

TOWARD INFINITE HORIZONS OF WONDER:
BERNARD LONERGAN'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
AND THE ROLE OF CRITICAL THINKING IN
TEACHING RELIGION IN CATHOLIC
HIGH SCHOOLS

BY
DENNIS C. GUNN, CFC, Ph.D.
M.Ed. Boston College

Mentor
Harold Daly Horell, Ph.D.

Readers
Michele Saracino, Ph.D.
Kieran Scott, Ed.D.

DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF RELIGION
AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

NEW YORK
2014

UMI Number: 3645917

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI 3645917

Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.

Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code



ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346

DEDICATION

To my mother,
my first religion teacher,
who has taught me more through her love
than I could ever learn in books

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

While this dissertation has been a solitary pursuit, it certainly has not been a singular achievement. Many people have helped me along the way. I would like to thank my mentor, Bud Horell, for his guidance, support, and ongoing commitment to this project. It was his encouragement that first brought me to Fordham to pursue doctoral studies, and it has been his encouragement that has sustained me throughout. Truly, I am blessed not just to call him a mentor, but also to consider him a friend.

I am equally grateful to the members of my committee, Kieran Scott and Michele Saracino who have offered so many helpful suggestions along the way. Kieran has been a wonderful teacher throughout my doctoral studies, who has helped reshape my language, and has continued to encourage and support me in so many ways. I am also very grateful to Michele for her generosity in agreeing to be a reader on my committee. She has been a continuing source of encouragement and motivation. And, I would like to thank Gloria Durka, whose initial enthusiasm for my topic helped motivate me to pursue this research.

I am also very grateful to have the tremendous support of my fellow Ph.D. students at Fordham. Together, we form a community of scholarship and support for one another, cheering each other on, encouraging each other, and helping one another along the way. It has been a blessing to be a part of such a wonderful community.

Finally, I would like to thank my fellow Christian Brothers. First, I must thank the brothers in leadership who supported me these past three years of full-time studies. I especially would like to thank Bro. Kevin Griffith for encouraging me to pursue doctoral studies in the first place. Second, I would like to thank my local Iona College community which has been a marvelous source of brotherhood and fraternal support throughout this process. Finally, I would like to thank my brother and friend, Joe Payne, for his tireless personal support. Not only has he been gracious enough to read my dissertation, but also, he has continued to be there for me through the ups and downs of this project, always with an encouraging word, a kind thought, and above all, with his continued friendship.

Dennis Gunn, CFC
May 2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT	i
DEDICATION	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
ABBREVIATIONS	viii
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: TOWARD INFINITE HORIZONS OF WONDER.....	1
Thesis	3
Background of the Study	5
Purpose and Significance of the Study	7
Research Methodology	10
Review of the Literature	14
Organization of the Study	31
CHAPTER 2. A LIFE SCHOOLED IN WONDER: BERNARD LONERGAN’S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION FOR SCHOOLS.....	36
Loneragan’s Intellectual Biographical Context: The Early Years.....	38
Early Background and Jesuit Formation (1904-1926).....	38
Early Intellectual Influences (1926-1933)	40
Seminary Years and Early Thomistic Influences (1933-1937).....	44
Doctoral Studies: Apprenticeship to Aquinas (1937-1940).....	47
Loneragan’s Theory of Human Knowing as the Basis for His Philosophy Education for Schools	50
Early Career and Major Works (1940-1957).....	50
<i>Insight</i> as Pedagogy (1957).....	51
Pedagogy on <i>Insight</i> : The Halifax Lectures (1958).....	54
Loneragan’s Philosophy of Education for Schools	59
<i>Topics in Education</i> (1959).....	59
Vatican II Years: Loneragan the Teacher (1959-1965).....	64

Threads of a Philosophy of Education for Schools In Later Works (1965-1984).....	67
Conclusion	74
CHAPTER 3. DEVELOPING NEW HORIZONS OF WONDER: GROWING IN CRITICAL AWARENESS.....	78
Developing Critical Awareness: Lonergan’s Developing Subject	79
The Human Person as a Knowing and Valuing Subject.....	79
Development as Inherited Potential “From Above Downward”	82
Development as Actualized Potential “From Below Upward”.....	86
Evolving Toward Critical Awareness: Robert Kegan’s Notion of the Evolving Self	98
Human Development as the Evolution of Meaning.....	98
The Evolving Self.....	104
Kegan’s Evolving Self and Lonergan’s Developing Subject	114
Emerging Critical Awareness in Adolescence.....	118
Conclusion	125
CHAPTER 4. TEACHING THE DYNAMICS OF WONDER: SCHOOL TEACHING AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS THAT FOSTERS THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL THINKING.....	128
Teaching for Critical Thinking	130
The Nature of Critical Thinking	130
The Developing Subject as Critical Thinker.....	135
Critical Thinking as a Socially Interactive Process	140
The Place of Critical Thinking in Catholic Schools	146
Critical Thinking and the Language of the School Classroom.....	146
Critical Thinking and the Catholic Intellectual Tradition.....	148

Critical Thinking as an Intellectual Virtue.....	154
Critical Thinking and Teaching Religion	158
Conclusion	166
CHAPTER 5. ENGAGING IN THE DIALECTICS OF WONDER: TEACHING RELIGION IN CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOLS AS A DIALECTICAL AND DIALOGIC PROCESS TOWARD FOSTERING CRITICAL CONVERSATION	169
Fostering Religious Literacy and Articulatory in Adolescents	173
The Cultural Ecology of Contemporary Adolescence	173
The Need for Fostering the Religious Literacy and Articulatory of Adolescents.....	179
Creating Conversational Spaces the Foster Religious Articulatory	189
Toward a Model for Fostering Religious Literacy and Articulatory.....	195
The Movement Downward as the Way of Religious Literacy	195
The Movement Upward as the Way of Religious Articulatory.....	200
The Dynamics of Teaching Religion as the Way of Integration	204
Conclusion	213
CHAPTER 6. AN INVITATION TO INFINITE WONDER: CURRICULAR IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING RELIGION IN CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOLS	217
Developing a Curriculum for Religious Literacy and Articulatory.....	219
Essential Elements for a Curriculum that Fosters Religious Literacy and Articulatory.....	219
The Adequacy of the USCCB’s <i>Curriculum Framework</i> for Fostering Religious Literacy and Articulatory	225
Areas for Further Curriculum Research and Development	234
Conclusion	239

REFERENCES 245

ABSTRACT

VITA

ABBREVIATIONS

CCE	Congregation for Catholic Education
GDC	Congregation for Clergy. 1998. <i>General Directory for Catechesis</i> . Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference.
GS	Second Vatican Council. 1965. <i>Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes)</i> .
NCCB	National Conference of Catholic Bishops
NCEA	National Catholic Education Association
NSYR	National Study of Youth and Religion
USCCB	United States Conference of Catholic Bishops

Chapter 1

Introduction: Toward Infinite Wonder

In a seminal essay responding to the question, “Does the Church really want religious education?” Gabriel Moran (1988) answers “of a kind and to a degree.” He recognizes the ambivalence of the Catholic Church’s hierarchy toward certain forms of religious education that move beyond a narrowly catechetical approach that simply “echoes” the tradition and those that adopt a more broadly educational approach that includes academic discourse, critical analysis, and ongoing debate. Such ambivalence is witnessed by the USCCB’s (2008,1) *Doctrinal Elements of a Curriculum Framework for the Development of Catechetical Materials for Young People of High School Age* (henceforth, *Curriculum Framework*). The USCCB’s statement emphasizes “catechetical instruction and formation that is imbued with an apologetical approach” and which raises “questions and provides direction for ways to answer them.” However, such an emphasis on providing pre-determined answers for pre-determined questions is educationally inadequate. A contemporary Catholic philosophical vision for education should take seriously the human person as a free, intelligent, and responsible subject. The Second Vatican Council’s *Declaration on Christian Education*, which outlines the essential aspects of a Catholic vision for education, emphasizes the importance of personal responsibility and fostering full human growth and development “in contradistinction to a previous attitude of education as if it were imposed from above” (Abbott 1966, 640 n. 8).

In my experience as a religious educator in Catholic schools for almost twenty years, working mostly with adolescents of middle school and high school age, I have often noticed, as Kenda Creasy Dean (2001, 30) observes, that adolescents are natural

theologians “uniquely wired for theological reflection” as they engage in a meaningful search for self in relation to the world. Yet, as Dean also notes, far too often youth ministry and religious education programs “tend to view young people as consumers of theology rather than as people who help construct religious discourse.” This “consumer” mentality seems to undergird the USCCB’s *Curriculum Framework* as well as subsequent efforts to impose standardized religion tests in diocese throughout the United States to ensure that students “know” their “faith.” These efforts also appear to endorse an approach to teaching religion that employs what Paulo Freire (1992, 58) calls a “banking concept of education,” whereby students are “filled” with information to be stored for later retrieval.

A “banking” approach to teaching religion is pedagogically inadequate for fostering the skills of critical theological reflection in adolescents. Young people must develop these skills if they are to engage in a meaningful search for answers to their deepest questions. This approach is also philosophically inconsistent with a Catholic vision for education that strives to assist young people in “the harmonious development of their physical, moral, and *intellectual* endowments,” that helps them “acquire gradually a more *mature sense of responsibility*” (Abbott 1966, 639; emphasis added). As the US bishops’ own *Renewing the Vision* states, included among the goals of the Church’s ministry with adolescents is not only the development of “biblical and doctrinal literacy,” but also the development of “young people’s critical thinking skills” in order to “empower them to analyze contemporary life and culture in light of the Good News of Jesus Christ and the teachings of the Church” (1997). Therefore, any approach to teaching religion in Catholic high schools that fails to engage young people seriously in

critical thinking fails to take seriously a Catholic vision of the human person-philosophically, developmentally, and educationally. The problem this dissertation seeks to address, then, is the need for a revitalized understanding of the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools, an understanding that is grounded in an adequate understanding of the human person as an intelligent, free, and responsible subject as seen from a Catholic philosophical perspective.

Here, the work of Canadian Jesuit philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984) offers some insight into the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools. Specifically, Lonergan's work can inform a Catholic philosophy of education that takes seriously the human person as a "knowing" and "valuing" subject, acting in the world (See Lonergan 1968; 1971a). Lonergan develops a philosophy of education for schools that attends to the human person as experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding subject, thus encouraging a critically engaged pedagogy that invites students into greater critical awareness of their own religious experience, that promotes further critical inquiry that honors their own deepest questions, that encourages deeper critical reflection on their own personally held beliefs, and ultimately, that urges them to move from those beliefs to more active critical engagement in the world. In other words, Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools insists on a pedagogy that helps students to become more attentive, more intelligent, more reasonable, and more responsible as authentic subjects in their own religious education.

Thesis

The central question of this study is: *How can Bernard Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools contribute to a revitalized understanding of the role of critical*

thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools? This study explores how Bernard Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools can inform the teaching of religion in Catholic high schools by moving students toward ongoing intellectual, moral, and religious conversion through critical questioning, critical reflection, and critical awareness.

This study focuses on the nature and role of religious education in one particular context, namely, the Catholic high school, and addresses one specific form of religious education within that context, that is, teaching religion in the Catholic high school classroom. As Gabriel Moran and Maria Harris (1998) point out, there are multiple forms of religious education housed within the overall curriculum of the Catholic school. These include forms of community, forms of service, and forms of worship, as well as various forms of religious instruction. Each serves a particular purpose in the overall religious education curriculum of the Catholic high school and each has a particular place within the overall intellectual, moral, and spiritual formation of young people. Yet, as Moran (1997, 185) notes, the religion classroom itself is a sacred space for free academic inquiry, intended to invite all questions, challenge all assumptions, and test all ideas. It is a space where the language of academic discourse takes center stage and where students are free to engage in honest and authentic dialogue. It is not a space for indoctrination or proselytization; rather, it is a space for the opening of minds to new ideas, new vantage points, and fresh possibilities toward new horizons of wonder.

This study does not propose that Lonergan offers a comprehensive philosophy of education for Catholic schools. Rather, the focus of this study is on how Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools can contribute to a more adequate understanding of

the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools today. It must also be acknowledged that Lonergan applied his philosophy of education narrowly to the specific educational context of school teaching. The researcher recognizes that there are multiple forms of education both inside and outside of the context of the school. Yet, this study also contends that Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools is grounded in a general theory of knowing which has possible further implications for religious education beyond the high school religion classroom, an investigation which is beyond the scope of this present study. However, this current study hopes to contribute in some modest way to the field of religious education by uncovering possibilities within Lonergan's philosophy of education for religious education in one specific context, and thus it hopes to further the understanding of the nature and role of teaching religion in Catholic high schools.

Background of the Study

Historian of ideas, Dominick LaCapra (1983, 14) points out that in reading philosophical texts they "impress themselves upon us at both naïve and at sophisticated levels of understanding," and that they "challenge the facile belief that anything that anyone has to read slowly, or even reread, must be objectionably 'abstract.'" Such was my first experience upon reading Bernard Lonergan as a graduate student at Boston College where I encountered the "startling strangeness" (Lonergan 1997, xii) of Lonergan's seemingly rather abstract style. Yet, my reflection on Lonergan's work is neither in the abstract nor the purely theoretical, but rather, it grows out of my own practical experience as a teacher of religion in Catholic schools for nearly twenty years, working with students of all ages, but mostly with adolescents of middle school and high school age.

In my experience as a teacher of adolescents, I have often noticed their increasing capacity for critical reflection, critical questioning, and critical awareness, especially as they move from middle school through their high school years. In teaching religion in Catholic middle schools and high schools, I have witnessed the growing capacity within adolescents to experience what Bernard Lonergan (1997) calls wonder, that is, the capacity to reflect deeply on profound questions, questions which emerge from their own experience as they attempt to make sense of their world. Such wonder moves beyond the mere inquisitiveness of childhood curiosity to a profound engagement with larger questions of meaning, purpose, and existence. I have noticed that engaging students in such critical reflection is expected in Catholic high school curricula in subjects such as English or History, which requires students to go beyond the mere repetition of information to engage them in “higher order thinking.”¹ Yet, at the same time, I have also noticed that encouragement of such critical reflection is often absent-if not outright discouraged-in the religion curriculum for Catholic high schools.

To be sure, since the implementation of the USCCB’s 2008 *Doctrinal Elements of a Curriculum Framework for the Development of Catechetical Materials for Young People of High School Age*, students in Catholic high schools have been expected to “know” more and think less in their religion classes. As a religious educator in Catholic schools for almost twenty years, I have found that the trend toward offering more information in the Catholic high school religion curriculum without encouraging serious critical engagement with the material offered undermines the very vision of Catholic

¹ See, for example, the NCEA’s 2013 “Position Statement on Common Core State Standards,” which reinforces Catholic schools’ “long-standing commitment to academic excellence.” http://www.ncea.org/sites/default/files/documents/ncea_commoncorestatestandards_053113.pdf. (accessed July 8, 2013).

schools as spaces open to wonder, as places of genuine inquiry, and as educational institutions committed to academic excellence. This present study, then, grows out of my fundamental conviction as a religious educator that teaching religion in Catholic schools requires engaging students' deepest questions, rather than providing them with ready answers. It requires opening spaces for academic discourse that tests, probes, and explores the depths of the Catholic tradition, rather than simply and uncritically handing it on to them. And, ultimately, it requires taking students seriously as developing and dynamic human persons, growing in intelligence, freedom, and responsibility, rather than seeing them as passive recipients of a static, unbending, and unchanging tradition.

Purpose and Significance of the Study

The overall purpose of this study is to work toward the development of a more adequate understanding of the role of critical thinking in the Catholic high school religion classroom, using the lens of Bernard Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools. This study attempts to develop a philosophical basis for understanding the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools. It not only explores Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools, but also seeks to establish a fruitful dialogue between Lonergan's thought on education and contemporary theories of education and religious education. Thus, the study aims at furthering the conversation concerning the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools. The overall goal, then, of this study is to provide a theoretical orientation for a re-conceptualized understanding of the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools and to explore the development, themes, and implications of Lonergan's philosophy of education for such a re-conceptualization.

The goal of chapter two is to trace Lonergan's philosophy of education in its historical and philosophical context. It seeks to provide an intellectual biography of Lonergan's thought as it relates to education, to explore his background and major philosophical influences, and to trace the development of his thought on education throughout his major philosophical works. Chapters three through five, then, aim at developing key themes in Lonergan's philosophy of education in dialogue with contemporary theories of education and religious education. These themes are: (1) education as an engagement of the human person as a developing subject, (2) education as an engagement of the dynamic, knowing subject, and (3) education as a dialectical and dialogic process of engagement between the wisdom of tradition and the maturing wisdom of the individual.

The goal of chapter three is to provide a broad conceptual framework for understanding human development toward a more fully developed critical awareness, that is, toward becoming a more self-aware, and responsible self, or what Lonergan (1968) calls the "subject." Taking his notion of the developing subject as its starting point, chapter three seeks to engage Lonergan in conversation with contemporary developmental theorists in order to provide a basis for understanding human development, especially as it relates to the development of critical awareness during adolescence. The chapter also seeks to contextualize the development of adolescents' critical thinking abilities in the wider framework of the self-transcendence and self-appropriation of the knowing and valuing subject. Chapter four, then, aims at exploring adolescents' development toward critical awareness from an educational perspective. The goal of chapter four is to examine Lonergan's notion of the dynamics of human

consciousness in light of contemporary educational theorists who attend to the pedagogical process of fostering critical thinking in adolescents. It seeks to contextualize the role of critical thinking in Catholic high schools, in general, and in teaching religion in Catholic high schools, in particular. Chapter five aims at uncovering the pedagogical implications of Lonergan's philosophy of education for teaching religion in Catholic high schools. It seeks to establish the need for fostering the development of adolescents' critical thinking capacities to help move them toward a more critically articulated religious understanding. It aims at providing a pedagogical model for teaching religion that fosters the development of such capacities. And, it seeks to explore ways to open up authentic conversational spaces in the Catholic high school religion classroom that fosters the growth of adolescents' critical thinking. Finally, the purpose of chapter six is to explore more fully the practical curricular and pedagogical implications of Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools for the theory and practice of teaching religion in Catholic high schools today. Additionally, chapter six seeks to evaluate the adequacy of the USCCB's current *Curriculum Framework* for fostering the full human flourishing of adolescents as authentic knowing and valuing subjects, and to suggest possible modifications based on Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools.

The significance of this study is that it offers an approach for re-conceptualizing the role of critical thinking in the Catholic high school religion classroom through a Catholic philosophical lens. It seeks to contribute to the field of religious education by furthering conversation between the theory and practice of teaching religion in Catholic high schools and certain key aspects of the Catholic intellectual tradition as mediated through the educational philosophy of Bernard Lonergan. Most notably, this study

contends that Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools, while deeply rooted in the Catholic Thomistic tradition, gives new expression to that tradition through engagement with modern philosophical thought. This renewed expression allows for fruitful and substantive dialogue on the role of critical thinking in religious education in Catholic schools today. By examining one specific area of religious education, namely, teaching religion in Catholic high schools, and by focusing on one specific aspect within that area, that is, the role of critical thinking for intelligent understanding, this study hopes to contribute in some modest way to a conversation that moves toward a more adequate Catholic philosophy of education for schools that attends to the human person as an intelligent, reasonable, and responsible subject. More broadly, this study has the potential of contributing to a deeper understanding of the dynamics of critical reflection and furthering the significance of developing critical thinking capacities in the field of religious education.

Research Methodology

This inquiry is a humanistic study that contributes to the field of religious education by engaging the question: *How can Bernard Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools contribute to a revitalized understanding of the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools?* Humanistic scholarship deals with the question of what it means to be human and, as such, invites inquiry into the very nature of human experience in the fullness of its dimensions, past and present. As Howard Mumford Jones (1960, 87) insists, "the subject of humane learning is the distillation of human experience in time." Humanistic inquiry requires interpreting human experience as part of an interpretive community of scholars, past and present, not

out of “deference paid to authority, but because the very data under inspection are, as it were, the creations of the judgment of scholars” (81). To engage in humanistic scholarship, then, is to participate in an ongoing interpretive dialogue of human experience.

Since this study deals with a noted figure in twentieth century Catholic intellectual history and, at the same time, seeks to bring his thought into dialogue with contemporary theories of education and religious education, the two primary research methodologies that are employed in the study are historical and philosophical. As this study seeks to present Lonergan’s thought on education in its intellectual and historical context, it employs the methodology of intellectual history in chapter two. As intellectual historian Dominick LaCapra (1983, 19) suggests, intellectual history “is a history of the situated uses of language constitutive of significant texts.” LaCapra insists, these ‘situated uses of language’ are themselves situated in networks of linguistic relations which provide the historical context for the interpretation of texts. In other words, language is both a shaper of and shaped by context. This study seeks to situate Lonergan’s philosophy of education in its historical, linguistic context within the intellectual conversation of twentieth century Catholic thought and its dialogue with modernity. Much of this dialogue was shaped by its own historically inherited forms of discourse, most notably by the Thomistic impulse of what Aiden Nichols (2011, 121) calls the “Leonine Project,” after the promulgation of *Aeterni Patris* in 1884. This, in turn, shaped much of the discourse of early and mid-twentieth century Catholic philosophy and theology prior to the Second Vatican Council, the very context in which Lonergan produced much of his work.

However, this study also recognizes that texts are not bound by their original context, but rather serve as invitations to further conversation. Here, LaCapra (1983, 30) makes the distinction between texts that one reads for and texts that one reads with.² Texts that one reads for are informational and documentary in nature, while texts that one reads with are dialogic and “work-like” in nature and invite a dialogic mode of reading that “engages the reader in re-creative dialogue with the text and the problems it raises.” It is a basic premise of this study that Lonergan’s works fall under the latter category and thus invite dialogue. Chapter two employs the historical methodology of LaCapra’s context analysis and dialogic reading to uncover layers of meaning in Lonergan’s thought on education in general and its implications for religious education in particular, by tracing the development of his philosophical ideas for education in order to expound further his philosophy of education.

Chapters three through six, then, place Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools in conversation with contemporary theories of human development, education, and religious education in order to explore how Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools might inform the role of critical thinking in the Catholic high school religion classroom. Since these sections are philosophical and interpretive in nature, they employ the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans Georg Gadamer (2004a, 305), and in so doing will seek a “fusion of horizons” between Lonergan’s thought and contemporary educational and religious educational theory. Gadamer’s notion of “horizon” involves “the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point” (301). Gadamer notes that such vantage points are never fixed, but “something

² LaCapra makes this distinction as one between “documents” and “works,” though he emphasizes that both types of texts contain “work-like” and “documentary” aspects. See LaCapra (1983), 30.

into which we move and that moves with us” (303). In effect, interpretation is a dynamic, ongoing process of dialogue with past voices that opens up a “hermeneutical conversation” with the present toward an ever moving “fusion of horizons,” inviting new interpretations and new horizons of vision (389). Chapters three through six engage Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools in “hermeneutical conversation” with contemporary theories of human development, education, and religious education in order to move toward expanded horizons of vision for understanding the role of critical thinking in the Catholic high school religion classroom.

Finally, as Gadamer notes (2004a, 307), interpretation always involves application in the “interpreter’s present situation.” For Gadamer, interpretation is never in the abstract, but rather, in the interpreted meaning that is applied to present circumstances. The concluding chapter, then, seeks to uncover practical applications of Lonergan’s philosophy of education for teaching religion in Catholic high schools. It explores possible curricular implications for the USCCB’s *Curriculum Framework*. And, it examines possible pedagogical applications for the practice of teaching religion in Catholic high schools. Thus, the study attempts to move beyond theory toward a more critically reflective praxis of teaching religion in Catholic high schools today. As a work in the field of religious education, this study seeks to contribute to scholarship in the field by engaging Lonergan’s philosophy of education to further conversation concerning the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools, thus fostering the full human flourishing of adolescents attending Catholic secondary schools. While this study is philosophical in nature, then, it hopes to point toward some practical applications

of Lonergan's philosophy of education for teaching religion in Catholic high schools today.

Review of the Literature

The review of literature highlights significant literature from select disciplines that inform the study, both sources that are primary to the study as well as sources that are secondary. The literature review is divided into two main sections: primary and secondary sources. Here, primary sources are understood as texts which serve as primary sources of investigation which significantly inform the study, while secondary sources supply background and further context for the research.

Primary Sources

Works by Bernard Lonergan Primary for this Study

While Bernard Lonergan's collected published works currently stand at twenty-four volumes, this study highlights certain key texts from Lonergan's work to reconstruct his philosophy of education for schools. Here, *Topics in Education* (1993) is a significant source for the study. It is a published transcription based on his 1959 summer lecture series for Catholic school teachers at Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio (Doran and Crowe 1993, xi). In it, Lonergan outlines several important concepts and their potential implications for teaching in Catholic schools that flow from his theory of knowing as a dynamic process of experiencing, understanding, and judging. Lonergan identifies the good of the human person as the "developing subject," that is, the good of an individual involves developing his or her human potentialities. It involves growing in greater self-awareness and self-appropriation of one's self as an intelligent, rational, and reflectively conscious subject. And, it is an educational process that ought to be intentionally fostered

in the context of school teaching (Lonergan 1993, 30). *Topics in Education*, then, provides the study with a central resource for understanding Lonergan's thought on education as it relates to teaching in Catholic schools.

Lonergan's *Verbum* (1967a), based on a series of articles published in *Theological Studies* from 1946 to 1949 which treat Thomistic cognitional theory as the basis for understanding the Trinitarian procession of the Word, provides a significant distinction that informs the study. This is the distinction between the human intellect as the potential to understand and the human intellect as "habit" of seeking understanding. Lonergan argues that if education in schools is to encourage critical thinking then intellectual habit needs to be cultivated, thus offering "freedom from the book," allowing one "to throw chains of reasoning into new perspectives" (185). In this dissertation, Lonergan's understanding of intellectual habit is explored as a central aspect of his thought on education, specifically as it relates to teaching religion in Catholic schools.

Lonergan's *Insight* (1997) offers a foundation for understanding his work in epistemology as it relates to his philosophy of education for schools. It provides the basis for understanding his cognitional theory of human knowing as attending to experience, inquiring for understanding, and correcting, testing, and affirming for judging. *Insight* also establishes Lonergan's understanding of self-appropriation as coming to one's self as an "attentive," "intelligent," and "reasonable" subject (22). Finally, it furnishes a conceptualization of judgment as maturing in wisdom within the various patterns of human experience: biological, aesthetic, "dramatic" or social, and intellectual (205-211).

Lonergan's *Method in Theology* (1971a) offers an educational model of theology as an ongoing dialogic learning process that moves "downward" from the foundations of

the revelatory religious experience of being grasped by ultimate mystery, to doctrines that thematize that experience in language and symbols, to systematics that seeks to understand doctrines in light of human experience, and to communication that attempts to make that understanding accessible. At the same time, it moves “upward” from research that attends to data, to interpretation that seeks understanding and insight, to historical investigation that judges and conditions interpretations, to the dialectical integration of beliefs, values, and insights. In this dissertation, the researcher argues that this educational model of theology can be adapted to provide a pedagogical framework for teaching religion in Catholic high schools.

Scholarship in the Field of Religious Education

As a work in the field of religious education, this study draws heavily on the work of several religious education theorists in dialogue with Bernard Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools in order to establish the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in the Catholic high curriculum. The work of Gabriel Moran and Kieran Scott provides the study’s theoretical framework for understanding the role of teaching religion in the particular context of the Catholic high school classroom. In particular, chapter six of Moran’s *Showing How: the Act of Teaching* (1997) makes a critical distinction that is significant for this study between academic speech and other speech forms. According to Moran, “academic criticism should be the centerpiece of classroom instruction,” opening up an authentic dialogue between teacher and students and among students (138). At the same time, Kieran Scott’s chapter “The Schoolteacher’s Dilemma” in *Critical Issues in Religious Education* (2005) further distinguishes the particular religiously educative form of school teaching from other forms of religious education that take place in the context

of a religiously affiliated school. Scott argues that the classroom should be a zone of “academic speech” used for “critical understanding,” in which speech is turned back on itself “to investigate its assumptions, biases, and meanings” (69). This understanding of the religion classroom as a space for critical conversation is central to this study.

Maria Harris’ *Teaching and Religious Imagination* (1991) provides the study with an understanding of teaching as “the creation of a situation in which subjects, human subjects, are handed over to *themselves*” (33; emphasis original). She emphasizes that the “revelation of subject matter” involves a mutual revelation whereby both students and teachers come to subject matter together as “questioners,” bringing their own deepest questions, where the posing of questions is “the center of the teaching act” (65, 72-73). This conceptualization of teaching and learning as mutual inquiry is brought into dialogue with Lonergan’s understanding of education as an ongoing heuristic process and supplies a backdrop for further understanding the role of critical questioning in the context of teaching religion in Catholic schools.

Educational Theorists

There are several educational theorists whose work contributes significantly to the study by furnishing an educational framework for understanding the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools. The understanding of critical thinking that informs this study is taken from educational theorist Stephen Brookfield’s *Teaching for Critical Thinking* (2012). He argues that critical thinking is a process of growing in metacognitive awareness that allows one to discover and test assumptions, to see ideas and situations from different perspectives, and to make informed choices for action (11-12). Such a capacity is nascent in early adolescence and grows throughout the

adolescent years into young adulthood (Fowler 1981, 152). For Brookfield, critical thinking is a process, not an end product. It grows and develops over time and as such it needs to be cultivated, fostered, and learned. The study brings Brookfield's understanding of critical thinking as critical metacognitive awareness into dialogue with Lonergan's notion of self-appropriation in exploring the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools.

The study also utilizes Brookfield's essay "How Do We Invite Students into Conversation? Teaching Dialogically," found in *Teaching Reflectively in Theological Contexts* (2008). Here, he insists that one of the ways to cultivate critical thinking is through authentic discussion. For Brookfield, "at the heart of discussion is the open and unpredictable creation of meanings through collaborative inquiry" (44). It is not "guided" by the teacher; but rather, grows out of the questions that emerge from teacher and students alike in dialogue with subject matter. This dialogic understanding of teaching as a conversation between teacher, students, and subject matter is developed further using Parker Palmer's *To Know as We are Known* (1993) and Maria Harris' *Teaching and Religious Imagination* (1991).

Additionally, the study draws on the research of psychologist Deanna Kuhn to provide an understanding of the development of critical thinking during adolescence. Kuhn's *Educating for Thinking* (2005) presents research on the transition from an "absolutist" epistemology in childhood where knowledge is conceived as "facts" that come from an external source to a "multiplist" epistemology in adolescence where knowledge is conceived as opinion. Kuhn suggests that critical thinking develops as adolescents move toward, what she calls, an "evaluativist" epistemology, where

knowledge is conceived as “judgments that can be evaluated” (31). Kuhn argues that adolescents need to be guided through this process in order to develop as critical thinkers. In addition, Kuhn’s article “A Developmental Model of Critical Thinking” in the *Educational Researcher* (1999) further develops the notion that critical thinking involves the growth of metacognitive capacities. She identifies the development of “meta-knowing” in adolescence as involving the growth of metacognitive processes that allow adolescents to think about their own thinking and, at the same time, to reflect on their own, and others, construction of knowledge (18). Kuhn’s research, which suggests that the development of critical thinking is linked to the development of an evaluativist epistemology, supports Lonergan’s assertion that authentic knowing is a dynamic process that involves the attentive, intelligent, and reasonable affirmations of the knowing subject.

