from which they collected taxes and trafficked in slaves. By 1800 there were less than 2000 Christians in the whole colony and no active proselytizing was occurring.⁶⁶ Therefore the clergy did not represent a coherent social force distinct from either the secular citizens or civil officials.

The degree of Hispanization of the Indians of New Spain was great. The degree of acculturation in Portugese Africa was generally small before the last century. This was especially true for Mozambique. In both places the Portugese adapted themselves to the social structures

⁶⁵ Davidson, op. cit., p. 88.

⁶⁶ Duffy, Portugese Africa, pp. 111-12.

they found, spreading their culture like a thin veneer over the surface. The vassalage system brought from Portugal was strikingly similar to the tributary structure of the Kimbundu and Kongo. The lands acquired by the early adventurers in Zambesia were often obtained through political processes familiar in the chiefdoms of the region. In a very real sense the prazeros functioned as African chiefs.⁶⁷ The verification of their holdings by the crown grants of prazos da corea was definitely ex post facto. Nominally Christian, speaking broken or pigeon Portugese, the prazero families were as much or more African as Portugese in culture. Nevertheless the aspects of Portugese culture that were maintained--the rituals, dress, titles, names, language--were a mark of distinction and prestige to the prazeros as such were preserved. Newitt maintains that "the community of the great prazo-holders still thought of itself as Portugese first and foremost. . ."68

As we have seen the Portugese colonial system in Africa remained remarkably stable during the two and one-half centuries from 1600 to 1850. Too weak to do otherwise, the Portugese government allowed the two colonies to persist in the feudal legal structures with which they had begun and to adapt to the African social circumstances. Not until the last half of the nineteenth century did conditions change. Chief among these conditions were the end of the slave trade and the competing

⁶⁷ This is the main thesis of the Isaacman book and Newitt agrees to an extent, see e.g. p. 184.

⁶⁸ Newitt, ibid., p. 152.

imperialism of the other Europeans in the scramble for Africa. Portugal was forced to foster different economic activities and to exert more effective political control over the territory claimed. Nevertheless, the longevity of Portuguese rule in central Africa is due not to its strength and efficiency but to the opposite. The Portuguese maintained their control not because they governed so well, but because they governed so weakly.

THE EFFECTS OF CONQUEST ON THE NATIVE SOCIETIES

All the conquered societies of this study were changed to some degree by the experience. The purpose of this section is to describe the nature and extent of these changes in the societal order (politics, economic, stratification) and the material core (population, technology, environment) of these societies. The basic trend was for the native societies to develop into peasant villages on the rural periphery of the colonial society. The centers of the colonies were occupied by the foreign elites, mulatto classes, and "detrribalized" natives. For the more complex native societies this process, insofar as it occurred, entailed devolution, including removal of the supra-village levels of political authority from native rulers, reduction of economic life to basic agriculture, crafts, and trade but with linkages to the financial and productive structure of the colony as a whole, and a leveling of the indigenous class system. At the same time, the social structure and culture of the peasant villages maintained a degree, often substantial, of continuity of language, religion, belief, and the folkways of everyday life.

For the most simply organized peoples--the bands and tribes--the

trend toward the peasant village entailed the opposite process: more concentrated and permanent population settlement, the substitution of agriculture for hunting and gathering or mixed subsistence patterns, and the acquiescence to extra-local political and economic authority.

Trends, even when conceptualized as causal processes, can be contravened or altered by intervening variables. One such intervening variable of great importance to the societies of this study is the relative population size and rate of growth/decline of the natives and their conquerors. The reduction of Mesoamerican Indian societies to peasant enclaves was greatly facilitated by the catastrophic population decline experienced by the Indians. In fact the degree of social devolution experienced by these Indians was quite unintended by the Spaniards.

On the other hand, the African peasants were much less thoroughly subordinated to the Portugese and therefore maintained more of their indigenous political authority and status systems. The colonial center was relatively smaller and weaker. It was easier for the numerous Africans to resist the few disease-ridden Portugese than for the declining numbers of Indians to resist the growing Spanish population. Whole groups of Africans sometimes avoided Portugese authority simply because there were so few colonial officials or by migrating into another unconquered African chiefdom.

The chiefdoms and states were more likely to undergo the trend toward the peasant village than were the tribes and bands. Often living in economically marginal areas, unused to settled agriculture, and unwilling to accept hierarchical authority structures, the tribes

and bands (unfortunately only represented in the American sample) did not make good imperial subjects. Continued military resistance and migration to areas inaccessible to the Spanish government were the most common reactions. Some managed to remain relatively autonomous; others were gradually exterminated by military expeditions sent to "punish" them for their recurrent raids. Spanish policy was very explicit about the necessity of changing the social structure of the band peoples to settled communities of peaceful peasants. There were various reasons for this: the economy of the bands produced no taxable surplus; impermanent settlement made them unavailable for labor expropriation or for conversion to Christianity; unconquered, uncaptured peoples were anathema to the military and bureaucratic mindset; but perhaps most important was the fact that some of the band peoples posed a continuing military threat to the lives and property of Spanish settlers and the settled Indians. No combination of carrot and stick was completely successful in transforming the band peoples into docile peasants, however. In purely economic terms, those that were so transformed did not repay in labor or taxes the costs of their conquest.

Changes in the Societal Order

1. Political structure. In the case of the chiefdoms and the states both the Portuguese and Spanish attempted to preserve the indigenous political authority structure at the regional and/or local level, imposing their own political system at the tops of the hierarchy. The Aztec emperor and various paramount chiefs were removed, but the segments of the system, the chiefdoms, were to remain. In return for cooperation, the native chiefs retained their position of privilege.

They were to function as conduits, funneling the tribute payments up and colonial authority down. The African chiefs were linked to individual Portugese or to the crown by ties of vassalage. The hereditary rulers of Mesoamerica, recognized as caciques and señores naturales (natural lords)⁶⁹ by the Spanish government, continued to occupy leadership roles for some time.

For the most part, the Portugese were content to leave the internal affairs of the Kimbundu and Shona villages in native hands as long as the tributes were paid. However, conditions in Angola and Mozambique mitigated against the smooth cooptation of native authority. African political systems were indigenously subject to segmentation, especially in times of succession. In the early years, the Portugese intensified these tendencies by lending the support of arms in these factional disputes. The successful claimant in these cases then was obliged to recognize Portugese land or tribute claims.

The advent of the Portugese presence in Angola came at the same time as the fearsome invasion and depredations of the Imbangala and/or Jaga hordes. The Portugese slavers found it convenient to cooperate with these groups in slaving wars, which created immense military insecurity and political upheaval among the settled chiefdoms.⁷⁰ This

⁶⁹ Gibson, The Aztecs, p. 153; Roys, op. cit., p. 140; Spores, op. cit., p. 110.

⁷⁰ There has been a good deal of debate in the literature over where these groups came from, whether there were one or several groups, and when they invaded the area. E.g., see the exchange between Birmingham and Jan Vansina in The Journal of African History (4:355-374, 6:143-152, 7:421-429) and Miller's revision (13:549-574). See also Birmingham, op. cit., pp. 65-67.

political instability continued throughout the slave trade period. For example, the tribute payments in slaves made by the conquered chiefs must certainly have compromised their legitimacy with their people; and there were always rival chiefdoms on the frontier where the chances of enslavement might be different. The main example of this were the Kimbundu of Angola; the largest Kimbundu chiefdom, Ndongo, split in two in the 17th century; the western half, the Ndongo proper or "Ngolas" were subordinated to the Portugese. The eastern group, Matamba or the "Jingas" were led further east by their queen and remained autonomous, although they traded with the Portugese.⁷¹

Nevertheless the Portugese did not apparently directly impose their legal procedures or administrative structures on the internal affairs of the native Angolans, nor did the vassal chiefs adopt the Portugese model to any great extent. The basic structure of vassalage continued into the 19th century; when the slave trade was abolished the tributes were paid in currency or trade goods.⁷²

In Mozambique the same was true. The representatives (achuanga) of the prazero stationed in the native villages were there to assure regular tribute payments and transmit the orders of the prazero, not to govern the internal affairs of the villages. Native political procedures continued, although the presence of the achuanga must have had some effect on the decisions reached by the native leaders.⁷³

⁷¹ Birmingham, ibid., p. 126.

⁷² Wheeler, op. cit., p. 94.

⁷³ Isaacman, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

In general, therefore, the Portugese adapted their political structure to the African, rather than forcing the African to adopt theirs. I have already noted that the main reasons for this were the fundamental structural similarity of the two systems and the weakness of the Portugese political presence. The sources on Portugese Africa create an impression of an Angola and Mozambique in which political stability, law and order, existed as a thin veneer at best.⁷⁴ One gets a picture of political systems both chaotic and vicious. On one hand it might be argued that political instability, insofar as it existed, was no greater after the Portugese came than before. On the other hand, it might be true that the slave trade and the ineffectiveness of the Portugese crown created conditions of political upheaval and destruction. The problem is that it is impossible for me to objectively verify or discount these impressions. It is not clear whether they are accurate statements or simply anti-slavery, anti-Portugese, anti-imperialistic biases on the part of the historians who have written in English about Portugese Africa.

The political impact of the Spaniards on the native peoples of Mexico was much more significant. Again it is helpful to divide the discussion into Mesoamerican and non-Mesoamerican societies. In the Mesoamerican area, the native political systems continued at the regional and local level for approximately a generation after the conquest. The Spanish recognized the hereditary right of the nobility to rule.

⁷⁴ The most extreme statement is Oliver and Fage's characterization of Angola as "a howling wilderness," *op. cit.*, p. 130; but see also Newitt, Duffy, and Wheeler for similar, if less extreme, impressions of colonial society.

Further the Spaniards recognized the basic Mesoamerican pattern of a political dominant town and its surrounding hamlets or component barrios in the designation of cabeceras and their subordinate sujetos.⁷⁵

Without ever contradicting that policy, around the mid-sixteenth century the Spanish began to reorganize local Indian government on the Spanish model of local or town government. This was undoubtedly done in the interests of bureaucratic rationality, in order to control tribute and labor systems, and as a part of a policy of Hispanization.

The system instituted a set of officials--governor, alcades (judges and councillors), regidores (councillors), alguaciles(police), and mayordomos (custodians of community property).⁷⁶ At least the top three offices were to be elected from, and apparently by, the nobility for terms of one or more years. The system appears to have been adopted in most areas with little resistance. It was somewhat more formalized than some communities had been, but was not, after all, radically different from native government, except for the removal of the political influence of the native priesthood. For the most part the hereditary chief or king was elected governor and the other nobles filled the other offices. The political structures of the Indian towns at the mid-16th century were quite vigorous. There was enthusiasm for political process and the legislative and litigative structures were very active. As Gibson points out the idea of election was not foreign in the Mesoamerican chiefdoms and states since caciques had always been selected from among the members of the high nobility. What was foreign and

⁷⁵ Gibson, The Aztecs, p. 34.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 167; Tlaxcala, pp. 105-18.

politically unacceptable was the idea of a limited term of office. The native cacique had held his post for life. The Indians, therefore, tried to avoid recurring elections and ignored Spanish regulations forbidding continued re-election of the same individuals.⁷⁷ This was true not only because it violated traditional political norms, but also because as population declined there were sometimes not enough eligible nobles to fill all the offices.

Eventually, however, the indigenous political system based on the hereditary rule of certain families faded out. By the early seventeenth century the offices of the Indian towns were sometimes filled by persons--commoners or low-ranking aristocrats--who would have been ineligible in pre-conquest society. The native nobility as a ruling class was ceasing to exist.

Curiously, however, the Spanish permitted certain survivals of the old system to continue which proved to be dysfunctional for the political structures and, indeed, the very existence of the Indian towns. It will be recalled that the Spaniards recognized the native nobility as "caciques and natural lords."⁷⁸

⁷⁷ The Aztecs, p. 175.

⁷⁸ The terminology is somewhat confusing since the word cacique was not consistently used throughout the region. In upper Mesoamerica, cacique seems to have referred to the political leadership role and "natural lord" to the hereditary principle which recognized a distinction based on birth between the nobility and the commoners. In the Maya area, however, cacique by the end of the Sixteenth Century seems to refer to this hereditary principle and the term governor to the political leadership role. See Gibson, The Aztecs, Tlaxcala, Spores op. cit., pp. 122-30, and Roys, op. cit., pp. 131-41 for discussion of this point and those to follow.

Accordingly this hereditary ruling class was affirmed in its rights-exemption from tribute and the right to receive tribute and labor services from the peasants. Now, of course, in pre-conquest society this right to tribute existed because the nobility performed the political functions at the top of a redistributive economy. They received tribute because they governed. The Spanish, however, thought of the tribute as a right associated with the noble birth. As the sixteenth century ended the political structure introduced by the Spanish led to a distinction between the hereditary rights of the nobility and their traditional political functions. The cacique was not always the governor. Yet the Spaniards continued to recognize the right of hereditary nobility to receive tribute whether they performed a political leadership role or not. And, of course, the Spanish crown demanded its share of tribute in addition, which was collected by the native government. These demands on the peasantry were at least tenable through the mid-sixteenth century, a time of economic prosperity. By the end of the sixteenth century, however, population decline, economic recession, and the increase in tribute demanded by the Spanish made the tribute demands of the native nobility an intolerable anachronism. Many towns could not pay the taxes demanded by the Spaniards let alone support an increasingly parasitic native aristocracy.