Developmental Theorists

This study is also guided by the work of developmental psychologist Robert Kegan, whose *The Evolving Self* (1982) provides a context for understanding human development as a process of “meaning-making” which allows individuals to construct ever increasingly complex understandings of themselves in relation to the world (11). According to Kegan, such a process evolves. With the emergence of critically reflective capacities during adolescence, young people are not only able to begin to take the perspective of the other, but also to reflect on their own perspective in relation to that of others, thus “leading to the experience of subjectivity” (95). In addition, Kegan’s *In Over Our Heads* (1994) offers an understanding of the development of adolescents’ critical thinking capacities as requiring the emergence of “cross-categorical” thinking which

allows adolescents to move beyond the “durable categories” of meaning of childhood toward the ability to coordinate mentally other perspectives different from their own (28). Kegan’s work supplies a psychological, developmental framework for understanding Lonergan’s notion of the developing subject, especially as it relates to the developing subjectivity of adolescents

This study also draws on Rolf Muss’ *Theories of Adolescence* (1988) to further contextualize the development of critical thinking capacities during adolescence. Muss offers a broad overview of various theories of adolescent development. He explores theories that emphasize both the social as well as the cognitive dimensions of adolescent development and he highlights the educational implications of those theories. Thus, Muss provides a theoretical backdrop for understanding adolescent development and the emergence of the capacity for critical thinking during adolescence.

The Socio-Cultural Context of Adolescence

The study draws on the work of several scholars to provide a backdrop for understanding the unique tasks and challenges that today’s adolescents face in critically appropriating values and beliefs and in navigating the currents of cultural postmodernity. Harold Daly Horell’s chapter “Cultural Postmodernity and Christian Faith Formation” in *Horizons and Hopes: The Future of Religious Education* (2003) supplies a broad overview for understanding the context of cultural postmodernity and the challenge of constructing a Christian identity within that context. It reinforces the need for “fostering critical reflection and evaluation of emerging postmodern practices” (99), underscoring the need for equipping young people with the necessary tools of critical analysis to negotiate the complexities and ambiguities of contemporary postmodern life. And, it

emphasizes the need for furthering dialogue with young people as they engage in a meaningful search for self in the context of a culture that is itself one of questing and questioning, where searching to develop more adequate understandings of life and the world are increasingly common (97).

At the same time, Christian Smith and Melida Lundquist Denton's *Soul Searching: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of American Teenagers* (2005) provides an empirical basis for understanding the shifts of cultural postmodernity and its influence on the formation of values and beliefs among contemporary adolescents. Their work reports the findings of the National Study of Youth and Religion (NSYR), a sociological study of the religious and moral convictions of contemporary U.S. teenagers that involved in-depth interviews of two-hundred and fifty youth in the United States concerning their beliefs regarding religion, morality, and worldview. Smith and Lundquist Denton synthesize and analyze the data collected by the NSYR. Their findings indicate that while most youth in the United States value religious affiliation and identity, most U.S. teenagers have difficulty articulating their own religious beliefs (262). Further, Smith and Lundquist Denton contend that parents and other significant adults, including adults in their religious communities, still have a major influence on the way U.S. teens construct their religious identities. However, the religious beliefs of these teens are also "shaped by the social and cultural forces of therapeutic individualism, mass consumer capitalism, the digital communication revolution. . . and other relevant cultural and social contradictions and tensions" (263). Thus, Smith and Lundquist Denton's research indicates that one of the challenges of contemporary religious education is to help youth reflect on and

articulate more fully their own beliefs, and to help them make meaningful connections between their faith, life, and culture.

Building upon the work of Smith and Lundquist Denton, Kenda Creasy Dean's *Almost Christian: What the Faith of Our Teenagers is Telling the American Church* (2010) explores more fully the religious educational implications of the NSYR. Dean suggests that one of the challenges for religious educators today is to help young people negotiate the complexities of living in our contemporary, postmodern culture by equipping them with skills of theological reflection in order to help them make sense of their faith from within our cultural context. In a similar way, Dean's chapter "Fessing Up: Owning Our Theological Commitments" in *Starting Right: Thinking Theologically About Youth Ministry* (2001) makes the case that young people are natural theologians whose abilities to reflect theologically on their own lives and culture needs to be cultivated in religious education and youth ministry programs.

Secondary Sources

Lonergan's Works Secondary to this Study

In addition to *Topics in Education, Insight, Verbum, and Method in Theology*, several of Lonergan's other works are used to expand the discussion of his philosophy of education. Significant essays for this study are found in the *Collection* (1967b), a *Second Collection* (1974), and a *Third Collection* (1985). In "Existenz and Aggiornamento" in the *Collection*, based on a 1964 lecture given at Regis College in Toronto, Lonergan (1967b, 244) develops the idea that authentic human community is "a product of freely self-constituting subjects" who further develop in human freedom in community. According to Lonergan, the Church and its members must remain open to learning, growing, and

developing insofar as human beings are “individually responsible for their lives” as subjects of their own lives, and “collectively are responsible for the world in which they live them” (248). Similarly, in the *Third Collection*, there is an address by Lonergan entitled “Pope John’s Intention,” delivered in 1981 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the founding of Boston College’s Institute of Religious Education and Pastoral Ministry. In it, he further emphasizes the teaching and learning role of the Church which must mediate a tradition that is “alive, personal, and communal” and which must engage the concrete, historically conditioned realities of human living in order “to mediate to the world not just a doctrine but the living Christ” (1985, 228). Here, Lonergan underscores that the function of religious education is not simply to echo the tradition, but to help students authentically appropriate the tradition in concepts and language that are relevant for their own living out of the tradition.

In a similar way, in the *Third Collection*, Lonergan’s (1985) essay “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness” offers a framework for understanding schooling as both “handing on” of the heritage of humanity to students and self-appropriation of values and beliefs from that heritage on the part of students (181). According to Lonergan, such a process involves moving them toward dialogue with historical and present others, whereby encountering the other in dialogue can “reveal. . . a natural propensity to seek understanding, to judge reasonably, to evaluate fairly, and to be open to friendship” (182). In effect, for Lonergan, schooling is an open-ended invitation to enter into dialogue with voices from the past and the present in order to bring about radical new possibilities for the future.

Lonergan's (1968) Aquinas lecture at Marquette, separately published as the *Subject*, which is also found in the *Second Collection*, identifies a fourth level of dynamic consciousness, that of valuing toward responsible action (19). In this lecture, Lonergan highlights the importance of the "concrete human living" of the existential subject, who discovers, constructs, and actualizes values and beliefs by seeking out that which is worthwhile for living one's own life as a free and responsible subject (31). In "An Interview with Bernard Lonergan, S.J." (1974, 223) in the *Second Collection*, Lonergan further clarifies the role of affectivity and imagination in coming to self-appropriated values and beliefs. According to Lonergan, the level of valuing involves "a synthesis" of feelings and cognition in answering the question "Is it worthwhile?" Answering such a question leads to "the judgment of value, the decision," and ultimately, to action. He also emphasizes that imagination is an essential part of the process of human knowing since imagination "liberates sensitivity" and opens the world of possible meanings and values beyond the world one is "already functioning in" (244). Thus, in order to foster authentic freedom and responsibility education in schools ought to strive to lead students to reflect deeply on questions of what it truly means to live a life worth living. Through such reflection, students' sensitivity can be liberated and imaginative worlds of possibility can be opened up for them.

At the same time, Lonergan's *Understanding and Being* (1990), based on a series of lectures he gave in Halifax, Nova Scotia in 1958, further explains and clarifies ideas he developed in *Insight*. He underscores that judging is a "personal act" of self-appropriation that involves taking responsibility for one's own affirmations, beliefs, and conclusions (113). He asserts that it is a process, not a finished product; but rather, it involves a habit

of mind that is a willingness to ask more questions, to check, test, and affirm, or revise one's own understanding. Such an understanding of judging has implications for Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools insofar as it suggests that if educators want to cultivate the art of judging, they must invite students to question, to move toward deeper reflection, and to remain open to new possibilities, new questions, and new angles of vision that arise in a never-ending process of discovery.

Other Lonergan materials that inform the study are found in the online Digital Lonergan Archives of Marquette University. Most notably, this research draws insight from notes for a course Lonergan developed at the Gregorian in 1961 on "Intellect and Method" (1961) which emphasizes the historicity of all knowledge and understanding. In his course notes, Lonergan highlights the dialectical nature of knowing as one of "positions and counter-positions" in both sources from the tradition and in the one investigating those sources. He points out that the one investigating "stands in the dialectic" as a conversation partner within the tradition. Thus, interpretation of the tradition is an ongoing dialogic process that requires authentic conversation, genuine openness to learning, and commitment to an ongoing journey of discovery.

Lonergan Scholarship

While the scholarship on Bernard Lonergan is quite vast, this study relies on the work of several scholars who interpret the relevance of Lonergan's work for a contemporary audience. Frederick Crowe's overview of Lonergan's work in *Lonergan* (1992), in the Outstanding Christian Thinkers series, supplies general biographical background and traces the broad outlines of Lonergan's work. At the same time, Crowe's *Old Things and New: A Strategy for Education* (1985) offers important curricular and

pedagogical implications of Lonergan's thought on education in schools as both "heritage" and "achievement" (14). This allows for both the transmission of insights from the past and the cultivation of new learning, new wisdom, and new insights through the development of critical consciousness within the knowing and valuing subject. Finally, Crowe's *Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes* (2004), invites an exploration of Lonergan's thought for contemporary theology and philosophy. In particular, Crowe develops the theme of the whole Church as a learning Church, drawing on Lonergan's notion of coming to insight as an ongoing process of learning and discovery.

Richard Liddy's *Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in Early Lonergan* (2008) provides an intellectual biography of Lonergan that provides background for understanding Lonergan's epistemology. It traces the early development of Lonergan's thought and explores the influences that shaped his understanding of human knowing. In particular, Liddy explores the influence of John Henry Newman on Lonergan's concept of judging as coming to personal assent. He also examines the influence of John Alexander Stewart's *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas* (1909) on Lonergan's notion of ideas, not as static "forms" independent of the knower, but as dynamically existent concepts within the knowing subject that structure the heuristic process of discovery toward insight. Additionally, Liddy looks at the role of Joseph Maréchal's transcendental Thomism on shaping Lonergan's understanding of human knowing as a discursive process that moves from potential intelligibility to actual intelligibility through the action of the will by actively attending, inquiring, and judging.

David Tracy's *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (1970) examines the significance of Lonergan's thought for contemporary theology. Tracy maintains that Lonergan's achievement lies not in offering solutions to theological questions, but in advancing a fundamental stance toward theology which adopts a critically "reflective attitude" and a "structural" approach that is fundamentally heuristic (xiv). Tracy's *The Analogical Imagination* (1981) and *Plurality and Ambiguity* (1987) build upon Lonergan's notion of the historical contingency of theological knowledge to address questions of theological investigation in the contemporary postmodern context as "the one investigating stands in the dialectic" of history (Lonergan 1961a). Tracy highlights the contingent nature of theological conclusions given the ambiguity of historical interpretations and the plurality of interpretive stances from which to enter the dialectic. Thus, Tracy emphasizes Lonergan's fundamentally educational approach to theology as ongoing discovery: attending, inquiring, testing, affirming, and revising.

Additionally, the work of Robert Doran provides an understanding Lonergan's theological anthropology as integral and holistic. Doran's *Subject and Psyche* (1994) unpacks the role of feelings in Lonergan's notion of self-appropriation. Doran argues that Lonergan's understanding of the "existential subject" includes a conception of the "psychic energy" of the individual as a knowing and valuing subject, moving toward an integrated unity of selfhood as a knower and chooser of values (17). Doran insists that such a process is not only cognitive, but deeply affective as well. According to Doran (1994, 62), in Lonergan's schema, feelings have a "transcendental significance" as the individual moves toward higher levels of integration insofar as, for Lonergan, feelings are "the locus of the primary apprehension of values." Thus, as Doran points out, for

Lonergan, consciousness is not simply a cognitive process, but affective as well, rooted in the primordial sensitivity of the human person as experiencing, understanding, judging, and deliberating subject.

At the same time, Doran's essay on the "Theological Grounds for a World-Cultural Humanity" in *Creativity and Method* (1981b, 107) emphasizes the nature of theological inquiry as "interdisciplinary collaboration within the dialectic of history." The theological inquirer is a situated subject who participates in an ongoing collaborative re-appropriation of texts, doctrines, and symbols into new cultural idioms. As such, the theological inquirer participates in the "creative vector of human consciousness" (108). Such participation takes place through the process of the self-transcendence of the inquirer as a knowing and valuing subject, which includes both cognitive and affective dimensions (108-109). As Doran notes, "The various operations that constitute the creative vector in human consciousness are permeated by feelings." These feelings move the inquirer to desire beauty, meaning, truth, and goodness. Thus, according to Doran, for Lonergan, theological inquiry is not detached from feelings, but rather, is grounded and inspired by them. Moreover, the whole process of self-transcendence itself is a "felt" experience of the "creative tension" between "limitation and transcendence" found in the desires of the restless heart that seeks the true, the good, and the beautiful (110).

Moira Carley's *Creative Learning and Living: The Human Element* (2005) offers some educational implications of Lonergan's work. She observes that Lonergan's understanding of the human person invites a pedagogy of self-appropriation, whereby students are encouraged to approach the canvas of their lives as creative artists who are in the process of authentically becoming free and responsible subjects of their own lives.

Such a process calls for an approach to education in schools that fosters creativity and imagination, allowing students to explore multiple perspectives, alternate versions, and undreamt possibilities.

Ecclesial Documents on Catholic Education

Undergirding this study is a vision of the Catholic high school as a place of excellence which attends to the whole human person: moral, physical, intellectual, and spiritual. This vision has deep roots in conciliar, pontifical, and episcopal documents on Catholic education. In particular, this study draws on the Second Vatican Council's *Declaration on Christian Education*. The declaration highlights the Council's theme of fostering personal responsibility through education, and offers a vision of Catholic education as facilitating the full growth and development of the human person (Abbot 1966). The Congregation for Catholic Education's *The Religious Dimension of Education in a Catholic School* (1988) further develops this theme and vision, specifically in relation to teaching religion in Catholic schools. It underscores the importance of religious instruction that fosters the religious development of students as free and responsible persons. Additionally, the Congregation for the Clergy's *General Directory for Catechesis* (GDC) (1998) highlights the importance of religious instruction in Catholic schools as an academic discipline, with the same standards and academic rigor as that of other disciplines taught within Catholic schools. The GDC also emphasizes the importance of attending to the religious development of students. Finally, the USCCB's *Renewing the Vision* (1997) delineates the development of critical thinking skills as one of the goals of religious instruction with adolescents in order to equip them with the tools necessary to engage the Gospel adequately in the contemporary world.

Historical Studies on Modern Catholic Thought

Historical studies of modern Catholic thought provide background for further contextualizing the development of Lonergan's philosophical thought on education. Gerard McCool's *Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism* (1977) supplies a backdrop for understanding the Thomistic revival in Catholic thought in the early twentieth century, after the promulgation of Leo XIII's *Aeterni Patris* in the late nineteenth century. This historical background is further expounded by James Livingston et. al. in *Modern Christian Thought: The Twentieth Century* (2006). Livingston explores the contours of early twentieth century Thomism as developed by various Catholic thinkers, especially Joseph Maréchal, whose transcendental Thomism, which attempted a Catholic engagement with the Kantian turn to the subject through the lens of Thomistic cognitional theory, had a profound impact on Lonergan's own epistemology.

Literature on Catholic Education

Finally, the study utilizes the work of several scholars who locate Catholic education in the wider context of the Catholic intellectual tradition. This provides a backdrop for understanding the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools today. John Haughey's *Where is Knowing Going? The Horizons of the Knowing Subject* (2009, 62) makes an important distinction that informs the study between the Catholic sacred tradition, as expressed in official pronouncements of Church teaching, and the Catholic intellectual tradition, as having its locus of authority in the community of scholarship. Haughey maintains that these two traditions stand in a critical and creative tension that allows for the vibrancy of the living tradition of the Catholic Church. Cyril Orji's *The Catholic University and the Search For Truth* (2013) also

provides an analysis of the dialogic nature of Catholic education as part of the ongoing dialogue of the Catholic intellectual tradition. Similarly, in “Living Conversation: Higher Education in a Catholic Context” in *An Ignatian Spirituality Reader* (2008), Michael Himes argues that fostering critical conversation with and among students by engaging them in dialogue with voices from the past and present is the *raison d’etre* of Catholic schools. Himes argues for a vision of schooling that is truly catholic, one that offers multiple perspectives, multiple interpretive lenses, and multiple partners in conversation in order to open up dialogue toward mutual understanding, mutual enrichment, and mutual learning. Thus, for Himes, an education in schools that call themselves “Catholic” must embrace a broad vision of the full spectrum of human learning, recognizing that to become more fully human is to grow ever more deeply in the realization of the divine.

Organization of the Study

Chapter 1.-Introduction: Toward Infinite Wonder

This chapter introduces the study, establishing its purpose and significance for the field of religious education, providing a background for the study, as well as describing the historical and philosophical methodologies that will be employed. It presents the central research question of the study: *How can Bernard Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools contribute to a revitalized understanding of the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools?* It offers a review of the significant primary and secondary literature to be utilized in the study. And, it outlines the study’s overall organizational framework.

Chapter 2.-A Life Schooled in Wonder: Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of Education for Schools

Chapter two situates Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools in its historical and philosophical context and traces the threads of his thoughts about education through his major works. In so doing, this chapter examines his concept of a philosophy of education, his understanding of the human person in education, and his conceptualization of the aims and purposes of education. This chapter outlines Lonergan's biographical and intellectual context by situating Lonergan in the wider philosophical context of twentieth century Catholic thought. It also discusses Lonergan's major philosophical influences and his engagement with modern philosophy. The chapter then explores Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools in the wider context of his interest in knowing. While the fullest expression of Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools is found in *Topics in Education*, based on his 1959 lectures at Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio (Doran and Crowe 1993, xi), this study seeks to contextualize and further explicate his thought on education by tracing the development of educational, philosophical threads in his earlier and later works. In so doing, this chapter uncovers key themes in Lonergan's philosophy of education that could inform the theory and practice of teaching of religion in Catholic high schools today.

Chapter 3.-Developing in Wonder: Toward the Critical Appropriation of Values and Beliefs

Starting with Lonergan's notion of the developing subject, chapter three offers a broad framework for understanding human development toward critical awareness, and examines the significance of the formation of values and beliefs during adolescence. The chapter explores how Lonergan's concept of the self-appropriation of knowing and

valuing as central to the development of the human person as subject can provide a philosophical lens for understanding human development, with an emphasis on the role of the critical appropriation of values and beliefs in such development. It examines Lonergan's understanding of the developing subject in light of psychologist Robert Kegan's notion of the evolving self as a self that continually organizes and reorganizes the meaning of self-in-relation to the world (1982). It also draws on Kegan's work to address adolescents' developing capacity for the critical appropriation of values and beliefs as they grow in their ability for self-reflection. And, it explores Lonergan's notion of the self-transcendence and self-appropriation of the developing subject in light of Deanna Kuhn's work on the development of critical thinking capacities during adolescence as a process of growing metacognitive awareness (1999, 2005).

Chapter 4.-Teaching the Dynamics of Wonder: School Teaching as a Dynamic Process toward Fostering Critical Awareness

Chapter four explores Lonergan's notion of the dynamics of human consciousness as a framework for understanding the educational development of critical awareness in the context of school teaching. It brings Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools into conversation with contemporary educational and religious educational theorists in order to provide an educational framework for understanding human development toward critical awareness. It draws on the work of educational theorist Stephen Brookfield (2012) to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the role of metacognitive awareness in critical thinking. It borrows insights from religious educational theorists Kieran Scott (2005) and Gabriel Moran (1989, 1997) to provide a theoretical understanding of the role of fostering critical awareness in the Catholic high school classroom. It utilizes ecclesial documents on Catholic education to establish the academic

purpose of teaching religion in the context of Catholic high schools, most notably the Congregation for Catholic Education's *The Religious Dimension of Education in a Catholic School* (1988) and the Congregation for the Clergy's *General Directory for Catechesis* (1998). And, it locates teaching religion in Catholic high schools in the context of the wider Catholic intellectual tradition as an ongoing interpretive dialogue between faith, culture, and reason, using the work of John Haughey (2009), Cyril Orji (2013), and Michael Himes (2010). Finally, it examines the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools as fostering the self-transcendence and self-appropriation of adolescents as authentic knowing and valuing subjects.

Chapter 5.-*Engaging the Dialogue of Wonder: Teaching Religion in Catholic Schools as a Dialogic Process toward Critical Conversation*

Chapter five focuses on the development of critical thinking as an aspect of the educational development of adolescents and its role in teaching religion in Catholic high schools in light of Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools. It examines the influence of the cultural ecology of postmodernity on the self-appropriation of values and beliefs of adolescents today, drawing on the work of Harold Daly Horell (2003, 2004) and Friedrich Schweitzer (2004). Building on the work of Kenda Creasy Dean (2010), and Christian Smith and Melinda Lundquist Denton (2005), it examines the need for fostering both adolescents' religious literacy, and a critically reflective religious articulacy which allows them articulate their own religious understandings, questions, values, and beliefs. It suggests a pedagogical model for fostering religious literacy and articulacy using Lonergan's educational model of theology as an ongoing dialectical and dialogic process that is presented in *Method in Theology*. It unpacks the religious educational potential of the eight functional specialties of theology as outlined in *Method*

in Theology—research, interpretation, history, dialectics, foundations, dogmatics, systematics, and communication—in light of Frederick Crowe’s (1985) understanding of education as both the way of “heritage” and “achievement.” And, it explores the dynamics of teaching religion as the way of integration that incorporates both movements in an ongoing dialectical and dialogic process.

Chapter 6.-*An Invitation to Infinite Wonder: Curricular Implications of Bernard Lonergan’s Philosophy of Education for Teaching Religion in Catholic High Schools*

The final chapter further develops the curricular implications of Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools, focusing especially on the importance of developing curricula that foster critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools. It highlights four essential elements of a religion curriculum that cultivates a critically reflective religious literacy and articulacy in light of Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools. And, it assesses the adequacy of the USCCB’s *Curriculum Framework for the Development of Catechetical Materials for Young People of High School Age* (2008) in light of those essential elements. This assessment places particular emphasis on the role of critical thinking for the development of students as authentic knowing and valuing subjects. Additionally, the chapter also suggests three curriculum areas for possible further research and development that grow out of the study that would promote the full human flourishing of adolescents attending Catholic high schools today. These implications include the potential for developing students’ advocacy for social justice, for cultivating students’ critical moral reflection, and for promoting interreligious dialogue. Finally, the chapter examines the limitations of the study and suggests possible directions for further research into the applications of the study beyond the high school religion classroom

Chapter 2

A Life Schooled in Wonder: Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of Education for Schools

While Bernard Lonergan's contribution to Catholic theology in the twentieth century has been widely studied, few studies address his philosophy of education for schools and its implications for teaching religion in Catholic high schools.³ Yet, as John Elias observes (1999, 105), Bernard Lonergan's "work could serve as one possible resource for constructing a renewed Catholic philosophy of education for schools that is, at once, grounded in the Thomistic tradition while "keeping it in dialogue with contemporary philosophy." To be sure, Lonergan offers a philosophy of education for schools that is grounded in a theological anthropology that attends to the human person as an intelligent, free, and responsible subject. Or, as Thomas Groome (2011, 245), points out, Lonergan offers a "Catholic epistemology" that "honors the whole person" in the process of knowing.

For Lonergan (1971a, 62), the human person is a dynamic subject: experiencing, inquiring, reflecting, and acting with a developing "capacity for wonder, for awe and fascination," and with the potential for an unrestricted "openness to adventure, daring, greatness, goodness, and majesty". It is this dynamic capacity for wonder that opens human persons out to a world "mediated by meaning," a world that moves us beyond "the infant's world of immediacy" toward the world of adulthood "embodied or carried in human intersubjectivity, in art, in symbols, in language and in the lives and deeds of persons" (76, 57). For Lonergan, then, education in schools ought to be an invitation to

³ See Brendan Carmody, "Toward a Contemporary Catholic Philosophy of Education" *International Studies in Catholic Education* 3, no. 2 (October 2011): 106-119 which treats Lonergan's philosophy of education as the basis for a Catholic philosophy of education in general.

infinite wonder, an apprenticeship in active intelligence, and a dynamic process of never-ending discovery, ongoing reflection, and ever expanding horizons of meaning.

The most complete expression of Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools is found in *Topics in Education*, from his 1959 summer lectures to Catholic school teachers at Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio (Doran and Crowe 1993, xi). However, this chapter seeks to understand further his thought on schooling by tracing the development of his philosophical vision for education in his earlier and later works. The purpose of this chapter is to trace the development of Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools throughout his major philosophical works and to highlight key themes that could inform the theory and practice of teaching religion in Catholic high schools today. This chapter does not propose a comprehensive Catholic philosophy of education, nor does it propose that Lonergan's educational philosophy for schools is the only source for the development of such a philosophy.⁴ Rather, this chapter situates Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools in its historical and philosophical context, locating his educational philosophy in the wider context of the development of his theological anthropology.

Since this chapter explores the philosophical framework of Lonergan's thought on education in schools in its historical and philosophical context, it employs the methodology of intellectual history. Historian of ideas Dominick LaCapra (1983, 30) discusses what he calls "work-like" aspects of texts which engage "the reader in a re-creative dialogue with the text and the problems it raises." LaCapra maintains that reading philosophical works requires understanding texts as historical documents with

⁴ For a treatment of Lonergan's Philosophy of education as the basis for a possible Catholic philosophy of education see Carmody (2011) and Elias (1999).

their own “situated uses of language” (19). At the same time, it demands “working through” the texts anew as living works that pose questions, address issues, and challenge assumptions (LaCapra 2000, 71). Accordingly, this chapter employs LaCapra’s context analysis and dialogic reading to open up “a critically controlled dialogic exchange” (71) with Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools and to explore its possible relevance for teaching religion in Catholic schools today.

The first part of this chapter establishes Lonergan’s biographical, historical, and philosophical context by attending to the intellectual currents that shaped Lonergan’s interest in a theory of knowing in general which, in turn, has implications for his philosophy of education for schools in particular. The second section traces the development of Lonergan’s thought on human knowing and its implications for a philosophy of education for schools. The third section then explores Lonergan’s epistemology as the basis for his philosophical understanding of education in schools. Finally, the concluding section highlights key themes in Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools that the researcher proposes can inform the contemporary theory and practice of teaching religion in Catholic high schools. Overall, the chapter provides an intellectual, historical approach to understanding Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools and its possible implications for teaching religion in Catholic high schools today.

Lonergan’s Intellectual Biographical Context: The Early Years

Early Background and Jesuit Vocation (1904-1926)

Bernard Lonergan was born in Canada in Buckingham, Quebec on December 17, 1904, the eldest son of Gerald Lonergan, a land surveyor of Irish ancestry and working class stock, while Bernard’s mother, Josephine, was of English descent from British

loyalists who had fled from the United States to Canada after the American Revolution (Crowe 1992, 3). Buckingham was a small mill town on the river Lièvre with only one Catholic parish, St. Gregory's, and one Catholic school, St. Michael's. Lonergan received his early religious instruction and elementary education there under the tutelage of the Brothers of Christian Instruction whom he later praised as excellent teachers with high standards of "industry and achievement" (4).

At the age of thirteen, Bernard was sent to Loyola College, a Jesuit boarding school in Montreal for his secondary education. There, he excelled at his studies. Yet, as he later recalled: "I was fully aware that the Jesuits did not know how to make one work. . . at Loyola I loafed and passed exams with honors" (Crowe 1992, 5). As Frederick Crowe (5) notes, Lonergan's "extremely negative view of the state of Catholic education" not only remained with him throughout his life, but also shaped his interest in improving the quality of that form of education. It is not surprising, then, that Lonergan's second major summer lecture series after the publication of *Insight* in 1957 was for Catholic school teachers at Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio. Nor, is it surprising that among his last public lectures was one given at Boston College in 1981 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Institute of Religious Education and Pastoral Ministry (Lonergan 1985, 238). From this researcher's perspective, then, Lonergan's interest in the problem of knowing has practical import and applicability in the field of education in schools, an area in which he himself labored as a teacher for almost fifty years.

In spite of his negative assessment of the schooling he received at Loyola, Lonergan decided to join the Jesuits at the end of his high school years, entering the

Jesuit novitiate at Guelph, Ontario in July 1922 at the age of seventeen (Crowe 1992, 6). After the standard two years of the Jesuit novitiate at Guelph, Lonergan remained there for two more years of study in the juniorate, during which time he focused on an academic course of studies which included classics, English, and history (9-11). In 1926, he was sent to England with two other Canadian Jesuits to the Jesuits' Heythrop College, north of London, to study philosophy. At the same time, he prepared for a bachelor's degree at the University of London in classics and mathematics (Liddy 2008, 8).

While in England, Lonergan first expressed his interest in "the theory of knowledge" which he said "is what is going to interest me most of all" (Crowe 1992, 14).⁵ Thus, Lonergan began a lifelong passion for the study of philosophy, especially foundational questions of epistemology, which he would later express as "three basic questions: What am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? And, what do I know when I do it?" (1971a, 83).

Early Intellectual Influences (1926-1933)

Among Lonergan's most significant early intellectual influences none ranks higher than that of John Henry Newman. Lonergan (1980, 32) describes Newman as one of his "fundamental" mentors and guides. While at Heythrop, Lonergan read Newman's *Grammar of Assent*. In it, he found the basis for his understanding of knowing as a dynamic process of coming to assent or agreement with the validity of propositions through acts of personal judgment. Such judgment is grounded in Newman's distinction between "real assent" and "notional assent." Real assent involves rational self-conscious appropriation of beliefs as personally affirmed by the knowing subject. In contrast,

⁵ From a letter dated December 11, 1926 to a friend and fellow Jesuit Henry Smeaton (In Crowe 1992, 14).

notional assent is mere perfunctory agreement with notions “made upon habit and without reflection,” simply accepting custom, tradition, or general opinion (Newman 1955, 21).

Moreover, Newman (1955, 271, emphasis added) makes an important distinction between “*certitude*” as a “mental state” within the mind of knowing subject and “*certainty*” as a “quality of propositions,” independent of the knower. Newman suggests “certitude is not a passive impression made on the mind from without,” but rather, it involves “an active recognition” of the “validity of an inference” as “committed to the personal action” of the rational subject. Such “certitude” is an act of personal assent to the validity of a proposition through the active process of judging and concluding for oneself, regardless of the logically or empirically provable “certainty” of a proposition. In other words, one can know subjectively with “certitude” more than can ever be “determined objectively” as “certain.” This process of coming to personal certitude Newman calls the “illative sense” which he likens to “good sense” or “common sense.” It is “felt” knowledge that allows the knowing subject to *know* with certitude the validity of a proposition, thus making real assent possible (271). For Newman, this illative sense reflects the personal “virtue” or wisdom of good judgment in which “it is the mind that reasons and that controls its own reasonings” (276). Through his study of Newman, then, Lonergan began to develop a conceptual framework for understanding judging as the rational self-affirmation of the knowing subject, an understanding that would later become the basis for his own cognitional theory.