Especially in the Aztec area, many peasants who survived the epidemics found it in their interests to leave the Indian town and work for wages on a hacienda or in the cities.⁷⁹ In the Maya area the solution

⁷⁹ Gibson, The Aztecs, p. 248.

for many peasants was withdrawal into remote areas out of the direct control of either Spanish or Indian nobility.⁸⁰

The result was that the political viability of the Indian towns was seriously in doubt by the early 17th century. Office-holding had become an onerous task, not the prestigious and lucrative role of the pre-contact and early colonial society. Accordingly the governments of many Indian towns floundered, and the remaining citizens often became apathetic with no effective political voice to speak for their interests. Accordingly the Indian towns became inward-looking, erecting social and attitudinal structures to isolate themselves from the wider colonial society.

This political devolution of the Mesoamerican Indians after Spanish conquest is not surprising; indeed, it is what we would predict. What was surprising to me was 1) how long it took--well over a century, and 2) that it was not simply a response to the imposition of force by the Spaniards, but a gradual adaptation to political conditions within native society, and to unintended economic and demographic developments as well.

In the non-Mesoamerican north political change took a different trajectory. It will be recalled that the more simply-organized northern Indians were not subject to the tribute demands and formal government of the Spanish crown and were instead more influenced by the missionaries and by private Spanish citizens. All were accustomed to purely

⁸⁰ France V. Scholes and Ralph Roys, The Maya-Chontal Indians of Acalan-Tixchel (2nd ed., Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), pp. 333-34, 343-45.

local political systems. Most found the informal direction of local headmen sufficient to the political needs of their semi-sedentary or nomadic life; even the sedentary Pueblos were each independent under the theocracy of the religious societies. The problem of the Spaniards was to impose extra-local political authority over peoples unused and unwilling to accept orders from anybody.

Some never were thoroughly conquered, as I have noted. The indigenous political systems of these people in general continued. We might guess that as they became more and more marginal environmentally and more and more and more pressed militarily that native political procedures must have altered somewhat. Unfortunately it is impossible to document this idea. The charismatic war leader certainly was the dominant political figure among the raiding groups like the Apache, but it is possible that these groups had been organized around military activity since their arrival in the Southwest.

For those groups who were "reduced," that is brought into settled communities usually around a mission, political life became more complex. The missionary usually established a regular set of town offices as well as religious offices. The former were adaptations of the Spanish municipal model to local conditions. The appointment of a native governor, etc. by the missionary often created or intensified factional divisions within the community or between villages.⁸¹ The mission settlements were invariably larger than the native ones and the missionary was, of course, the central figure of authority. Native

⁸¹ Spicer, op. cit., pp. 290-91.

decision-making in such communities took place in the shadow of the Spanish clerics, and therefore was fundamentally altered. Nevertheless, the new structure maintained an essentially local orientation.

How well did structured political life of these communities "take"; that is, how thorough was the political assimilation? There was great variance on this point. For groups like the Seris and Apaches, mission life represented a temporary expedient to be accepted only as long as was necessary or as appeared beneficial. Several times groups of these Indians returned to their traditional lifestyle after years of mission life and after the missionaries had congratulated themselves on the success of the reduction program.⁸² With others, like the Northern Pimans, the mission was accepted as a shred of security in a world filled with dangerous raids, land expropriation, and population decline.⁸³ Among the tribally organized, sedentary eastern Pueblos, the Spanish system was adopted as a protective shield, a device by which influences from the Europeans could be contained so that traditional politico-religious life could continue.⁸⁴ And finally, some groups such as the Yaqui, Mayo, and Opata thoroughly adopted the new system so that political structure and consciousness was fundamentally and permanently changed. A short description of the Yaqui case will demonstrate this point.⁸⁵

⁸² Ibid., pp. 239-41, 107-11.

⁸³ Dobyns, op. cit.; Spicer, ibid., pp. 130-31.

⁸⁴ Dozier, op. cit., p. 68.

⁸⁵ Spicer, op. cit., pp. 41-85, 397-401.

The Yaqui enthusiastically requested and received Jesuit missionaries in 1617 and by 1623 the Yaqui residents of the estimated 80 rancherías were grouped into eight towns structured on the Spanish municipal model. The next several generations were peaceful and prosperous. In the late 17th century mining operations in the vicinity led to the encroachment of Spanish settlers. The hostility this engendered led to a revolt of the Yaqui & Mayo in 1740. The social and economic disruption thus created persisted and intensified with the expulsion of the Jesuits by the Spanish government in 1767. Nevertheless, the imperial pressures which followed did not result in substantial political change. The eight towns continued to exist and function. Especially during the 19th century the eight towns became the symbol to the Yaquis of their independent tribal existence in the face of continued attempts by the Mexican government to dominate them. From the mid-1830s through their final defeat and deportation in the 1920's, the Yaquis revolted again and again in attempting to defend their land and lives from the Mexicans. By this time the eight towns had been invested with a sacredness and the offices were positions of an almost sacred trust. Even after the dispersal which the military campaigns and deportation entailed the Yaqui political system did not disintegrate. In recent years several of the Yaqui towns have been rebuilt and they are still structured in a fashion similar to that introduced by the Jesuit missionaries in the early 17th century.

2. Economic Structure. The area of economic change is the institutional sphere in which the trend toward the peasant village is most obvious. In the areas of complex society--Mesoamerica and Africa--the

native peoples became incorporated into the evolving world economy almost immediately upon their military conquest. The forms this took included direct expropriation of wealth and the emergence of a new division of labor oriented toward world trade. Production of the commodities in demand by the Europeans required greater native effort and, in some cases, these commodities were ones the natives had not produced before. There was a drift of individuals out of the native communities into the economic life of the European settlements--cities, mines, plantations. Over the long term the development of the colonial economy resulted in the relative impoverishment of the people who remained in the native communities.

The wealth of the Mesoamerican Indians, in particular, began to flow into Spanish hands immediately through the encomienda system and its successor colonial systems. The Indians raised the food that fed the Spanish conquerors and Indian labor built the churches, houses, and public buildings of the conquest society. The exploitative character of these systems has already been described.

Native agriculture in the Mesoamerican area continued with the addition of European grains and some livestock. Spanish custom recognized two categories of livestock, the ganado mayor (cattle and horses) and the ganado menor (pigs, sheep, and goats). Production of the former was by law or by custom monopolized by Spaniards and usually only the ganado menor could be raised by Indians. Often livestock production within native society was confined to the native nobility. The animals (usually sheep) and European grains such as wheat were sometimes raised commercially by the nobility during the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries. In Tlaxcala, Mixteca, Chontal, and probably in general in the Mesoamerican area, the peasants remained primarily agriculturalists with a strong preference for the traditional food crops of maize, etc.⁸⁶

In some regions in the sixteenth century the Indians supplemented or revised their farming to include products of commercial value. The two of greatest significance are silk and cochineal. The former product became the primary agricultural activity of the Mixtec of Oaxaca from the 1530's through the end of the century, after which the industry collapsed.⁸⁷ Silk raising is also mentioned for the Zoque of Chiapas.⁸⁸ Cochineal, a dye extracted from the body of an insect that lives on a particular type of cactus, was widely produced in Mesoamerica. While silkworms had been introduced by the Spaniards, cochineal was a native product. However, production greatly increased in the sixteenth century to meet export demand. This entailed developing plantations of the nopal cactus and this activity was taken up by the commoners. Such activity by common Indians became a cause for concern among the Tlaxcalan nobility who "in 1551 and 1553...ineffectively sought to prohibit nopal plantations, in the belief that common Indians were already acquiring too much money and were refusing to obey their principales."⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Spores, op. cit., p. 84; Gibson, Tlaxcala, pp. 148-49.

⁸⁷ Spores, op. cit., pp. 81-82.

⁸⁸ Roys, op. cit., p. 110.

⁸⁹ Gibson, Tlaxcala, p. 149.

Another agricultural product that found expanded markets after the conquest was maguey, a plant with numerous uses in native society, among which was the manufacture of pulque, an intoxicating beverage. Unlike the production of silk and cochineal, which expanded in the sixteenth century and stabilized or declined thereafter, the amount of land used for maguey cultivation expanded throughout the colonial period. The main region for this was in the central Aztec area, the Valley of Mexico itself. The detribalized Indians of Mexico City provided a good market for the drink and the dessication of the valley following the conquest made much formerly valuable corn land unsuited to anything but maguey.

Traditional Mesoamerican society exhibited an elaborate division of labor into many specialized arts and crafts. These occupations were often passed from father to son in Aztec and other Mesoamerican societies, and hence localities within the cities were associated with a concentration of certain craft activities.⁹⁰ Although conquest society saw the decline of certain native crafts, such as feather design and manuscript painting,⁹¹ and the introduction of new skills, such as sword-making, blacksmithing, and glovemaking, the traditional patterns of family and locality specialization continued, particularly in the Aztec area.⁹² Craft specialization was, of course, primarily an urban

⁹⁰ Gibson, The Aztecs, pp. 349-50.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid., pp. 397-98.

phenomenon both before and after the conquest. Accordingly, over the course of the colonial period, the Indian and Spanish craft groups in the cities gradually merged.⁹³ They became the urban counterpart to the peons in the emergence of Mexican culture and society.

One major occupational group from preconquest Mesoamerican society which did not survive was the merchant class, the pochteca. In preconquest society the merchants were a privileged class and trade routes were extensive. The conquest saw the disruption of native trade and the disappearance of the pochteca as a distinct social group.⁹⁴ The new commercial patterns established by the Spaniards created new groups of traders, both Spanish and Indian. Although Spanish policy attempted to separate Spanish and Indian trade, this was never really enforceable and through time the traders' groups, like the craftsmen, became intermingled.⁹⁵ This was most true in regions of heavy Spanish settlement, such as the Valley of Mexico, and less true in the fringe areas. My impression is that in the largely Indian regions the decline of native long-distance commerce was not replaced by strong trade links to the colonial center, but remained as local or regional markets only.⁹⁶

The Mesoamerican Indians not only were drawn into a colonial and hence world economy as producers. There were also attempts to draw

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 397, 400.

⁹⁴ Scholes and Roys, op. cit., p. 165; Gibson, The Aztecs, pp. 358-59.

⁹⁵ Gibson, ibid., pp. 359-60.

⁹⁶ E.g. see Laura Nader, "The Zapotec of Oaxaca," Ethnology, Part I (vol. 7, HMAI), pp. 338-344.

them in as consumers. In general, however, the consumption patterns of the Indians exhibited a marked degree of continuity with the past. Only a few of the products of Spanish society were in demand among the bulk of the people, although presumably acceptance of these items increased over time.⁹⁷ The native nobility, on the other hand, exhibited a greater enthusiasm for Spanish dress and other objects of daily use. To encourage consumption among the Indians the custom of forced sale repartimento grew up. This system required the Indians of a certain jurisdiction to purchase certain items at set (and usually inflated) prices. The civil officials who administered such sales, of course, profited greatly from them. This form of exploitation was especially prevalent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the Spanish economy and that of her colonies was in decline.⁹⁸

The economic structure of the Indian communities was able to survive the initial economic exploitation of the conquest and encomienda. In some places the new productive and commercial opportunities even produced a measure of prosperity through the mid-sixteenth century. As the sixteenth century ended, however, population decline, the accompanying increase in tribute and labor requirements, and the faltering of Spanish world economic dominance produced general impoverishment for the surviving Indian communities. The demographic and economic pressures associated with the rise of the hacienda system saw the

⁹⁷ Gibson, *op. cit.*, pp. 353-54.

⁹⁸ Gibson, Spain in America, p. 151; The Aztecs, p. 96; Wolf, op. cit., pp. 202-203.

Indians pushed onto more and more marginal lands or forced to accept positions as wage laborers on the Spanish estates or in the mines.

In Africa the process of colonial expropriation was a good deal simpler, although the same basic trends are evident. It has already been made clear that the main commodity produced in Angola during the Portugese period was human labor power--slaves. The processes by which the slaves were produced were tribute and war. The citizens of the conquered Kimbundu and Kongo chiefdoms were therefore subject to potential enslavement. As time went on the bulk of the slaves were acquired by trade or war beyond the borders of the colony itself. This appears to have happened because the demand for slaves far outstripped the ability of the conquered groups to supply them from within without complete demographic collapse. Therefore, as time passed the probability of enslavement of the natives under Portugese rule must have declined, although some chance always remained. Birmingham argues that the tribute in slaves paid by the Kimbundu in the first half of the seventeenth century produced serious depopulation in the area. Therefore, after 1680, the chiefs paid their tribute in carriers, laborers, soldiers, and goods or money.⁹⁹

Nevertheless, the tribute payments provided the means by which the slave trade was carried on. The carriers, laborers, and soldiers mentioned as part of tribute obligations were, of course, used to carry trade goods inland, work in the slave barracoons, and capture

⁹⁹ Birmingham, Trade and Conflict, pp. 99-100, 113-14, 133.

slaves in the punitive expeditions mounted by the Portugese.¹⁰⁰

Some Africans appear to have participated in the slave trade voluntarily as well. These men either became traders or represented Portugese traders in the back country. It is impossible to estimate what proportion of the African traders, carriers, etc. did this voluntarily but the suggestion is that it must have been a substantial proportion.¹⁰¹

It is widely agreed that the Angolan slave trade was not accompanied by other forms of economic development such as commercial agriculture, manufacturing or processing industries, mining, and the like.¹⁰² Therefore, the economic opportunities of the native Angolans consisted of traditional agriculture or stock-raising and the slave trade. Native agriculture received no apparent stimulus, although the introduction of American food crops may have resulted in increased productivity. It is reasonable to hypothesize that the attraction (or compulsion) of the natives to trade may have led to dislocations in agriculture as fewer and fewer workers were available for farm work. Certainly the native agricultural system produced little or no surplus, for it has already been noted that Luanda had to import food from overseas to feed her population. It was not until after the slave trade ended in the mid-nineteenth century that some commercial agriculture development,

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 93, 133; Wheeler, op. cit., p. 63.

¹⁰¹ Wheeler, ibid., pp. 95-97.

¹⁰² E.g. Birmingham mentions unsuccessful attempts to diversify in the 18th century, op. cit., pp. 155-56.

especially coffee production, began to take place.¹⁰³

The end of the slave trade also resulted in an increase in taxation on the natives. The tax collection system was often subject to extortion, such as the selling of the position of tax collector. That the taxes were perceived by the native Angolans as confiscatory is evidenced by the recurring revolts and disturbances over taxes.¹⁰⁴

Trade dominated the Portugese economy of Zambesia as well, although as already noted the slave trade became substantial there only after it declined elsewhere. The prazeros were traders as well as "feudal" lords. Gold, ivory, native cloth, food, and slaves came into the prazeros' hands in two ways - through taxes paid by the natives (colonos) to the prazero and through the sale of imported goods to interior societies or to one's own subjects. The latter was sometimes a forced sale like the repartimento of Mexico. Through such means the prazero supported his family, his retainers, and his slave army.¹⁰⁵

The slaves of a prazo were partially self-sufficient. The actual work of the prazero's household — the drawing of water and fetching of wood, the cooking, repair, building, etc. — was done by the slaves. In addition, however, some of the slaves lived in villages scattered about the estate and farmed. The day-to-day life of these people was very similar to that of the native villages who remained under their traditional chiefs. They married, raised families, had their own

¹⁰³ Wheeler, op. cit., p. 409.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 93-94.

¹⁰⁵ Isaacman, op. cit., pp. 64-75.

leaders, and paid tribute to the prazero. We can assume that slave women tended gardens or did other productive tasks while their men served in the prazo army.¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, the food raised by the slaves was generally not sufficient to feed the entire prazo community.

Commercial agriculture was in effect non-existent on the Zambesian estates. Isaacman argues that plantation production was an economic activity almost totally rejected by the prazeros. Some products such as coffee were even imported when they could have been gathered wild on the lands of the estate.¹⁰⁷ Accordingly, farming activities among both the slaves (achikunda) and village natives (colonos) retained their traditional shift-and-burn, subsistence character.

Therefore the food tribute paid by the colonos was the margin needed by the prazero to support himself and his followers plus providing a surplus for sale. In times of good harvests, these tribute payments were tolerable to the colonos. However, the generally low productivity and the problem of storage made famine a recurrent phenomenon. The achikunda used their power to rob the grain supplies of the colonos in times of scarcity, and, of course, the prazeros were usually unaffected by famine. The burden of starvation fell most heavily on the colonos in this only marginally productive economic system.¹⁰⁸ This fact is one reason why individuals often chose to sell themselves into the ranks of the achikunda. Another reason for voluntary enslavement was to avoid

¹⁰⁶ Newitt, op. cit., p. 197.

¹⁰⁷ Isaacman, op. cit., pp. 68-69.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 66-68.

being sold abroad as the external slave trade grew in the nineteenth century. The achikunda were substantially safer from this hazard than were the colonos.¹⁰⁹

It can be seen that although the colonial economies of Mesoamerica and Portugese Africa were quite different, they produced the same general effects on the natives. These effects were increasing marginality and insecurity for those who remained in the native villages and a movement of individuals out of native villages into the direct employ of the colonial elite. These effects occurred in all the sample societies, but in Mesoamerica the trends were more extensive because of the more pervasive character of Spanish domination.

In the less complex societies, the bands and tribes of northern New Spain, the economic changes introduced by Spanish colonial rule were toward more complex forms of production and distribution. Insofar as the Spanish program was successful, it incorporated individuals or whole groups into patterns of market/money exchange, division of labor, wage labor, and agriculture which had been absent before. It is difficult to know whether these changes added up to an improved material standard of living. It seems likely that the overall material well-being of some of the band and tribal people was improved. Whether the costs in autonomy, disease, and social disruption were "worth it," however, seems dubious.

The groups who lived in mission communities--learning new skills, raising new crops and animals, etc.--seem in particular to have en-

¹⁰⁹ Newitt, op. cit., p. 189.

joyed a measure of prosperity. Sometimes the crops raised were abundant enough for the missionary to sell some of the surplus outside the community. This was especially true of the Yaqui.¹¹⁰ In addition, all the settled mission communities were, it will be recalled, exempt from tribute. Therefore, although populations declined during the first few generations, these Indians were probably no worse off materially and were perhaps more prosperous than they had been before the conquest. During the eighteenth century, however, the influx of Spanish settlers and miners put pressure on these mission Indian communities. With the expulsion of the Jesuits, this pressure forced many Indians off their land and into wage labor in the mines and towns. This trend does not necessarily imply material impoverishment, however. Although working conditions and wages in the mines were abominable, other jobs such as mule driver, blacksmith, carpenter, etc. would have provided more security to individuals.

The Pueblos are unique among the northern groups in have experienced direct and immediate expropriation through tribute and labor demands. However, after the Pueblo Revolt and reconquest of the late seventeenth century, the economic demands upon them were much less severe. Some Pueblo Indians entered the employ of the Spanish in various jobs. One particularly common one was employment as a mercenary in the Spanish military effort against unconquered groups.¹¹¹ The Pimans did this

¹¹⁰ Spicer, op. cit., p. 58.

¹¹¹ Oakah Jones, Pueblo Warriors and the Spanish Conquest (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966).

also.¹¹² The basic Pueblo economy of corn agriculture remained constant with the addition of the employment opportunities, European livestock, etc. Basically before the nineteenth century Pueblo economic structure remained quite traditional.

For a few unconquered groups on the fringes of Spanish settlement, the European presence provided definite economic benefits. The Apache, in particular, learned to supplement their hunted-and-gathered food supply with raids in the livestock, pack trains, and farms of the Spaniards and settled Indians. That the economic benefits of this outweighed the risks is evidenced by the fact that the raids continued and intensified in spite of Spanish and Indian attempts to stop them in the first three-quarters of the eighteenth century.¹¹³ Some Apaches were induced to settle in the colonial settlements by a combination of military strength and economic inducement. The latter was a policy, begun in 1786, of issuing rations of food and liquor to those Apaches who settled near the garrisons. For approximately twenty-five years the rationing system produced a cessation of Apache raids; however after 1811 the Mexican War and ensuing inability of the Mexican government to pay for the rations led the "peaceful Apaches" to drift away and begin raiding again. The Apaches were not finally subdued until the late nineteenth century.¹¹⁴ The rationing system was, in economic terms, conquest turned upside down. The Apaches were an economic drain

¹¹² Dobyns, op. cit., p. 69.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 79; Spicer, op. cit., pp. 236-39.

¹¹⁴ Spicer, ibid., pp. 239-41.

on the Spaniards in peace or war.

Similarly the Navaho benefitted from the Spanish presence. Although they did some raiding, the main effect was the development of a pastoral economy and expansion of trade links to the Spanish and other Indian communities. These economic benefits accruing to the Navahos and Apaches are not properly effects of conquest, however, for the Spaniards never really controlled them politically, except in part during the pacification period already described. The contrast between the economic changes which came to the conquered Indians and the unconquered Indians is evident. Conquest produced pressures on the northern Indians to become incorporated into the larger colonial and hence world economy. These pressures were in part successful. However, it is probably safe to conclude that the extent of economic change was not as great among the tribes and bands as that experienced by the chiefdoms and states.

3. Changes in Systems of Stratification. The main effect of the Spanish conquest on the Mesoamerican Indians was a leveling of the native status structure. This happened in spite of the fact already discussed that Spanish policy was to preserve the native aristocracy. The first step in the leveling process, however, took place at the other end of the native status structure with the elimination of the slave group by the 1540's and of the serf group by approximately the last quarter of the sixteenth century.¹¹⁵ This latter group, which had paid tribute to various noble lords and not to the central government

¹¹⁵ Gibson, The Aztecs, pp. 153-54.

before the conquest, was needed by the Spanish colonial system as tribute payers with the decline of the Indian population. The elimination of these two groups affected the nobility directly by removing a substantial part of their income. Nevertheless, the native aristocracy persisted as a distinguishable social group into the seventeenth century. By 1800, however, the native aristocracy was no longer a privileged group in any but a few symbolic and insignificant ways.¹¹⁶ I suspect that some must have intermarried into Spanish society over the long term. The rest of the native nobility gradually were no longer distinguishable from the mass of the peasants. The leveling process was so complete that in this century almost all the surviving Indian communities have developed internal means for redistributing wealth and preventing private accumulation.

The overall Spanish colonial status system was based on wealth, place of birth, and racial purity. The high positions in church and government were reserved for Spaniards born in Spain (peninsulares) while Spaniards born in the colony (creoles) occupied a somewhat lower status. Both were concerned about racial purity in a society where mixture between Spaniard, African, and Indian was the rule, not the exception. It was possible, in the eighteenth century, to purchase a document from the government which legally "extinguished" one's Indian or Negro ancestry.¹¹⁷ In this society the Indians came gradually to occupy the bottom of the status structure and being called indio was

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 165.

¹¹⁷ Gibson, Spain in America, pp. 129-30.

a derogatory term. I believe this racial consciousness persists in modern Mexico to some degree. Therefore the native Indian communities became over the long term compressed internally and consigned to a low status within colonial/Mexican society.

The same leveling process occurred, but to a lesser extent, in Portugese Africa. It is not that the Portugese were less racist; it is rather that their impact on native society was less. In Angola the hereditary native rulers lost some status, but other natives rose in their place through success in trade, etc. Some prestige accrued to an individual who became acculturated to Portugese folkways. For example, natives who adopted Portugese dress, sometimes called "blacks with cloth" or "putting on shoes," were apparently able to avoid certain tribute obligations and also occupied a somewhat higher status, at least in Portugese eyes.¹¹⁸ In Zambesia also the native aristocracy lost some status. But the achikunda, the prazo slaves, developed their own status and class systems. For example, the leader of a prazo slave community (the mwanamambo) was often a rich and powerful individual, as was his family.¹¹⁹

The Indians of northern Mexico, on the other hand, experienced little change in the degree of inequality. Relatively unstratified before the conquest, they remained so after.

Changes in the Material Core

The final problem of this chapter is to describe the changes which

¹¹⁸ Wheeler, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

¹¹⁹ Newitt, op. cit., pp. 194-96.

took place in the native societies in the material core variables of population, technology, and environment. In the American conquest area the changes in these three variables were similar to those observed in the trade and land expropriation areas of the continent. Population declined because of European disease, metal tools were adopted, and certain environmental changes accompanied the introduction of European plants, animals, and patterns of land use. However, the degree to which population, technology, and environment in Mexico changed was affected by the character of the native societies at contact and by the directness of European impact provided by the conquest situation. In particular, the degree of population decline in Mexico was probably greater than elsewhere and this fact stands out as an extremely significant intervening variable which shaped the form which Spanish colonial society took. In addition the direct application of Spanish patterns of land use and technology produced drastic environmental change in Mexico.

In Central Africa, on the other hand, changes in environment and technology were essentially the same as those experienced in the trade area of West Africa. As in the trade area, new world cultigens were incorporated into indigenous agricultural systems but soil and climatic conditions in this tropical area explain the basic conservatism of native technology. Overall the technological and environmental impact of European conquest in Central Africa was no greater than that produced by trade in West Africa. The slave trade in Angola, however, resulted in population decline there to a degree not observed in the West African region. I hypothesize that the compulsion inherent in the

conquest situation is the main explanation for this difference. In summary, the changes experienced by the native peoples in population, technology and environment under conquest are similar to those produced by the other forms of contact but the degree of change was affected by the conquest situation. The specific character of these changes will be described for each continent separately.

1. Material Change in New Spain. The Mesoamerican region was the main area of concentrated population in the whole new world before contact. The population studies of numerous anthropologists, historians, and others¹²⁰ have led to the conclusion that between a quarter and a third of the entire population of North and South America was concentrated in the Mesoamerican culture area. The most recent and highest estimate of this Mesoamerican population is 25 million.¹²¹ Indeed it is this high population, cybernetically linked to socio-political structure, that lay at the heart of the cultural achievements of Mesoamerican civilization. It was, as we have seen, the rich and populous nature of these civilizations which attracted the Spanish conquerors and which served as the focal point of imperial policy. It was, finally, the catastrophic collapse of that population which helps us to understand the evolution of Spanish colonial society.

The main cause for this decline in Mexico was, as elsewhere, the

¹²⁰ The bibliography on Indian population before contact is enormous. See Henry Dobyns, Native American Historical Demography: A Critical Bibliography for a summary of the issues and a list of the main works.