Newman’s influence on Lonergan can be seen in a series of papers that Lonergan published while a student at Heythrop College in the Heythrop journal *The Blandyke*

Papers. In these papers, Lonergan explores the dynamics of human knowing. In the first of these, “The Form of Mathematical Inference” published in January 1928, Lonergan deals with the question of what happens in the process of drawing mathematical conclusions (Liddy 2008, 20-21). Like Newman, Lonergan’s approach is not an appeal to universal abstract concepts, such as “circularity” as the basis for judgment as a type of *recognition*. Rather, Lonergan is interested in the particular judgments of the knowing subject through inferences “intuited in the concrete” (21) as a form of *cognition* that grasps the general in the particular. To borrow Newman’s language, Lonergan is not interested in proving the metaphysical “certainty” of the proposition $2+2=4$; but rather, Lonergan is interested in the epistemological “certitude” of the knowing subject in drawing the conclusion *that* $2+2=4$. In the second of the *Blandyke Papers* presented in February 1928, Lonergan deals with “The Form of Inference” which treats acts of reason not as “mechanical” processes independent of the desire of the knowing subject to “grasp meaningful relationships.” Instead, he argues “reason acts only because of a reason” (22). He would later formulate that reason as an “unrestricted desire to know” which grounds the very dynamics of human consciousness toward knowing through infinite wonder (1990, 149-150).

Finally, the last of Lonergan’s *Blandyke Papers* presented in February 1929 deals with “True Judgment and Science” (Liddy 2008, 24). In it, Lonergan uses Newman’s notion of the “illative sense” to ground true judgments for which “evidence is the mark of truth, not the measure of assent” (27). Building on Newman’s ideas, Lonergan (2007, 34-35) asserts, “true judgment” is not reducible to the simple recognition of the empirical validity of evidence alone. Rather, as Newman (1955, 276) indicates, true judgment

involves the self-appropriated affirmation of the validity of a proposition through the judgment of the “mind that reasons and controls its own reasonings.” For Lonergan as for Newman, one can know with “certitude” more than can be proved logically or empirically with “certainty.”

After completing his studies in London in 1930 at the age of twenty-six, Lonergan began his regency, a period of apostolic involvement as part of his Jesuit formation prior to the study of theology. He was assigned to teach at Loyola College in Montreal, the very boarding school he had attended as an adolescent (Liddy 2008, 41). While teaching and other duties occupied much of his time, he still found some time for reading on his own. One of the books that proved to be a significant influence for him during this period was *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas* by John Alexander Stewart (Liddy 2008, 41). Through his reading of Stewart, Lonergan discovered that Plato's epistemology need not be conceived as an esoteric appeal to abstract “forms” or “ideas” independent of the knowing subject. Rather, according to Stewart, Plato's forms should be conceived as an appeal to conceptual ideals or conditions which the knower seeks to fulfill in asking the question “What?” Stewart (1909, 3) claims Plato's “ideas” are not “separate things” that exist in some ethereal realm. Rather, “they are known only as dynamically existent-only as performing their function of making” data “intelligible.” He contends that Plato's “ideas” are “concepts-in-use” (3), instruments which human understanding employs in interpreting the world. In effect, for Stewart, Plato's “ideas” act simply as conceptual place holders that structure the dynamics of human knowing through the unfolding process of questioning and discovery.

From Stewart's interpretation of Plato's ideas, Lonergan discovered a gateway to a new understanding of "intellection as an immanent act" within the knowing subject. This notion stood in opposition to the scholastic interpretation in vogue in Catholic philosophy in the early twentieth century of the intellection of concepts as a type of "spiritual apprehension" of essences separate from the knowing subject (Liddy 2008, 43). As Liddy (2008, 43) points out, "For Lonergan at last this was an account of concepts that related them to the dynamism of the human mind. They are 'points of view' from which the sensible world is interpreted" which "structure human questioning in its dynamic search for understanding." As Lonergan (1974, 264) later expressed, "from Stewart I learned that Plato was a methodologist, that his ideas were what the scientist seeks to discover, that the scientific or philosophic process towards discovery was one of question and answer." Through Stewart's interpretation of Plato, Lonergan began to further develop the notion of human knowing as heuristic, as a dynamic process toward intelligent understanding, not as simple apprehension of the world "out there" apart from the knowing subject.

Seminary Years and Early Thomistic Influence (1933-1937)

In the fall of 1933, at the end of his regency, Lonergan was assigned to Rome to study theology at the Gregorian University in preparation for priestly ordination. At that time, the Gregorian was still recovering from several decades of uncreative Thomistic thought. It was taught mostly by "seminary professors rather than creative philosophers and theologians." This stagnant era began in the late nineteenth century with the promulgation of Leo XIII's *Aeterni Patris*, which made Thomism the official philosophy of the Catholic Church (McCool 1977, 238). As Gerald McCool (1977, 243-244) points

out, the “Thomism” taught at this time was actually ahistorical with little or no appreciation for differences in the thought of Aquinas and that of other scholastics, and with practically no distinction between Aquinas’ original ideas and that of his baroque interpreters such as Cajetan or Suarez. Moreover, this scholastic brand of Thomism was taught through manuals whose purpose was “the clear exposition of ‘safe’ Thomistic doctrine” rather than the development of creative theological thinking for the modern world (238).

At the heart of this “safe Thomistic doctrine” was “an epistemology of changeless concepts” in which “truth” was defined as “conformity of the judgment to reality” (McCool 1977, 247). In the conceptual framework of early twentieth century scholasticism, judgment was understood as involving a type of “spiritual apprehension” of concepts apart from the knowing subject, the very epistemology that Lonergan had come to oppose through his own study of Newman’s *Grammar of Assent* and Stewart’s interpretation of Plato’s concept of ideas. Always intellectually restless, Lonergan began reading Aquinas’ *Summa Theologiae* on his own as he began to suspect that there may be more to Aquinas than he had at first been led to believe (Liddy 2008, 91).

However, one of Lonergan’s most important Thomistic influences during his seminary years at the Gregorian was by osmosis. Stephanos Stephanou was a Greek Jesuit also studying at the Gregorian whom Lonergan had befriended. Stephanou was a member of the Sicilian province who had studied philosophy at Louvain (Liddy 2008, 101). While there, Stephanou encountered the thought of Joseph Maréchal, a Belgian Jesuit who taught courses on philosophical psychology to the scholastics at the Jesuit house at Louvain from 1910 to 1935. Maréchal had earned a Ph.D. in biology and was

interested in the intersection of experimental psychology and philosophy. His work has been described as the beginning of twentieth-century European Catholic intellectual engagement with Kant's philosophical turn to the subject (Livingston et. al. 2006, 201).

At the heart of Maréchal's project is an attempt to ground Catholic philosophy in the dynamic movement of the human intellect toward an unlimited and thus transcendental end. In Kant, Maréchal found the "transcendental principles" that allow a "reconstruction" of intelligible concepts in the intellect that starts with "the effective cooperation of the senses" through the synthetic *a priori* forms of the mind that order sense experience (Maréchal 2005, 322). Yet, for Maréchal, Kant's "turn to the subject" did not go far enough. He argues that Kant failed to account adequately for the dynamic process of human knowing within the knowing subject. To account for this dynamism, Maréchal turned to Aquinas who describes human knowing as the movement of the "active intellect" from the "potentially intelligible" to the "actually intelligible" through the agency of the will (Kreeft 1990, 273, 295).

Following Maurice Blondel's emphasis on a Thomistic philosophy of action as the dialectic of intellect and will, Maréchal (2005, 322) contends that it is the will or desire to know as "elicited appetite" that moves the intellect toward knowledge of unlimited being. Maréchal insists, "no activity of our intellect, no intellectual assimilation is possible but in virtue of the deep yearning whose saturating end would be the intuition of the absolute Real" (Quoted in Livingston et. al 2006, 201). According to Maréchal, the human spirit is dynamically directed toward the unlimited being of God.

Maréchal's "transcendental Thomism," on the dynamism of the human spirit found in the dialectic of intellect and will, had a profound influence on Lonergan's

thought as well as that of fellow Jesuit and contemporary Karl Rahner. For Lonergan, Maréchal offered an account of human knowing as a dynamic process, consistent with Lonergan's own growing understanding of the dynamism of human knowing. Maréchal's transcendental Thomism fleshed out Lonergan's conviction that knowing is more than "taking a look" as the prevailing "naïve realism" of scholastic epistemology had maintained (Lonergan 1997, 396). From Maréchal, Lonergan (1982, 110) "got hold of the idea that knowledge is discursive." It is an incremental process that involves a range of acts that successively run together: experiencing, understanding, and judging. As Lonergan later describes,

Maréchal was the one that effectively introduced in Catholic circles the notion that human knowledge is discursive and that you know when you affirm. An affirmation is a detail of the process, the third level. I was taught philosophy on an intuitive basis-naïve realism-and I took refuge in Newman's *Grammar of Assent*. Later I read a book by J.A. Stewart, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*-it was a book that influenced me unconsciously a great deal. I discovered that, according to Stewart, Plato's ideas are what the scientist is trying to discover and what Plato is doing in the *Dialogues* is setting up a methodology. (1973, 62)

By the time he completed his seminary studies in Rome, then, Lonergan had already found the seeds of his theory of knowing as a dynamic process within the knowing subject whose basic orientation is toward unlimited horizons of infinite wonder. It is a theory that would later serve as the basis for his philosophy of education for schools.

Doctoral Studies: Apprenticeship to Aquinas (1937-1940)

Bernard Lonergan was ordained a priest on July 25, 1936 in Rome at the Church of St. Ignatius at the age of thirty-one, before his fourth year of theology and according to the Jesuit custom at the time. After he completed his seminary studies at the Gregorian the following year, he began his Jesuit Tertianship in France at the Jesuit house in

Amiens in 1937. It was during this year of prayer and spiritual renewal that Lonergan, in dialogue with his Jesuit superiors, discerned his call to the “intellectual apostolate” of the Jesuits. So, at the end of his Tertianship in 1938, Lonergan returned to the Gregorian to begin his doctoral studies (Liddy 2008, 123).

Lonergan had originally planned on studying for a doctorate in philosophy at the Gregorian. However, the Rector of the Gregorian sent a letter to the Canadian Provincial asking that Lonergan be assigned to study theology instead. This request came in order to accommodate the large number of English speaking students who had begun studying theology at the Gregorian from the North American College “who will be needing his [Lonergan’s] help in the future” (Liddy 2008, 123-124).

Lonergan began doctoral studies in theology at the Gregorian in the fall of 1938 under the direction of a French Jesuit Charles Boyer, who had been recommended to Lonergan while he was in France. Lonergan chose for his dissertation the topic of the development of the idea of “operative grace” in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. This topic essentially deals with the question of how God’s grace operates in the human person with respect to human freedom. In his dissertation, Lonergan explores the questions: Is the action of God’s grace limited by human freedom? Or, is human freedom limited by the action of God’s grace?

For Lonergan, the basic problem of the relationship between God’s grace and human freedom comes down to the way human beings *think* about God. Such questions arise, he argues, from the fallacy of thinking of God as object, that “fails to grasp that God is not some datum to be explained,” but rather God is “absolute explanation, pure intelligibility. . . and the first cause and last end of everything else” (Lonergan 1971b,

105). He rejects the notion that God is an object of understanding, but rather, following Aquinas, he insists that God is the source of all understanding, of all that which is understood as well as the very act of understanding itself. In his dissertation, then, he recasts the question of God's agency in relation to human freedom as one of epistemology not metaphysics.

Lonergan (1971b, 115) claims, the starting point of all questions regarding God's agency in human affairs is Aquinas' notion of God as the intelligent creator of both the human intellect that seeks to understand and the intelligible universe that is understandable. He builds upon Aquinas' notion of divine transcendence, according to which human freedom "emerges from" and is already "conditioned by created antecedents over which freedom has no direct control." He observes that God acts through "created antecedents," including the intellect and will without violating those antecedents, which God chooses as the natural instruments through which human beings cooperate with supernatural grace. In his dissertation he concludes that "there is no end of room for God to work on the free choice of the will without violating it" since the intellect and will are the very means through which grace operates (116).

Yet, as Frederick Crowe (1992, 47) points out, Lonergan's "real discovery" in writing his dissertation, which was later published under the title *Grace and Freedom*, was "the way Aquinas worked and questioned and thought and understood." Therefore, Lonergan's dissertation was the true beginning of his apprenticeship in the thought of Thomas Aquinas.

Lonergeran's Theory of Human Knowing as the Basis for his Philosophy of Education for Schools

Early Career and Major Works (1940-1957)

After completing his doctoral dissertation in 1940, at the age of thirty-five Bernard Lonergan began teaching theology at *L'Immaculee-Conception*, the Jesuit scholasticate in Montreal (Liddy 2008, 135). He then moved to Regis College in Toronto in 1947, and later, in 1953 at the age of forty-eight, he was assigned to teach theology at the Gregorian University in Rome. Since 1949 he had been working on a monumental work intended to study the problem of a contemporary method in theology grounded in a Thomistic epistemology that sought to engage modern philosophy. Yet, because of his assignment to Rome, he decided "to round off" what he had done and publish it under the title *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (Lonergan 1974, 268). Lonergan worked on *Insight* while at Regis College and it was later published in 1957 while he was in Rome (Crowe 2004, 44). In it, he develops his theory of human understanding that attempts to "capture the essential dynamism of human intelligence" by inviting others to experience that dynamism for themselves as knowing subjects: "experiencing, understanding, and judging" (Lonergan 1997, 57).

Prior to his work on *Insight*, however, Lonergan had already begun to develop his theory of knowing through a series of articles he published in *Theological Studies* from 1946 to 1949. Known as the *Verbum* articles, they treat Aquinas' thought on the inner dynamism of the life of the Trinity through the eternal procession of the Word (Morelli and Morelli 1997, 600). While on the surface, such a topic appears unrelated to his interest in human knowing, Lonergan grounds his study of the Trinitarian procession of the Word in Thomistic cognitional theory which, in his words, is a synthesis of "a

phenomenology of the subject with a psychology of the soul” (1967a, vii). In effect, Lonergan (1967a, 45) argues that “the human mind offers an analogy to the Trinitarian procession.” He asserts that since human persons are made in the image of God, they possess an “inner word” or teacher, borrowing from Augustine. This inner word allows for authentic self-possession through the dynamic process of knowing itself. For Lonergan, every act of knowing is itself an act of self-possession of one’s own self as a knowing subject. He contends that it is precisely this dynamically intelligent self-aware self that mirrors the very life of the Trinity.

Moreover, in the *Verbum* articles, Lonergan (1967a, 185) makes an important distinction between the human intellect as “potency,” that is, the potential to understand, and the human intellect as “habit,” that is, the intentional desire to seek understanding. He considers that the cultivation of intellect as habit is at the heart of any educational enterprise. The cultivation of intellect as habit offers freedom of thought and moves one to self-possession whereby “intellectual habit is not possession of the book but freedom from the book,” which “enables us to recast definitions, to adjust principles,” and “to throw chains of reasoning into new perspectives.” Intellectual habit is nothing less than “intelligence in act” (185). It allows human persons to be who they truly are as persons made in the image of God, fully possessing the freedom of the children of God through the dynamic orientation of human intelligence as an unrestricted desire to know directed toward ultimate mystery.

Insight as Pedagogy (1957)

In *Insight*, Lonergan further develops his notion of human intelligence as a dynamic orientation toward an unlimited horizon of infinite wonder by inviting his

readers to experience that invitation to wonder for themselves. As Frederick Crowe (1992, 65) notes, “Lonergan saw his book as pedagogical,” leading others into a heuristic process of self-appropriation of the self as a knowing subject. He invites his readers to gain “insight into insight” (Lonergan 1997, 4), experiencing, understanding and judging their own dynamic process of knowing: attending to the data of their own experience, intelligently inquiring for deeper understanding, and reasonably affirming with a degree of self-reflective certitude on the validity of their own insights. As Crowe observes, “*Insight* remains forever an invitation” (65); it is an invitation to wonder, an invitation to self-discovery; and, ultimately, it is an invitation to ongoing insight into never ending mystery. In *Insight*, Lonergan invites his readers to explore the depths of their own self-consciousness as attentive, intelligent, and reasonable subjects. Such a rationally self-reflective consciousness is grounded in an authentic subjectivity that grasps the self as a knowing subject who attends to experience, inquires for understanding, and reflects toward reasonable, self-affirmed judgment.

Throughout *Insight*, Lonergan offers examples of coming to insight from science, mathematics, common sense, philosophy, and theology in order to provide the readers with ample exercises in the process of coming to insight, hence leading them to discover for themselves “what it is to understand” (1997, 22). He arranges his examples “not by abstract considerations of logical or metaphysical priority, but by concrete motives of *pedagogical* efficacy” (11; emphasis added). In *Insight*, Lonergan as teacher invites the reader as student into a self-appropriating process through the discovery of one’s self as a knowing subject. This process of self-discovery is not coming to knowledge as “an object characterized by catalogues of abstract properties but by the appropriation of one’s own

intellectual and rational self-consciousness” (1997, 22). Through a self-reflecting and self-correcting heuristic process the reader is invited to gain insight into his or her own process of coming to insight. Thus, in *Insight*, Lonergan adopts a pedagogy of self-discovery, self-awareness, and self-appropriation.

For Lonergan (1990, 180), this process of coming to self-appropriation is a process of “intellectual conversion” which involves a new metacognitive awareness, a shift in perspective away from seeing knowing as static apprehension to understanding knowing as a dynamic, self-reflective process. It is an existential grasp of the self as knowing subject. Such a conversion is not so much a product but a process insofar as “the appropriation of one’s own rational self-consciousness. . . is not an end in itself, but rather a beginning” (Lonergan 1997, 22), opening up new horizons of wonder, meaning, and insight.

It is precisely this pedagogy of self-appropriation that serves as the basis for Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools. As Lonergan (1993, 81) notes, one of the main purposes of education in schools is to awaken consciousness, to help persons become aware of their “own freedom and responsibility,” and to help them become alive to their own human potentiality. For him, education is an ongoing process of humanization, whereby persons claim their own self-consciousness as authentic knowing subjects. As he notes, “The subject is not conscious empirically unless he [or she] experiences. The subject is not conscious intellectually unless” he or she “inquires, understands, conceives.” And, “the subject is not conscious rationally unless he [or she] reflects, weighs evidence, judges” (1961a, Digital Lonergan Archive). In other words, the appropriation of oneself as self-conscious subject is an essential educational task. It is the

task of becoming oneself, fully aware, fully awake, and fully alive. Such self-appropriation is actualized in action insofar as “knowing heads for doing” in that “*I do the doing. I choose. I will*” (Lonergan 1993, 82; emphasis original). Lonergan insists, self-appropriation of one’s own consciousness invites freedom and authentic subjectivity as persons in the world: experiencing, understanding, affirming, and acting.

Pedagogy on Insight: The Halifax Lectures (1958)

Following its publication in 1957, Lonergan gave a series of lectures on *Insight* during the summer of 1958 at St. Mary’s University in Halifax, Nova Scotia where his brother Greg, also a Jesuit, was stationed (Morelli and Morelli 1990, xiii). Lonergan had been spending summers there and was invited by the rector to offer a series of lectures on his recently published book. These lectures were recorded and later published as *Understanding and Being* (Morelli and Morelli 1990, xvii-xviii). In these lectures, Lonergan clarifies certain ideas raised in *Insight*.⁶ As Elizabeth and Mark Morelli (1990, xvii) note, Lonergan’s style in these lectures is that of a “teacher teaching rather than an author writing a book.” They give the flavor of what it must have been like to have him as a teacher when he is in “full form.”

Building upon Maréchal’s transcendental Thomism, Lonergan argues that at the root of all human knowing is an unrestricted desire to know. In the Halifax lectures, he explains that this “intellectual curiosity” is “the root” of all questioning. It is this unlimited capacity for wonder that grounds human subjectivity and directs it toward its “conscious finality” in “being” (1990, 149). According to Lonergan (1990, 151), “when

⁶ In addition to the lectures there were also nightly discussions with question and answer sessions which were also recorded and appear in the text of *Understanding and Being*, thus offering further clarification of his ideas.

you reach a conception” the “fundamental finality or teleology of intellect reveals itself in a further question. It is not enough to conceive; you want to know whether it is really so.” He argues that the dynamics of human consciousness lead to the affirmation of being, that is, to distinguish that which is from that which is not. As Lonergan (1990, 150) observes, “With wonder we have the finality that sets the process going, the finality that lifts us above the level of merely empirical consciousness to the level of intellectual consciousness; and then emerges the finality that lifts us above intellectual consciousness to rational consciousness.” Yet, Lonergan emphasizes that while such wonder is innate, it is not always conscious. Rather, it needs to be cultivated and brought fully into awareness through the intentionality of the knowing subject. Consequently, Lonergan’s invitation in *Insight* is an invitation to a conscious self-appropriation of the capacity for wonder, to actualize human self-consciousness, and to appropriate authentic subjectivity by *being* attentive, *being* intelligent, *being* reasonable, and, as he would later say, *being* responsible.⁷

Further, he asserts, the self-appropriation of the knowing subject is an ongoing process. It is learned. It is cultivated. It develops. It is intellect as habit, not simply an intellectual act. It involves maturing in what he calls “the intellectual pattern of experience” (Lonergan 1997, 209). Or, as Moira Carley (2005, 32) points out, it is “active intelligence,” that is, “personal awareness of actively engaged intelligence,” an ongoing cultivation of “our own inner activity consciously engaged in understanding what’s happening around us in the process of creative living and learning.” For Lonergan, growth in the intellectual pattern of experience involves active engagement of

⁷ Lonergan later develops the idea of human responsibility as a fourth transcendental precept to correspond with the fourth level of consciousness as valuing and deciding (See *Method*, 20).

intelligence in experiencing, understanding, and judging. It involves the increasing ability to make ever more subtle distinctions, to ask even more relevant questions, and to affirm the validity of one's own judgments as reasonably accurate. Thus, for Lonergan, this intellectual pattern unfolds and matures precisely with experience. In effect, he argues that growth in the intellectual pattern of experience involves maturing in wisdom.

Such wisdom is the basis for sound or good judgment. He points out, "If one accepts the responsibility for judging, by what criteria does one judge? The response can be given in one word: wisdom" (Lonergan 1961c, Digital Lonergan Archives). Here, Lonergan follows Newman's notion of judgment as moving toward real assent, as the knowing subject coming to a degree of certitude about the validity of his or her own reasoning. Yet, gaining such wisdom is itself a self-correcting, self-reflective, and self-conscious process of ongoing learning. While the novice student of mathematics has less certitude of his or her conclusions than the experienced mathematician, both are aware of the possibility of error. Therefore, for Lonergan, a fundamental requirement for the cultivation of wisdom is openness to learning: to question, to challenge, to test, and, when necessary, to correct.

At the same time, like Newman, Lonergan (1990, 113) asserts that judging is a "personal act, a personal commitment;" it is "something that is entirely yours" as "an expression of one's own reasonableness. . . it is entirely one's own responsibility." The act of judging is a self-affirmation of the knowing subject as subject. It is a self-appropriation of one's own knowledge and wisdom. And, it is a self-conscious exercise of responsibility for one's own learning. Accordingly, Lonergan suggests that judging is always personal, deeply experiential, and freely existential. It is the difference between

owning an idea and parroting an idea, between knowledge and ideology, and between “insight” and “oversight” (Lonergan 1997, 8).

In order to grow as persons of good judgment, Lonergan maintains, wisdom must be cultivated through the intellectual habit of attending, inquiring, and affirming. Wisdom itself is continually open to testing, correcting, and learning. He recognizes that through the cultivation of such wisdom by experience one gradually acquires varying degrees of competence or expertise in different areas which allows individuals to make increasingly more sophisticated judgments in those areas. He further points out: the intellectual pattern of experience is only one pattern of experience out of which human beings operate. Human beings operate within a “biological pattern of experience” (Lonergan 1997, 205), which involves embodied sensory ways of knowing as exemplified by the wisdom of athletes, dancers, and surgeons. Humans beings operate within the “aesthetic pattern of experience” (207), which involves a sensitivity to the affective, the creative, and the imaginative as exemplified by the wisdom of artists, poets, and musicians. Human beings operate within the “dramatic pattern of experience,” which employs “artistry” in the “drama of living” (211) as exemplified by the wisdom of mothers, activists, and friends. And, human beings operate within an “intellectual pattern of experience” (209), which brings rational self-conscious reflection on experience itself as exemplified by the wisdom of scholars, explorers, and teachers. Thus, Lonergan observes, human wisdom is manifold with multiple sources, multiple forms, and multiple patterns of being. However, in each of these patterns, Lonergan argues, the intellectual pattern brings an intentional conscious self-reflection to experience itself, thus allowing for the intentional conscious self-appropriation of wisdom.

For Lonergan, then, the judgment of wisdom is the judgment of experience. It is the wisdom to ask the right questions and to know that most relevant questions have been asked or still need to be asked. According to Lonergan (1990, 116), in the process of judging “questions are more important generally than answers. . . The problem is to find the right questions and the right series of questions.” Judging is a dynamic process of the ongoing self-affirmation of the knowing subject: checking, testing, and confirming from the self-appropriated wisdom of his or her own experience and expertise. Judging is a “self-correcting” process of moving toward “the virtually unconditioned.” That is, one grasps the apparent fulfillment of the “conditions” or conceptual ideals which one is seeking through questioning (1997, 312). This “virtually unconditioned” is how Stewart conceived of Plato’s ideas, not as static, but as “dynamically existent” as “concepts in use” in the heuristic process of inquiry, discovery, and insight. Yet, as dynamically existent, grasping the “virtually unconditioned” is never absolute and never fully complete insofar as new questions, new conditions, and new insights will emerge. As Lonergan observes,

Affirming ‘it is so’ will itself give rise to further questions. . . You reach judgment only to raise further questions; there is no limit to further questions. . . you start over again, find a further aspect, add it on, and so on. Knowledge is something that gradually accumulates through our living. Because judgment is contextual, each new judgment has to fit into the set of judgments that is already determined. So this intelligent and rational finality underpins, penetrates, and goes beyond all contents. (1990, 153)

Judging, then, is not the end of the process of coming to insight. Rather, it is a dynamic part of a never ending process of ongoing insight. It is open and maturing. It is learning and growing. And, yet, it is a willingness to commit oneself personally and freely, to what David Tracy (1987, 22) calls the “relative adequacy” of one’s own insights. Moira Carley (2005, 64) observes, Lonergan’s insistence on “the appropriation of ourselves as

knowers frees us from the tyranny of un-revisable certitudes that paralyzes consciousness and inhibits the personal response to received tradition that will keep it alive.”

Lonergeran’s concept of judging as maturing in wisdom certainly has implications for his philosophy of education for schools. Like the pedagogy of *Insight*, the notion of growth in wisdom encourages a pedagogy of probing, testing, and affirming. It recognizes the dynamic and developing nature of the capacity for knowing within the knowing subject. And, it invites a pedagogy of wonder, imagination, and ongoing insight.

Lonergeran’s Philosophy of Education for Schools

Topics in Education (1959)

During the summer following his Halifax lectures on *Insight*, Lonergan gave a series of lectures on his philosophy of education for schools for a Catholic school teachers’ institute at Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio. These lectures were also recorded and later published under the title *Topics in Education* (Crowe and Doran 1993, xi-xix). The lectures develop a philosophy of education for schools based on his understanding of “the essential dynamism of human intelligence” (Lonergan 1997, 57). Lonergan himself suggested the focus of the lectures: a philosophy of education for schools, where the mode of presentation would involve “a philosopher speaking on topics of concern to educators” (Crowe and Doran 1993, xi).

In these lectures on education, as it relates to schools, Lonergan outlines several key concepts for a philosophy of education for schools that flow from his theory of human knowing as a dynamic process of experiencing, understanding, and judging. He identifies the good as the “developing subject” which invites self-conscious appropriation of the self as a knowing subject through the development of the intellectual pattern of

experience. It invites the development of the subject as an intelligent, rational, and self-reflective subject in action, thus bringing self-conscious reflection to all patterns of lived experience: biological, aesthetic, dramatic, and intellectual (1993, 30-48). Lonergan's presupposition is that "Man [*sic*] develops" (1993, 30), that the human person grows into authentic subjectivity through an educational process of attending, inquiring, and affirming. He insists that the good of the human person is not stasis but growth and development as human beings continue to learn, to become more fully self-aware, and ever expand their horizons of meaning. In effect, Lonergan (1997, 648) argues, "the concrete being" of the human person is not static but a dynamically oriented "being in process."

At the same time, Lonergan (1993, 196) borrows from the work of Jean Piaget to account for the dynamics of educational development as a process of "assimilation and adjustment." Assimilation involves the adaptation of new information into existing schemas, or mental frameworks, while "adjustment" involves modifying existing schemas to develop more adequate mental frameworks for understanding the world. This process of assimilation and adjustment is an ongoing differentiation of consciousness. It involves what Piaget calls a "decentering" of the self, whereby the self becomes a distinct object of thought in relation to the world. This allows "seeing things from a different viewpoint," and of taking "different perspectives" (Lonergan 1993, 202). In essence, it allows for the expansion of one's horizon and a re-constitution of one's world. Thus, Lonergan argues, one of the main goals of education in schools is the "development of assimilative powers" in order to equip students with the ability to adapt, adjust, and "to move about" in an ever increasingly complex world (206).

Yet, Lonergan (1993, 81) insists that such development is not merely individual, but societal as well. Just as individuals are called to develop, to learn, to adapt, and to become more fully aware of their “own freedom and responsibility,” human societies themselves are called to grow in a process of authentic humanization as places of full human flourishing. To be human is to become authentically an “I” in order to become more fully a “We” (81). Therefore, the purpose of education in schools is to aid in this process of development, whereby “Education helps the subject construct his [or her] world and broaden his [or her] horizon” (105). It invites persons to enter new worlds of meaning, to see through new lenses of vision, and to adopt new modes of understanding. Such a process is not solipsistic but dialogic, not private but intersubjective, and not solitary but mutually exploratory in that it involves a *broadening* of the individual’s horizons. From Lonergan’s perspective, while education in schools concerns the development of the individual, it can never be individualistic. As Michelle Saracino (2003, 61) points out, Lonergan emphasizes “the open posture” of the subject, opening persons out to new horizons, fresh encounters, and undreamt possibilities of meaning. In a word, Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools invites self-transcendence.

However, such self-transcendence, rather than removing the subject from history situates the knowing subject squarely in the flow of human history, which, for Lonergan, “externally” is “a series of observable actions.” Yet, “internally, is “a flow of consciousness” (1993, 251). In other words, Lonergan’s notion of the knowing subject is as an historical subject, whereby individual self-consciousness is a participation in the flow of an historical self-consciousness in human history as self-conscious appropriation of authentic responsibility and human freedom. As Lonergan (1993, 257) notes, “Human

history is the realization of a divine idea. . . It is free.” It is “an interlocking, and interdependence of the different exercises of freedom.” Hence, for Lonergan, one of the key tasks of education in schools is to help students actualize more fully their freedom as intelligent, free, and responsible subjects, as active agents in human history, and as common participants in the drama of human living. He insists that a “philosophy of education” is “a tool” for those who “are out to transform human society” and “human living” (233), to bring conscious intentionality to the educational task of directing human freedom toward its good in the developing subject and to foster full human flourishing in society.

Here, Lonergan returns to a theme he first developed in *Insight*, namely, that to the extent to which individuals and societies act attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly, human history is open to “progress,” opening up new horizons of meaning and new possibilities for human living. However, to the extent that individually or collectively human beings act with “oversight” in a “flight from understanding,” in a self-assured block to further understanding that grows from untested assumptions, unreflected upon biases, and uncritical and ideological claims, human history enters into a process of “decline,” closing off possibilities and stifling human potentiality (Lonergan 1997, 8). Human history is a continual process of progress and decline contingent upon the dynamic openness of individuals and societies to insight, that is, openness to the self-appropriating and self-correcting process of ongoing learning. For Lonergan, then, the ongoing dialectic of education in schools is nothing less than the inherent dynamics of human learning actualized in human history as a heuristic process of openness to new discoveries, creative interpretations, and fresh insights.

Lonergan (1993, 85) argues that such openness requires a conscious intentionality on the part of the knowing subject insofar as “the subject’s concern determines his [or her] horizon, and his [or her] horizon selects his [or her] world.” Consequently, another crucial task of the process of schooling is precisely the cultivation of such openness. For Lonergan, the basis for this unrestricted openness is nothing less than the unlimited capacity for wonder. He insists that schools ought to be playgrounds of wonder, spaces for marveling and musing, and places where “to the spontaneous joy of conscious living there is added the spontaneous joy of free intellectual creation” (1997, 208). Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools, then, highlights education as an ongoing “re-horizoning of subjects” (Braio 1995, 99), a continuous re-patterning of human experience, or, to borrow Gabriel Moran’s (1989, 49) language, it involves a “reshaping of life’s forms with end and without end.”

Lonergan (1993, 217) suggests that schooling ought to invite students into the self-conscious, self-reflective artistry of human living insofar as “There is an artistic element in all consciousness, in all living.” It is this self-aware consciousness that is a “selecting, an organizing” and a “patterning” of experience (212). In other words, schooling ought to lead students to authentic subjectivity, allowing them to take increasing possession of themselves as intelligent, free, and responsible subjects, equipping and engaging them for the ongoing process of “creative learning and living” (Carley 2005). Lonergan emphasizes that the school form of education should empower students to become self-conscious artists who creatively approach the canvas of their own lives. It should form them to become self-reflective protagonists in their own drama of

living. And, it should help them become authentic self- appropriating subjects of their own *praxis* in the dynamics of human history.

Vatican II Years: Lonergan the Teacher (1959-1965)

By the time Lonergan returned to Rome in the fall of 1959 preparations were already underway for the Ecumenical Council that the recently elected John XXIII had announced earlier that year (O'Malley 2008, 15). Lonergan was later invited, though unable to serve, as a *peritus* or "expert" at the Second Vatican Council, convened in October of 1962 (93).⁸ As Fergus Kerr (2007, 107) notes, Lonergan's theological influence on the Council was minor, especially in comparison to that of his fellow Jesuit and fellow "transcendental Thomist" Karl Rahner. Nevertheless, Lonergan's most significant contribution during the Council years was not his theological influence on the Council, but rather, his role in the classroom at the Gregorian, where he was shaping the future of Catholic theology by teaching a new generation of Catholic theologians.

As Frederick Crowe (2004, 90) points out, it was during the spring of 1959 that Lonergan first developed a course at the Gregorian on the "Intellect and Method."⁹ This course emphasizes the dialectical nature of historical investigation in theology, distinguishing between "the sources of theology and theology itself" (90). In his course notes, Lonergan (1961a, Digital Lonergan Archives) underscores the historicity of all human knowing, whereby self-conscious reflection is required in which the "one investigating knows them [doctrines, creeds, beliefs] how they are" as the one

⁸ While Lonergan was invited to serve as a *peritus* or expert at the third session of the Council by the Canadian bishops, he was unable to do so because of health issues (Robert Doran, April 10, 2013, e-mail message to author).

⁹ These notes are contained in the Lonergan Archive in Toronto. In addition, there are notes for a repeat of this same course in 1961 contained in the Digital Lonergan Archives of Marquette University, transcribed and translated by Robert Doran, SJ. These can be accessed at <http://bernardlonergan.com>

investigating “stands in the dialectic.” There are positions and “counter-positions in the one investigating” as well as positions and “counter-positions in sources” themselves. Self-appropriation of the act of knowing, then, requires appropriating one’s own contingency as an historical subject.

According to Lonergan, with this knowledge of the historical contingency of all knowledge comes greater responsibility on the part of the knowing subject for attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible inquiry in the very act of knowing itself, which involves consciously experiencing, understanding, and judging. For, as noted earlier, Lonergan (1993, 257) asserts, “human history is the realization of a divine idea:” the exercise of human freedom. Such freedom is only fully actualized in authentic subjectivity, in the knowing subject consciously and actively taking possession of his or her freedom to be attentive, to be intelligent, to be reasonable, and to be responsible, not as an object of history, but as a subject in history. Thus, as an historical subject, the knowing subject is contingent on, yet acting in human history as a free and responsible agent. Only then, can one who is inquiring “stand in the dialectic” of history as an authentic partner in conversation.

Lonergan’s emphasis on both the historical contingency and historical agency of human knowing reflects his insistence on the need for education to be historically conscious and historically transformative. This emphasis can be found in Lonergan’s assessment of the Second Vatican Council itself. Of it, he writes, “while remaining faithful to the basic tenets of our faith,” it “aimed at evoking a fresh vitality, an *aggiornamento*, an updating of apostolic activity,” open to the world (1985, 229). For

Loneragan, the Second Vatican Council represents the Church in progress, as developing, growing, and learning.

In a 1964 address given at Regis College entitled “*Existenz and Aggiornamento*,” Lonergan (1967b, 244-5) asserts that the world to which the Church continually is opening is “the world constituted by meaning, the properly human world,” the world in which “community is the product of freely self-constituting subjects.” He asserts, “to exclude freedom is to exclude *Existenz*,” or being, in the world. Insofar as the Church is an authentic community of “freely self-constituting subjects” the Church must remain open; it must remain actively engaged in the world; and, it must remain teachable. As Crowe (2004, 284) observes, “the whole Church is a learning Church. . . from prophet to pope, from apostle to bishop, there has always been learning in the Church.” However, when we have “insisted so much on the teaching role. . . we have neglected the learning role,” thus giving “a one-sided view.” For, as Lonergan insists, to be a teacher is to be a learner, to be actively engaged as a dynamic subject in history: attending, inquiring, affirming, and acting intelligently, freely, and responsibly.

Such an emphasis on the whole Church community as a learning Church community has implications for Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools, especially, as it applies to Catholic schools in general, and teaching religion in Catholic schools in particular. As Lonergan (1985, 229) notes, just as the Church must remain rooted in tradition, yet open to “a fresh vitality,” so too must teaching religion in Catholic schools remain faithful to the tradition while taking “a bold leap forward into contemporary significance and relevance.” Hence, “religious education is not just indoctrination in an ideology;” rather, it involves the actualization and realization of

“each person’s religious potential,” as an open, free, and intelligent subject, dynamically oriented toward infinite horizons of mystery and wonder.

To the extent that the Church is to remain a learning community open to “rejuvenation, renewal, reform” and “development” (Lonergan 1967b, 245), one of the central tasks of religious education, then, is the cultivation of this infinite capacity for wonder, the development of authentic subjectivity, and the fostering of authentic self-appropriation and “re-expression” of the tradition.” Otherwise, as Lonergan (1993, 248) observes, “all one can do is repeat the formulae” of the tradition without personal meaning, without personal relevance, and without personal implications for one’s own living.

Threads of a Philosophy of Education for Schools in Later Works (1965-1984)

In 1965 at the age of sixty-one, Lonergan returned to Toronto to undergo surgery for lung cancer. He remained in Toronto for the next ten years as a professor of theology at Regis College. During this time, he lectured widely in the United States and Canada and began finishing what he had “rounded off” in *Insight*, a theological method grounded in the dynamic movement of human knowing, a work which was later published in 1971 as *Method in Theology* (Crowe 1992, 104).

Prior to the publication of *Method*, however, Lonergan identified a fourth level of dynamic consciousness, that of deciding. According to Lonergan, authentic deciding ought to lead to responsible action. He developed his analysis of deciding in his 1968 Aquinas lecture at Marquette University, a talk which was also published that same year as *The Subject* (1968, 22-27). Here, he develops the idea of the “existential subject,” drawing on his previous emphasis on the historical agency of the knowing subject as

“concrete human living” as expressed in its “historical unfolding.” He explains that “the human world does not come into being or survive without deliberation, evaluation, decision, action, without the exercise of freedom and responsibility” (31). For Lonergan, “human doing is free and responsible” to the extent that it grows out of authentic subjectivity: the human person as authentically self-consciously attending, understanding, judging, and deciding toward action on the basis of self-appropriated values and beliefs (19). To appropriate one’s own subjectivity authentically, one is called to be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, and be responsible as an existential subject in the world.

This notion of self-appropriating responsibility as a fourth level of dynamic consciousness is “the fuller flowering of the same dynamic principle that now keeps us moving toward ever fuller realization of the good” as that which is “worthwhile” for the developing subject as both a knowing and *valuing* subject (Lonergan 1968, 24). It moves his philosophy of education for schools to a greater realization that the ultimate goal of education in schools is responsible action and authentic living. Such an emphasis is consistent with a Catholic vision for school-based education as highlighted by the Second Vatican Council’s *Declaration on Christian Education*. It is a vision for schooling that strives to assist young people in “the harmonious development of their physical, moral, and intellectual endowments” by helping them “acquire gradually a more mature sense of responsibility” (Abbott 1966, 639). Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools is enriched by the addition of this fourth level of dynamic consciousness which invites the self-appropriation of values into the process of teaching religion in Catholic schools, moving students beyond notional assent toward real assent, moving them toward personal

self-appropriation of religious and moral values, and, ultimately, moving them from belief to action.

As Moira Carley (2005, 86) observes, “In the time between the writing of *Insight* and *Method*, Lonergan seems to have discovered the place in human consciousness where intelligence and feelings converge. In *Insight*, readers were invited to identify and claim the workings of their own minds.” In *Method*, Lonergan “invites readers to become aware of their own experience as existential subjects *being* consciously attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible” (86, emphasis original). Knowing and doing cannot be separated, for, it is the knowing subject who acts in the world, a world in which real actions have real meanings, where justice really means something other than injustice, where compassion really means something other than indifference, and where love really means something other than hatred. Such a world Lonergan (1985, 155) describes as a world “mediated by meaning and motivated by value,” a world of real distinctions that have real meaning for knowing and valuing subjects who seek to critically, personally affirm and value certain meaningful ideals, not just intellectually but affectively as well. For, asking the question “Is this worthwhile?” brings one to the level of judgments of value and decision. This level brings about “the synthesis of the feeling side and the cognitional side” without which experiencing, understanding, and judging would be “paper thin” (1974, 223, 221). In effect, judgments of value draw the human person into a world ripe with meaning and value.

In *Method in Theology*, Lonergan (1971a, 77) argues that the world of meaning is the world in which “we live out our lives.” It is “to what we refer when we speak of the real world.” It is the dynamically intelligible world of meaning and values in which real

distinctions are to be made by the knowing and valuing subject in the dynamic process of knowing and valuing which involves experiencing, understanding, judging, valuing, and acting as a free and responsible subject in the world. This “critical realism” on the one hand, rejects the naïve realism of traditional scholastic epistemology that reduces knowing simply to “taking a look” and apprehending the “essences” of things independent of the knower. On the other hand, it rejects Kantian idealism that posits an unknowable “noumenal” world of “things-in-themselves,” apart from the knowing and valuing subject. In contrast, Lonergan (1971a, 74) insists, the world of meaning is only “potentially intelligible,” made actually intelligible by “an intelligence in act,” rendered meaningful only through conscious acts of affirming meaning, and appreciated as valuable only through the act of valuing. In effect, Lonergan’s account of human knowing and valuing offers a grounded subjectivity founded upon the dynamically existent operations of the knowing and valuing subject acting authentically in the process of knowing and valuing.

As Lonergan (2004, 314) notes, “one is more a subject when one is awake, still more when one is actively intelligent, still more when one actively is reasonable, still more in one’s deliberations and decisions when one actively is responsible and free.” Through the dynamic process of *being* attentive to one’s own experience, of *being* intelligent toward greater understanding, of *being* reasonable in the affirmations of one’s own judgments, and of *being* responsible in one’s own decisions, the “being of the subject is becoming” as “one becomes oneself” (314). For Lonergan, human persons become more authentically themselves to the extent that they appropriate their authentic

subjectivity as dynamically existent persons: experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, and acting.

Furthermore, the dynamic process of the self-appropriation of the knowing and valuing subject is not simply an individual achievement; but rather, it is common and intersubjective. Lonergan (1971a, 57) observes, “Meaning is embodied or carried in human intersubjectivity.” A function of meaning is “communicative,” whereby what one “means is communicated to another intersubjectively, artistically, symbolically, linguistically, incarnately,” so that “individual meaning becomes common meaning” (78). According to Lonergan, such “common meaning is realized by decisions and choices. . . in the love that makes families, in the loyalty that makes states,” and “in the faith that makes religions”(79). Meaning and value are fully actualized in the concrete choices of knowing and valuing subjects acting together attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly. Community itself, including religious community, Lonergan argues, is “an achievement of common meaning” (79), which invites persons to share meaning, to share values, and to share their world with one another.

Lonergan’s account of the world of meaning and value as an intersubjective world has significance for his philosophy of education for schools insofar as participating in the intersubjective world of meaning and value requires increasingly coming to authentic subjectivity as attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible subjects. In order to prepare persons to live meaningful lives, to seek ultimate values, and to act as responsibly engaged persons in community, education in schools must invite students into greater self-awareness, greater self-responsibility, and greater self-appropriated freedom, while at the same time, inviting them into greater awareness of, responsibility with, and freedom

for others. Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools, then, proposes that education in schools must equip persons for the lifelong project of finding "common meaning."

At the same time, in *Method in Theology*, Lonergan (1971a, xi) also applies his cognitional theory to the task of theology itself in order to develop a theological method for contemporary theology as an ongoing process, not as a "permanent achievement," not "as a set of rules to be followed," but as "a framework for collaborative creativity." In *Method*, he develops an educational approach to theology as ongoing, heuristic, and engaged in a never ending process of learning and discovery. He moves beyond traditional categories of theological specialization to identify what he calls eight interdependent "functional specialties" that correspond to the four operations of human consciousness: attending, understanding, judging, and deciding (127-133). These "specialties" function dynamically, moving respectively from the level of attending to the level of deciding, or inversely from the level of deciding to the level of attending. Thus, "research" begins in attending to data; "interpretation" moves to the level of understanding for meaning; "history" moves to the level of judging in order to explain; and, "dialectics" moves to the level of decision toward valuing and believing (134). Conversely, "foundations" begins at the level of decision, both personal and communal, through a "conversion," or turning toward unlimited horizons of infinite mystery (131); "doctrines" moves into the level of judging by thematizing religious experience; "systematics" moves into the level of understanding by interpreting doctrines; and, finally, "communication" moves into the level of attending to concrete cultural, historical, and linguistic circumstances in order to communicate effectively interpretations and doctrines against the backdrop of foundations (135). Each of these is

not isolated, but functions dynamically in relation to all the others-interdependently, dialogically, and educationally.

Such a dynamic ongoing educational process expands Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools, especially as it relates to teaching religion in Catholic high schools. As Crowe (1985, 14) notes, using Lonergan's categories, education in schools can be conceived as a dynamic and dialectic process of communicating a communal "heritage" from "above" and as personal "achievement" or self-appropriation from "below." Lonergan points out,

. . . the handing on of [cultural, historical, religious] development may be complete or incomplete. But it works from above downwards: it begins in the affectivity of the infant, the child, the son [*sic*], the pupil, the follower. On affectivity rests the apprehension of values. On the apprehension of values rests belief. On belief follows growth in understanding of one who has found a genuine teacher and has been initiated into the study of the masters of the past. Then to confirm one's growth in understanding comes experience made mature and perceptible by one's developed understanding. With experiential confirmation the inverse process may set in. One now is on one's own. One can appropriate all that one has learned by proceeding as does the original thinker who moved from experience to understanding, to sound judgment, to generous evaluation, to commitment in love, loyalty, and faith. (1985, 181)

For Lonergan, education in schools ought to be a dynamic process in the development of the individual as attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible subject, while at the same time, developing the individual in community as common meanings, common traditions, or what John Dewey (1959, 19) calls "the funded capital of civilization," is handed on to the individual. It is a dialogue between the wisdom of the tradition and the growing wisdom of the individual. And, it is a dynamic interplay between education as a "conserving" activity and education as a liberating one (Huebner 1974, 5).

In 1975 at the age of seventy-one, Bernard Lonergan went to Boston College as visiting distinguished professor of theology, where he continued to lecture widely. In his

research, he returned to an earlier interest in economics which grew out of his ongoing concern with the dynamics of history and his own experience of seeing the effects of the Great Depression first hand in the 1930's both in Europe and in Canada. He retired to the Jesuit infirmary in Pickering, Ontario in 1983 at the age of seventy-nine and died on November 26, 1984 just a few weeks short of his eightieth birthday (Morelli and Morelli 1997, 600). He leaves behind an almost fifty year legacy as an educator, both inside and outside the classroom. As Tracy (1970, 268) notes, "Lonergan's enterprise does not impose a new classical system," but "promises rather a new possibility of open. . . inquiry." While such can be said of his theological method, it can also be said of his philosophy of education for schools. Lonergan himself spent a lifetime inviting others into the dynamics of wonder, teaching the dialectics of mystery, and empowering others to be attentive, to be intelligent, to be reasonable, and to be responsible.

Conclusion

Bernard Lonergan's thought on education in schools is inextricably linked with the development of his thought on human knowing. As he continued to probe the mystery of human understanding, he saw wide ranging application of a theory of human knowing for philosophy and theology as well as for education in schools. This chapter has traced the development of Lonergan's thought on education throughout his major works and highlighted some possible themes that can contribute to a Catholic philosophy of education for schools that can provide a foundation for formulating a revitalized understanding of teaching religion in Catholic high schools. Here, three key themes emerge from Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools that could possibly inform the theory and practice of teaching religion in the context of Catholic school teaching.

The first theme that emerges from Lonergan's philosophy of education for a Catholic philosophy of education for schools is his emphasis on education in schools as a process of developing the potentialities of the human person. For Lonergan, the process of development is ongoing and continuous as the subject becomes more authentically him or herself through attending, understanding, affirming, deciding, and acting. Education in Catholic schools, then, ought to be a continuous schooling toward personally appropriated wisdom, an apprenticeship in authentic freedom, and a patterning and re-patterning of one's own experience. A religious education in Catholic schools that takes seriously the human person as a developing subject necessitates facilitating authentic self-appropriation of values, beliefs, and understandings. It requires inviting students to think, judge, and act for themselves as maturing Christians. It encourages them to see themselves as growing in personal freedom and responsibility. And, it helps them develop in authentic subjectivity as persons made in the image and likeness of God.

A second theme that emerges from Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools is the notion that education in schools is a dynamic process of self-transcendence. According to Lonergan, human understanding itself is dynamic. It is open-ended and, therefore, continuous. His description of the person is as a dynamic subject, ever engaged by and engaging the world, a world "mediated by meaning," a world overflowing with a surplus of wonder, and a world that is itself a dynamic invitation to mystery. For a Catholic philosophy of education for schools, it is a reminder that all education begins and ends in the dynamics of mystery, in the dynamic mystery of God and the dynamic mystery of the human person. It is a reminder, as Lonergan (1971a, 103) points out, that the human person's "transcendental subjectivity" is "a native orientation to the divine"

where every question is a “stretching forth,” a reaching out, and an invitation to infinite horizons of wonder. As Brendan Carmody (2011, 115) notes, “Lonergan’s notion of self-transcendence could be central to the construction of a distinctive Catholic educational philosophy” that takes seriously the human person as a dynamic being in the world, oriented toward the divine.

Such a philosophical understanding of the human person as a dynamic subject requires a religious education in Catholic schools that invites mystery, that inspires wonder, and that encourages questioning. As Maria Harris (1991, 72-73) notes, at “the center of the teaching act” is the process of questioning, whereby teachers and students come together “as questioners, presenting questions to one another and to subject matter.” It requires moving beyond repeating fixed formulas to open students up to the mystery of their own wonder and to allow them to claim their role as natural theologians (Dean 2001, 30).

Finally, Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools highlights education in schools as an ongoing dialectic between values, beliefs, and interpretations from the tradition and the self-appropriation of values, beliefs, and interpretations for oneself. Such a dialectical approach can never reduce teaching religion in Catholic schools simply to communication alone. Communicating the tradition is just one partner in the overall conversation of teaching religion. In order to teach religion effectively, students must be engaged in mutual dialogue with the tradition handed down from religious foundations to communication of the tradition and up from their own deepest questions to the dialectic of the personal integration of values and beliefs. Only then can students “come to appropriate what is sound in their tradition,” while opening the tradition up to new

learning, new ideas, and fresh insights so that those things in the tradition which have “decayed can be renewed” (Lonergan 1985, 181).

Bernard Lonergan’s philosophy of education for schools, then, invites a developmental, dynamic, and dialectical approach to teaching religion in Catholic schools. It encourages creative and critical thinking. It invites mystery and wonder. And, it empowers students to become agents of transformation as authentic subjects and as living members of a living tradition that is the Church.

Chapter 3

Developing New Horizons of Wonder: Growing in Critical Awareness

Chapter two established the intellectual, biographical context of Lonergan's thought on education and suggested themes for further development in addressing the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools. The purpose of this chapter is to consider the first of these themes by providing a broad conceptual framework for understanding human development toward greater critical awareness of oneself as a knowing and valuing subject. This chapter aims at establishing a "hermeneutical conversation" between the thought of Bernard Lonergan and that of developmental psychologists Robert Kegan and Deanna Kuhn in order to provide an interpretive context for understanding human development toward critical awareness of the self as a self-in-relation to the world (Gadamer 2004a, 389). Finally, it seeks to situate the development of adolescent critical thinking capacities in the broader framework of the developing subjectivity of the human person.

The first section explores Lonergan's conception of the knowing and valuing subject. It investigates his philosophical understanding of human development "downward" as involving the handing down of inherited potential from the socio-cultural matrix of family, community, and world into which a person is born. And, it examines Lonergan's notion of development "upward" as the actualization of that potential in the human person through the process of self-transcendence, whereby the knowing and valuing subject moves toward authentic subjectivity. The second section unpacks Robert Kegan's theory of the evolving self and examines his concept of human development as an ongoing reorganization of the meaning of the self-in-relation to the world. It also draws attention to parallels between Kegan's theory of the evolving self and Lonergan's

notion of the developing subject. The last section, then, addresses the emergence of critical awareness in adolescence as it relates to the development of critical thinking capacities. It locates the emergence of critical awareness in the context of the wider evolution of the self as a developing subject.

Developing Critical Awareness: Lonergan's Developing Subject

The Human Person as a Knowing and Valuing Subject

In his philosophy of education, Lonergan (1993, 79) contends that the good of the human person is developing his or her human potentialities fully as a subject, that is, developing the human person as a free, intelligent, and responsible self-in-the-world. At the same time, he recognizes that such development is not automatic, but requires engaging persons at ever increasing levels of critical awareness of themselves as knowing and valuing subjects. For Lonergan (1971a, 14), such awareness involves coming to appropriate oneself as a subject through the manifold operations of human consciousness: experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. Through increasing critical awareness of oneself as a knower and chooser of values, one comes to know oneself more fully as a knowing and valuing subject, meaningfully engaged in the world. As such, the subject becomes increasingly aware of his or her world and is thus constituted as a self-in-relation to the world. The object of knowing and valuing is not simply the self, but a "world mediated by meaning and motivated by value," a world of ever expanding horizons, of ever more complex distinctions, and of ever increasing wonder (Lonergan 1985, 155).

According to Lonergan, knowing and valuing subjects are self-appropriating insofar as they take possession of themselves as knowers and choosers of values precisely

by attending to experience, intelligently inquiring for deeper understanding, reflecting to make more reasonable judgments, and deliberating over which courses of action are most valuable, most meaningful, and most worthy of a life worth living. Hence, as Lonergan (1968, 19) notes “By his [sic] own acts the human subject makes himself what he is to be, and he does so freely and responsibly.” Therefore, knowing and valuing subjects do not simply know and value; rather, they also act on the basis of their knowing and valuing, and as such, they are also “existential” subjects, free and responsible selves-in-relation to the world (1968, 19).

At the same time, human subjects are both self-transcended and self-transcending as active participants in the world of meaning and value (Lonergan 1971a, 110). This world exists prior to, yet is open to transformation by, the subject. It is a world in which the subject is self-transcended insofar as he or she is born into a given socio-cultural ethos that forms, shapes, and conditions the subject as a knower and chooser of values. Yet, it is also a world in which the subject is self-transcending insofar as he or she develops as a knowing and valuing subject: experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding for him or herself. Hence, the world of meaning and value remains radically open to the subject’s new experiences, fresh insights, revised affirmations, and revitalized appropriations of values and beliefs.

Moreover, Lonergan (1985, 196-197) makes a distinction between two, mutually dependent processes of human development “from above downward” and “from below upward.” Frederick Crowe (1985, 15) points out that development “from above downward” is the “way of heritage;” it is the handing on of tradition in community. Conversely, development “from below upward” is the “way of achievement;” it is the

individual's growing in his or her capacity to make sense of the self-in-relation to the world and the world-in-relation to the self (27). In effect, these two vectors of human development operate together in a dynamic interplay that allows the individual to organize mentally his or her world as a world of meaning. As Brian Braman (2008, 74) observes, Lonergan shows how the human person is "both a constituting and constituted subject. The way down describes the lived and already given cultural and linguistic matrix that structures the person's sense of identity. The way up explains the constituting activity of the human subject: the intentional activity of the person as she constitutes herself to be a knower, chooser, and lover."

For Lonergan, then, development "downward" represents the human person as self-transcended. In other words, the human person is embedded in a larger world of meaning and value which constitutes the given horizon of the knowing and valuing subject. It is the way of "heritage" (Crowe 1985, 15), and it is the way of tradition. The human subject is thus "constituted" by his or her own particular socio-cultural location, which, in turn, shapes, conditions, and forms the subject as an historical subject-in-relation to the world. At the same time, through development "upward," the human person is self-transcending, insofar as he or she develops the capacity to experience, understand, judge, and decide for him or herself. The knowing and valuing subject, then, is not held captive to knowledge, beliefs, and values that are inherited; but rather, the knowing and valuing subject is free to appropriate, adopt, accept, reject, or adapt inherited knowledge, beliefs, and values from tradition in order to make them alive, vibrant, and life-giving in the present. Such development requires cultivating both the human person's potential as inherited "from above" by way of tradition and "from

below” by way of personal achievement. It is this creative tension between the subject as self-transcended and self-transcending that invites the growth and development of human persons toward authentic subjectivity.

Development as Inherited Potential “From Above Downward”

According to Lonergan, human development begins as an inherited potential that constitutes the individual “from above downward,” or perhaps more accurately, from outside inward, insofar as development does not take place in a vacuum, but rather occurs in a particular context. The individual is constituted in a particular life context with its own inherited networks of relations: family, community, nation, and world. It is a context that exists prior to the individual and into which the individual is born. This context provides not only the genetic raw material for the development and constitution of the individual—already given from within a particular relational context—but also, it includes the whole set of relations into which the individual is embedded and which constitutes the individual as a self-in-relation. Thus, it is a movement “downward” and inward into the depths of one’s being, touching the core of one’s very identity, and shaping the individual as a self-in-relation.

Moreover, according to Lonergan (1985, 196-197), this movement “downward” and inward exists “chronologically prior” in that ideally “children are born into a cradling environment of love” which nurtures them and supports them “by a long slow process of socialization, acculturation, education.” It is a process that “rests on trust and belief” (196), and which “begins in the affectivity of the infant, the child, the son [sic], the pupil, the follower. On affectivity rests the apprehension of values. On the apprehension of values rests belief. On belief, follows growth in understanding” (181). For Lonergan,

then, human development “downward” and inward is fundamentally an interpersonal, interactive, and intergenerational process. It is process that is contextual and particular. And, ultimately, it is a process that simply is given as gift.

Here, Lonergan finds religious significance in the process of human development insofar as human development begins with the gift of life and proceeds from the gift of love. For Lonergan, human development is fundamentally a religious process that, at once, grounds and orients the whole being of the person outward toward an encounter with the mystery of the other, finding its ultimate fulfillment in the mystery of the ultimate Other. Loved received affects a transformation which “constitutes us as persons.” And, “it leads to a new understanding of one’s world” (Rusemuka 2001, 67). Through love received the human person is constituted, not as an isolated individual, but as a self-in-relation. It is this relational context into which human persons are born and by which human development proceeds. As Lonergan (1971a, 57) notes, “Prior to the ‘we’ that results from the mutual love of an ‘I’ and a ‘thou,’ there is the earlier ‘we’ that precedes the distinction of subjects. . . It is as if ‘we’ were members of one another prior to our distinctions of each from others.” It is precisely this intersubjective matrix of human existence that constitutes persons as persons. It is expressed in the natural and “spontaneous” intersubjectivity that grounds them as persons-in-relation and that invites them to become ever more relational as persons in community (57). And, it is this intersubjective world of human relations that constitutes the subject’s world as a world of meaning.

As Michele Saracino (2003, 82) observes, Lonergan’s subject is, foundationally, a subject that stands in a radically “open posture” toward the other. Such openness is first

given as a gift. It is “the material and spiritual fabric of the human” that orients persons toward others, toward the world, and ultimately toward God (83). For Lonergan, this openness is received as the inherited potential of the human spirit that leads them to reach out toward the other. It is the graced context of human existence into which persons are born and through which they develop. It is a graced context that is incarnated in the love of family, community, and neighbor. And, for Lonergan, ultimately, it is a context that manifests the love of God. Thus, the human person’s “insertion in community and history includes an invitation. . . to accept the transformation of falling in love” in the family, in community, and with God (Lonergan 1985, 76-77). It is this context of love first given and received that shapes and forms the “passionateness of being” of the human person that “underpins and accompanies” the whole process of development “upward” and outward (29-30).

Here, Lonergan’s insight that love received “downward” and inward is the primordial gift of human development finds resonance with Erik Erikson’s recognition that trust born of love is the cornerstone of all human development. Erikson (1993, 247) argues that developing a basic sense of trust versus mistrust in the world of the immediate family is “the infant’s first social achievement.” It is a pre-conceptual recognition that the social world of the infant is essentially consistent and trustworthy, not only in terms of providing for the infant’s basic needs, but more importantly, in providing a sense of care and love as most profoundly expressed in the maternal bond (249). Moreover, Erikson points out that such “trust born of care” is the “touchstone” of all religious experience insofar as it establishes a basic sense of the trustworthiness of the universe itself (250). As James Fowler (1981, 121) notes, this primordial experience of love provides “the fund

of basic trust” for further religious development. Fowler calls this the stage of “undifferentiated faith” where “pre-images” of God are formed prior to the acquisition of language. According to Lonergan (2004, 328), this primordial religious experience is the non-objectified, unthematized, and largely subconscious “experience of the mystery of love” itself. It is “the prior soundless word that God speaks to us,” calling forth a response of love, serving as the basis for the subsequent religious development of persons into a communion of love. As Muhigirwa Rusembuka (2001, 98) notes, “the metaphor from above downward” has its “origin in affectivity.” At once, the human experience of affectivity forms the basis of and finds its ultimate fulfillment in the experience of God’s love. It is a gift received in the human capacity for loving and being loved and it is a gift made manifest in the invitation to love in an unrestricted way.