¹²¹ Sherborne Cook and Woodrow Borah, "The Aboriginal Population of Mexico on the Eve of the Spanish Conquest," Ibero-Americana (No. 45, 1963), cited in Spores, op. cit., p. 71.

epidemics of European-introduced diseases which swept the population. The epidemic of 1520-21 aided Cortez enormously in the military conquest.¹²² And extensive epidemics recurred in the 1540's and 1570's. The high density of Mesoamerican population in the cities and towns certainly encouraged the spread of the contagion. The result appears to have been a population decline of 90% by 1650. Cook and his associates have made two different estimates of the Mesoamerican population in the late 1590's from tribute records, and other colonial documents. These estimates are 2,500,000 and 1,370,000.¹²³ For the central Aztec region, the Valley of Mexico, Gibson estimates the following Indian population.¹²⁴

<u>1520</u>	<u>1570</u>	<u>1650</u>	<u>1742</u>	<u>1800</u>
1,500,000	325,000	70,000	120,000	275,000

Spores suggests a somewhat lower overall rate of decline for the Mixtec with an initial decline to 1540, some partial recovery to 1570 due to improved economic opportunities followed by a large decline thereafter.¹²⁵

The Yucatan Maya at the time of the Spanish conquest had already experienced substantial population decline (perhaps 80%) attendant upon

¹²² Crosby, op. cit., pp. 48-50.

¹²³ Spores, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

¹²⁴ Gibson, The Aztecs, pp. 140-41.

¹²⁵ Spores, op. cit., pp. 73-75.

the collapse of Classic Maya civilization around 900 A.D.¹²⁶ The disease and exploitation brought by the Europeans produced the same sort of extensive decline observed elsewhere. The epidemics which preceded the conquerors (who were successful in the 1540's) produced some unknown rate of decline. The first generation or so of conquest produced a further 2/3 decline in population.¹²⁷ For the Maya this meant virtual depopulation of extensive areas of land.¹²⁸

It appears safe to assume an overall decline of population of 90% or more for the Mesoamerican region during the first century of conquest. After 1650 Indian population in Mesoamerica stabilized and began to increase slowly. Population decline was also extensive in the northern region after their conquest. It is not possible to document whether the same rate of decline occurred there, however, because the evidence is much more scanty. It is known that populations declined markedly through disease and other forces. The work of Henry Dobyns on the population of the northern Piman Indians living in Tucson between 1690 and 1821 shows continuing high rates of population decline throughout the colonial period. Continued immigration is all that kept the Indians of Tucson from dying out all together.¹²⁹ The decline of the northern Indians did not end until much later in time, probably in the late nineteenth century. In neither region did Spanish settlement keep pace

¹²⁶ Adams, op. cit., pp. 224-25.

¹²⁷ Scholes and Roys, op. cit., p. 326.

¹²⁸ Andrews, "Maya Civilization after the Southern Cities," in T. P. Culbert, ed., The Classic Maya Collapse (Albuquerque University of New Mexico Press, 1973), p. 261.

¹²⁹ Dobyns, Spanish Colonial Tucson, pp. 133-40.

with Indian mortality. It is only in this century that total population has exceeded precontact levels.¹³⁰

One reason for this is that the ability of the Spanish system was limited by the loss of Spanish political power and economic dominance to the northern European countries. The colonial response was retrenchment. Another reason, however, that the Spanish population did not grow as fast as the Indians died off was that the conquest introduced environmental changes and patterns of land use which reduced the human carrying capacity of the land. The introduction of livestock, deforestation, and the flood control projects of the Valley of Mexico resulted in reduced agricultural potential.

In an earlier chapter we noted that none of the large domestic animals are native to the Americas. Cattle, horses, sheep, goats, and pigs were all introduced here by European settlers and explorers. The Spaniards were very significant in this process, bringing the animals into Mexico almost immediately at conquest. Crosby describes the almost unbelievable rate of natural increase which these animals experienced in Mexico.¹³¹ It seems that environmental conditions from just south of Mexico City to the north were ideal for cattle; these conditions include lack of natural barriers, plenty of forage, and little competition from other species. Therefore Spanish settlers quickly established herds in this region; moreover, animals escaped and propagated in the wild. The land-extensive nature of the Spanish livestock raising had very serious effects on the Indians. The animals, allowed to roam, were continually

¹³⁰ E.g. see Gibson, The Aztecs, pp. 6-7.

¹³¹ Crosby, op. cit., pp. 75-96.

trampling Indian gardens and eating the corn. Although the colonial government had laws requiring control of the stock, these laws were impossible to enforce.

The livestock were overall a net loss as far as the agricultural people were concerned. The hunter-gatherers and rancheria people lost out to livestock also, for as Spanish settlers began expropriating the land and water resources, it was almost always to support a livestock operation. Therefore, the growth of livestock operations is associated with the loss of Indian control over the land. It was animals who replaced the people. In the far southern area, on the other hand, livestock were not as numerous. But in the north livestock, by trampling and over-grazing the ground cover, were the cause of extensive soil erosion.¹³²

Deforestation also caused soil destruction in some of the areas of heavy Spanish settlement. The numerous churches, public buildings and residences built in the Spanish style used much more wood than their Mesoamerican counterparts. In addition timber was required for mining, fuel, certain manufacturing processes, and so forth. The removal of the trees from the foothills and the hillsides led to the familiar tragic pattern of erosion and dessication. Spanish plow agriculture, never as productive as the chinampas and hoe techniques of the Aztecs,¹³³ was made even more marginal through soil destruction and increasing aridity. The result was more sheep and other animals who can live on marginal

¹³² Gibson, Spain in America, pp. 152-53.

¹³³ Gibson, The Aztecs, pp. 310-20.

lands. This, of course, meant more soil erosion and so on in a downward spiral.

The Valley of Mexico was an area of swamps and lakes before the conquest. The Aztecs and their predecessors had adapted themselves to this environment through dikes, causeways, aqueducts, canals, boat travel, and the famous chinampa agricultural technique.¹³⁴

The Spaniards did not adapt so well; at first they enlarged the dikes constructed before they came. Various drainage proposals to recover land, protect the city from flood, and reduce disease hazard were made but not put into effect in the sixteenth century. Severe flooding, however, led to heavy damage in the early seventeenth century. The potential for flood had been increasing through the latter sixteenth century with the deforestation and attendant siltation of the lakes.¹³⁵

Accordingly, incredibly ambitious projects to control the water by dams, by tunnels cut through the mountain, and by dikes were attempted. The drainage system, called the Desague, was all built with Indian repartimento labor, placing an extreme burden on the declining Indian population.¹³⁶ Although floods recurred because of progressive deforestation and soil erosion, the major part of the water of the lakes was carried away. The new land, however, was barren. Gibson explains why:

¹³⁴ Adams, op. cit., pp. 27-29.

¹³⁵ Gibson, The Aztecs, pp. 236-37.

¹³⁶ Ibid., pp. 238-39.

Subsurface alkaline waters continued to rise in drained areas and with their evaporation soils became impregnated with salts. . .Salinization was evident on the eastern shore of Lake Texcoco in the sixteenth century, where lagunillas had formed, where soils were alkalized, and where sterile years for crops were common. The first alkali dust storms occurred in the sixteenth century, and similar storms were regular features of the dry season during the rest of the colonial period. Thus the draining of the lakes, far from creating new agricultural land, rendered existing agricultural land less serviceable. ¹³⁷

Where lakes had been only salt-dust flats remain.

Obviously, the establishment of colonial Spanish society meant the establishment of European technology--in mining, agriculture, ranching, building, transport, etc. Among the Indians, the native nobility adopted European methods to some degree. But the mass of Indians who survived in their native communities adopted this new technology only in part and very slowly. They preferred corn to wheat, farming to ranching, native craft and clothing styles to European imports, pole-and-thatch or adobe dwellings to Spanish styles. We might guess that metal tools and perhaps carts and wagons were more readily adopted. We can also assume greater adoption of Spanish traits among the "detrribalized" Indians of the towns and haciendas. In any case the material culture of Indian and Spanish appear to have only gradually intermingled and in the Indian areas of modern Mexico numerous technological and material continuities with the preSpanish past may be observed.

2. Material Change in Central Africa. In Central Africa changes in the three test variables were confined almost exclusively to changes in population. The small number of Portugese, the nature of their im-

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 306.

perial goals, and the character of the African environment meant that the technological and environmental impact of the Portugese was minimal. This was especially true in Zambesia.

In the area of human population, on the other hand, significant impact was felt on the native people from the presence of the Portugese. The size of the native population and its spatial and ethnic composition were altered.

It appears that the slave trade in Central Africa substantially reduced the native population. It will be recalled that in Chapter 3 I estimated a total population export of at least 11 million over the four hundred years of the slave trade. I further estimated that around 7 million of those came out of West Africa. The large majority of the remaining four million came out of Angola and its hinterland. I think it is safe to guess that over 3.5 million so originated, and Zambesia added a portion of the remainder in the latter years of the slave trade. A glance at a map of Africa will show that Angola is only around 1/3 the size of the Western slave region; furthermore, it is likely that Angola was less densely inhabited to begin with. Therefore it is not surprising that many scholars agree that depopulation was an effect of the slave trade in Angola. Unfortunately I am unable to numerically describe the extent or rate of that decrease. Most of the Angolan slaves were shipped to the Portugese colony in the new world, Brazil.

Why did the slave trade have this demographic effect in Angola in contrast to West Africa? The obvious explanation is that many of the slaves were acquired in Angola, especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries "for free," that is, as tribute payments from conquered

chiefs. The trading system of West Africa allowed (or forced) the chiefs there to exercise some demographic restraint. The tributary chiefs of Angola did not have that option. Population decline near the coast forced the Portugese to acquire the slaves by trade from further and further inland as time went on. Further, they were economically incapable of competing with the English, French, and others in open competition. Therefore, they concentrated their slaving energies to the areas they could monopolize. The demand for slaves for Brazil led to the excessive slaving we have seen.

The slave trade and the prazo system led numerous Africans as individual or whole communities to migrate inland out of the Portugese sphere. This movement was especially marked in Angola through the middle half of the seventeenth century.¹³⁸ The migration of peoples associated with the conquest and the economic and political forces which pertained thereafter led to substantial alteration in the distribution and "tribal" identity of the people.¹³⁹

In Zambesia population movement and changing identity also occurred. The most interesting is the growth of ethnic consciousness among the prazo slaves, the Achikunda. Coming from diverse political units and language groups, the slaves over time acquired a definite sense of

¹³⁸ Birmingham, Trade and Conflict, pp. 82-126.

¹³⁹ Joseph Miller, Kings and Kinsmen: The Imbangala Impact on the Mbundu of Angola (Ph.D. thesis, history, University of Wisconsin, 1972), pp. 13-19.

"peoplehood" which persists to this day.¹⁴⁰

CONCLUSION

What conclusion may we draw about the effects of conquest on native peoples? First, it is clear that conquest is the most exploitative form of contact considered in this paper. The effects of conquest are more extensive by far than those produced by trade or land expropriation. Conquest, in general, reorganizes the native peoples into peasant communities whose labor and productive resources are controlled by the conquerors for the latter's benefit. For the most part these changes entail socio-cultural devolution of the native societies. In this sense, then, conquest is what we expect it to be.

Our second conclusion, however, is that a conquest situation requires a very long time to affect this reorganization insofar as the conquerors are successful at all. The colonial society is the result of a long evolutionary process by which the explicit goals of the conqueror is shaped by the material context and social structure of the native peoples. The colonial society is not simply the result of the application of force over the natives, but represents a process of mutual adaptation of the intruder and the native.

Finally, we have seen in the contrast between Spanish American and Portugese Africa that "conquest society" is not the same everywhere. The Spanish transformed Mexico much more extensively than the Portugese

¹⁴⁰ See Newitt and Isaacman on this point. It is interesting that Murdock's Outline of World Cultures, p. 66, lists the Achikunda as a subgroup of the Maravi people without noting the diversity or nature of their origin.

affected Africa. For example, in Zambesia we could legitimately speak of the Africanization of the Portugese. This is not only because the Spanish were better organized. The relatively small impact of the Portugese is partially explained by the social and environmental character of the Africa they tried to rule.

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS

What finally may be concluded about the patterns of social change experienced by native societies at the dawn of the modern age? First, in the most general terms we have seen that the pattern of social change experienced in the various contact situations is strongly influenced by the pre-existing level of complexity of the native society. Under none of the three contact situations did the simpler bands and tribes adapt in the same way as the more complex chiefdoms. The forces for change generated by contact found their greatest impact among the chiefdoms and were less influential with decreasing levels of complexity. In the trade areas, for example, the bands were less likely to be changed by the increased wealth, new material goods, and new patterns of influence than were the chiefdoms. None of the African bands changed substantially according to my measures while in the North American area the higher levels of social order were more often transformed into bands than the reverse. In the case of land expropriation, the bands were for the most part unable to marshal the organizational resources to survive as migrants, while those who did survive were almost all drawn from the more complex societies. And finally, the chiefdoms were affected by conquest much more than were the simpler peoples. This point has not been sufficiently appreciated in sociological studies of culture contact and change. My research has shown that vague constructs such as "periphery" or "underdeveloped society" need to be replaced by an explicit recognition that societies of varying levels of complexity are likely to respond differently to the same stimuli.