Initiation into the human family through the bonds of love, then, serves as the foundation for further development “downward” and inward. Since, according to Lonergan (1985, 181), affectivity is the foundation for all belief. Just as one is received into a tradition, one also receives that tradition through trust and belief. It is the process of what Crowe (1985, 12) calls “the way of heritage.” or what Dwayne Huebner (1974, 6) calls the “conserving” role of education. As Rusembuka (2001, 91) points out, Lonergan recognized that belief is an integral part of human development insofar as it is through belief that one receives from others their experiences, their interpretations and understandings, their judgments of fact, and their judgments of value. It is this process that forms “our initial mind-set, worldview” or “horizon” (Lonergan 1985, 156). And, it is this process “downward” and inward that forms the basis for further development “upward” and outward in that believing is itself an act of knowing and valuing, requiring

attending, inquiring, reflecting, and deciding. For this reason, Lonergan (2004, 336) argues that belief and immanently generated knowledge can never be separated, but rather, they act together in a “symbiosis,” whereby what one knows through inherited belief is further probed, tested, refined, and reshaped through the process of coming to know for oneself. Thus, one’s worldview or horizon is never entirely a product of one’s own making; rather, it is shaped and conditioned by the values, judgments, understandings, and experiences of one’s multi-layered traditions: familial, communal, religious, national, and global. Yet, at the same time, one’s horizon can never be completely restrained by these inherited traditions insofar as the human person is made to be more than an automaton that mechanically repeats what has been received. Rather, as Lonergan (1968, 19) points out, the human person is made to be a subject, that is, a person who thinks, decides, and acts for oneself. Development “downward” and inward, then, prepares the way and lays the foundation for further development “upward” and outward. Hence, according to Lonergan, the two vectors of human development, “downward” and inward, and “upward” and outward complement and complete one another as love received becomes the very basis for the transformation of the subject as a being-in-love for others.

Development as Actualized Potential “From Below Upward”

Lonergan (1985, 197) characterizes the second vector of human development as movement “from below upward.” Essentially, it is the process of self-transcendence which involves moving beyond the self out to the world. Thus, this movement “upward” can also be characterized as a movement outward. It is a movement up from the depths of consciousness out toward the world. It involves both expanding one’s existing horizon

and shifting to new horizons of meaning that open up fresh possibilities, new vantage points, and whole new fields of vision. It involves moving beyond the world of immediacy of the infant out toward a far richer world “mediated by meaning and motivated by value” (155). And, it involves the human person becoming more authentically human by taking possession of him or herself as a knowing and valuing subject, acting in the world. Hence, development “upward” and outward is a “matter of getting beyond” oneself and “of becoming a genuine person in community” (Lonergan 1974, 144). Far from removing the human person from the world, self-transcendence engages the human person ever more deeply within the world. For Lonergan (1974, 144), then, “an authentic humanism is profoundly religious” insofar as self-transcendence leads one out to encounter a world infinitely larger than the self and in so doing it enlarges the world of the self. It is a world pregnant with meaning and ripe with value. It is a world fresh with possibility and bursting with vitality. And, in the words of Gerard Manley Hopkins (1983, 502), it is a world “charged with the grandeur of God.” Thus, Roger Haight (2012, 87) insists that “transcendence does not leap out of the physical, but appears as the possibility of spirit within and through it.” Development “upward” and outward, then, is an ongoing actualization of the potential of the human person to become more fully human, and in so doing, to realize ever more fully the actuality of the divine.

Through self-transcendence the human person is always in the process of becoming. As Lonergan (2004, 314-315) notes, “The being of the subject is becoming. . . . Development is a matter of increasing the number of things that one does for oneself, that one decides for oneself, that one finds out for oneself.” This developmental process finds ultimate expression in the realization that one must decide for oneself what one is to

make of oneself. Self-transcendence, then, is nothing less than an exercise of authentic human freedom or what Lonergan (1971a, 40) calls “vertical liberty.” It is a freedom that moves beyond the “horizontal liberty” of everyday life, of simply choosing options from within one’s existing horizon. Rather, it is the freedom to choose one’s “stance,” to direct one’s freedom toward new horizons of becoming, and to realize more fully one’s humanity as an authentic subject: experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding, and acting in the world (40). Such freedom, Haight (2012, 87) observes, “is the sphere of being in which a person recognizes the self as self,” and which “gives rise to responsibility and ethics where reality other than the self elicits responses to values.” According to Lonergan (1971a, 9), this ongoing process of self-transcendence occurs through the actualization of the manifold operations of human consciousness: experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. These operations structure the process of human knowing, valuing, and acting by moving one through the corresponding four levels of human consciousness: the empirical, the intellectual, the rational, and the responsible. For Lonergan, consciousness is an awareness of oneself in the process of knowing, valuing, and acting. It is what makes one authentically a subject insofar as one “operates consciously” (7). Through consciousness “the subject is aware of himself [or herself] operating, present to himself [or herself] operating, experiencing himself [or herself] operating” (8). Moreover, moving through each level of consciousness “expands” one “in a new dimension” toward greater awareness of a “fuller self” (9), that is a fuller realization of oneself as an authentic subject.

The empirical level of consciousness is the level of experiencing. It is the level of awareness of oneself as a sensor, perceiver, and feeler. It is what one means when one

says “*I see. I hear. I feel.*” The intellectual level of consciousness, then, brings understanding to what has been experienced. It is awareness of oneself as an inquirer, investigator, and philosopher. It is what one means when one says “*I think. I suppose. I surmise.*” The rational level of consciousness attempts to affirm the validity of one’s own understanding. It is awareness of oneself reflecting, weighing evidence, and judging. It is what one means when one says “*I know. I believe. I affirm.*” Finally, the responsible level of consciousness is awareness of oneself not simply as a knowing subject, but also, as a valuing subject who deliberates and chooses courses of action on the basis of knowing and valuing. It is what one means when one says “*I pledge. I commit. I vow.*” Thus, moving through the levels of consciousness brings one to a higher integration of oneself in relation to the world, while, at the same time, deepening one’s awareness of oneself as a knowing and valuing subject acting in the world.

In effect, the process of self-transcendence reshapes one’s world. It is a broadening of one’s horizon. And, it is a re-constituting of the subject him or herself. As Lonergan (1985, 18) observes, “The broadening, deepening, developing of the horizon. . . is also a broadening, deepening, developing of the subject, the self, the ego. The development that is the constitution of one’s world is also the constitution of oneself.” Through self-transcendence one becomes more authentically him or herself as a self-in-relation, as an intelligent, free, and responsible subject in the world.

At the same time, Lonergan (1971a, 14) insists, the transcendental operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding are not simply conscious, rather, they are also intentional insofar as the operations of the subject intend an object of meaning. In other words, the subject experiences *something*, understands *something*, judges

something, and decides something. These intended objects of the transcendental operations are what Lonergan (1971a, 12) calls “transcendental notions.” These “transcendental notions” structure the very process of the subject’s knowing and valuing in that they orient the subject’s operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding toward an object that is consciously intended. Moreover, Lonergan argues, the object of knowing and valuing that is consciously intended is not an object of immediate perception; but rather, it is an object or end that aims toward meaning. The “transcendental notions,” then, are categories of meaning that structure knowing and valuing beyond the tactile world of immediacy. According to Lonergan, at the level of experience, the intended object of meaning is the beautiful. At the level of understanding, the intended object of meaning is the intelligible. At the level of judging, the intended object of meaning is the true. And, at the level of deciding, the intended object of meaning is the good (13). The transcendental notions, then, “constitute the very dynamism of our conscious intending” by “promoting us from mere experiencing towards understanding, from mere understanding towards truth and reality,” and ultimately from knowledge toward “responsible action” (12).

At the empirical level of consciousness, through the operation of experiencing, the subject seeks an ordered coherence of relations with and among objects, an ordered coherence which classical tradition names, “the beautiful.”¹⁰ Such coherence of relations

10 The classical understanding of beauty, from which Lonergan borrows, characterizes beauty as a harmony of ordered relations. For example, in his *Poetics*, Aristotle associates the beautiful with “a certain order in its arrangement of parts” (2001, 1462). Likewise, in the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas identifies “three conditions” of Beauty: “integrity,” “due proportion or harmony,” and “clarity” (ST I, 39, 8). These conceptions build upon the notion of beauty as an ideal to be desired as expressed in Plato’s *Symposium* where one is led to contemplation of “Beauty itself” through the successive contemplation of beautiful things (1984, 106). While much of modern philosophy eschews this idealist conception of beauty in favor of more a subjective notion, some contemporary philosophers argue for a retrieval of the classical notion of beauty as a relationship between subject and object which draws the subject beyond him or herself toward

is found in multiple patterns of experience: the biologic, the aesthetic, the dramatic, and the intellectual (Lonergan 1997, 205-212). The biologic pattern of experience seeks an ordered coherence of sensory data. It is found in the beauty of nature, the beauty of the human body, and the beauty of life itself. The aesthetic pattern of experience seeks an ordered coherence of feeling, form, and expression. It is found in the beauty of art, the beauty of language, and the beauty of creativity. The dramatic pattern of experience seeks an ordered coherence within human relationships. It is found in the beauty of love, the beauty of friendship, and the beauty of community. And, the intellectual pattern of experience seeks an ordered coherence of the transcendental operations themselves. It is found in the beauty of thought, the beauty of insight, and the beauty of discovery. These relational patterns of experience draw the subject beyond him or herself as a “spark of desire” that seeks coherence, relationship, and beauty (Nehamas 2007, 5). As Alexander Nehamas (2007, 77) points out, “beautiful things don’t stand aloof, but direct our attention and our desire to everything else we must learn and acquire in order to understand. . . they quicken the sense of life, giving it new shape and direction.” In a word, the transcendental notion of the beautiful beckons the human person toward mystery. As Lonergan (1971a, 23-24) observes, “the transcendental notions are not a matter of knowing, but of intending.” They “intend all that as yet remains unknown.” They are a summons toward mystery, not limited by what is already known, but unlimited by the infinite horizons of the unknown. They are open invitations to question, to explore, and to wonder. And, ultimately, they draw the human spirit toward the numinous, toward transcendence, and toward mystery. Experience, then, is the starting

an ideal, even if as an unfulfilled promise (See Alexander Nehamas. 2007. *Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).

point for the “eros of the human spirit” that leads the human person to encounter mystery (Lonergan 1971a, 13). This encounter with mystery begins in seeking the ordered coherence of the beautiful as “a promise, an anticipation,” and “a hope as yet unfulfilled” (Nehamas 2000).

At the intellectual level of consciousness, through the operation of understanding, the subject seeks to find meaningfully intelligible connections among objects of experience. Here, experiential data becomes organized, arranged, and categorized into an intelligible pattern of meaning. Thus, the intended object of understanding is the intelligible (Lonergan 1971a, 13). This intelligibility is expressed in concepts, ideas, and propositions. These reflect the subject’s growing understanding and reveal his or her developing insights. The intelligible invites discovery. Yet, like the beautiful, the intelligible also beckons the human person toward deeper mystery. It invites further questions, further investigations, and further insights. Ultimately, like the beautiful, the intelligible remains forever an open invitation to learn more, to discover more, and to question more.

At the rational level of consciousness, through the operation of judging, the subject seeks to affirm the validity of one’s insights and ideas. Judging asks the question “Is it so?” Hence, the intended object of judging is the true or the real. Following Aquinas, Lonergan (1990, 149) insists that the object of all affirmation is “being” in that “being is the object toward which our intellectual knowledge tends.” What the subject seeks to affirm in judging the validity, or even the probability of an insight, is its *being* so. According to Lonergan, the dynamic structure of human knowing aims toward this affirmation of being. The human person is not satisfied with simply having ideas,

insights, and understandings. Rather, the human person naturally and spontaneously desires to know whether and to what extent their ideas, insights, and understandings are true. The transcendental notion of the true, then, is an ideal toward which the transcendental operation of judging aims. While such affirmations may be partial, qualified, and limited, the true, nonetheless, remains as a category of meaning, alongside the beautiful, and the intelligible, that structures the process of human knowing. As Lonergan (1990, 153) notes, “Affirming ‘it is so’ will give rise to further questions. . . when you affirm ‘it is so’. . . you have not entirely reached it. You know only some little aspect of being in any true judgment. You reach judgment only to raise further questions.” Therefore, the transcendental operation of judging does not foreclose the process of knowing. Rather, it opens it out even further.

Finally, at the responsible level of consciousness, through the operation of deciding, the subject seeks a course of action that is truly worthwhile, a course of action that aims toward the good. For Lonergan (1993, 79), the good is “the developing subject,” that is, the human person’s becoming more authentically human. Such development is not merely individual, but communal as well insofar as the self is formed as a self-in-relation. Thus, the good includes the whole set of relations required for full human flourishing. The good encompasses both the developing of the individual and the developing of community. The good fosters self-transcendence as persons grow in their capacity for experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. Seeking the good, then, moves the subject beyond the level of knowing toward the level of valuing and acting. It moves the subject beyond the experiential, intellectual, and rational levels to the existential level where “we deliberate, evaluate, decide, act” (Lonergan 1968, 21). And, it

brings into being an authentically human world, as “a world of existential subjects” whose exercise of freedom and responsibility realize the values that promote human authenticity (30).

Through the transcendental operations of human consciousness-experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding-the subject’s world is constituted as a world of meaning and value, a world of potential and possibility, and a world that seeks to find expression for the beautiful, the intelligible, the true, and the good. The transcendental notions constitute the “dynamism of conscious intentionality. They promote the subject from lower to higher levels of consciousness, from the experiential to the intellectual, from the intellectual to the rational, from the rational to the existential” (Lonergan 1971a, 34-35). In the human person’s quest for meaning, the transcendental notions orient the subject toward deeper meaning, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. For, as Lonergan (1971a, 23; 1985, 155) insists, “it is by them that we intend the concrete,” that is, to truly know, value, and act in a world “mediated by meaning and motivated by value” as intelligent, free, and responsible subjects.

For Lonergan, then, the transcendental notions are not ethereal forms floating in some transcendent realm, independent of the knowing subject. Rather, they are akin to John Alexander Stewart’s interpretation of Plato’s notion of “ideas” as conceptual placeholders that structure the knowing and valuing subject’s relation with the objects of knowing and valuing.¹¹ Without a knowing and valuing subject there would be no “notions” or ideas to know and value. Yet, without such notions that point beyond the subject, there would be no knowing and valuing of *anything*. Without the notion of the

¹¹ Lonergan acknowledged his debt to Stewart for influencing his understanding of Plato’s ideas as conceptual ideals that structure the heuristic process of human knowing. (See Lonergan 1973, 62).

beautiful, however contextual, however particular, or however circumscribed, there would be no object of desiring. Without the notion of the intelligible, however limited, however undeveloped, or however obfuscated, there would be no object of understanding. Without the notion of the true, however partial, however inadequate, or however incomplete, there would be no object of knowing or believing. And without the notion of the good, however truncated, however qualified, or however restrained, there would be no object of valuing. Thus, the transcendental notions structure the operations of human consciousness to seek meaning and value, even and in the midst of the limitations of human knowing and valuing.

Lonergan insists that the human person's potential for authentically knowing, valuing, and acting in a world charged with meaning and infused with value is made possible by the four "transcendental precepts" that guide the corresponding transcendental operations to seek the beautiful, the intelligible, the true, and the good. These precepts are: "be attentive," "be intelligent," "be reasonable," and "be responsible" (Lonergan 1971a, 53). As Mark Miller (2013, 65) observes, "The transcendental precepts are internal commands built into human consciousness." They guide the process of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding toward the transcendental notions. At the empirical level of consciousness, the subject authentically experiences by being attentive to the coherence of one's experience. At the intellectual level of consciousness, the subject authentically understands by seeking intelligible understanding through intelligent inquiry. At the rational level of consciousness, the subject authentically judges by reasonably seeking the most probable affirmation of the truth of his or her understanding. And, at the responsible level of consciousness, the subject authentically

decides by responsibly seeking decisions that aim at promoting the good based on his or her best knowing and valuing. As Lonergan (2004, 319) notes, “Human authenticity is a matter of following the built-in-law of the human spirit. Because we can experience we should attend. Because we can understand, we should inquire. Because we can reach toward the truth, we should reflect and check. Because we can realize values in ourselves and promote them in others, we should deliberate.” The transcendental precepts, then, act as internal compasses that can direct the operations of human consciousness toward greater authenticity. For, just as one can carefully attend to one’s experience, one can also be oblivious. Just as one can ask intelligent questions, one can also ask trivial ones or none at all. Just as one can reasonably weigh evidence to make what Tracy (1987, 22) calls “relatively adequate” judgments, one can also pre-judge or refuse to take a stance on anything at all. And, just as one can responsibly deliberate and decide on a best course of action, one can also make irresponsible and reckless decisions. Hence, Lonergan recognizes, alongside the human potential for authenticity, there is the very real possibility of inauthenticity, not only for individuals, but for communities as well.

The dynamic process of self-transcendence, then, is an ongoing process of the person becoming more authentically a subject, insofar as authenticity is never fully reached but is always in the process of reaching, always in the process of becoming, and always in the process of being actualized through the experiences, understandings, judgments, and decisions of the subject that constitute and re-constitute the subject as him or herself. As Miller (2013, 71) notes, “self-transcendence is a single process comprised of four transcendental operations, guided by four transcendental precepts, seeking four levels of transcendental notions, and driven by the natural, unrestricted thrust of the

restless human spirit.” This “unrestricted thrust” is what Lonergan (1971a, 13) calls “the *eros* of the human spirit” which is the person in the process of becoming through the “unfolding” of human consciousness. The process of self-transcendence, then, constitutes the person as a knowing and valuing subject. It opens the person out toward a world of ever expanding meaning. And, it establishes the person as a self-in-relation, as an existential subject, engaged with and in the world.

At the same time, development “upward” and outward not only involves the process of self-transcendence, but it also includes the process of “self-appropriation” insofar as through self-transcendence the subject comes to know him or herself as a knowing and valuing subject (Lonergan 1971a, 83). In effect, the subject not only experiences, understands, judges, and decides; rather, the subject also comes to know him or herself as one who experiences, understands, judges, and decides. In other words, the subject comes to know him or herself as an authentic subject. Development “upward” and outward, then, involves not only growing in critical awareness of one’s world through the process of self-transcendence; but also, it involves growing in critical awareness of oneself as a knowing and valuing subject, acting in the world through the process of self-appropriation. Thus, development “upward” and outward, at once, broadens and deepens the world of the subject, while at the same time broadening and deepening the subject’s awareness of him or herself as an authentic subject.

As Robert Doran (1981b, 112, emphasis added) points out, this ongoing process of self-appropriation is not simply cognitive, but affective as well. It involves the whole self, fully engaged in the drama of human living insofar as “one’s story is a matter of the satisfaction or frustration of one’s *desire* for meaning, truth, reality, and genuinely

ordered values.” It is a story that begins in a person’s “sensitive consciousness” as an experiencing subject “that cannot be left behind or displaced in any genuine human exercise of intelligence, rationality, and deliberation.” Or, as Lonergan (1971a, 30-31) notes, “feeling gives intentional consciousness its mass, momentum, drive, power,” without “feelings our knowing and deciding would be paper thin.” Moreover, Lonergan emphasizes, “to take cognizance” of one’s feelings “makes it possible for one to know oneself” more fully (33). Hence, self-appropriation involves the ongoing process of becoming more fully aware of oneself, both cognitively and affectively, as a knowing and valuing subject. It involves taking greater possession of one’s own story. And, it involves growing in awareness that one truly is the subject of one’s own living, loving, and acting in the world.

Evolving Toward Critical Awareness: Robert Kegan’s Notion of the Evolving Self

Human Development as the Evolution of Meaning

Psychologist Robert Kegan (1982, 11) argues that the process of human development is essentially a process of organizing and re-organizing the meaning of the self-in-relation to the world. Building on the “constructive-developmental” framework of Jean Piaget, Kegan insists that the “human organism organizes” meaning, that is, human persons continually construe meaningful patterns of relationship between themselves and the world around them. For Kegan, the human person continually “constructs” or mentally organizes the meaning of the self-in-relation to the world. According to Kegan, human beings “literally make sense” of the world. They develop a sense of the self-in-relation to the world that brings meaning and coherence to both. According to Kegan, to be human, then, is to be an organizer and mediator of meaning (11). In effect, the self is a

“zone of mediation where meaning is made” (3), allowing persons to conceive of themselves and their world in meaningful patterns of relationship. Thus, Kegan contends that human development is about “the evolution of meaning” (15), as the human person organizes and reorganizes the self and the world into increasingly complex patterns of meaning.

Kegan (1982, 4) borrows his “constructive-developmental” approach to human development from Piaget. While Piaget began his career as a zoologist first studying mollusks, he increasingly became interested in the development of human intelligence, a study to which he devoted most of his academic career. His most famous experiments involve the study of young children and changes in how they mentally organize the meaning of their world. Piaget brings a biological lens to the study of human development insofar as he views the development of intelligence from an “interactionist” perspective that studies the interaction of the individual with his or her environment and subsequent adaptations over time (Muuss 1988, 176). As David Elkind (1978, 99) notes, Piaget’s conception of intelligence is “an extension of biological adaptation” which includes the evolutionary processes of “assimilation” and “accommodation.” Assimilation and accommodation are two interrelated, yet distinct mechanisms in the overall process of evolution.

For Piaget, assimilation refers to the internalization of information from the environment by fitting it into existing “cognitive structures,” or mental frameworks, for organizing information into coherent systems of meaning. Accommodation, on the other hand, refers to a fundamental shift in the person’s mental framework itself, marked by the emergence of new cognitive structures in order to accommodate new information that no

longer fits into old mental frameworks of understanding (Muuss 1988, 177-180). Moreover, with the emergence of new mental frameworks, there emerges new “operations” that become “meaningful parts of” the new “cognitive structure” (Muuss 1988, 177-178). These operations allow the individual to manipulate objects of understanding mentally in order to produce a coherent sense of the self-in-relation to one’s environment. Operations are “internalized actions that constitute a system of organized and related thoughts,” such as the logical operations of arithmetic (Muuss 1988, 178).

According to Piaget, then, cognitive development is a process of adaption whereby individuals grow in their capacity to assimilate and accommodate new information from the environment in order to maintain a coherent sense of the self in the world. In effect, Piaget argues, cognitive development occurs through the basic evolutionary process of organisms moving toward equilibrium or harmony with their environment. As new information causes “disequilibrium,” that is, it “disturbs existing, incomplete, or incorrect knowledge,” the individual adapts through the processes of assimilation and accommodation. Through assimilation new information is taken into existing cognitive structures, and through accommodation these existing structures develop, change, and expand over time. Thus, through this evolutionary process “a new higher-level equilibrium is attained” in the mental organization of the self-in-relation to the world (Muuss 1988, 179). This new organization of the self and world involves a greater differentiation of both self and world as more complex patterns of meaning emerge. Piaget calls this process “de-centration” insofar as it involves a loss of one’s old center and the emergence of a new one (Kegan 1982, 31).

Kegan builds on Piaget's interactionist perspective of human development as a process of organizing the self-in-relation to the environment. Kegan (1982, 374) insists that the capacity for growing in differentiation of self and other, subject and object, or self and world is a "deep structure" in human consciousness that allows for the evolution of meaning. Fundamentally, for Kegan, human development is a process of "re-differentiating," renegotiating, and "reintegrating" this basic relationship. It involves a re-composition of the self in response to new information, new challenges, and new stimuli in one's environment. It requires a reconceptualization of the categories of "me" and "not-me." And, it "creates a new subjectivity" that allows new meaning to emerge in one's world (31).

This basic evolutionary pattern of differentiation exists in the dynamic interplay of self and world. Moving beyond Piaget, however, Kegan argues that this process is neither exclusively cognitive, nor exclusively affective. Rather, Kegan (1982, 81) insists that both dimensions are present in the "single, more basic. . . evolutionary" thrust of differentiation between self and world, always moving the individual toward equilibrium. While this "evolutionary activity is intrinsically cognitive. . . it is no less affective" insofar as "we *are* this activity and we experience it" (81, emphasis original). Thus, Kegan contends that emotion is "the felt experience" of this evolutionary process "of defending, surrendering, and reconstructing a center" (81-82). This meaning-organizing and meaning-experiencing process creates what Kegan calls the "psycho-logic" of individuals (113), allowing them to mediate meaning both cognitively and affectively in organizing and re-organizing their relationship with the world. As a "system of meaning," it "organizes our thinking, feeling, and acting" (374) as a self-in-relation to the world. In

effect, the emergence of new subjectivities does not simply involve the emergence of new ways of knowing the world; but rather, it also involves the emergence of new ways of experiencing and being in the world.

At the same time, Kegan (1982, 108) emphasizes that the evolutionary process of differentiation involves a built-in tension “in the yearning for inclusion and distinctiveness” which moves persons to seek equilibrium or balance *within* their environments. He points out, “subject-object relations *become*; they are not static.” Rather, they “live *in the world*” and “take form in actual human relations and social contexts” (114, emphasis original). He argues that “the relationship between the individual and the social. . . is not absolute.” Rather, “development is intrinsically about the continual settling and resettling of this very distinction” (115). In effect, a person is not simply an individual, but is, at the very same time, an “embeddual” (116), that is, a person embedded in a particular life context that forms and sustains the person as a person-in-relation. Throughout the life cycle, then, the human person is continually being constituted and reconstituted through the process of differentiation, which shapes, reshapes, and reconfigures the meaning of the self-in-relation to the world and the world-in-relation to the self.

Following pediatrician and child psychologist D.W. Winnicott, Kegan (1982, 116) calls the life contexts in which persons are embedded, “holding environments.” These holding environments are “psychosocial environments” that form the backdrop for the evolutionary process of differentiation. They are “cultures of embeddedness” that form persons as persons-in-relation (116), while at the same time, they are cultures from which persons emerge as individuals to the extent that they engage in the process of

differentiation. This process begins at birth with emergence from the womb, but continues throughout the life cycle as individuals are continually re-embedded in new holding environments, forming “a life history of cultures of embeddedness” (116). Through each successive environment, the evolutionary process of adaptation and moving toward equilibrium occurs, until disequilibrium brings new adaptations, new changes, and new levels of differentiation. Whether the pre-school child moving into the new social world of school, whether the adolescent moving into new social worlds of interpersonal relations, or whether the adult moving into new worlds of work, professional, and intimate relations, the process of growth takes place through a re-organization of the self as a new self-in-relation. Such a process is not a complete repudiation of previous holding environments, but rather, a reintegration of new understandings of the self at increasingly more complex levels of meaning. Yet, as Kegan (1994, 43) points out, in order for growth to take place, holding environments ideally ought to provide “welcoming acknowledgement to exactly who the person is right now as he or she is,” while fostering “the person’s psychosocial evolution” by allowing for the process of differentiation. Thus, fostering growth requires creating holding environments that allow for the evolution of the self. They are “evolutionary bridges” or contexts for “crossing over” to a new sense of the self-in-relation to the world (43). Such environments hold individuals until they are ready to let go, while “remaining in place” to support individuals in the successful re-integration of who they once were and who they are now with who they are in the process of becoming (Kegan 1982, 129).

The Evolving Self

Kegan identifies several key movements in the evolutionary process of human becoming. For Kegan, these movements are not so much stages as they are dynamic transitions. Kegan (1982, 85) argues that human development proceeds according to the evolutionary thrust of the differentiation of self and world as “each qualitative change” occurs as “a response to the complexity of the world” by reorganizing the individual in relation to his or her environment. Each transition marks a new evolutionary balance or adaptation to changes in one’s psychosocial world. These adaptations involve a differentiation from one’s previous “personal organization” and become a “new organization” and a “new subjectivity” (85). In essence, according to Kegan, developmental change occurs over time in the re-composition of one’s sense of meaning of the self-in-relation to the world.

Kegan (1982, 113) identifies the first transition of human development as “the growth and loss of the incorporative self,” generally spanning the first eighteen months of life. According to Kegan, human development begins with the embeddedness of individuals into a social environment and their incorporation of elements of that environment into themselves. Kegan calls this primary culture of embeddedness a “mothering culture” to the extent that the primary caregiver is usually the infant’s mother (118). It is a culture of physical presence, of literal holding, of sensing, moving, and the reflexes. It is “a world in which everything sensed is taken to be an extension of the infant,” where out of sight, out of touch, out of taste, out smell, or out of hearing literally means out of mind (Kegan 1982, 78). Piaget identifies this period as “sensorimotor,” indicating the infant’s tactile way of knowing the world, while Freud refers to this period

as the stage of “orality,” describing the “all-assimilative, incorporative newborn” (78). Yet, the complete embeddedness and fusion of individuals with their earliest holding environment already sets the stage for the evolutionary process of human development in that the main task of moving through infancy and toddlerhood is to begin the process of differentiation: to stop nursing, to begin crawling and even walking, and to start asserting one’s independence (118).

Through the initial process of differentiation there emerges a new transition in human development, a movement Kegan (1982, 133) calls “the growth and loss of the impulsive self.” This new subjectivity emerges with the developing coordination of the reflexes. As Kegan notes, “In disembedding herself from her reflexes the two-year old comes to *have* reflexes rather than *be* them, and the new self is embedded in that which coordinates the reflexes, namely the perceptions and the impulses” (85, emphasis added). Unlike infants, preschool age children recognize objects as separate and durable, apart from themselves. However, their world is subject to their immediate perception of it. If their perception of an object changes, for them, the object itself changes (Kegan 1982, 88). This way of organizing meaning around perception and impulse is demonstrated by Piaget’s experiments with young children showing that they are unable to hold mentally two perceptions simultaneously. For example they believe that there is more chocolate when a single chocolate bar is broken up since they perceive that more pieces equals more chocolate. Piaget refers to this stage as “preoperational” since young children lack the ability to perform the basic cognitive operation of mentally manipulating objects of understanding (Muuss 1988, 181). Just as they are unable to separate themselves from their perceptions, young children also lack the ability to separate themselves from their

impulses since “the impulses are the self” (Kegan 1982, 88). Thus, Kegan calls the holding environment of the young child a “parenting culture” since the young child needs to be parented in order to successfully make the transition beyond the world of impulse and immediate perception (118). The family provides an environment of stability for young children, while, at the same time, gradually transitioning them into a wider world of early schooling, play companions, and perhaps even, religious community.

Generally between the ages of five and seven, children experience another shift in their mental organization of the world. They begin to differentiate themselves from their perceptions and impulses. Rather than being defined by their perceptions and impulses, they are able to hold them as objects of meaning. They no longer *are* their perceptions and impulses. Instead, they now *have* perceptions and impulses (Kegan 1982, 88-89). Kegan (1982 161) identifies this movement as “the growth and loss of the imperial self.” As a child “takes command” of his or her impulses there is a new sense of agency and control. They now rule their impulses. They are, then, in a sense, “imperial.” With this new sense of agency, there emerges “a self-concept, a more or less consistent notion of a me” (Kegan 1982, 89). They become *someone*, distinct from others, with an “enduring disposition,” with their own needs and interests, and with a role to play in the social world. This world expands to include school, peers, and activities. They are embedded in a “role-recognizing culture” that recognizes the constitutive dimensions of who they perceive themselves to be through their various roles: student, friend, and perhaps, soccer player, Yankees fan, or Catholic (Kegan 1982, 119). These roles not only define the self, but also, they define the self-in-relation to others, establishing both boundaries and connections between self and others.

With the development of this “imperial self,” there also begins to emerge the capacity for what Piaget calls “concrete operational thinking.” Around the age of seven or eight, children begin to develop the ability to perform logical operations, to hold their perceptions as objects of thought and to manipulate them mentally. This allows the child to classify objects, to relate parts to the whole, and to reverse operations, such as replicating a pattern or sequence in reverse order (Muuss 1988, 182-183). Children now understand that there is the same amount of chocolate whether a chocolate bar is whole or broken into smaller pieces. Immediate perception no longer dominates their understanding of reality. Rather, they are able to think about their world and form reasoned opinions, opinions that they are able to share, defend, and argue. At the same time, they are able to differentiate their own perspective from that of others. This allows them to take the perspective of others into account, in developing, for example, a reciprocal sense of fairness (Fowler 1981, 66). As role-takers, they actively participate in and help to construct the dramatic narrative of their own social experience. Hence, as James Fowler (1981, 136) notes, “the great gift to consciousness at this stage is the ability to narratize one’s experience,” thus binding “our experiences into meaning through the medium of stories.”

Still, school-age children and even young adolescents have not yet developed the capacity for hypothetical or abstract thinking and thus they are concrete thinkers to the extent that they can only solve problems as they apply to concrete objects of their experience (Kegan 1982, 86). God is conceived in anthropomorphic terms. Morality is understood to be rule based. And, symbols are interpreted as “one-dimensional and literal in meaning” (Fowler 1981, 149). According to Kegan (1994, 21), the world of the school

age child and early adolescent, then, is a world of “durable categories” of meaning. These “durable categories” are classes of objects seen as having enduring qualities, including the categories of things, others, and the self. The “other” is constructed as a durable category, as someone with his or her own independent point of view. Likewise, the self is also constructed as a durable category, with “enduring dispositions, ongoing needs, and self-interest” (Kegan 1994, 22). Thus, Kegan points out, school age children and early adolescents are embedded in their own needs and interests to the extent that these needs and interests define them.

At the same time, as Robert Selman observes, as children move into early adolescence their role-taking capacity, or the ability to distinguish between their perspective and that of others, develops further. They grow in their capacity for understanding the self and others as “subjects” and in their ability to consider another’s point of view (Muuss 1988, 245). According to Selman, early adolescents develop “a more generalized third-person perspective.” This allows them to mentally “step outside” of their interpersonal relations and see themselves from the perspective of the other, seeing themselves as “both actor and object” (Muuss 1988, 255). Fowler (1981, 153) summarizes this new, emerging self-awareness as “I see you seeing me: I see the me I think you see.” This ability for “third-person perspective-taking,” then, allows for the budding emergence of a “self-aware self” who increasingly controls his or her own “inner life” (Muuss 1988, 256). In early adolescence, then, the “imperial self” is brought to the beginning of a new level of personal autonomy that lays the groundwork for the next evolutionary transition.

As young people move from early into late adolescence, roughly spanning the ages of twelve to eighteen, they become increasingly more self-aware. They gradually begin to develop the capacity to differentiate themselves from their needs and interests. Transitioning from early into late adolescence, then, involves letting go of “the imperial self,” of becoming persons who no longer are their needs and interests, but rather, *have* needs and interests. This allows them to begin to coordinate their own needs and interests with those of others. There begins to emerge a sense of mutuality and responsibility toward the other. Yet, as Kegan (1982, 171) insists, in this transition, “my needs” are not lost, but simply “my ultimate orientation to them.” Thus, Kegan (1982, 95-96) identifies this movement as “the growth and loss of the interpersonal self” since the self is “located” in an “interpersonal matrix.” During this transition, identity is no longer role-driven, but rather, relationship-driven. While late adolescents still *have* various roles, they no longer are defined by them. Rather, they are their relationships. Roles are meaningful only to the extent that they foster relationships. Priorities begin to shift. Interests begin to center around relational contexts, rather than role-recognizing ones. Older, even long-standing interests may be abandoned, giving way to new ones that cluster around friendships or romantic relationships. New constellations of friendship often emerge at a deeper level than previous childhood and early adolescent friendships. And, romantic relations are thrown into a new, more intense light. Thus, the holding environment of late adolescence, even into young adulthood is a “culture of mutuality” which fosters a sense of belonging, acceptance, and interpersonal connectivity (Kegan 1982, 165).

In the transition from early to late adolescence, individuals begin to develop the capacity for what Kegan (1994, 32) calls “cross-categorical” thinking. In this process, the “durable categories” of meaning that school age children and young adolescents use to organize the meaning of their world now become objects of reflection. Needs and interests become categories of thought that can be related to other categories of thought such as another’s needs and interests. Thus, cross-categorical thinking allows for developing truly *interpersonal* relations during late adolescence and early young adulthood (Kegan 1994, 46). In many ways, this developing capacity for cross-categorical thinking dovetails with the emergence of third-person perspective taking in early adolescence. As third-person perspective-taking capacities emerge in early adolescence, “there emerges the ability to distinguish between one’s own point of view and a more generalized perspective” (Muuss 1988, 255). This ability opens the way for new categories of thought, allowing categories of thought themselves to become categories of thought.

Moreover, as Kegan (1994, 32, emphasis original) notes, as cross-categorical thinking develops, the concept “*durable* category moves from being the *subject* of one’s experiencing to the *object* of one’s experiencing.” This allows the durability of the category “durable category” itself to be called into question, including the category of the self. In effect, as the concrete concept “durable category” becomes “an element” of thought, rather than the organizing principal of thought, abstract and self-reflective thinking can begin to develop. This process allows for the development of reflective, inferential, connotative, and thematic thinking (26). Hence, the development of cross-

categorical thinking generally corresponds with the stage that Piaget identifies as the development of “formal operational” thought (Kegan 1982, 86).

According to Piaget, with the development of formal operational thinking, there emerges the ability to engage in hypothetical and deductive reasoning, to combine propositions mentally in order to develop theoretical constructs, and to think about one’s own thinking (Muuss 1988, 187). Thinking is no longer tied to concrete objects of experience, but rather, persons “can carry out symbolic operations in their minds” (189). Piaget insists that early formal operational thought develops as young as the age of eleven and is fully developed as young as fourteen (185). However, Kegan (1982, 86) maintains that early formal operational thought and its concomitant of cross-categorical thinking does not develop until late adolescence and that full formal operational thought does not completely develop until young adulthood.¹² Thus, for Kegan, the transition from early adolescence into late adolescence and early young adulthood involves the loss of the “imperial self” and the growth of the “interpersonal self” through the development of cross-categorical thinking. This development involves transitioning from what Kegan (1994, 37) calls the “second order of consciousness” of childhood and early adolescence with its durable categories of meaning to a “third order of consciousness.” This transition allows one to reflect on the categories themselves, allowing for a reorganization of meaning of the categories of self, world, and other. It is a reorganization that lays the groundwork for the next transition.

Kegan (1982, 221) identifies the next movement of human development as the “growth and loss” of what he names “the institutional self.” It is during this transition that

¹² Some research indicates that the development of full formal operational thinking is by no means typical or common among middle and late adolescents. Some estimates show that as few as 20% of late adolescents achieve full formal operational reasoning (See Muuss 1988, 198-199).

one establishes oneself in the world as an adult self. There is an emergence from enmeshment in and dependency on the interpersonal matrix for one's exclusive sense of identity. One no longer is defined by his or her relationships. Rather, one *has* relationships. Relationships do not go away, but are re-integrated at a new level of meaning that organizes and relates the self as a category of meaning in relation to the category of the other. As Kegan (1982, 101) notes, "others are not lost by an emergence from embeddedness in the interpersonal. On the contrary, in a sense they are found." The question is "how they are known." During this transition, there begins a new sense of "self-ownership," whereby, "the new I, who, in coordinating or reflecting upon mutuality, brings into being a kind of psychic institution," or a new "self-system" (100-101). Here, there is a new embeddedness in various cultures of "identity," which shape and, in turn, are shaped by the self-in-relation to the worlds of work and relationships. As Kegan (1982, 191) explains, during this transition, there is an emerging sense of "self-authorship," which allows the person to become the subject of his or her own life through the establishment of career paths, committed relationships, personal beliefs, values, and a world-view. The dynamic transition of young adulthood, then, is the loss of the "interpersonal self" and the growth of the "institutional" self.

Through the growth of the "institutional" self, there emerges a new level of self-awareness. "Third order" cross-categorical thinking allows the categories of self, world, and other to become reorganized as categories of reflection. This facilitates the emergence of a new "fourth order of consciousness" that allows for reflection on one's own reflection, reflection on one's own subjectivity, and reflection on one's own mutuality within the world (Kegan 1994, 315). It allows one to mentally organize

categories of meaning into complex systems of meaning, to formulate an ideological position, and to construct a world-view. Yet, here the self becomes embedded in these new sources of meaning. The self is defined by them. Thus, the final differentiation Kegan identifies in the evolution of the meaning of the self is differentiation even from one's own self-constructed ideologies and world-views. This requires what Kegan (1994, 291) calls "the fifth order of consciousness."

For Kegan, the "fifth order of consciousness" involves reflection not only on one's own reflection, but reflection on one's whole process of self-authorship. It involves reflecting on one's world-view construction in light of other systems of world-view construction. And, it involves what Kegan (1994, 315) calls "dialectical" thinking, the ability to hold complex meaning systems, including one's own, in creative tension, to embrace paradox in oneself and others, and to allow "the interpenetration of self and other." Kegan (1982, 103) identifies this movement as the development of the "inter-individual self." It is a movement toward interdependence, toward understanding the relativity and relationality of multiple complex meaning systems without collapsing into meaninglessness and relativism; and, it is a movement toward "an identification with the transformative process of our being rather than the formative products of our becoming" (Kegan 1994, 351).

Kegan's notion of the evolving self, then, lays out the various movements of the symphony of human development. Through these unfolding movements of differentiation, the self grows in critical awareness of what it means to be a self, yet always as a self-in-relation to the world. In effect, each movement brings a reorganization of self and world at ever more complex levels of meaning. This complexification of

meaning is both a deepening and broadening of one's world; while at the same time, it is a deepening and broadening of the self. Kegan insists that this evolution of meaning is found in the creative tension between the two great yearnings of human experience: the yearning for communion and the yearning for selfhood. Yet, as Kegan (1982, 107) points out, although these yearnings "seem to be in conflict," they are, in fact, in deep relationship as "a lifelong tension" that is the very "creative motion of life itself." Moreover, Kegan notes, these deepest longings of the restless self are often expressed in language that "finds its way into prayer" (107). They are formed as a desire for the recognition of one's unique selfhood before a God who knows each one by name, and, at the same time, as a desire for loving communion with that same God. Thus, like Lonergan's notion of the developing subject, Kegan's understanding of the evolving self admits a deeply religious dimension to the process of human becoming.

Kegan's Evolving Self and Lonergan's Developing Subject

Thomas Berchmans argues that both Lonergan and Kegan offer a religious vision of human development. With regard to Kegan, Berchmans (1999, 108-114) bases that claim on his study of Kegan's first major published work as a psychologist, *The Sweeter Welcome: Voices for a Vision of Affirmation-Bellows, Malamud, and Martin Buber*. Troubled by nihilistic tendencies within contemporary culture that appear as a pervasive sense of hopelessness and alienation, Kegan sought to recover voices of affirmation that would help counter those tendencies. He believed that he found those voices in his Jewish roots, specifically the voice of Neo-Hasidism as mediated through the writings of Saul Bellows, Bernard Malamud, and Martin Buber. Kegan (1976, 16) argues that "Neo-Hasidism" is "the flowering of existentialism," an affirmation of the holy in the here-and-

now, and a celebration of life itself. Building on Harvey Cox, Kegan contends that the “seeds” of this flowering “were originally sown when Hebrew met Hellene” (16). As Cox (1965, 18) argues, “The impact of the Hebrew faith on the Hellenistic world, mediated through the early Christians, was to temporalize the dominant perception of reality. The world became history. *Cosmos* became *aeon*.” For the Jews, God is a God of history. According to Kegan, then, this temporalizing tendency of the Jewish faith finds expression in Neo-Hasidism as a complete affirmation of the human. For Kegan, this affirmation responds to the nihilistic strains of existentialism. Kegan (1976, 16) asks, “Given that there is nothing up there, what is down here?” Kegan argues, beyond nihilism: “There is another answer. There is affirmation: Everything! It’s all down here. . . . We may live on the horizontal. But the horizontal is the holy.” Berchmans (1999, 113) contends that this affirmative vision of human life is a deeply religious vision that undergirds Kegan’s theory of the evolving self. It is “the discovery of meaning and significance” in the unfolding drama of human living which is also “the crux of the affirmative answer of Hasidism.” Berchmans (1999, 108-109) insists that “this answer of affirmation, as Kegan calls it in *The Sweeter Welcome*, is implicit in his theory of the evolving self” insofar as, for Kegan, human development is an ongoing process of the affirmation and evolution of meaning. According to Berchmans, then, for Kegan, human becoming is itself holy.

Moreover, Kegan’s notion of human becoming as a yearning for both communion and selfhood finds resonance with Lonergan’s conception of human development as a dynamic movement both inward and outward. According to Lonergan (1971a, 13), “the eros of the human spirit” is the transcendental drive of the self-in-relation, drawn outward

through the unfolding of human consciousness in its four-fold operations: experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. This “eros” or “passionateness of being” is the drive toward selfhood (Lonergan 1985, 29). It is the drive of human becoming that enlarges both self and world. And, ultimately, for Lonergan, it is the drive of the human toward the divine. At the same time, development inward is the interpenetration of self and world. It is the prior, already given matrix of human relations into which the human person is born and through which the human person grows and develops. It is an expression of the human yearning for communion, to be held, to belong, and to be interconnected. And, for Lonergan (1985, 106), foundationally, it is a pre-thematic awareness of the love of God that holds and “orients” the human person outward toward infinite horizons that reshape, reconfigure, and reconstitute the self as a self-in-relation. Both Lonergan and Kegan, then, present a religious understanding of human development as a process ignited by the spark of the divine from within.

As Berchmans (1999, 25) points out, both Lonergan and Kegan also offer an understanding of human development that is “integral and holistic.” Lonergan’s account of human development “downward” and inward offers a social vision of human development. Lonergan recognizes that development occurs in the lived context of human history and in the interpersonal context of human relations. Likewise, Kegan’s notion of the evolving self recognizes the deeply interpersonal nature of human development. Like Lonergan, Kegan asserts that the self is always a self-in-relation. The human person is an “embeddual” who is both shaped by and shapes his or her world. This resonates with John Dewey’s (1959, 19) conviction that “all education proceeds by the participation of the individual in the social consciousness” of society. It is a process that

is “continually shaping the individual’s powers, saturating his [*sic*] consciousness, forming his habits, training his ideas, and arousing his feelings and emotions.” Thus, through community the individual becomes “an inheritor of the funded capital of civilization.”

Lonergan’s account of human development as self-transcendence “upward” and outward is grounded in human experience itself and its multiform patterns: biologic, aesthetic, dramatic, and intellectual. At the same time, Kegan insists that human development is an ongoing process of the re-integration of the individual with his or her social and cultural environment. For Kegan, this process is both cognitive and affective insofar as the individual mentally reorganizes the meaning of his or her self-in-relation to the world in response to the felt experience of disequilibrium. Simultaneously, the process of the reorganization of meaning itself is a felt experience with the emergence of new meaning. Thus, Berchmans (1999, 133) points out, “For both Lonergan and Kegan there is a common integrative epistemology” found in the human search for meaning.

For both Lonergan and Kegan, this search for meaning is what defines the human person. Lonergan insists that the human capacity to find meaning is what makes the human person not simply a rational animal, but rather, a “symbolic animal” (1985, 133).

Accordingly, in the human person, then:

There is an all but endless plasticity that permits the whole of our bodily reality to be fine-tuned to the beck and call of symbolic constellations. The agility of the acrobat, the endurance of the athlete, the fingers of the concert pianist, the tongue of those that speak and the ears of those that listen and the eyes of those that read, the formation of images that call forth insights, the recall of evidence that qualifies judgments, the empathy that sets our own feelings in resonance with the feelings of others—all bear convincing testimony that self-transcendence is the eagerly sought goal not only of our sensitivity, not only of our intelligent and rational knowing, not only of our freedom and responsibility, but first of all of our

flesh and blood that through nerves and brain have come spontaneously to live out symbolic meanings and to carry out symbolic demands. (Lonergan 1985, 133)

As symbolic animals, human persons grow in their capacity to find meaning. Hence, meaning is not static; but rather, it grows, evolves, and deepens over time.

Both Lonergan and Kegan, then, offer an interpretation of human development as the evolution of meaning through the development of critical awareness of self and world. However, Lonergan and Kegan frame their understanding of that evolution quite differently. While Lonergan offers an understanding of self-transcendence as occurring from within specific life-contexts with the development of the capacity for critical awareness, Kegan presents a wider vision of self-transcendence as an evolutionary process over the course of the life cycle. Thus, Kegan's theory of the evolving self provides a broader evolutionary framework for understanding the process of human development as the evolution of meaning over the course of time. Yet, Lonergan's attention to the very process of self-transcendence itself, as found in the operations of human consciousness, provides a more detailed conceptual framework for understanding the process of the evolution of meaning through the manifold operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. It is this capacity for growth in the awareness of meaning that shapes and reshapes the world of the human. And, paradoxically, it is this capacity for growing in awareness of meaning that allows finite creatures to reach toward the infinite.

Emerging Critical Awareness in Adolescence

Lonergan's notion of the human person as a developing subject, of persons growing in critical awareness of self, world, and others, is the cornerstone of his philosophy of education for schools. He contends that the goal of all schooling is

fostering the growth of the developing subject (1993, 80-83). According to Lonergan, schools must foster both socialization and self-transcendence in the dynamic interplay between the processes of development inward and development outward. As Frederick Crowe (1985, 12) notes, the movement “downward” and inward is the handing down of values, beliefs, and ideas. It is “the way of heritage.” At the same time, the movement upward and outward is “the way of achievement” (3). It is moving beyond the mere apprehension of inherited values, beliefs, and ideas toward the critical appropriation of values, beliefs, and ideas for oneself.

As Kegan indicates, moving from early adolescence into late adolescence involves developing the capacity for critical awareness through the development of cross-categorical thinking, or the ability to think about categories of thought themselves as categories of thought. Kegan (1994, 27) notes that “the construction of values, ideals, and broad beliefs also requires at least a cross-categorical principal of mental organization.” In other words, in order to move toward the self-appropriation of values and beliefs, adolescents need to begin to develop cross-categorical thinking that allows for the capacity of self-reflection. Without this capacity, values and beliefs cannot be truly self-appropriated. Yet, Kegan observes, this development is not automatic, nor is it fully achieved by late adolescence. However, Kegan insists, that in order to help adolescents move toward this new order of consciousness, it is necessary to envision “schooling as a context to support and foster” and not simply “promote and expect” reflective, cross-categorical thinking (56). He argues that schools must be about “coaching the curriculum” of consciousness by helping students practice and develop their emerging critical awareness (37). High school, then, becomes a significant bridge time in the

development of adolescent critical awareness, as young people move from organizing meaning around concrete, “durable categories” of meaning toward “cross-categorical thinking” which allows a new organization for the meaning of self, world, and others.

Developmental psychologist Deanna Kuhn agrees with Kegan insofar as her research on the development of critical thinking in adolescents suggests that such development needs support and scaffolding (Felton and Kuhn 2007, 105; Kuhn 2000, 179). Along the same lines as Kegan, Kuhn (1999, 17) argues that critical thinking involves the development of “meta-cognitive competencies,” that is, the ability to think about one’s own thinking. She further suggests that these competencies develop as potentialities in middle and late adolescence as the adolescent brain continues to develop. She observes, “By middle and late adolescence teens have fewer, more selective, but stronger, and more effective neuronal connections than they did as children” (2006, 59). This results in an “enhanced executive control” as a “major dimension of cognitive development” in adolescence (60). Such executive control allows adolescents to “access dual representations,” as they coordinate their own understanding with new information. She notes, “In the absence of this function, there exists a singular experience of ‘the way things are’ that serves as a framework for understanding the world.” Moreover, this new executive function allows them to mentally “bracket new information” in order to draw conclusions from statements, whether or not they believe those statements to be true (62). This “bracketing” ability allows adolescents to test new ideas and to try out new points of view.

Kuhn’s work finds parallels with Kegan’s understanding that adolescence is a transition time from the mental organization of the world around “durable categories” of

meaning to the development of “cross-categorical thinking.” Along with Kegan, Kuhn (2000) also contends that the development of such critical thinking capacities is a gradual process that requires the acquisition of learned metacognitive competencies over time. Kuhn (1999, 18) identifies the development of these meta-cognitive competencies as including the development of “meta-strategic” thinking. Meta-strategic thinking involves knowing and thinking about the strategies that one has available to address a particular problem, whether deciphering a poem or addressing a hypothetical problem. It involves the conscious application of successful strategies along with the conscious “inhibition,” or non-application, of less successful ones (Kuhn 2000, 179). Kuhn (2006, 62) maintains that critical thinking develops in adolescence with the learned acquisition of “more advanced inquiry strategies.” Such learned acquisition takes place, Kuhn (2006, 62) argues, through cognitive engagement with conceptual learning “that involves a change in understanding,” and that opens up new angles of vision. Without such engagement, Kuhn insists, meta-strategic thinking remains underdeveloped. As Kuhn (2006, 64) points out, brain development is “experience driven,” whereby “the activities that one engages in affect which neuronal connections will be strengthened and which will wither.”

Kuhn (1999, 18) further identifies a second meta-cognitive competency necessary for the development of critical thinking as “epistemological meta-knowing.” This form of knowing involves knowing about knowing itself. It answers the question, “What do I know about my own knowing?” It involves reflection on what one believes or knows about knowledge itself. Kuhn argues that developing one’s epistemological understanding, that is, growing in understanding of what knowledge is and how it is constructed, is essential to the development of critical thinking since “critical thinking by

definition involves reflecting on what is known and how that knowledge is justified.” Thus, to grow in knowing “how you know” gives greater control to the individual in “deciding what to believe and why” (23). Hence, knowing how one knows is a crucial development in moving toward a more sophisticated understanding of knowledge construction.

Kuhn (2001, 5) identifies four basic epistemological beliefs that emerge over the course of the life cycle. The first of these, she names a “realist” epistemology. This realist conception of knowledge is the epistemological world of the infant and young child. Beliefs are understood as “copies” of reality. The young child believes that everyone shares his or her same knowledge of the external world. For example, a three-year-old believes that another child entering the room also knows that a candy jar, in fact, contains pencils. Between the ages of four and six, children develop a “false-belief concept,” that is, the notion that others may hold a belief that is actually wrong (Kuhn, Cheney, and Weinstock 2000, 312). This initiates what Kuhn calls an “absolutist” epistemology. Beliefs are understood as “facts” about the world (311). Thus, one is either right or wrong in one’s belief. During adolescence, however, there generally emerges what Kuhn (2001, 5) calls a “multiplist” epistemology that conceives of beliefs as “opinions” that are “freely chosen by their holders as personal possessions and accordingly not open to challenge.” Finally, Kuhn (2001, 5) identifies the emergence of what she calls an “evaluativist” epistemology. Here, beliefs are seen as “claims” that “require support in a framework of alternatives, evidence, and argument.” It involves the discovery that there can be several legitimate positions that have merit, but that some claims have more merit

than others. Kuhn notes, “a key event in this evolution is the relocation of the source of knowledge from the known object to the knowing subject” (5).

Kuhn’s account of epistemological development finds resonance with Lonergan’s understanding of self-transcendence as moving toward what he calls “intellectual conversion.” For Lonergan (1971a, 238), intellectual conversion involves “a radical clarification” that knowing and believing are not simply copying reality, as in Kuhn’s description of the realist epistemology of infants and young children. Nor, is the process of knowing simply grasping the “out there now” as fact, apart from the knowing subject, as in Kuhn’s description of the absolutist epistemology of childhood and early adolescence. At the same time, Lonergan also rejects the idea that knowing is purely relativistic with no basis for making what Tracy calls “relatively adequate” judgments (1987, 22), as in the multiplist epistemology of adolescence. Rather, for Lonergan, knowing involves the whole process of “experiencing, understanding, judging, and believing.” According to Lonergan, “The reality of the known. . . is given in experience, organized and extrapolated by understanding, posited by judgment and belief” (1971a, 238). It is akin to the evaluativist epistemology that Kuhn (2001, 5) asserts often develops in late adolescence into young adulthood. This involves the reintegration of “the objective dimension of knowing by acknowledging uncertainty without forsaking evaluation” (5). Hence, for Lonergan (1971a, 238), the process of intellectual conversion is movement beyond “the world of immediacy” into a “world mediated by meaning.”

Moreover, for Lonergan, this process of intellectual conversion is not simply coming to know in a different way. Rather, it is also coming to know that one knows in a different way. In other words, it involves the development of what Kuhn calls

“epistemological meta-knowing,” that is, knowing one’s knowing itself. It is the process that Lonergan (1971a, 83) calls “self-appropriation” of oneself as a knowing subject: experiencing, understanding, and judging. Beyond the level of knowing, there is the further level of valuing that involves deciding and acting in the world. According to Lonergan, then, intellectual conversion points toward further moral and religious conversion, that allow one to choose freely one’s stance in the world as a responsible and loving subject. Through the process of self-appropriation, one increasingly takes possession oneself as a knowing and valuing subject (Lonergan 1971a, 14-15). Thus, Kuhn and Lonergan offer compatible epistemologies. Yet, each offers something unique that can inform an understanding of how best to approach the teaching of high school students. Kuhn offers guidance in understanding the evolution of ways of knowing during adolescence into young adulthood, while Lonergan offers a way to conceptualize how these ways of knowing can and should develop in the process of helping students become authentic knowing and valuing subjects.

The adolescent, then, is in the process of becoming an authentic subject. As adolescents grow in their capacity for critical awareness of self, world, and others, they begin their journey of self-appropriation, which is ongoing and life-long. However, as Kegan and Kuhn indicate this process is neither automatic, nor is it completed by the end of adolescence. Rather, adolescence is a bridge time in the development of the subject, which lays the groundwork for further development as the capacity for critical awareness continues to grow. Thus, developing critical thinking through growing metacognitive awareness toward cross-categorical thinking, meta-strategic awareness, and an evaluativist epistemological understanding is essential for fostering the growth of

adolescents as developing subjects. This process of fostering adolescent growth toward authentic subjectivity requires scaffolding and support. It requires holding on and letting go. And, it requires accompanying and affirming adolescents on their journey of self-transcendence toward authentic selfhood.

Conclusion

For Lonergan, human development is an inherently religious journey. As the self grows in greater awareness of the self as subject, the human person realizes within him or herself ever more fully the image of the divine. Self-transcendence, then, is not a movement away from the self, but an ever fuller, richer, and deeper development of the self as a self-in-relation. Thus, Lonergan would agree with Kegan that “the horizontal is the holy,” insofar as self-transcendence opens the human person out to new horizons of the holy, in the discovery of new horizons of meaning and infinite horizons of wonder. At the same time, Lonergan (2004, 328) affirms that human development occurs in a graced context that begins in the “prior soundless word” of God’s love that penetrates to the core of one’s being. It is a graced context that establishes, holds, and nurtures the individual in relation to others, in relation to the world, and in relation to God. And, it is a context that is infused with sparks of the divine, drawing persons out to encounter ever greater mystery in the evolution of human becoming.

Yet, as the process of human becoming can lead to authentic subjectivity, likewise failure to develop can lead to inauthenticity. Experiencing can remain unattended to and un-reflected upon. Understanding can remain shallow and at a surface-level. Judging can remain perfunctory and ill-considered. And, deciding can remain haphazard and perpetually ambivalent. Rather than living in “a world mediated by meaning and

motivated by value,” then, one could live in a world that is meaningless and valueless, without purpose or vision (Lonergan 1985, 155). Instead of authentically appropriating one’s human subjectivity, one could drift “into an ever less authentic selfhood” (Lonergan 1971a, 40). Here, Lonergan (1993, 233) contends that education in schools is one way to “transform human society and human living” by promoting the authentic development of the human person as a subject. Fostering such development requires not only handing the tradition “downward” and inward; but also, it requires creating schools that truly are “holding environments” that support individuals in their growth toward authentic subjectivity as knowing and valuing subjects, acting in the world.

For adolescents in Catholic high schools, then, in order to create “holding environments” that foster the development of authentic subjectivity, it is necessary to support them in their transition from early to late adolescence by cultivating the development of critical awareness. As students move through high school, toward late adolescence, it is necessary to coach them in the use of meta-strategic thinking that allows them to reflect more deeply on their own processes of reflection. It is necessary to engage them with substantive materials that offer multiple, perhaps even contradictory, viewpoints that require critical evaluation and that challenge a more simplistic, multiplist epistemology. And, it is necessary to help them move toward “epistemological meta-knowing” by cultivating self-ownership of their knowing and valuing: inviting them to reflect on their own multiple patterns of experiencing, helping them to articulate their own processes of understanding, encouraging them to evaluate their own evaluations, and teaching them tools of discernment so they can take greater ownership of their own decision-making. Engaging adolescents in critical reflection at meta-experiential, meta-

intellectual, meta-rational, and meta-responsible levels, then, can foster growth in critical awareness and invite students toward authentic subjectivity.

Such an invitation toward selfhood, Lonergan (1993, 105) argues is, ultimately, the *telos* of all Catholic schooling. It is an invitation to wonder and reflection. It is an invitation to discovery and mystery. And, ultimately, it is an invitation to human becoming. For this reason, Lonergan (1993, 102) argues that the chief task of Catholic high schools is “to provide adolescents with the help and preparation they will need” in order to “do a good job in becoming themselves.” This journey of becoming is an enlargement of the “capacity for self-transcendence” that fosters “unrestricted openness” to the beautiful, the intelligible, the true, and the good (Lonergan 1985, 32). Lonergan (1985, 32) notes, the Christian “experience of grace, then, is as large as the Christian experience of life,” since to experience self-transcendence is to be grasped by the mystery of the divine. Thus, as Lonergan (1993, 102) observes, the journey toward selfhood, ultimately, is a religious journey, which involves authentically becoming oneself before God. To the extent, then, that Catholic high schools promote self-transcendence by fostering critical awareness, they promote the religious development of adolescents. To the extent that they help adolescents grow toward a critical appropriation of values and beliefs, they become cultures of God’s grace. And, to the extent that they assist adolescents in becoming themselves before God as intelligent, free, and responsible subjects, it is only then that they advance God’s reign.

Chapter 4

Teaching the Dynamics of Wonder: School Teaching as a Dynamic Process that Fosters the Development of Critical Thinking

The previous chapter provided a developmental framework for understanding Lonergan's philosophy of education as promoting the development of the knowing and valuing subject. It is a process that Lonergan conceives as involving two complimentary movements: a movement inward through the handing down of values and beliefs from tradition, and a movement outward through the critical appropriation of values and beliefs for oneself. The chapter also placed Lonergan's notion of the developing subject in the broader context of Robert Kegan's theory of the evolving self as a self that continually organizes and reorganizes the meaning of the self-in-relation to the world through the development of new categories of meaning that allow greater understanding of both self and world. Finally, the chapter established a hermeneutical conversation between Lonergan's epistemology and that of Deanna Kuhn. For Lonergan (1985, 110), authentic human knowing and valuing involves moving beyond a "world of immediacy" toward a "world mediated by meaning and motivated by value." Similarly, Kuhn (2005, 31) traces the development of epistemological frameworks from a "realist" framework in infancy and toddlerhood, where knowledge consists of sense impressions, toward an "evaluativist" framework, where knowledge consists of the meaningful judgments of the knowing subject. For both Lonergan and Kuhn, such development is not automatic, but rather, requires an educational process that fosters the ongoing development of critical thinking capacities. It is the purpose of this chapter to explore more fully the dynamics of that process.