My second conclusion is that the three forms of contact between native peoples and the Europeans produced different forms of adaptation. The effects of trade in the precolonial past are easily distinguished from the effects of conquest. The implicit assertion of the dependency school that trade is not fundamentally different from conquest imperialism is not warranted. Trade did not result in the same processes of social change as conquest nor were the structural results of trade similar to those produced by conquest. Trade, even at its most exploitative, still left a degree of social and individual discretion which conquest did not. And at the extremities, one has only to compare the growth in wealth and power of the Ashanti Empire on one hand with the disintegration and impoverishment of the Aztec Empire on the other to be convinced that it is preferable to trade than to be conquered. Further and surprisingly, the successful migrants in a land expropriation situation were marked by a much faster and much greater degree of social change than was seen in the other two cases.

These two general conclusions may be supplemented with some specific conclusions about each of the three forms of contact. With regard to trade, the data for my sample do not support the frequently hypothesized idea that this kind of contact produces developmental effects in the political and economic systems of a society. First, all kinds of trade do not produce the same results. In particular the fur trade, because of the way it was organized and because it took place in a context of population decline, had no developmental effects. Although the material well-being of the individual natives improved, the fur trade

did not result in political centralization, economic development, or capital accumulation. In fact the fur trade was associated with devolutionary social trends.

In Africa a minority of the sample societies experienced centralization and/or economic development. Technological change was not extensive. Those few societies which did experience political centralization, economic development, or both were more likely than others to possess one or more of the following characteristics: they began as tribes or chiefdoms, not bands, or they were far enough away from direct European contact to avoid disruptive effects, or they had "free" economies that were not monopolized by foreigners or indigenous elites.

The infrequency of developmental effects of trade in both North America and Africa leads to the conclusion that the effects of this form of contact support the dependency model rather more than the diffusionist model. However, neither paradigm held the predictive power we would wish in the precolonial context from which my sample was drawn. In particular, the frequency of the "no-change" event suggests that the claims of both schools may be overdrawn for a sample such as this one. A question for further research is whether the effects observed with this sample are unique to the particular characteristics of the European political economy and cultural system or whether the same results would be seen with any case of commercial contact between societies of differing levels of technological and organizational complexity.

In the case of land expropriation the data show that native political structure and leadership were the most significant variables pre-

dicting the outcome of this type of contact. Those who migrated away from contested lands and thereby survived as independent peoples, as in the cases of the Cherokee, Choctaw, Ndebele, Ngoni, etc., were generally those who had experienced substantial political centralization in the period prior to the expropriation. Those who had not experienced political evolution usually fell to the Europeans as conquered peoples. The strong polities were able to protect their economic system and to maintain stable or growing populations. With only the exceptions of the Seminole and Makololo, these strengths allowed the societies to migrate into lands sufficiently like those they had lost to allow continuity of their social orders. Thus the ecological model, i. e. the prediction of the crucial effect of environmental change, could not be effectively tested.

The effects of conquest on the native peoples generally followed the hypothesized model of change, namely that the more complex societies would become less complex and the simpler ones would become more complex. The states and chiefdoms devolved and the tribes and bands were often incorporated into supralocal political and economic systems. However, the basic trend of the conquest process, the development of peasant villages on the rural periphery of conquest society, was not inevitable. The extent of incorporation of the native societies into a conquest society depended on several factors. These were: 1) the pre-existing level of complexity, with the more complex societies being "easier" to conquer than the simpler tribes or bands; 2) the efficiency and structure of the conquering society; and 3) the size of the native population relative to the conquering population. The first of these is the

most surprising since it goes against our common sense notions of relative military strength. But the fact is that the mighty Aztec Empire with its thousands of warriors was conquered in a matter of months while the Spaniards were never able to best the fighters of groups like the Apaches. In general a conquest society evolves; it is not created by the will or as a result of pure coercion by the conqueror. The outcome, insofar as an integrated conquest society emerged at all, took a long time to develop. In any case, a conquest society is not the same kind of social structure as a trading network, and therefore the role of the native societies in the former was not the same as in the latter. Clearly, the impacts of European expansion were more complex than we have traditionally believed.

APPENDIX A

The following is a listing of the sample societies; the code following each is the designation used in the Outline of World Cultures. Reference to these numbers will allow the reader to detect which societies grouped by Murdock that I have treated separately. The 5th Edition of OWC was used.

A. Trade Areas

West Africa		N.E. North America	
Name	OWC Code	Name	OWC Code
1. Aja	FA18	1. Abnaki	NL4
2. Southern Akan, with the addition of Denkyira and Akwamu	FE12, (TW1)	2. Assiniboine	NF4
3. Northern Akan		3. Beothuk	NI4
4. Ashanti	FE12	4. Western Cree	NG4
5. Baga	FA7	5. Swampy Cree	NG4
6. Balanta	FB6	6. Delaware	NM7
7. Banyun	FB6	7. Erie	NM7
8. Bambara	FA8	8. Fox/Sauk	NP5, NP11
9. Beafada	FB6	9. Huron	NG5
10. Benin	FF21(EDO)	10. Illinois	NP6
11. Chamba	FF15	11. Iroquois (League, incl. Cayuga Mohawk Oneida Onondaga Seneca)	NM9
12. Dagomba	FE5	12. Kickapoo	NP7
13. Dahomey	FA18	13. Mahican	NM10
14. Dida	None	14. Mandan	NP17
15. Diola (Jola)	FA14	15. Maskoutin	NP6
16. Dogon	FA16	16. Menomini	NP8
17. Dyula	FA15 (Diula)	17. Miami	NP9
18. Fanti	FE12	18. Micmac	NJ5
19. Fulani	MS12 (Fulbe)	19. Montagnais/ Naskapi	NH6
20. Futa Jallon	FA19	20. Nanticoke	NM11
21. Futa Turo	None	21. Narragansetts	NL6
22. Ga	FE6	22. Neutral	NM8
23. Gbande	FD4	23. Northern Ojibwa	NG6
24. Gbari	FF23	24. Southern Ojibwa	NG6
25. Gola	FD5	25. Ottawa	NG6
26. Gonja	FE8 (Guang)	26. Pennacook Confederacy	NL4
27. Hausa	MS12	27. Pequot	NL6
28. Ibibio (Efik)	FF22	28. Petun	NG5

A. Trade Areas (continued)

West Africa		N.E. North America	
Name	OWC Code	Name	OWC Code
29. Ibo, except Western	FF26	29. Potawatomi	NP10
30. Western Ibo	FF26	30. Susquehannock	NM8
31. Igala	FF28	31. Wampanoag	NL5
32. Ijaw (Ijo)	FF30	32. Winnebago	NP12
33. Itsekiri	FF21		
34. Katab	FF38		
35. Kissi	FA23		
36. Konkomba	FA24		
37. Kono/Koranko	FC4, FC5		
38. Kpelle	FD6		
39. Kru	FD7		
40. Kulango	FA26 (Lobi)		
41. Kurama	FF42		
42. Lagoon Tribes	FA25		
43. Landuma	FB5		
44. Mamprusi	FE9		
45. Mende	FC7		
46. Malinke/Gambia	FA27		
47. Malinke/Bambuhu	FA27		
48. Mossi	FA28		
49. Nupe	FF52		
50. Pepel	FB6		
51. Serer	FA32		
52. Sherbro	FC8		
53. Susu	FA33		
54. Temne	FC9		
55. Tiv	FF57		
56. Vai	FD9		
57. Voltaic Groups, includ- ing-Dagari	FE4		
Grusi	FE7		
Nankanse	FE10		
Tallensi	FE11		
58. Wolof	MS30		
59. Yoruba	FF62		

B. Land Expropriation Areas

South Africa		S.E. United States	
Name	OWC Code	Name	OWC Code
1. Cape Nguni	FX17 (South Nguni)	1. Alabama/Koasati	NN11
2. Gaza	FR5	2. Apalachee	NN14 (Gulf Tribes)
3. Hlubi	FX20	3. Calusa	NN7
4. Kgalagadi	FV4	4. Catawba	NN13 (Eastern Siouxsans)
5. Khoi	FX13 (Hottentot)	5. Cherokee	NN8
6. Makololo	FQ9	6. Chickasaw	NN9
7. Ndebele	FS4	7. Choctaw	NN10
8. Ngoni	FR5	8. Creek	NN11
9. Ngwane		9. Guale	NN12
10. Pedi	FX16	10. Houma/Chitimacha	NO4
11. San	FX10 (Bushman)	11. Lumbee	NN21
12. Sotho (Mosheshwe's) (Basuto)	FW2	12. Natchez	NO8
13. Swazi	FU2	13. Seminole	NN16
14. Tlokwa	FV6	14. Tequesta	NN7
15. Transvaal Ndebele	FX18	15. Timucua	NN18
16. Tswana	FV6	16. Tuscarora	NN19
17. Venda	FX19	17. Yamassee	NN11
18. Zulu	FX20	18. Yuchi	NN20

C. Conquest Areas

Angola/Zambesia		Spanish America	
Name	OWC Code	Name	OWC Code
1. Kimbundu (Ndongo)	FP6	1. Acaxee	NU6
2. Kongo	F021	2. Aztec	NU7 (Nahua)
3. Maravi	FR4	3. Apache	NT8, NT21
4. Shona (Rozwi)	FS5	4. Cazcan	NU9
		5. Chol	NV6
		6. Chontal	NV7
		7. Cora/Huichol	NU15/NU19
		8. Cuitlatec	None
		9. Huastec	NV17
		10. Maya (Yucatecan)	NV10

C. Conquest Areas (continued)

Angola/Zambesia		Spanish America	
Name	OWC Code	Name	OWC Code
		11. Mixe	NU23
		12. Mixtec	NU24
		13. Navaho	NT13
		14. Olmec/Popoluca	NU30
		15. Opata	NV25
		16. Otomi	NU26
		17. Pame	NU27
		18. Northern Pimans	NU29, NV28
		19. Eastern Pueblos, includes all Pueblo groups ex- cept Hopi and Zuni	NT7, NT10, NT11, NT12
		20. Western Pueblos (Hopi & Zuni)	NT9, NT23
		21. Tarahumare	NU33
		22. Tarasco	NU34
		23. Tepehuan	NU36
		24. Tlapanec	NU39
		25. Tlaxcala	
		26. Totonac	NU40
		27. Totorame	NU41
		28. Trique	NU11 (Choco)
		29. Tzeltal/Tzotzil	NV9/NV11
		30. Seri	NU31
		31. Yaqui/Mayo	NU8 (Cahita)
		32. Yumans	NT14, NT15
		33. Zacatec	NU43
		34. Zapotec	NU44
		35. Zoque	NU23

APPENDIX B: Population Estimates 1600-1850, North American Fur Area

Society	1600	1625	1650	1675	1700
Assiniboine					
Cree (Western)					
Delaware		8000-10000 (1634)			
Erie	c. 10000	8000-10000	Destroyed (1654-7)		
Fox and Sauk			6500		4000-5000
Huron	30000	20000-40000 10000-20000 (1640)	10000 refugees		
Illinois				12000	5800-6200

	1725	1750	1775	1800	1825	1850
			2400-3000 (1776)	6800-8500 (1809)	9600-12000 (1837)	5000 (1863)
			1600-2000 (1789)		3200-4000 (1838)	3000 (1869)
		3700-6200 (1776)	2480-3100 (1789)	2400-3000 (1809)	1500 (1838)	11520 Plains 425 Woodland (1860)
				2500 Plains (1819)	1840-2300 (Plains 1820)	7000 Plains (1871)
	3600-4500 (1750)	2500-3000 (1775)		3500 (2000 in main group, rest scattered)		950 (Kansas Reserve)
	3000 (1765)					
200 Fox (1731)				1200 (1805)		
	400-500 Wyandot					
2500 (1736)	1900-2000 (1763)	700 (east of Mississippi)	500			

Appendix B, page 2

Society	1600	1625	1650	1675	1700
Iroquois	12000-15000				4400-5500
Kickapoo				c. 3000	
Mahican	6400 (1610)			1000+ (River Indians 1689)	
Mandan		c. 10000			
Mascoutin				3000 Miami + Mascoutin in Wisconsin	
Miami					4400-4800 (1695) 5600-6400 (1718)
Neutral		c. 35000		dispersed	
Micmac	3000-4000 (1609)	c. 3000			
Narragansetts	7800 Cook (1610) 20000 Jennings				4000-5000 (pre-war)

1725	1750	1775	1800	1825	1850
	8000-10000 (1763)	6000-6500 (1780)			
960-1200 (1736)	720-900 (1762)			1600-2000 (US) 600-750 (Canada) (1815)	
360-450 (Mahican) 350 (Mixed)	120 (Stockbridge) (1740)	420 (to Oneida) (1783)		1600	120-130 survivors to Hidatsa (1838)
					"a few left" No mention after 1812 Merge with Kickapoo?
2240-2800 (1736)	2100-2625 (1757)				
			1400-2000	1425 (1841)	

Appendix B, page 3

Society	1600	1625	1650	1675	1700
Pennacocks	12000 (1600) c. 3000 (1620)	2500 (1630)		1250	"remnants"
Pequot	20000 (Jennings) 3500 (Cook)	3000 (1637) 2200 (1643)		1500+ (pre-war)	
Ojibwa	c. 4500				
Ottawa					c. 2000 c. 1400 (1721)
Petun		5000 (Noble) 15000 (Hunt)	dispersed		
Potawatomi			4000		
Susquehannock	2400-3000	2400-3000 (1633) 5200-6500 (1647)	2000-3000 (1652) 2800-3500 (1663)	1200-1500	120-150 (1697) "Conestoga"

1725

1750

1775

1800

1825

1850

11177 (1805) 12500 (Chipp-
 pewa and
 Ottawa) 11639 (1865)
 17000 U. S. (1883)
 11200 Canada (1883)

2000
 (1736)

2000-3000
 (1760)

4000 (1812)

4700 (1890)

720-900
 (Detroit)
 1150-1430
 (1736)

c. 2100 in
 37 villages
 + 10 mixed
 villages

Conestoga
 massacred (1763)

Appendix B, page 4

Society	1600	1625	1650	1675	1700
Wampanoag [+Cape and Islands]	5000 (1610) [8100]	[5000]		2500 (1674) [4750] 1000 (1685)	[3650] 800 (Martha's Vineyard) (1720)

Winnebago "Several thousand warriors" "huge loss" (1640-50) "almost nothing" 600-750

Assiniboine and W. Cree calculated at 8-10 persons per lodge, following Ray, op. cit.