The overall goal of this chapter is to provide an educational framework for understanding the pedagogical significance of fostering critical thinking capacities in adolescence, using Lonergan's understanding of the dynamics of the knowing and valuing subject in dialogue with contemporary educational and religious educational theorists. It aims to unpack the role of promoting critical thinking capacities in adolescents as developing subjects. And, it seeks to situate the importance of the development of those capacities in the context of Catholic school teaching, in general, and in teaching religion in Catholic high schools, in particular. Altogether, this chapter aims at establishing the significance of fostering critical thinking capacities in adolescents, in order to help them grow as developing subjects.

The first part of this chapter examines the role of critical thinking in the context of school teaching. It explores the nature of critical thinking as a metacognitive process, drawing from the work of educational psychologist Deanna Kuhn and educational theorist Stephen Brookfield. It, then, considers Lonergan's notions of self-transcendence and self-appropriation as metacognitive processes that involve the critical appropriation of oneself as a knowing and valuing subject. Finally, building on Kuhn's research, it examines the pedagogy of fostering critical thinking in adolescence as a social learning process that involves engaging in critical dialogue with others in questioning, challenging, and critiquing established positions, inherited beliefs, and unexamined assumptions. The second section, then, deals with the role of critical thinking in Catholic schools. It examines the nature of the school classroom itself as a sacred space for intellectual inquiry, drawing on the work of Gabriel Moran and Kieran Scott. It, then, broadly locates the place of critical inquiry in the Catholic intellectual tradition, in

general, and in Catholic education, in particular. Lastly, it investigates Lonergan's notion of critical thinking as *habitus* in relation to Kuhn's concept of critical inquiry as an acquired intellectual virtue. The last section, then, analyzes the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic schools. It considers critical thinking in relation to the aims of teaching religion. It looks at the place of critical thinking in the overall religion curriculum. And, it explores the pedagogical significance of fostering critical thinking in teaching religion. Hence, this chapter provides an educational lens with which to view the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools, placing Lonergan's philosophy of education in a hermeneutical conversation with contemporary educational theorists.

Teaching for Critical Thinking

The Nature of Critical Thinking

At its etymological root, *critical* thinking is a process of discernment. The original Greek word "*kritikos*" means "able to discern," and it is related to the Greek word "*krino*," which means "to separate out," "to distinguish," "to decide." It is related to the Greek word for "judge" and it shares the same root as the English word "criterion" as a "means for judging" (*A Pocket Dictionary of the Greek and English Languages*, s.v. "*Κρινω, Κριτικός, Κριτήριο*;" *American Heritage Dictionary*, s.v. "Criterion"). Among its earliest usages in English, the word "critical" carries the connotation of "careful judgment" and it is closely related to one of the earliest modern English usages of the word "criticism" as the "art of judging" literary and artistic works (*Oxford English Dictionary, Compact Edition*, s.v. "Critical, Criticism"). In the early twentieth century, William Graham Sumner (1906, 632) defined "criticism" as an exercise of the "critical

faculty” that is the “product of education and training” which involves “the examination and test of propositions of any kind.” Thus, at its root, critical thinking is the ability to make ever clearer distinctions, to make ever more careful judgments, and to make even more discerning decisions.

In contemporary educational parlance, the term “critical thinking” has various connotations. Robert Ennis (1996, xvii) describes critical thinking as “a process, the goal of which is to make reasonable decisions about what to believe and what to do.” Mal Leicester (2010, 2) insists that critical thinking is “a mental act or process” that involves “our conscious attempt to make sense of our experience. . . to help us go on revising, expanding , and improving our mental map” of reality. And, M. Neil Browne and Stuart Keeley (2010, 3, emphasis added) argue that “critical thinking consists of an awareness of a set of interrelated critical questions, *plus* the ability and willingness to ask and answer them.” However, as Kuhn (1999, 17) points out, common to most descriptions of critical thinking, there is an underlying sense that thinking critically involves metacognitive awareness and examination of oneself in the process of thinking. Hence, critical thinking involves consciousness and intentionality. As John Dewey (1916, 145-146) notes, “thinking” is an “intentional endeavor to discover connections.” It is an “explicit rendering of the intelligent element in our experience” that allows the human person to discover meaning. Moreover, Dewey insists “no experience having a meaning is possible without some element of thought” (145). Critical thinking, then, is not simply an academic exercise; but rather, it involves growing in the ability to discover meaning for oneself, to discern values in one’s world, and to live one’s life authentically as a knowing and valuing subject, acting in the world.

Kuhn (1999, 18) underscores the metacognitive character of critical thinking when she identifies “epistemological meta-knowing” as central to the process of thinking critically. Essentially, “epistemological meta-knowing” involves developing the capacity to reflect on one’s own knowing, thus allowing greater participation of the knowing subject in the process of his or her own believing (18, 23). While this nascent critical thinking capacity emerges in early adolescence, Kuhn argues that its development is by no means automatic. Rather, cultivating this capacity in adolescents requires “educating for thinking” which promotes the developing metacognitive awareness of adolescents as knowing subjects (2005, 12).

Brookfield (2012, 1) identifies four key movements in the process of developing critical thinking, movements which involve increasing metacognitive awareness: identifying one’s own and others’ assumptions, checking the validity of those assumptions, examining assumptions from multiple points of view, and making “informed” decisions. Brookfield (2012, 3-4) suggests there are three main types of assumptions that need to be uncovered in the process of critical thinking: “causal,” “prescriptive” and “paradigmatic.” Causal assumptions are “explanatory” in nature (3). They explain why things are the way they are. They posit an underlying causal, explanatory structure for what happens in the world, and they fundamentally assume a particular way in which the world operates. For example, in asking the question “If God is good, then why does evil exist?” a certain causal assumption embedded in this question might be that “God is the cause of all things.” At the same time, prescriptive assumptions are assumptions about what “ought” to happen and the way things “ought” to be (Brookfield 2012, 18). They assume a particular framework for understanding the way

things should or should not be. For example, in the question above, a prescriptive assumption that could be operating might be that “God *should* not allow evil to exist.” Finally, paradigmatic assumptions encompass the ideologies and world-views that structure “the whole way we look at the world” (4). They assume a certain stance, a position, or a mental outlook. In the preceding example, an underlying paradigmatic assumption might be that “God is good” in the first place. As Brookfield (2012, 7) points out, each of these three types of assumptions is “embedded” in “mental outlooks” that frame beliefs, values, and decisions. According to Brookfield, then, the “core process” of critical thinking involves uncovering these assumptions in any position, whether one’s own or that of others. It is a process that brings conscious intentionality to critical reflection on any position. And, it involves cultivating what Brookfield (1987, 9) calls a “reflective skepticism” regarding any position, including one’s own, that is, a willingness to ask more probing questions, to look for more salient information, and to unmask still more hidden assumptions.

The second movement of critical thinking, according to Brookfield (2012, 12), requires checking the validity of those assumptions that are uncovered. It involves asking whether, and to what extent, assumptions are valid. It involves “identifying and assessing” evidence that supports and challenges those assumptions. And, it involves becoming “contextually aware” of the various contexts that shape and condition assumptions: personal, social, cultural, historical, religious, intellectual, political, and economic (1987, 8). Cultivating such contextual awareness entails asking why the ideas embedded in those assumptions are framed in a particular way, based on who is doing the framing. It includes analyzing the various layers and nuances of meaning that underlie the

concepts embedded in those assumptions. And, it involves making critical connections between related concepts and ideas that support or challenge those assumptions (Leicester 2010, 10). In the above example, for instance, there could be variously nuanced meanings of the concepts “God,” “evil,” and “good” that are operating, depending on who is using those terms and in what context. In addition, those concepts could be situated in various theological, philosophical, and ethical systems that frame how the concepts are used. Finally, those intellectual systems themselves could be variously situated in particular historical, cultural, and political networks that legitimate or de-legitimate specific usages of the concepts themselves. Thus, checking the validity of assumptions requires questioning, testing, and probing not just the what, but also, the who, when, where, how, and why of concepts and ideas in order to establish a broader analytical framework for assessing in what ways and to what extent assumptions are valid, reliable, and authentic descriptions of human experience.

Brookfield (2012, 12) identifies the third movement of critical thinking as looking at assumptions from multiple perspectives. It involves seeing ideas from different angles of vision, including opposite positions, as well as various intermediary ones. To take just one assumption from the above example, in critically analyzing the assumption “God is good,” one must also entertain the proposition “God is not good,” alongside multiple possible interpretations of God’s “goodness,” or lack thereof. In effect, looking at assumptions from multiple perspectives is a process of creatively imagining alternatives. Using the same example, other possible alternatives might include propositions such as “God does not exist,” or “God is the author of evil,” or perhaps “evil does not exist.” As Mal Leicester insists, “imagining alternatives” requires “creative thinking.” Thus,

creativity and imagination are essential to the process of critical thinking. It allows one to ask the question “What if. . . ?” And, it allows one to bring new perspectives and fresh insights to a question, idea, or problem at hand (Leicester 2010, 12). Far from discouraging imagination, then, fostering critical thinking requires it. As Maria Harris (1987, 9) notes, imagination “looks at reality from the reversed, unnoticed side; as such, it is the mind’s glory, the ample fullness of intelligence, rather than the thinness of reason alone.” Hence, while critical thinking incorporates various forms of reasoning on multiple levels, it cannot be reduced to reason alone, since it invites creativity, imagination, and alternative ways of thinking.

Finally, Brookfield (2012, 12) identifies the last movement of critical thinking as deciding to take “informed action.” For Brookfield, such a movement is not optional or superfluous to the whole process of critical thinking; but rather, it is essential insofar as critical thinking is directed toward a particular end or goal, namely that of living in consonance with one’s best thinking. Or, as Lonergan would say, it involves living as an authentic knowing and valuing subject. In this regard, growing in one’s ability to think critically is integral to one’s *praxis*, that is, to one’s critically reflective activity (Groome 1991, 44). It is an ongoing and never ending process that allows one “to go on revising, expanding,” and “improving” one’s “mental map” of reality in order to make better decisions, to take more informed actions, and to grow in greater awareness of oneself and one’s world (Leicester 2010, 2).

The Developing Subject as Critical Thinker

Brookfield’s four movements of critical thinking-identifying assumptions, checking assumptions, assessing assumptions from multiple perspectives, and taking

informed action—find resonance with Lonergan’s description of the four operations of human consciousness. At the empirical level of consciousness, attending to one’s experience includes attending to and identifying the beliefs and assumptions that structure one’s experiencing. At the intellectual level of consciousness, intelligently inquiring for understanding includes asking questions that test the validity of beliefs and assumptions. At the rational level of consciousness, reasonably judging includes assessing various positions and counter-positions that support or challenge beliefs and assumptions. And, at the deliberative level of consciousness, responsibly deciding includes taking informed action that is consonant with one’s authentic knowing and valuing. Thus, the process of self-transcendence itself is inclusive of the process of critical thinking insofar as authentically knowing and valuing is an ongoing process of testing, probing, and revising beliefs and assumptions. Fostering such a dynamically oriented, open-ended learning process, then, is the very basis for the knowing and valuing subject’s developing toward greater authenticity.

For Lonergan, the movement toward greater authenticity involves not only the uncovering of error, but also the uncovering of bias as well, both that of individuals and that of traditions and communities. As Lonergan (1971a, 44) notes, one promotes authenticity to the extent that one examines error “to uncover other connected views that in one way or another supported or confirmed it.” In turn, “these associates of the error may themselves be errors.” Moreover, “besides the false belief there is the false believer,” thus “one has to try to discover and correct the carelessness, the credulity, the bias that led one to mistake the false for the true” in the first place. In other words, moving toward greater authenticity requires growing in the capacity to think critically: by

carefully attending to beliefs and values in order to uncover assumptions, by intelligently inquiring into the errors and biases contained therein, by reasonably weighing assumptions in relation to other positions and counter-positions, and finally, by responsibly acting in accordance with the fruit of one's own authentic knowing and valuing. Hence, critical thinking is a constitutive dimension of the process of self-transcendence as the knowing and valuing subject grows in authentic subjectivity.

At the same time, critical thinking is also an integral aspect of the process of self-appropriation, insofar as it is through increasing metacognitive awareness of the operations of one's own knowing and valuing that one comes to possess more fully oneself as a knowing and valuing subject. Thus, the knowing and valuing subject does not simply experience the world as the object of experiencing; but rather, the subject also experiences him or herself precisely as a subject in performing the operations of knowing and valuing. Hence, one experiences "one's experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding." Likewise, one does not simply understand objects of understanding; but one also begins to understand oneself in "the unity and relations of one's experienced experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding." Similarly, one does not simply judge the validity of objects of understanding; one also judges "the reality of one's experienced and understood experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding." Finally, one does not simply decide among objects of value; but rather, one's deciding reveals "the spontaneous relatedness of one's experienced, understood, affirmed experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding" (Lonergan 1971a, 15). In effect, in authentically experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, the knowing and valuing subject increasingly takes possession of him or herself as a subject.

Moreover, through the transcendental operations of human consciousness, the knowing and valuing subject intends the objects of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. For Lonergan (1971a, 13), these intended objects of the transcendental operations are the respective transcendental notions of the beautiful, the intelligible, the true, and the good. Yet, as Lonergan notes, “one and the same operation not only intends an object, but also reveals an intending subject.” In other words, through the transcendental operations, the knowing and valuing subject comes to awareness not only of “what is intended,” but also of him or herself as “intending” (15). At the empirical level of consciousness, in intending or seeking the ordered coherence of beauty, not only is the beautiful revealed to the subject, but the subject is revealed to him or herself as capable of experiencing beauty. At the intellectual level of consciousness, in intending or seeking intelligibility, not only is the intelligible revealed to the subject, but the subject is revealed to him or herself as capable of understanding intelligibly. At the rational level of consciousness, in intending or seeking truth, not only is the true revealed to the subject, but the subject is revealed to him or herself as capable of judging truth. And, at the deliberative level of consciousness, in intending or seeking goodness, not only is the good revealed to the subject, but the subject is revealed to him or herself as capable of deciding to act for the good. Knowing and valuing, then, not only reveal knowledge and values; but also, they reveal the knowing and valuing subject to him or herself as a knower and chooser of values. Hence, the process of self-appropriation is a self-reflective, metacognitive process, whereby the knowing and valuing subject increasingly appropriates his or her own experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding at the meta-level of consciousness.

Such metacognitive awareness requires the development of “epistemological meta-knowing” that allows one to think about one’s own knowledge and how it is constructed (Kuhn 1999, 17). Along with Brookfield, Kuhn (1999, 23) maintains that the development of this metacognitive awareness is the key feature of critical thinking insofar as critical thinking “involves reflecting on what is known and how knowledge is justified.” For Kuhn (2005, 31), this “epistemological meta-knowing” enables one to move beyond the “absolutist” epistemology of childhood, which construes knowledge as facts “out there” to be possessed and the “multiplist” epistemology of early adolescence which construes knowledge as mere opinion. Instead, as noted in chapter three, it invites what Lonergan calls an intellectual conversion toward an “evaluativist” epistemology that conceives of knowledge as “judgments that can be evaluated and compared.” Here, critical thinking is “valued as a vehicle that promotes sound assertions and enhances understanding.” It allows one to begin questioning one’s own assumptions, to start uncovering one’s own biases, and to commence imagining alternative perspectives. It allows one to take possession of oneself as a knower and chooser of values. And, it allows one to grow in authentic subjectivity.

Developing critical thinking, then, is a constitutive dimension of the ongoing, twin processes of self-transcendence and self-appropriation. As developing subjects grow in their ability to reflect critically on themselves and their world, they increasingly take possession of themselves as knowing and valuing subjects precisely through their experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding for themselves. Critical thinking allows them to become more authentically themselves: to revise their beliefs, to change their minds, and to choose who they wish to become. It allows them to participate more

fully in the world of meaning and value. And, it allows them to engage more actively in the process of human becoming.

Critical Thinking as a Socially Interactive Process

Kuhn (2005, 14) points out that critical thinking develops in the context of social interaction. It is “embodied in the discourse people engage in to advance their individual and shared goals.” Without such interaction, there would be no challenge to move forward in one’s thinking. As Browne and Keely (2010, 11) observe, interaction with others, especially with those who hold different perspectives, who share different assumptions, and who bring different sets of experiences “stimulates our continued growth as thinking persons.” In effect, while critical thinking is thinking *for* oneself, it is never thinking *by* oneself. For, even when alone, one never thinks alone. Rather, one is always in conversation with multiple dialogue partners from both the past and present: through inherited forms of language that structure one’s world of meaning, through the learned stories and visions that structure one’s interpretive lenses of understanding, and through multiple ways of seeing that comprise the richly woven tapestry of human thought itself. Barbara Rogoff (1998, 680) argues that thinking is not “a property of individuals;” but rather, it is “an aspect of human sociocultural activity.” She points out that not only is knowledge created through an interactive social process, but the “tools for thinking” themselves have “social roots” which allow one to participate in the social creation of knowledge (682). Following Dewey, Rogoff asserts that thinking is “a mode of participation” in the social world, or what Lonergan calls the world of meaning and value (687). She insists that critical thinking develops “in collaboration with a community of thinkers in which more than one person is working on a particular

problem, with historical and material aspects of other people's solutions available to each thinker in their extended conversation" (726).

David Moshman (1998, 961) contends that this "extended conversation" is not only dialogic, but dialectical as well. It involves the development of "dialectical reasoning" that entails the ability to coordinate and evaluate multiple, even contradictory perspectives in order to develop more coherent frameworks for understanding. The development of this ability to think dialectically requires "a deliberate effort to make conceptual progress through active metacognition" (961). In other words, it requires actively attending to the assumptions that justify one's own beliefs, intelligently questioning the validity of those assumptions, reasonably weighing the veracity of those assumptions in light of alternative positions, and responsibly deciding to accept, reject, or revise one's own position. Moshman argues that the development of such reasoning "is a profoundly social process," insofar as one's thinking is challenged "in the face of alternative interpretations and viewpoints." Thus, dialectical reasoning emerges through "a collaborative process in which people formulate, communicate, criticize, justify, and revise their various ideas" (961). Maturing as a critical thinker, then, requires growing in the ability to think dialectically, an ability that necessitates encountering alternate perspectives, different viewpoints, as well as diverse and divergent interpretations.

Kuhn's research supports the idea that growth in the ability to think critically can be nurtured and that such growth is best fostered through discourse with others who hold different points of view. Kuhn (2005, 114) maintains that "argumentative discourse provides the individual with exposure to others' ideas and perspectives" and that "it aids in the expression and development of one's own ideas, through the process of

communicating them to others.” Moreover, engagement in such discourse further develops the metacognitive competencies necessary for critical thinking, most notably “epistemological meta-knowing.” In asking others to justify their knowledge claims, “students acquire the skills and values that lead them to pose the same questions to themselves” (115). Thus, through the development of the skills of argumentative discourse, students come “to appreciate that opinions require reasons to support them” (118). In effect, introducing students to argumentative discourse allows them to begin to move toward an “evaluativist epistemology” where knowledge is conceived as a set of “judgments that can be evaluated and compared” (31).

In introducing argumentative discourse in a variety of middle school classrooms, Kuhn developed a curriculum and a pedagogical process intended to teach the basic skills of argumentation to adolescents. Students worked collaboratively in groups of four to eight in pro or con teams based on their own initial positions concerning capital punishment. Students then worked with teachers who “served as coaches” and guides throughout the process of developing an argument and preparing rebuttals to counter-arguments. Finally, opposing teams faced each other, with each member taking a turn at a one-on-one argumentative discourse, with the proviso that students could confer with their teammates at any point during the debate (Kuhn 2005, 154-158). Throughout, emphasis was placed on the process of developing a well-reasoned argument. Over the course of several weeks, students were led through a process that asked them (1) to generate reasons that support their position, (2) to evaluate and elaborate on their reasons and to think about criteria for assessing the validity of those reasons, (3) to support those reasons with evidence, (4) to rate the strength of their reasons, (5) to construct an

argument around their best reasons, (6) to examine and evaluate the opposing side's reasons, (7) to offer counterarguments to the opposition's reasons, (8) to generate rebuttals to the opposition's counterarguments to the group's own reasons, (9) to consider and evaluate mixed evidence that could support either position, and (10) to engage in and critique practice dialogues with group members playing the role of the opposition (155-157). After this collaborative process, students then engaged in a sustained one-on-one argumentative discourse with members of the opposing side. Kuhn then compared the final dialogues to initial dialogues that occurred between the same pairs of students at the beginning of the process. Kuhn found that overall, students improved in their ability to argue against another's claims and to clarify their own positions. She also found that students actually grew in their ability to engage in authentic discourse. She notes that by and large, initial dialogues were generally not dialogues at all, but simply juxtapositions of claims and counter claims with little engagement with the other's position (159). Kuhn argues that the "externalization" of discourse through argumentation offers pedagogical scaffolding for the development of critical thinking in adolescents insofar as it engages students in thinking on both sides of an issue. She maintains that "if students learn to engage in this discourse covertly," that is "to conduct both sides of a conversation inside their heads," they are more likely to grow in their ability to think dialectically (171-172).

Brookfield (2012, 66) also emphasizes the pedagogical significance of encountering multiple perspectives in the classroom in order to foster critical thinking. He emphasizes that teachers need to model critical thinking by "engaging in structured devil's advocacy" that introduces counter-positions and objections to their own presentations. He advocates that teachers answer student generated questions from

different angles of vision and various theoretical positions, perhaps even by standing in different places in the classroom while wearing different hats as she or he does so (63). And, he advances the idea that teachers should pause in the middle of their presentations to identify the assumptions embedded in their own positions and to raise questions and objections to them (65). Thus, Brookfield highlights the need for “considerable teacher scaffolding” in fostering critical thinking, especially in the form of teacher modeling that shows students how to think critically (74).

At the same time, Brookfield underscores the importance of social interaction in learning to think critically. He insists that “to become aware of our assumptions we need to find some lenses that reflect back to us” those very assumptions. According to Brookfield, such “lenses” are found in those who question, challenge, or simply help one to clarify one’s own assumptions (57). To the extent that “critical thinking describes the process we use to uncover and check our assumptions,” this socially interactive mirroring is an integral part of developing as critical thinkers (159). He maintains, then, that critical thinking is best fostered through discussion and debate. However, as he points out, not all conversation is critical discussion and not all argument is critically reflective debate. Brookfield and Preskill (2005, 7) insist that “conversing critically implies an openness to rethinking cherished assumptions and to subjecting those assumptions to a continuous round of questioning, argument, and counterargument.” They contend that such critical discussion is best fostered through encounters with diverse perspectives on a topic that stimulate and challenge students’ own thinking and their own interpretive stances (22). Moreover, they maintain that “a good discussion is one that leaves issues open for further inquiry” where “as many questions are raised as are answered.” (23). Hence, inviting

students to raise questions of one another, of the subject matter, and of authors “to help clarify and explain,” “to extend and deepen the conversation,” and to understand another’s point of view is an essential component of fostering critical thinking in the classroom (95).

In order to develop as critical thinkers, then, students must be exposed to multiple perspectives, various interpretations, and opposing points of view. Genuine critical conversation is always *dialectical*, that is, an exchange *between* different viewpoints. As Bell Hooks (2010, 46) notes, such conversations are never “one-dimensional;” rather, “they always confront us with different ways of seeing and knowing.” Thus, critical thinking is best learned through a socially interactive process that includes debate, discussion, and questioning for discovery. Therefore, fostering critical thinking abilities in adolescents requires creating dialogic classrooms that promote ongoing discourse, that encourage the exploration of alternative angles of vision, and that invite all questions, test all assumptions, and probe all ways of thinking. Creating such dialogic classrooms requires a commitment to genuine inquiry on the part of both teachers and students. It requires opening spaces for critical conversation where, as Parker Palmer (1993, 98) notes, it is necessary “not only that we listen to one another, but also to the subject at hand” as having its own distinct voice in the conversation “that can speak its own truth and resist our tendency to reduce it to our terms.” And, as Maria Harris (1987, 72) observes, it requires that teachers and students alike “come to content as questioners, presenting questions to one another and to subject matter.” In a word, creating such dialogic classrooms that foster critical thinking requires a commitment to wonder, where questions are more important than answers, where teachers and students approach content

together as learners, and where students are truly honored as intelligent, free, and responsible subjects.

The Place of Critical Thinking in Catholic Schools

Critical Thinking and the Language of the School Classroom

Gabriel Moran (1989, 239) emphasizes that the central feature of Catholic schools is the rather obvious, though often misunderstood reality that they are, in fact, schools. As noted earlier, for Lonergan (1985, 181-182), the purpose of schooling is two-fold: the handing down of the rich heritage of tradition to students and the development of students as authentic knowing and valuing subjects. It is in this dynamic interplay between these two vectors of education that schooling fulfills what Dwayne Huebner (1974, 5) calls the “conserving” and “liberating” aspects of education. For Huebner, “curriculum is the conserving pole and teaching in the liberating pole of educational activity.” These two aspects stand in creative tension “in a dialectical process between that which is conserved and the emancipation” to “reinterpret” that content in order to “project new possibilities” for the future (5-6). Schooling, then, prepares individuals to become active members of a tradition, not only by handing down its heritage, but also by empowering them to become critically reflective participants in reshaping that heritage. Thus, by definition, schools ought to be places where critical thinking is not only encouraged, but cultivated, where questions are not only invited, but stimulated, and where debate, dialogue, and discussion are not only allowed, but central to the process of teaching and learning. As Moran (1989, 239) notes, a school “is a zone of intellectual freedom where all questions can be asked and where all loyalty oaths, except the quest for truth, are suspended.” And, he warns, “a religious body sponsoring a school should know what it is getting into.”

While schools may house multiple forms of education: communal, leisure, and work forms, Moran (1997, 161-162) emphasizes that central to the purpose of the school is school teaching itself, and central to that purpose is the classroom as a place of inquiry, discovery, and critical reflection. He observes that “the classroom is a deliberately invented setting for one kind of learning:” critical reflection (162). Moreover, central to the process critical reflection is the language of academic discourse which tests, probes, and questions meaning. Academic discourse includes both the languages of “dialectical discussion” and “academic criticism.” Dialectical discussion allows students to “observe a play of conflicting ideas,” while academic criticism questions the very meaning of those ideas themselves (134-136). Thus, as Kieran Scott (2005, 71) insists, “When a student, then, enters a classroom in a school, he or she enters into a particular kind of discourse, namely academic speech.” It is a language form “concerned with meaning” that “questions the adequacy of every form of expression” and that turns “speech back on itself” in order to “investigate its assumptions, biases, and meanings” (71, 69). In effect, academic speech is the language of critical thinking. It is the language of discourse and debate. It is the language of questioning and critiquing. And, it is the language that teachers must teach and that students must learn if the classroom is to fulfill its role in fostering students’ development as critical thinkers.

Scott (2005, 66) notes that teaching in a school classroom, then, “offers an invitation. . . to go in search of deeper and richer understanding.” It is a process of offering “resistance to certitude” and to “cognitive and imaginative closure.” And, it is a process that “opens up complexity and ambiguity” through ongoing critical questioning, critical reflection, and critical analysis of assumptions, positions, and inherited beliefs. As

Lonergan (1993, 221) suggests, school teaching is directed toward opening students out toward new worlds of meaning and value. It is an invitation to explore new horizons of wonder. And, ultimately, its purpose is to hand students over to themselves as authentic knowing and valuing subjects. Thus, as Scott (2005, 69) insists, the schoolteacher “does not tell people what to think;” rather, the schoolteacher helps students critically examine their own understanding through critical discourse. In essence, the schoolteacher cannot think for his or her students. But, he or she can show students how to think well by helping them critically examine assumptions, biases, and presuppositions in their own thinking and that of others. As Lonergan (1993, 115) observes, the schoolteacher can “stimulate” students’ thinking “by making things puzzling in one way or another.” They can invite more nuanced, critically reflective conversations in the classroom. And, they can initiate students into the language of academic discourse, empowering them to become authentic conversation partners in a mutual journey of discovery.

Critical Thinking and the Catholic Intellectual Tradition

John Haughey (2009, 61) makes an important distinction between the Catholic “sacred tradition” and the “Catholic intellectual tradition.” The Catholic sacred tradition includes the sacred texts, doctrines, and symbols of the Catholic Church, while the Catholic intellectual tradition is a broader search for meaning and value that connects that tradition with the wider world of scholarship, human creativity, and intellectual activity. Haughey argues that while it grows out of the Catholic Church’s engagement with the world as faith seeks understanding, its concerns go beyond theological questions to encompass “potentially every field of knowledge” (63). As Richard Liddy (2009, 3) notes, “If the Christian message is to be communicated to all nations,” the Church needs

to enlarge its “horizons to include an accurate understanding of the cultures and languages of the people” with whom it engages in ongoing critical conversation. As such, the Catholic intellectual tradition is not static, but a dynamic, critically reflective “learning tradition” that is vibrant, growing, and alive (Haughey 2009, 64).

At the same time, Haughey (2009, 62) observes, “There is a dialectical relationship” between the doctrinal authority of the magisterium which conserves Catholic sacred tradition and “the Catholic intellectual tradition whose authority is located in the quality of scholarship” of those engaged in various fields of inquiry. It is a dialectical relationship founded on a common quest for truth. As John Paul II (1998, 7) highlights in *Fides et Ratio*, “Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to contemplation of the truth; and God has placed in the human heart a desire to know the truth—in a word, to know himself—so that by knowing and loving God, men and women may also come to know the fullness of truth about themselves.” Hence, it is a common quest that must recognize that faith and reason are complimentary, not contradictory. It is a quest where faith must truly seek understanding. And, it is a quest where both the Catholic intellectual tradition and the Catholic sacred tradition must remain ever open, ever expanding, and ever beckoning to new horizons of wonder, lest either tradition become static, fixed, and immobile. As Haughey (2009, 62) observes, each tradition needs the other since “the capacity of each to be critical of the other keeps both of them in a healthy dialectic” that forms a creative tension that allows growth, development, and creative fidelity to tradition.

Cyril Orji (2013, 28) points out that a natural embodiment of the Catholic intellectual tradition as a learning tradition has been the creation of schools as places for

teaching and learning. Orji observes that early on the Catholic Church concerned itself with schooling from Origen's catechetical school in Alexandria in the second century A.D. to the development of cathedral schools and universities in the middle ages to various contemporary forms of Catholic schooling. Haughey (2009, 69) notes that a school "is an enterprise in understanding" and that a Catholic school, then, is "an enterprise in understanding" that is "open to the world in the light of faith." While the mission of the Catholic sacred tradition, then, "is to enable believers and would-be-believers to inhabit the story of the [Catholic] faith," the mission of the Catholic intellectual tradition "is to enable and encourage scholarship," including scholarship that critically examines that sacred tradition in order to help make that tradition's engagement with the world "more intelligent and more credible" (85). Thus, as a manifestation of the Catholic intellectual tradition, the Catholic school ought to be a place that invites critical questions concerning meaning and value, especially questions of ultimate meaning and value. It ought to be a place that encourages critical conversations that engage in thoughtful and serious debate concerning substantive issues that affect the world today. And, it ought to be a place that promotes the development of critical thinking capacities in the developing subject, recognizing as *Gaudium et Spes* notes that "The human spirit must be cultivated in such a way that there results a growth in its ability to wonder, to understand, to contemplate, to make personal judgments, and to develop a religious, moral, and social sense" (Abbott 1966, 265).