All others, except Winnebago, calculated at 4-5 persons per warrior; this appears to be standard.

Winnebago after 1750 calculated at 18-20 persons per lodge, following Janet Spector, "Winnebago Indians, 1634-1829: An Archaeological and Ethnohistoric Investigation," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin, 1974).

Jennings and Cook give widely different estimates for New England. The references are Jennings, op. cit., and Sherburne Cook, The Indian Population of New England in the Seventeenth Century (University of California Publications in Anthropology, no. 12; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, Richard E. W. (ed.). The Origins of Maya Civilization. (School of American Research Advanced Seminar Series.) Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977.
- _____. Prehistoric Mesoamerica. Boston: Little, Brown, Co., 1977.
- Ahanotu, Austin. "The Economics and Politics of Religion: A Study of the Development of the Igbo Spirit of Enterprise, 1800-1955." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1971.
- Ajayi, J. F. A. and Crowder, Michael (eds.). History of West Africa. Vol. I. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
- Alagoa, Ebiegberi. A History of the Niger Delta: An Historical Interpretation of Ijo Oral Tradition. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1972.
- _____. The Small Brave City-State: A History of the Nembe-Brass in the Niger Delta. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964.
- Alpers, Edward. "Trade, State and Society Among the Yao in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of African History, X, no. 3 (1969), 405-420.
- Andrews, E. Wyllys. "Archaeology and Prehistory in the Northern Maya Lowlands: An Introduction," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. II, 288-330.
- Anson, Bert. The Miami Indians. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970.
- Baerreis, David. "Chieftainship among the Potawatomi: An Exploration of Ethnohistoric Methodology," The Wisconsin Archaeologist, LIV, no. 3 (1973), 114-135.
- _____. Indians of Northeastern Illinois. (American Indian Ethnohistory: North Central and Northeastern Indians) New York: Garland, 1974.
- Bailey, Alfred Goldsworthy. The Conflict of European and Eastern Algonkian Cultures, 1504-1772: A Study in Canadian Civilization. Sackville, New Brunswick: The Tribune Press, 1937.

- Balogun, Soka Adegbite. "Gwandu Emirates in the Nineteenth Century with Special Reference to Political Relations 1817-1903." Unpublished thesis, University of Ibadan, 1970.
- Bascom, William and Herskovits (eds.). Continuity and Change in African Cultures. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959.
- Barnes, John A. Politics in a Changing Society: A Political History of the Fort Jameson Ngoni. Manchester: University Press for the Institute for Social Research, University of Zambia, 1967.
- Beach, D. N. "Ndebele Raiders and Shona Power," Journal of African History, XV, no. 4 (1974), 633-651.
- Beals, Ralph L. The Acaxee: A Mountain Tribe of Durango and Sinaloa. (Ibero-Americana, no. 6.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1933.
- _____. The Comparative Ethnography of Northern Mexico before 1750. (Ibero-Americana, no. 2.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1932.
- _____. "Southern Mexican Highlands and Adjacent Coastal Regions," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. VII, 315-328.
- _____. "The Tarascans," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. VIII, 725-773.
- Bellah, Robert. "Religious Evolution," American Sociological Review, XXIX, no. 3 (June, 1964), 358-374.
- Bere, Rennie. The African Elephant. New York: Golden Press, 1966.
- Birmingham, David. "The Date and Significance of the Imbangala Invasion of Angola." Journal of African History, VI, no. 2 (1965), 143-152.
- _____. The Portugese Conquest of Angola. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- _____. Trade and Conflict in Angola: The Mbundu and their Neighbors under the Influence of the Portugese, 1483-1790. Oxford: Clarendon, 1966.
- Bishop, Charles A. The Northern Ojibwa and the Fur Trade. Montreal: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, Ltd., 1974.

- Blasingham, Emily J. "The Illinois Indians, 1634-1800: A Study in Depopulation." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Anthropology Department, Indiana University, 1956.
- Bohannen, Laura and Bohannen, Paul. The Tiv of Central Nigeria. (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, West Africa, Part 8.) London: International African Institute, 1953.
- Boissevain, Ethel. The Narragansett People. Phoenix: Indian Tribal Series, 1975.
- Borah, Woodrow, and Cook, Sherbourne. The Aboriginal Population of Central Mexico on the Eve of the Spanish Conquest. (Ibero-Americana, no.45.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.
- Boston, J. S. The Igala Kingdom. (Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research.) Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Bouton, Nathaniel. The History of Concord. . .with a History of the Ancient Pennacooks. Louisville: Lost Cause Press, 1973. (First published in 1856: Concord, New Hampshire, B. W. Sanborn.)
- Boxer, C. R. Race Relations in the Portugese Colonial Empire, 1415-1825. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.
- _____. Salvador de Sa and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola. London, 1952.
- Bradbury, R. E. The Benin Kingdom and the Edo-speaking Peoples of Southwest Nigeria. London: International African Institute, 1964.
- _____. "Patrimonialism and Gerontocracy in Benin Political Culture," in Man in Africa, Mary Douglas and Phyllis Kaberry (eds.) London: Tavistock Publications, 1969.
- Brain, J. P. "Natchez Paradox," Ethnology, X (April, 1971), 215-222.
- Brand, Donald D. "Ethnohistoric Synthesis of Western Mexico," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol XI, 632-656.
- Brasser, Ted. J. "The Coastal Algonkians," in North American Indians in Historical Perspective, Eleanor Leacock and Nancy O. Lurie (eds.) New York: Random House: 1971.
- _____. Riding on the Frontier's Crest: Mahican Indian Culture and Culture Change. Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1974.

- Busia, K. A. The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti: A Study of the Influence of Contemporary Social Change on Ashanti Political Institutions. London: The Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1951.
- Caplan, Gerald. "Baroteseland's Scramble for Protection," Journal of African History, X, no. 2 (1969), 277-294.
- Carrasco, Pedro. "The Social Organization of Ancient Mexico," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. X, 349-375.
- Chilcote, Ronald (ed.). Protest and Resistance in Angola and Brazil. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
- Childs, Gladwyn M. Umbundu Kinship and Character. London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute and Witwatersrand University Press, 1949.
- Christensen, James Boyd. Double Descent Among the Fanti. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1954.
- Clarke, George F. Someone Before Us: Our Maritime Indians. Fredericton, New Brunswick: Brunswick Press, 1968.
- Conkling, R. "Legitimacy and Conversion in Social Change: The Case of French Missionaries and the Northeastern Algonkian," Ethnohistory, XXI (Winter, 1974), 1-24.
- Connolly, R. M. "Social Life in Fanti-Land," Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, XXVI (1897), 128-153.
- Cook, Sherbourne H. The Indian Population of New England in the Seventeenth Century. (University of California Publications in Anthropology, no. 12.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.
- Cook, S. and Borah, Woodrow. The Indian Population of Central Mexico, 1531-1610. (Ibero-Americana, no. 44.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960.
- _____. The Population of Mixteca Alta, 1520-1960. (Ibero-Americana, no. 50.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.
- Cotterill, Robert. The Southern Indians: the Story of the Civilized Tribes Before Removal. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954.
- Cottrell, William F. Energy and Society. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970. (Originally published 1955, McGraw-Hill)

- Cox, Bruce A. (comp.) Cultural Ecology: Readings on the Canadian Indians and Eskimos. Toronto: McClelland and Stuart, 1973.
- Crosby, Alfred W. The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492. (Contributions in American Studies, no. 2.) Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972.
- Culbert, T. P. (ed.) The Classic Maya Collapse. (School of American Research Advanced Seminar Series.) Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1973.
- Cunnison, Ian. "Kagembe and the Portugese, 1798-1832," Journal of African History, II (1961), 61-76.
- Curtin, Philip. Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975.
- _____. The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969.
- _____. "The Lure of Bambuk Gold," Journal of African History, XIV, no. 4 (1973), 623-631.
- Daaku, Kwame Y. Trade and Politics on the Gold Coast, 1600-1720. London: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Dachs, Anthony. "Missionary Imperialism--the Case of Bechuanaland," Journal of African History, XIII, no. 4 (1972), 647-658.
- Danquah, J. B. Gold Coast: Akan Laws and Customs and the Akim Abuakwa Constitution. London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1928.
- Datta, Ansu and Porter, R. "The Asafo System in Historical Perspective," Journal of African History, XII, no. 2 (1971), 279-297.
- Davidson, Basil. The African Slave Trade: Precolonial History, 1450-1850. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1961.
- _____. In the Eye of the Storm. New York: Doubleday, 1972.
- Davidson, John. "Trade and Politics in the Sherbro Hinterland, 1849-1890." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1969.
- Davis, Ronald. "Historical Outline of the Kru Coast, Liberia, 1500 to the Present." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Indiana University, 1968.
- D'Azevedo, W. L. Gola of Liberia. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1972.

- Deale, V. B. "The History of the Potawatomi Before 1722," Ethnohistory, V (1958), 105-160.
- Debo, Angie. The Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republic. 2nd ed. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961.
- DeForest, J. W. History of the Indians of Connecticut from the Earliest Period to 1850. Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1964.
- Dieterlen, Germaine. Essai sur la Religion Bambara. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951.
- Dike, K. Onwuka. Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885; An Introduction to the Economic and Political History of Nigeria. (Oxford Studies in African Affairs.) London: Oxford University Press, 1956.
- DiMarco, Luis Eugenio (ed.). International Economics and Development: Essays in Honor of Raul Prebisch. New York: Academic Press, 1972.
- Dobyns, Henry. "Estimating Aboriginal American Population: An Appraisal of Techniques with a New Hemispheric Estimate," Current Anthropology, VII (1966), 395-416.
- _____. Native American Historical Demography: A Critical Bibliography. (Published for the Newberry Library.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976.
- _____. Spanish Colonial Tucson: A Demographic History. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976.
- Dozier, Edward P. The Pueblo Indians of North America. (Case Studies in Cultural Anthropology.) New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970.
- Duffy, James. Portugal in Africa. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962.
- _____. Portugese Africa. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961.
- Duly, L. C. "The Failure of British Land Policy at the Cape, 1812-28," Journal of African History, VI, no. 3 (1965), 357-371.
- Dunham, Douglas. The French Element in the American Fur Trade, 1760-1816. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, Inc., 1950.
- Durkheim, Emile. The Division of Labor in Society. New York: The Free Press, 1933.

- Edmunds, Russell. "A History of the Potawatomi Indians, 1615-1795." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1972.
- Ellsworth, Paul T. The International Economy. 4th ed. London: Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., 1969.
- Elphick, Richard. Kraal and Castle: Khoikhoi and the Founding of White South Africa. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
- Englund, Donald. "A Demographic Study of the Cherokee Nation." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Oklahoma, 1974.
- _____. "Indians, Intruders, and the Federal Government," Journal of the West, XIII (April, 1974), 97-105.
- Epstein, A. L. "Military Organization and the Precolonial Polity of the Bemba of Zambia," Man, X (June, 1975), 199-217.
- Eshleman, Henry. Lancaster County Indians: Annals of the Susquehannocks and other Indian Tribes. . . from about the Year 1500 to 1763, the Date of their Extinction. Lancaster, Pa.: 1908.
- Fage, J. D. States and Subjects in Sub-saharan African History. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1974.
- Fenton, William C. The Iroquois Eagle Dance; An Offshoot of the Calumet Dance. (Bureau of American Ethnology, no. 156.) Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1953.
- _____. "The Iroquois in History," in Eleanor Leacock and Nancy O. Lurie (eds.) North American Indians in Historical Perspective, New York: Random House, 1971.
- _____. "Locality as a Basic Factor in the Development of Iroquois Social Structure," in Symposium on Local Diversity in Iroquois Culture. (Bureau of American Ethnology, no. 149.) Washington: The Smithsonian, 1951.
- _____. Masked Medicine Societies of the Iroquois. (Annual Report of the Smithsonian.) Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1940.
- Ffoulkes, Arthur. "Fanti Marriage Customs," Journal of the African Society, VIII (1909), 31-48.
- Forde, Cyril (ed.). Efik Traders of Old Calabar; Containing the Diary of Antera Duke, an Efik Slave-trading Chief of the Eighteenth Century. London: Oxford University Press, 1956.

- Forde, C. Daryll. The Yoruba-speaking Peoples of Southwest Nigeria. (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, West Africa, Part 4.) London: International African Institute, 1951.
- Forde, C. Daryll, and Jones, G. I. The Ibo and Ibibio-speaking Peoples of Southeast Nigeria. (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, West Africa, Part 3.) London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1950.
- Forde, C. Daryll, Brown, P, and Armstrong, R. Peoples of the Niger-Benue Confluence. (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, West Africa, Part 10.) London: International African Institute, 1955.
- Foreman, Grant. Advancing the Frontier, 1830-1860. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1933.
- _____. The Five Civilized Tribes. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1934.
- Fortes, Meyer. "Kinship and Marriage among the Ashanti," in African Systems of Kinship and Marriage, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and D. Forde (eds.) London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1950.
- _____. "Time and Social Structure; An Ashanti Case Study," in Social Structure: Studies Presented to A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, Meyer Fortes (ed.) London: Oxford University Press, 1949.
- Friedl, Ernestine. "An Attempt at Directed Culture Change: Leadership Among the Chippewa, 1640-1948." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Columbia University, 1950.
- Fulton, Richard. "The Kpelle of Liberia: A Study of Political Change in the Liberian Interior." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Connecticut, 1968.
- Furtado Celso. Economic Development of Latin America. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970.
- _____. Obstacles to Development in Latin America. Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1970.
- Fynn, J. K. Asante and Its Neighbors 1700-1807. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971.
- Gamble, David. The Wolof of Senegambia together with Notes on the Lebu and the Serer. London: International African Institute, 1957.
- Gast, Arthur Donald, Jr. "The Impact of the Fur Trade upon Chippewa-American Culture and Education." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, School of Education, Indiana University, 1974.

- Gbadamosi, Gbadebo. "The Growth of Islam among the Yoruba 1841-1908." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Ibadan, 1968.
- Gearing, Frederick. Priests and Warriors: Social Structures for Cherokee Politics in the Eighteenth Century. (American Anthropological Association Memoir, no. 93.) Washington: American Anthropological Association, 1962.
- Gemery, Henry A. and Hogendorn, Jan. "The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Tentative Economic Model," Journal of African History, XV, no. 2 (1974), 223-246.
- Gibson, Arrell. The Chickasaws. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1971.
- _____. The Kickapoos: Lords of the Middle Border. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963.
- Gibson, Charles. The Aztecs under Spanish Rule: A History of the Indians of the Valley of Mexico, 1519-1810. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1964.
- _____. Spain in America. New York: Harper and Row, 1966.
- _____. "Structure of the Aztec Empire," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope. ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. X, 376-394.
- _____. Tlaxcala in the Sixteenth Century. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952.
- Goldstein, Robert. French-Iroquois Diplomatic and Military Relations, 1609-1701. The Hague: Mouton, 1969.
- Goody, Jack. "Ethnohistory and the Akan of Ghana," Africa, XXIX, no. 1 (1959), 67-81.
- Gray, Richard and Birmingham, David. Pre-colonial African Trade: Essays on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa Before 1900. London: Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Green, Michael. "Federal-State Conflict in the Administration of Indian Policy: Georgia, Alabama and the Creeks, 1824-1834." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Iowa, 1973.
- Gunn, Harold D. Pagan Peoples of the Central Area of Northern Nigeria. (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, West Africa, Part 7.) London: International African Institute, 1956.
- Harris, Joseph. "The Kingdom of Fouta Diallon." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Northwestern University, 1970.

- Harris, Marvin. The Rise of Anthropological Theory. New York: T. Y. Crowell, 1968.
- Harvey, H. R. "Ethnohistory of Guerrero," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchoppe, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. XI, 603-618.
- Henry, Joseph, abbé. L'âme d'un Peuple Africain. Les Bambara, Leur vie Psychique, Ethique, Sociale, Religieuse. I (Bibliothèque Anthropos, Coll. internationale de monographies ethnologiques, t. 1, fasc. 2.) Münster i. W.: Ashendorf, 1910.
- Heintze, Beatrix. "Historical Notes on the Kisama of Angola," Journal of African History, XIII, no. 3 (1972), 407-418.
- Henderson, Richard N. The King in Every Man: Evolutionary Trends in Onitsha Ibo Society and Culture. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972.
- Herbert, Eugenia. "Aspects of the Use of Copper in Precolonial Africa," Journal of African History, XIV, no. 2 (1973), 179-194.
- Herskovits, Melville. Acculturation: The Study of Culture Contact. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1958.
- Hickerson, Harold. "The Chippewa of the Upper Great Lakes," in North American Indians in Historical Perspective, Eleanor Leacock and Nancy O. Lurie (eds.). New York: Random House, 1971.
- _____. The Southwestern Chippewa: An Ethnohistorical Study. (American Anthropological Association Memoir, no. 92.) Menasha: American Anthropological Association, 1962.
- Holsoe, Svend, E. "The Cassava-leaf People: An Ethnohistorical Study of the Vai People." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Boston University, 1967.
- Horton, Robin. "From Fishing Village to City-State: A Social History of New Calabar," in Man in Africa, Mary Douglas and Phyllis Kaberry (eds.). London: Tavistock Publications, 1969.
- Hudson, Charles. The Catawba Nation. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1970.
- _____. (ed.) Four Centuries of Southern Indians. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1975.
- _____. The Southeastern Indians. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976.

- Hunt, George T. The Wars of the Iroquois: A Study in Intertribal Trade Relations. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940.
- Igbafe, Philip. "The Fall of Benin: A Reassessment," Journal of African History, XI, no. 3 (1970), 385-400.
- Isaacman, Allen F. Mozambique: The Africanization of a European Institution, The Zambezi Prazos 1750-1902. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1972.
- Isichei, Elizabeth. The Ibo People and the Europeans: The Genesis of a Relationship to 1906. New York: St. Martin's, 1973.
- Jennings, Francis. "The Covenant Chain," in Delaware Indian Symposium. Herbert Kraft (ed.). (Seton Hall University, 1972; Anthropological Series, no. 4.) Harrisburg, Pa.: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1974.
- _____. The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1975.
- Jones, G. I. "Ecology and Social Structure among the Northeastern Ibo," Africa, XXXI (1961), 117-134.
- _____. The Trading States of the Oil Rivers. London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1963.
- Jones, Oakah, Jr. Pueblo Warriors and the Spanish Conquest. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966.
- Kinietz, W. Vernon. The Indians of the Western Great Lakes, 1615-1760. (Occasional Contributions from the Museum of Anthropology of the University of Michigan, no. 10.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1940.
- Klein, Martin. "Sine-Saloum 1847-1914: The Traditional States and the French Conquest." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1964.
- _____. "Social and Economic Factors in the Muslim Revolution in Senegambia," Journal of African History, XIII, no. 3(1972), 419-441.
- Kraft, Herbert. "Indian Prehistory of New Jersey," in Delaware Indian Symposium. Herbert Kraft (ed.). (Seton Hall University, 1972; Anthropological Series, no. 4.) Harrisburg, Pa.: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1974.

- Kuper, Hilda. The Swazi. (Case Studies in Cultural Anthropology.) New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963.
- LaFarge, Oliver. "Maya Ethnology: The Sequence of Cultures" in The Maya and their Neighbors. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1940.
- Lang, James. Conquest and Commerce: Spain and England in the Americas. (Studies in Social Discontinuity.) New York: Academic Press, 1975.
- Larson, Lewis. "Aboriginal Subsistence Technology on the Southeastern Coastal Plain During the Late Prehistoric Period." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1970.
- Latham, A. J. H. "Currency, Credit, and Capitalism on the Cross River in the Pre-colonial Era," Journal of African History, XII, no. 4(1971), 599-605.
- _____. Old Calabar, 1600-1891: The Impact of the International Economy upon a Traditional Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.
- Laughlin, Robert M. "The Huastec," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. VII, 298-311.
- _____. "The Tzotzil," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. VII, 152-194.
- Lauer, Joseph. "Rice in the History of the Lower Gambia-Geba Area." Unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1969.
- Lauer, Robert H. Perspectives on Social Change. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1973.
- Leacock, Eleanor. "Introduction," in North American Indians in Historical Perspective, Eleanor Leacock and Nancy O. Lurie (eds.) New York: Random House, 1971.
- Lenski, Gerhard. Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.
- Little, Kenneth. The Mende of Sierra Leone: A West African People in Transition. New York: Humanities Press, 1967.
- Lloyd, P. C. "The Itsekiri in the Nineteenth Century: An Outline Social History," Journal of African History, IV, no. 2(1963), 207-231.

- Lloyd, Peter. The Political Development of Yoruba Kingdoms in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. (Occasional Paper, no. 31.) London: Royal Anthropological Institute, 1971.
- Lupold, Harry Forrest. The Forgotten People: The Woodland Erie. Hicksville, N. Y.: Exposition Press, 1975.
- Luskin, Evan Ross. "Kingship in Ashanti." Unpublished M. A. thesis, History Department, University of Wisconsin, 1969.
- Lye, William F. "The Ndebele Kingdom South of the Limpopo River," Journal of African History, X, no. 1 (1969), 87-104.
- Lyford, Carrie. Iroquois Crafts. (Publications of the U. S. Indian Service, Indian Handicraft Pamphlets, no. 6.) Lawrence, Kan.: Haskell Institute, 1945.
- MacNeish, Richard S. "Comments on the Archaeology of the Dawson Site," in Cartier's Hochelaga and the Dawson Site, James Pendergast and Bruce Trigger (eds.) Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972.
- Mainga, Mutamba. Bulozi under the Luyena Kings: Political Evolution and State Formation in Pre-colonial Zambia. London: Longman, 1973.
- Manoukian, Madeline. Akan and Ga-Adangme Peoples of the Gold Coast. (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, West Africa, Part 1.) London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1950.
- _____. The Ewe-speaking Peoples of Togoland and the Gold Coast. (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, West Africa, Part 6.) London: International African Institute, 1952.
- _____. Tribes of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast. (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, West Africa, Part 5.) London: International African Institute, 1952.
- Martin, Calvin. Keepers of the Game: Indian-Animal Relationships and the Fur Trade. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- _____. "European Impact on the Culture of a Northeastern Algonquian Tribe: An Ecological Interpretation," William and Mary Quarterly, series 3, XXXI (January, 1974), 3-26.
- Mason, Michael. "Population Density and 'Slave-raiding'--the Case of the Middle Belt of Nigeria," Journal of African History, X, no. 4 (1969), 551-564.

- McCulloch, M. Peoples of Sierra Leone Protectorate. (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, West Africa, Part 2.) London: International African Institute, 1950.
- McGee, Harold. The Native Peoples of Atlantic Canada: A History of Ethnic Interaction. (The Carleton Library, no. 72.) Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974.
- Meek, Charles K. Tribal Studies in Northern Nigeria. 2 vols. London: Kegan, Paul, French, Tubner, and Co., Ltd., 1931.
- Meier, Gerald M. The International Economics of Development: Theory and Policy. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.
- Meillassoux, Claude (ed.) The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa. (International African Institute Series). Vol. X. London: Oxford University Press for the International African Institute, 1971.
- Meyer, Roy W. The Village Indians of the Upper Missouri: The Mandans, Hidatsas, and Arikaras. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1977.
- Miles, S. W. "Summary of Preconquest Ethnology of the Guatemala-Chiapas Highlands and Pacific Slopes," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. II, 276-287.
- Miller, Joseph. "The Imbangala and the Chronology of Early Central African History," Journal of African History, XIII, no. 4 (1972), 549-574.
- _____. "Kings and Kinsmen: The Imbangala Impact on the Mbundu of Angola." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 1972.
- _____. "Nzinga of Matemba in a New Perspective," Journal of African History, XVI, no. 2 (1975), 201-216.
- Milloy, John. "The Plains Cree: A Preliminary Trade and Military Chronology, 1670-1870." Unpublished M. A. thesis, Carleton University, 1973.
- Monteil, Charles. Les Bambara du Ségou et du Kaarta: Étude, Historique, Ethnographique et Littéraire d'une Peuplade du Soudan Française. Paris: Emile Larose, 1924.
- Morgan, Lewis Henry. The League of the Ho-de-no-sau-nee, or Iroquois. New York: Corinth Paperbacks, 1962. (Originally published 1851, Rochester: Sage.)

- Morton-Williams, Peter. "The Influence of Habitat and Trade on the Politics of Oyo and Ashanti," in Man in Africa, Mary Douglas and Phyllis Kaberry (eds.), London: Tavistock Publications, 1969.
- Moss, Rowland Percy and Rathbone, R. J. A. R. (eds.) The Population Factor in African Studies. London: University of London Press, 1975.
- Murdock, George Peter. Outline of World Cultures. 5th ed. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1975.
- Nadel, Siegfried. A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of Nupe in Nigeria. London: Oxford University Press, 1942.
- Nader, Laura. "The Trique of Oaxaca," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. VII, 400-416.
- _____. "The Zapotec of Oaxaca," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. VII, 329-359.
- Ndlovu, Callister P. "Missionaries and Traders in the Ndebele Kingdom: An African Response to Colonialism, a Case Study 1859-1890." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, State University of New York--Stony Brook, 1974.
- Newbury, Colin W. The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers: European Trade and Administration among the Yoruba and Adja-speaking Peoples of Southwestern Nigeria, Southern Dahomey and Togo. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961.
- Newitt, M. D. D. Portugese Settlement on the Zambesi: Exploration, Land Tenure and Colonial Rule in East Africa. London: Longman, 1973.
- _____. "The Portugese on the Zambesi: An Historical Interpretation of the Prazo System," Journal of African History, X, no. 1 (1969), 67-85.
- Noble, William C. "Iroquois Archaeology and the Development of Iroquois Social Organization (100-1650 A. D.): A Study in Culture Change based on Archaeology, Ethnohistory, and Ethnology." (Canadian theses on microfilm, no. 2092.) Ottawa: National Library of Canada, 1968.
- Noon, John A. Law and Government of the Grand River Iroquois. New York: Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, no. 12., 1949.
- North American Fur Trade Conference, 2nd, Winnipeg, 1970. People and Pelts: Selected Papers. Winnipeg: Peguis Publishers, 1972.

- Norton, Thomas E. The Fur Trade in Colonial New York, 1686-1776. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974.
- O'Connor, James. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973.
- Oliver, Roland, and Fage, J. D. A Short History of Africa. 5th ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966.
- Omer-Cooper, J. D. The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth Century Revolution in Bantu Africa. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969.
- Ottenberg, Simon. "Ibo Oracles and Intergroup Relations," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, XIV (1958), 295-317.
- Oxford Book of Food Plants. London: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Paques, Viviana. Les Bambara. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954.
- Parry, J. H. The Audencia of Nueva Galicia in the Sixteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948.
- Pate, James. "The Chickamauga: A Forgotten Segment of Indian Resistance on the Southern Frontier." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Mississippi State University, 1969.
- Patterson, K. David. "The Vanishing Mpongwe: European Contact and Demographic Change in the Gabon River," Journal of African History, XVI, no. 2 (1975), 217-238.
- Polanyi, Karl. Dahomey and the Slave Trade: An Analysis of an Archaic Economy. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966.
- Postma, Johannes. "The Dutch Participation in the African Slave Trade: Slaving on the Guinea Coast, 1675-1795." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Michigan State University, 1970.
- Prebisch, Raúl. Change and Development--Latin America's Great Task. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971.
- Quain, B. H. "The Iroquois," in Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples, Margaret Mead (ed.), New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937.
- Quimby, George I. Indian Culture and European Trade Goods: The Archaeology of the Historic Period in the Western Great Lakes Region. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966.

- Quimby, George I. Indian Life in the Upper Great Lakes: 11,000 B. C.-1800 A. D. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.
- Quinn, Charlotte. Mandingo Kingdoms of the Senegambia: Traditionalism, Islam, and European Expansion. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1972.
- Randle, Martha. "Iroquois Women, Then and Now," in Symposium on Local Diversity in Iroquois Culture. (Bureau of American Ethnology, no. 149.) Washington: The Smithsonian, 1951.
- Ranger, Terence O. (ed.) Aspects of Central African History. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968.
- Rattray, Robert S. Ashanti. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923.
- _____. Ashanti Law and Constitution. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1929.
- _____. Ashanti Proverbs (The Primitive Ethics of a Savage People). Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1916.
- _____. Religion and Art in Ashanti. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927.
- Rasmussen, Raymond Kent. "Ndebele Wars and Migrations c. 1821-1839." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1975.
- Ravicz, Robert and Romney, A. Kimball. "The Mixtec," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. VII, 367-399.
- Ray, Arthur J. Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Trappers, Hunters, and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of Hudson's Bay, 1660-1870. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974.
- Redfield, Robert. The Folk Culture of Yucatan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941.
- Reed, Nelson. The Caste War of Yucatan. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964.
- Roberts, Andrew. "Chronology of the Bemba," Journal of African History, XI, no. 2 (1970), 221-240.
- _____. A History of the Bemba: Political Growth and Change in Northeast Zambia before 1900. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973.
- Rodney, Walter. A History of the Upper Guinea Coast, 1545-1800. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.

- Roethler, Michael. "Negro Slavery Among the Cherokee Indians, 1540-1866." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Fordham University, 1964.
- Rojas, Alfonso Villa. "Maya Lowlands: The Chontal, Chol, and Kekchi," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. VII, 230-243.
- _____. "The Maya of Yucatan," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. VII, 244-275.
- _____. "The Tzeltal," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. VII, 195-225.
- Roys, R. L. The Indian Background of Colonial Yucatan. (Publication no. 548.) Washington: The Carnegie Institute, 1943.
- _____. "Lowland Maya Native Society at Spanish Contact," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. III, 659-678.
- Ryder, Alan. Benin and the Europeans: 1485-1897. New York: Humanities Press, 1969.
- Sabloff, Jeremy A. and Lamberg-Karlovsky, C. C. (eds.) Ancient Civilization and Trade. (School of American Research Book.) Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975.
- Sahlins, Marshall. Stone Age Economics. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1972,
- Sahlins, Marshall and Service, Elman with Harding and Kaplan. Evolution and Culture. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960.
- Sanders, William T. "Cultural Ecology and Settlement Patterns of the Gulf Coast," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. XI, 543-557.
- Sarbah, John Mensah. Fanti Customary Laws. 2nd ed. London: William Clowes and Sons, 1904.
- Sauer, Carl and Brand, Donald. Aztatlan, Prehistoric Mexican Frontier. (Ibero-Americana, no. 1.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1932.
- Sauer, Carl. The Road to Cibola. (Ibero-Americana, no. 3.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1932.

- Schapera, Isaac. Western Civilization and the Natives of South Africa: Studies in Culture Contact. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967.
- Scholefield, Alan. The Dark Kingdoms: The Impact of White Civilization on Three Great African Monarchies. London: Heinemann, 1975.
- Scholes, France V. and Roys, Ralph. The Maya-Chontal Indians of Acalan-Tixchel. 2nd ed. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968.
- Scholes, France V. and Warren, Dave. "The Olmec Region at Spanish Contact," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. III, 776-787.
- Service, Elman. Origins of the State and Civilization. New York: W. W. Norton, 1975.
- _____. Primitive Social Organization: An Evolutionary Perspective. New York: Random House, 1962.
- Smith, Alan K. "The Peoples of Southern Mozambique: An Historical Survey," Journal of African History, XIV, no. 4 (1973), 565-580.
- Smith, M. G. "Differentiation and the Segmentary Principle in Two Societies," in Man in Africa, Mary Douglas and Phyllis Kaberry (eds.). London: Tavistock Publications, 1969.
- Smith, Robert. Kingdoms of the Yoruba. London: Methuen, 1969.
- Snyderman, George S. "Concept of Land Ownership among the Iroquois and their Neighbors," in Symposium on Local Diversity in Iroquois Culture. (Bureau of American Ethnology, no. 149.) Washington: The Smithsonian, 1951.
- Spear, Thomas. "Zwangendaba's Ngoni, 1821-1890: A Political and Social History of a Migration." (Occasional Paper, no. 4) Madison: African Studies Program, 1970.
- Speck, Frank G. The Iroquois: A Study in Cultural Evolution. Bloomfield Hills, Mich.: Cranbrook Institute of Science, 1945.
- Spector, Janet. "Winnebago Indians, 1634-1829: An Archaeological and Ethnohistoric Investigation." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Department of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin, 1974.
- Spicer, Edward. Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United States of the Indians of the Southwest, 1533-1960. Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1962.

- Spores, Ronald. The Mixtec Kings and their People. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967.
- _____. "The Zapotec and Mixtec at Spanish Conquest," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. III, 962-987.
- Steel, R. W. "The Population of Ashanti: A Geographical Analysis," The Geographical Journal, CXI-CXII (1948), 64-77.
- Stenning, Derrick J. "Transhumanance, Migratory Drift, Migration: Patterns of Pastoral Fulani Nomadism," in Cultures and Societies of Africa, Simon and Phoebe Ottenberg (eds.). New York: Randon House, 1960.
- Stokes, Eric and Brown, Richard (eds.) The Zambesian Past. Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1966.
- Stresser-Péan, Guy. "Ancient Sources on the Huasteca," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. XI, 582-602.
- Sturtevant, William. "Creek into Seminole," in North American Indians in Historical Perspective, Eleanor Leacock and Nancy O. Lurie (eds.) New York: Ransom House, 1971.
- Swanton, John R. "Early History of the Creek Indians and their Neighbors." (Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin no. 73.) Washington: The Smithsonian, 1922.
- _____. "Aboriginal Culture of the Southeast." (United States Bureau of Ethnology, 42nd Annual Report, Washington, 1928), 673-726.
- _____. "Religious Beliefs and Medicinal Practices of the Creeks." (United States Bureau of Ethnology, 42nd Annual Report, Washington, 1928.), 473-672.
- _____. "Social Organization and Social Usages of the Indians of the Creek Confederacy." (United States Bureau of Ethnology, 42nd Annual Report, Washington, 1928.), 23-472.
- Tait, David. "The Political System of Konkomba," Africa, XXIII, no. 3 (1953), 213-223.
- Tax, Sol (ed.) Heritage of Conquest. New York: Cooper Square, 1968.
- Thompson, Leonard (ed.) African Societies in Southern Africa. New York: Praegar, 1969.

- Thurman, Melburn. "Delaware Social Organization," in Delaware Indian Symposium. Herbert Kraft (ed.) (Seton Hall University, 1972; Anthropological Series, no. 4.) Harrisburg, Pa.: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1974.
- Trigger, Bruce G. "Hochelaga: History and Ethnology," in Cartier's Hochelaga and the Dawson Site, J. Pendergast and B. Trigger (eds.) Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972.
- _____. The Huron: Farmers of the North. (Case Studies in Cultural Anthropology.) New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969.
- _____. "Settlement as an Aspect of Iroquoisan Adaptation at the Time of Contact," American Anthropologist, LXV (February, 1963), 86-101.
- Trowbridge, C. C. Meēarmeēar Traditions. Vernon Kinietz (ed.) (The Museum of Anthropology, Occasional Contributions, no. 7.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1938,
- Trudeau, Jean. "Culture Change Among the Swampy Cree Indians of Winisk, Ontario." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Catholic University, 1966.
- Vansina, Jan. "The Foundations of the Kingdom of Kasanje," Journal of African History, IV, no. 3 (1963), 355-374.
- _____. "More on the Invasions of the Kongo and Angola by the Jaga and the Lunda," Journal of African History, VII, no 3 (1966), 421-429.
- Voegelin, Ernestine and Stout, David. Indians of Illinois and Northwest Indiana. (American Indian Ethnohistory: Northcentral and Northeast Indians.) New York: Garland, 1974.
- Vogt, Evon Z. "Chiapas Highlands," in Handbook of Middle American Indians (Robert Wauchope, ed., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964-1976), Vol. VII, 133-151.
- Wallace, Anthony F. C. and Fogelson, R. The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca. New York: Vintage Books, 1972.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel M. The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press, 1974.
- Waugh, F. W. Iroquois Foods and Food Preparation. (Canada Department of Mines, Geographical Survey Memoir 86, Anthropological Series, no. 12.) Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1916.
- Weslager, Clinton A. The Delaware Indians: A History. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1972.

- Wheeler, Douglas L. "The Portugese in Angola, 1836-1891: A Study in Expansion and Administration." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Boston University, 1963.
- Wilks, Ivor. "Land, Labour, Capital and the Forest Kingdom of Asante: A Model of Early Change," in The Evolution of Social Systems, J. Friedman and M. J. Rowlands (eds.) Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978.
- _____. The Northern Factor in Ashanti History. Legon: Institute of African Studies, University College of Ghana, 1961.
- Wilson, Houston. The Kickapoo Indians: An Ethnohistory. Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1975.
- Wilson, Monica and Thompson, Leonard (eds.) The Oxford History of South Africa. (Vol. I: South Africa to 1870) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
- Wolf, Eric. Sons of the Shaking Earth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959.
- _____. (ed.) The Valley of Mexico: Studies in Pre-Hispanic Ecology and Society. (School of American Research Advanced Seminar Series.) Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976.
- Yoder, John C. "Fly and Elephant Parties: Political Participation in Dahomey, 1840-1870," Journal of African History, XV, no. 3 (1974), 417-432.
- Zavala, Silvio. New Viewpoints on the Spanish Colonization of America. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943.
- Zimmerman, Albright G. "European Trade Relations in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," in Delaware Indian Symposium. Herbert Kraft (ed.) (Seton Hall University, 1972; Anthropological series, no. 4.) Harrisburg, Pa.: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1974.
- _____. "The Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania." Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Delaware, 1966.

TITLE OF THESIS Trade, Land Expropriation, and Conquest: The Effects of
European Contact on the Native Peoples of Africa and
North America

Major Professor H. Kent Geiger

Major Department Sociology

Minor(s) Anthropology

Full Name Patricia Allen Shifferd

Place and Date of Birth Elgin, Illinois, Nov. 18, 1941

Colleges and Universities: Years attended and degrees _____

University of Dubuque, Dubuque, Iowa

Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois, B.A. and M. A.

University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis., Ph. D.

Membership in Learned or Honorary Societies Alpha Kappa Delta

Publications "A Study in Economic Change: The Chippewa of Northern Wisconsin,
1854-1900," Western Canadian Journal of Anthropology, 1976

Date April 25, 1980