Michael Himes (2008, 234) emphasizes that, at its best, the Catholic intellectual tradition is informed by a Catholic theological vision that takes seriously Christianity's claim of the Incarnation, the claim that God enters fully into humanity. Such an

incarnational vision, he maintains, leads to an underlying principle that ought to imbue all activities in Catholic schools, namely, “whatever humanizes divinizes.” That is, “whatever makes you more genuinely human, more authentically, richly powerfully human, whatever calls into play all the reaches of your intellect, your freedom, energy, your talents and creativity, makes you more like God.” Thus, “whatever expands the mind opens the imagination, frees the will, enlarges our capacities as human beings,” allowing human persons to become more fully who they are as persons made in the image and likeness of God (235). Schools informed by this Catholic vision, then, have an obligation to foster the growth of students as authentic subjects, and thus to promote their authentic knowing and valuing as intelligent, free, and responsible persons, made in the image of the divine.

Himes further argues that this incarnational vision is embodied in human community and that community comprises the whole of the Catholic intellectual tradition, which extends beyond the bounds of Catholicism to embrace the richness of human conversation with those living and dead (237). As Orji (2013, 35) notes, the Catholic intellectual tradition comprises “the human search for the fullness of God” that “is carried out everywhere and by everyone who believes in truth and value.” Or, to use Lonergan’s terms, it is embodied in the authentic search for meaning and value. Liddy (2009, 5) notes, “The Catholic intellectual tradition finds expression, then, not just in philosophical and theological works, but also in poetry, and art; architecture and music.” It finds expression in the work of scientists, scholars, and explorers. It finds expression in the work of journalists, authors, and filmmakers. And, it finds expression through social media, websites, and emerging forms of communication.

The Catholic intellectual tradition, then, embraces a wide community of inquiry with many and varied voices, from both the past and present. It engages those voices in an ongoing critical conversation that is “trans-temporal” as well as “trans-spatial” (Himes 2009, 238). And, as Liddy (2009, 6) points out, while it is a conversation that includes voices from the past, it “is not confined to the truths defined in the past; rather, it invites creativity in the present” in order to imagine new possibilities for the future. The quest for meaning and value, then, is dialectical in nature, since it is only through encounters with the other that one attends to one’s experience of the other, inquires for understanding the other, compares and weighs one’s reasoning against that of the other, and takes a responsible stance toward the other. Whether they are encounters with Picasso or Plato, Emily Dickinson or Emmet Till, Alice Tulley or Tertullian, one authentically engages in conversation with the other, when another voice that is distinctly not one’s own is allowed to emerge in the discourse.

Historically, discussion, discourse, and debate have a long and rich heritage within the Catholic intellectual tradition. In the Acts of the Apostles, Paul is described as debating in the synagogue in Athens and “daily in the public square” where “even some of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers engaged him in discussion” (Acts 17:17-18). Early patristic thinkers such as Clement and Origen of Alexandria attempted to engage “Greek philosophical modes of thought” with theology for “a deeper understanding” of Christian beliefs (Leinsle 2010,16-17). Medieval scholastic theology as practiced in universities adopted the *quaestio* as “a privileged place for the questioning of truth,” as a form of instruction that “has its source in the dialogical, dialectical questions of antiquity” (40-41). It is a method that found its full flourishing in public disputations “as

a field of intellectual activity in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries” that posed questions and required debaters to offer “arguments for the opposite answer as well,” the very method that structures Aquinas’ *Summa Theologiae* (41-42). As Moran (2002, 212) points out, in these medieval *disputatio*, one could not answer an objection until one repeated” the objection to the full satisfaction of the one objecting. Hence, they required carefully attending to the argument of the other. With the advent of the printing press, public intellectual debates could be carried on through published tracts, such as those between Luther and Erasmus on the question of free will (See MacCulloch 2003, 151). Thus, at its best, the Catholic intellectual tradition has recognized the educational value of dialectical discourse for clarifying ideas, posing questions, and raising objections in the face of alternative positions, challenging problems, and even opinions considered heterodox.

Haughey (2009, 88) insists, then, that as a learning tradition the Catholic intellectual tradition “can learn from anyone” through discourse with others. It is an open invitation to extended conversation; and as such, it ought to be a “tradition of hospitality” with a capacious “ability to host otherness” in its schools (89). Using a similar image, Michael Himes notes that teachers in Catholic schools ought to be “like good hosts and hostesses. . . at a cocktail party,” where “students are the newcomers standing at the door wondering how to begin the conversation.” Teachers are the ones “who take them by the arm and say ‘Wonderful to see you! Let me introduce you!’” Thus, according to Himes, teachers in Catholic schools ought to facilitate students’ encounters in an “enormously immense conversation with people of different places and extraordinarily different times” that comprise the ongoing conversation of the Catholic intellectual tradition (238).

Such conversation is never one-dimensional for students themselves are invited to become active participants in that multifaceted discourse, bringing their own sets of experiences, their own prior understandings, their own preconceived judgments, and their own previously made decisions. Yet, if they are willing to enter into real conversation, to engage in genuine discourse with multiple voices, and to be truly open to further experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, then, paradoxically, they can begin to appropriate themselves as knowing and valuing subjects in the encounter with the other as their world of meaning and value is expanded. They can begin to enter the discourse as authentic subjects-in-relation. And, they can begin to take possession of their own knowing, believing, and valuing. As Lonergan (1985, 182) notes, it is then that one can “move beyond dialectic to dialogue, to transpose issues from a conflict of statements to an encounter of persons.” Michele Saracino points out that “dialectical encounter encompasses the process by which the subject is challenged by another’s position,” where “dialogue is an event in which the subject and the other can move from conflict to friendship.” Thus, Saracino insists, “an encounter with alterity can challenge and reposition the subject to an alternative posture, to a higher viewpoint” (2003, 141). Inviting students in Catholic schools, then, to engage in the ongoing critical discourse of the Catholic intellectual tradition opens them up not only to new horizons of meaning and value; but also, it opens them out to new ways of relating and being in the world.

Critical Thinking as Intellectual Virtue

If critical thinking is a socially interactive process that emerges from the engagement of subjects in dialectical discourse with the other, then it requires openness on the part of subjects to engage in that discourse. Here, Lonergan makes a distinction

between three interrelated dimensions of openness: openness as gift, openness as fact, and openness as achievement (1967a, 199). As Saracino (2003, 166) notes, “Openness as gift refers to the graced relationship with God that invites transcendence.” It is the basic orientation toward self-transcendence that is given to the subject, orienting the person out toward mystery. It is an invitation through the human person’s “insertion in community and history,” to move out toward the other (Lonergan 1985, 76). And, it is a gifted stance toward the world that Saracino (2003, 61) calls “the open posture” of the subject.

Openness as fact refers to “the pure desire to know” which arises from the gift of openness (Lonergan 1967a, 199). And, openness as achievement refers to the ongoing, sustained practice of openness toward the other. Lonergan (1967a, 199) contends that openness as achievement involves both the intentional “orientation of consciousness” toward mystery, arising from the “unrestricted desire to know,” and also the unrestricted view and intentional seeking of that which “our knowledge can attain.” In other words, it involves the basic orientation of the subject toward infinite horizons of wonder.

Saracino (2003, 84) points out that openness as achievement is “a lifelong journey of diligence and responsibility, that requires humility, trust, and risk.” It requires the humility to be open to revising one’s own position through encounters with the other. It requires the trust to be able to engage the other in authentic dialogue. And, it requires taking the risk of being opened up to other ideas, fresh insights, and new horizons of meaning. Saracino observes that such openness involves the ongoing process of the self-appropriation of the subject. This requires the cultivation of a conscious intentionality of “being open to the self-corrective dynamism” of the transcendental operations: experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding (83). As Neil Ormerod (2012, 981)

observes, this ongoing process of self-appropriation leads one toward intellectual conversion which “emerges” as both a commitment and a conviction. It is “a commitment to one’s own basic orientation to meaning, truth and goodness;” and it is “a conviction” in that commitment. Yet, like all commitments, it must be sustained, and, like all convictions it must be renewed. Thus, openness as achievement requires ongoing commitment to the process of self-transcendence through attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible inquiry in light of the other. It requires sustained practice of self-reflective awareness of oneself as a knowing and valuing subject. And, it requires renewed conviction in oneself as a critical thinker, capable of testing, probing, and revising one’s own knowledge, values, and beliefs in light of new information, revitalized understandings, and reconsidered judgments. In a word, it requires the practice of intellectual virtue.

Alasdair MacIntyre (1984, 191) describes virtue as “an acquired human quality, the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.” He further asserts that the cultivation of virtue involves practice and participation. As practice, it is ongoing and habitual. As participation it is sustained and nurtured in a community of practice (191). In the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas identifies “intellectual habit” as a virtue, akin to the work of a craftsperson, requiring sustained practice in understanding and wisdom (ST I-II, Q 57, Art. 2-3, 1947, 828-829). Following Aquinas, Lonergan (1967b, 186) insists that intellectual habits are “habits of understanding” that involve “learning. . . developing and expressing.” According to Lonergan, such practice “enables us to recast definitions, to adjust principles,” and “to

throw chains of reasoning into new perspectives according to variations of circumstances and exigencies of the occasion” (185). In effect, intellectual habit is the virtue of thinking critically. It involves the ongoing practice of carefully attending, intelligently inquiring, reasonably judging, and responsibly deciding for the beautiful, the intelligible, the true, and the good. It involves the practice of conscious, metacognitive awareness of the operations of one’s own knowing and valuing. And, it is the practice and renewal of one’s commitment to one’s own authentic subjectivity. As Joseph Flanagan (1997, 232) observes, “Truly authentic knowers are continually struggling knowers, always on alert for further questions that will advance their accumulated knowing or reverse their mistaken assumptions and judgments.”

Yet, as a virtue, critical thinking and its commitment to be a “struggling” knower cannot be cultivated and sustained alone. Rather, it requires a community of practice to sustain the commitment to struggle. As Kuhn (2005, 35-36) notes, “intellectual values. . . cannot be instilled by exhortation.” Rather, only by experiencing themselves as critical thinkers can students be led “to the conviction that inquiry and reasoned argument offer the most promising path to deciding between competing claims, resolving conflicts, solving problems, and achieving goals.” Such experiences require inviting them into “a community of thinkers,” who engage in “extended conversation” (Rogoff 1998, 726). The Catholic intellectual tradition forms just such a community and the Catholic school classroom, ideally, is one such locus for that conversation to take place. Moreover, as Haughey (2009, 35) notes, creating such community in Catholic schools requires “the praxis of hospitality,” that is, a critically reflective practice of inviting the other into the conversation. Or, as Saracino (2003, 164-165) argues, “openness in the form of

hospitality” ought to be informed, in the Catholic tradition, by the virtue of charity as a “loving, open” “disposition” to the other. Kathleen Talavacchia (2003, 39) emphasizes that in the classroom, creating such openness requires fostering real listening that “demands attentiveness” to the other, where the goal is “not only hearing, but understanding.” Thus, as a community of practice, the Catholic school classroom can inculcate a truly “catholic” intellectual vision that invites students into a universally open and charitable dialogue with multiple voices, both past and present, where faith truly seeks understanding of those whom it engages, and where students develop the virtues of openness, hospitality, and commitment to authentic intellectual engagement in the search for meaning and value.

Critical Thinking and Teaching Religion

Moran (1989, 238) emphasizes that there are two distinct aims under the rubric of “religious education,” namely “teaching religion” and “teaching to be religious.” The former, Moran points out, is an academic endeavor whose purpose is to foster critical understanding of religion, while the latter involves “formation in being religious” (218). The first is a scholarly enterprise, while the second is confessional in nature. The first generally takes place in the context of the school classroom, while the second takes place in the context of a faith community. While these two ends can be complimentary, they stand in a creative tension, especially in the context of a religiously sponsored school.

In the context of Catholic schools, while there often has been a blurring and confusion in some ecclesial documents of the two distinct purposes of religious education-academic, on the one hand, and catechetical, on the other, there is also ecclesial recognition that these are two distinct purposes. For example, the Congregation

for Catholic Education's (1988, 31) *The Religious Dimension of Education in a Catholic School*, recognizes that "There is a close connection, and at the same time, a clear distinction between religious instruction and catechesis." It is a "connection that makes it possible for a school to remain a school and still integrate culture with the message of Christianity." The document further acknowledges that "the aim of catechesis" is "the handing on of the Gospel message," while "the aim of the school, however, is knowledge" (32). Similarly, the Congregation for Catholic Education's (2009, 17) *Circular Letter to the Presidents of Bishop's Conferences on Religious Education in Schools* reiterates that "catechesis aims at fostering personal adherence to Christ and the development of Christian life. . . whereas religious education in schools gives the pupils knowledge about Christianity's identity and the Christian life." For this reason, the *General Directory for Catechesis* emphasizes that "the relationship between religious instruction in schools and catechesis is one of distinction and complementarity." It goes on to say that "it is necessary, therefore, that religious instruction in schools appear as a scholastic discipline with the same systematic demands and the same rigor as other disciplines" (Congregation for the Clergy 1998, 64-65).

However, in spite of these official clarifications, there appears to remain confusion, especially at the episcopal level in the United States, as to the nature of teaching religion in Catholic schools. The USCCB's (2005, 232) *National Directory for Catechesis*, for example, makes no distinction between religious instruction in schools and catechesis; rather, it insists that "Catechetical instruction in the Catholic school should be based on the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*" and that "It should be coordinated with the catechetical plan of the parish or parishes to which it is connected."

Moreover, it emphasizes that “Religion teachers in Catholic schools have the same responsibilities and perform many of the same functions as parish catechists.” This blurring of the distinction between the academic purpose of teaching religion in Catholic schools and the formational goals of catechesis is further highlighted in the USCCB’s (2008, 1) *Doctrinal Elements of a Curriculum Framework for the Development of Catechetical Materials for Young People of High School Age*. The *Curriculum Framework* proposes an all-inclusive curriculum “designed to guide catechetical instruction for young people of high school age, wherever and however it takes place: in Catholic high schools, in parish religious education programs, with young people schooled at home, or within the context of the catechetical instruction which should be part of youth ministry programs.” Thus, the distinction made in the *General Directory for Catechesis* between religious instruction in Catholic schools and catechesis is conspicuously absent in the U.S. Bishop’s *Curriculum Framework*. This absence poses serious educational questions for the teaching of religion in Catholic schools in the United States: Is teaching religion in Catholic schools to be approached as an academic subject with the same academic “rigor” as any other subject taught in a Catholic school, as the *GDC* suggests? Or, is teaching religion in Catholic schools conceived as a type of catechetical formation whose purpose is to initiate students into the Catholic faith? In other words, is teaching religion in Catholic schools pedagogy or mystagogy?

Some have argued for a sharp distinction or “divorce” between the catechetical aims of Catholic schools and the academic aims of teaching religion in the Catholic school classroom. This approach recognizes that while there are catechetical, that is, religiously formative elements, contained in the overall purpose of Catholic schools,

teaching religion as an academic subject in a school classroom is distinct and separate from those purposes (See Rossiter 1982, Moran 1989, Scott 2005). At the same time, there are those who argue that critical academic inquiry is not foreign to the catechetical enterprise and that they should be integrated together in the religion classroom and that “there should be no divorce for the children’s sake” between religious instruction and catechesis (See Groome 2002). However, the researcher maintains that this apparent tension between the academic and the catechetical dimensions of religious education in Catholic schools is best understood if examined in light of Lonergan’s description of the whole process of knowing and valuing.

Lonergan consistently emphasizes that knowing is not just “taking a look,” that is, knowing is not simply taking information in from the outside. Rather, knowing is a dynamic process that involves carefully attending to the data of one’s experiencing to seek ordered patterns of coherence, intelligently inquiring for understanding the data of one’s experiencing to seek intelligibility, and reasonably judging one’s understanding against the backdrop of other understandings to draw reasonable conclusions regarding the truth of one’s understanding. In effect, the process of knowing is not seeing, but *seeking* meaning. And, knowledge does not consist of information taken in, but of judgments about meaning. As noted earlier, this process is open-ended, ongoing, and open to revision.

Yet, as Lonergan insists, the dynamic process of knowing first rests on believing insofar as one inherits certain beliefs and values that one accepts without fully having tested them for oneself. This corresponds to Lonergan’s (1985, 181) notion of the first movement of education as development “from above downward,” where beliefs and

values are handed down from tradition. Through an educational process of socialization, training, and upbringing one's beliefs are formed before one can authentically "appropriate all that one has learned by proceeding as does the original thinker." In terms of teaching religion in Catholic high schools, this means that students already enter the religion classroom with a variety of religious beliefs they have previously inherited from various sources: family, religious communities, prior schooling, peers, the media, and society at large. These include beliefs about the existence or non-existence of God, beliefs about the credulity or incredulity of certain religious tenants, and beliefs about the universe and their place within it. Such beliefs help constitute their world of meaning and comprise part of their knowledge of that world. As knowledge, then, these beliefs consist of students' own judgments as knowing subjects, albeit, based largely on judgments inherited from others. These judgments can remain untested, unexamined, and unreflected upon. However, as indicated earlier, it is precisely the purpose of the school classroom to help students critically reflect on their own process of knowing and believing in order to help them uncover assumptions, reveal biases, and correct distortions in their own thinking and that of others.

The religion classroom, then, actively engages the knowing and valuing subject in the process of knowing, a process whose purpose is the discovery of meaning. Moreover, as suggested earlier, a constitutive dimension of this dynamic process involves critical thinking. In the case of teaching religion, it involves attending to the assumptions that structure one's religious horizon and that underlie one's religious experiencing, intelligently inquiring for understanding by checking the validity of those assumptions, and reasonably weighing those assumptions against counter-positions in order to make

more informed judgments. Thus, teaching religion in the Catholic school classroom ought to engage students in ongoing academic discourse for greater depth of religious knowledge, broader religious understanding, and a fuller conceptualization of the meaning of the religious.

Beyond the operations for knowing, however, Lonergan identifies the operation for valuing which occurs at the deliberative level of consciousness. This operation is that of deciding. It occurs as an exercise of authentic freedom. And, it invites responsible action. As Lonergan (1985, 132) notes, “On previous levels there stood in the foreground the self-transcendence of coming to know. But deliberation confronts us with the challenge of self-direction, self-actualization, self-mastery, even self-sacrifice.” Its dimensions extend far beyond the boundaries of the classroom since it is actualized in the choices one makes in daily living, in the causes one chooses to embrace, and in the commitments one decides to enter into. Yet, it is not wholly unrelated to the activities of the classroom insofar as responsible deciding ought to be informed by one’s authentic knowing. To the extent that the school classroom engages knowing and valuing subjects in the process of breaking open meaning, it liberates and empowers them to make informed decisions for authentic valuing. Without this dynamic interplay between knowing and valuing, the subject runs the risk of making uniformed, ill-informed, or even misinformed decisions. Nevertheless, the chief educational purpose of the classroom remains the process of knowing and thus focuses on attentive, intelligent, and reasonable inquiry for understanding, understanding that hopefully can guide students in making responsible and informed decisions beyond the classroom.

To take a simple illustration, in teaching Shakespeare to high school students, while the teacher may hope, wish, and pray that his or her students come to love Shakespeare, the goal of teaching Shakespeare in the English classroom is more modest. It is to help students understand Shakespeare, in other words, to break open the meaning of his language. As a result of their encounter with Shakespeare in the classroom, however, some students may decide that they love Shakespeare so much that they are going to read all of his works on their own. Some may decide to go to a performance of *Hamlet* or *Macbeth*. And, some may be so inspired as to dedicate their entire lives to becoming Shakespearean actors or Shakespeare scholars. While these decisions are all, no doubt, uplifting to the teacher of Shakespeare, they are not the goal of teaching Shakespeare to students in an English classroom. The student who leaves the classroom and decides he or she prefers Sylvia Plath to Shakespeare is no less academically engaged if he or she leaves the classroom with a better *understanding* of Shakespeare.

To extend the illustration further, in order to make an informed decision regarding Shakespeare one needs to be exposed to multiple texts and multiple interpretations of Shakespeare. The student who never read Shakespeare, but has heard from his or her English teacher that Shakespeare is too obscure and out-of-date, and so decides never to bother reading Shakespeare makes an uninformed decision. The student who reads only one Shakespeare play in English class and is given only the teacher's interpretation to memorize and repeat back on the test, and then decides never to read Shakespeare again makes an ill-informed decision. And, the student who does not actually read Shakespeare, but is only given the teacher's biased summary and slanted interpretation of *Hamlet*, and then decides he or she does not like Shakespeare makes a misinformed decision. In

contrast, the student who reads multiple works by Shakespeare, who is exposed to multiple, even contradictory, interpretations, and who is constantly challenged to re-think the meaning of Shakespeare's texts is better prepared to make an informed decision regarding his or her valuing of Shakespeare. Thus, to the extent that the classroom focuses on the process of seeking informed understanding, it contributes to the process of one's informed deciding.

In terms of teaching religion in a Catholic high school classroom, the same dynamic applies. As pedagogy in a school classroom, its purpose is to engage students in the process of seeking intelligent understanding of religion, to break open the meaning of texts, doctrines, and practices, and to help them critically reflect on their own religious assumptions, biases, and presuppositions. In other words, the purpose of teaching religion in Catholic high schools is to engage in what the *GDC* refers to "religious instruction" as a "scholastic discipline" (1998, 65). At the same time, as the *GDC* suggests, this instruction, while distinct from catechesis, whose purpose is the formation of the believer, is, nonetheless complementary insofar as it aids in the process of informed believing (1998, 64). Just as the student of Shakespeare is aided in his or her decision to value or not to value Shakespeare by greater understanding of Shakespeare, so too, the student of religion is aided in his or her decision for believing or not believing certain religious doctrines by growing in greater understanding of them. In effect, academic instruction in religion prepares the way for students to move beyond what Newman (1955, 21) calls "notional assent," that is, "assents made upon habit and without reflection" toward "real assent" which involves a critical appropriation of beliefs and values as one's own. As Thomas Groome (2002, 592) points out, real assent is a

commitment “to living what we know.” To the extent that the religion classroom guides students in the process of authentic knowing, it prepares them for the lifelong process of authentic valuing. To the extent that it invites them to critically reflect on their beliefs and values, it prepares them to make informed decisions regarding what they truly believe and what they genuinely value. And, to the extent that the religion classroom fosters the twin processes of the self-transcendence and self-appropriation of students as knowing and valuing subjects, it prepares them to live intelligent, free, and responsible religious lives.

Conclusion

If one of the educational purposes of Catholic schools is to help young people develop as authentic knowing and valuing subjects, then teaching in a Catholic high school classroom requires fostering the critical thinking capacities of adolescents as a constitutive dimension of the dynamic process of knowing. No less is true of teaching religion in Catholic high schools, where the goal of teaching religion as an academic subject is not religious, but intellectual conversion that invites students to enter new horizons of meaning. Such conversion aims at moving them beyond the unexamined assumptions of an “absolutist epistemology” and the narrowly relativistic framework of a “multiplist epistemology” toward an “evaluativist epistemology” where knowledge is understood as consisting of the judgments of the knowing subject (Kuhn 2005, 32). This shift in understanding allows them to develop more informed opinions concerning their religious beliefs and values and to begin to take ownership of those beliefs and values for themselves. The intellectual conversion of the subject at the level of knowing, then, prepares the way for the moral conversion of subject at the level of valuing and further

religious conversion of the subject as “a being-in-love” with God as “the efficacious ground of all self-transcendence” (Lonergan 1978, 19). As Lonergan (1985, 247) notes, “Conversion is three-dimensional. It is intellectual inasmuch as it regards our orientation to the intelligible and the true. It is moral inasmuch as it regards our orientation to the good.” And, “It is religious inasmuch as it regards our orientation to God.”

Rather than divorcing the academic and the catechetical dimensions of the Catholic school, then, Lonergan’s description of the dynamic relationship between knowing and valuing clarifies the interplay between the two as one of creative cohabitation, not separation. In teaching religion as an academic subject, the knowing and valuing subject is invited into the process of *knowing*: critically attending, inquiring, and judging to understand the meaning of religious texts, doctrines, and practices. Through the religiously formative dimensions of the Catholic school-liturgical celebrations, campus ministry, and spiritual counseling-the knowing and valuing subject is invited into the process of *valuing* in choosing what to believe and how to practice those beliefs. As the U.S. bishops point out, “Catholic schools provide young people with opportunities to deepen their understanding of the Catholic faith” as well as opportunities to deepen their faith (NCCB 1997, 14). Yet, as Lonergan (1978, 18) insists, the processes of knowing and valuing are not divorced from one another, but are part of the same modality of self-transcendence. Thus, in developing as an authentic knower, the subject is better prepared to become an authentic chooser of values.

In addition to being complimentary, however, the interplay between the academic study of religion and the formation of one’s religious beliefs and practices also stands in creative tension. It is the tension inherent between the “liberating” and “conserving”

aspects of education (Huebner 1974, 5). And, it is the tension between the Catholic intellectual tradition, whose authority is found in the integrity of scholarship, and the Catholic sacred tradition whose authority is located in the ecclesial tradition itself. Yet, it is precisely this creative tension that is necessary in order to open up the dialectical discourse required to foster critical thinking in adolescents. It is a tension that invites critical conversations in the religion classroom. And, it is a tension that promotes students' critical appropriation of values and beliefs as authentic knowing and valuing subjects. Allowing this creative tension to exist in the context of teaching religion in Catholic high schools, then, prepares students to become active and engaged participants in the living conversation between the Catholic intellectual tradition and the Catholic sacred tradition. It challenges them to grow beyond a merely perfunctory notional assent to religious formulas toward real assent that takes genuine ownership of one's own authentic valuing and believing. And, it empowers them to become attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible subjects of their own religious lives.

Chapter 5

Engaging in the Dialectics of Wonder: Teaching Religion in Catholic High Schools as a Dialectical and Dialogic Process toward Fostering Critical Conversation

Chapter four addressed the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools from an educational perspective. It examined the nature of critical thinking as a metacognitive process that involves students taking increasing ownership of their own knowing and valuing by identifying assumptions, checking the validity of assumptions, weighing the veracity of those assumptions against other positions, and taking informed action consistent with their own best thinking (Brookfield 2012, 1). It argued that the development of critical thinking is a constitutive dimension of the self-transcendence and self-appropriation of the developing subject as an authentic knowing and valuing subject. And, it proposed that critical thinking is a dialectical process that is best fostered through socially interactive, critical engagement with others who offer counter-positions and propose different interpretations. The chapter also situated the role of critical thinking in the context of the Catholic school classroom as a place of genuine academic inquiry and in the wider context of the Catholic intellectual tradition as an ongoing interpretive discourse between faith, culture, and reason. It emphasized that the role of the Catholic school classroom is to equip and invite students to become active participants in that ongoing intellectual discourse. Finally, following the *GDC* and recommendations of the Congregation for Catholic Education, the chapter proposed that teaching religion in Catholic high schools is best understood as an academic endeavor, distinct from, though complimentary with, the catechetical aims of the wider Catholic school community. It suggested that Lonergan's distinction between the levels of knowing and valuing offers a helpful lens through which to view both the distinction and

complementarity between the two aims of the overall program of religious education in Catholic schools. While both levels are part of the single process of the self-transcendence of the knowing and valuing subject, the chapter emphasized that the focus of teaching religion in Catholic high schools is on the process of knowing, and thus aims at cultivating greater insight. At the same time, it suggested that this emphasis on the process of knowing in the religion classroom better prepares students to make more critically informed decisions regarding their own religious lives at the level of valuing, thus empowering students to move toward greater ownership of their own religious beliefs and values through the self-appropriation of their own knowing and valuing.

The purpose of this chapter is to unpack more fully the pedagogical implications of Lonergan's philosophy of education for teaching religion in Catholic high schools. It aims at providing a model for teaching religion that includes the dynamic interplay between the educational movement "downward" as the handing down of values and beliefs from tradition and the movement "upward" as helping students to think more critically about religious meaning and value, in order to empower them to articulate more clearly their own religious understandings, beliefs, and values as authentic knowing and valuing subjects. And, it seeks to offer practical suggestions on ways to implement that model by opening spaces for dialectical and dialogic discourse in the Catholic high school religion classroom.

The chapter proposes that the educational movements "downward" and "upward" are dynamically interrelated and complimentary, working together in a creative tension in promoting both religious literacy and religious articulacy. Lonergan suggests these movements are not linear, but "a spiraling process" (1993, 209). They are like the upward

and downward movements of the rhythmic patterns of notes in a musical score, constantly interweaving, interacting, and interplaying with each other. Through the dynamics of teaching, one not only sees that rhythm unfolding, but one also hears that rhythm unfolding. And, one not only hears that rhythm unfolding, but one feels it as well. In the context of teaching religion in Catholic schools, the movement “downward” is what Frederick Crowe (1985, 3, 14) calls “the way of heritage” that promotes religious literacy as “values handed down” and “beliefs received.” Conversely, the movement “upward” is the “way of achievement” that fosters religious articulacy which allows one to make critical distinctions and to articulate more clearly one’s own understandings and beliefs (Crowe 1985, 12).

Charles Taylor (1989, 77) notes, articulacy allows one to make “qualitative distinctions” that involve “articulating what underlies” one’s own “choices, leanings,” and “intuitions.” It allows one to give voice, critically and reflectively, to one’s own religious questions, interpretations, beliefs, and values. And, at the same time, it allows one to engage in critically reflective discourse with others that tests, probes, and clarifies one’s own position through “a willingness to enter the conversation” at the “place where one is willing to risk” one’s present understanding “by facing the claims” of the other (Tracy 1987, 93). The chapter advances the idea that promoting religious literacy alone is insufficient to develop students’ critical thinking abilities in order to prepare them to make informed decisions concerning their own religious beliefs and values as authentic knowing and valuing subjects. Rather, students also need to develop a critically reflective religious articulacy. Developing such articulacy allows for more critically nuanced understandings of religious beliefs and values at the level of knowing and, at the same

time, invites a more fully articulated expression of one's own religious beliefs and values at the level of valuing.

The first part of the chapter looks at adolescent religious literacy and articulacy in the context of contemporary culture in the United States. It first explores the cultural ecology of postmodernity in shaping adolescent religious understanding, believing, and valuing. It examines the current state of adolescents' religious literacy and articulacy in the United States, drawing on the National Study of Youth and Religion (Smith and Lundquist Denton 2005; Smith and Snell 2009) and the work of Kenda Creasy Dean (2001, 2010). It considers the need for fostering both religious literacy and articulacy in teaching religion in Catholic high schools. And, it highlights the need for creating conversational spaces in the religion classroom for developing such articulacy. The second section, then, proposes a model for teaching religion for promoting religious literacy and articulacy that involves the ongoing, dynamic interplay between the movements "downward" as the "way of heritage" and "upward" as the "way of achievement," based on Lonergan's eight functional specialties of theology. The movement "downward" promotes religious literacy by teaching students the language of the Catholic sacred tradition as embodied in the collective values, judgments, understandings, and experiences of that tradition. At the same time, the movement "upward" supports the development of religious articulacy by engaging students in the ongoing dialogue of the Catholic intellectual tradition which employs the language of academic discourse that requires them to articulate ever more critical distinctions, ever more developed understandings, and ever more nuanced positions. The section proposes that these two movements are not separate moments, but two distinct *movements* in

teaching religion that form what Crowe (1985, 1) calls “the two vector forces of education” that operate together rhythmically, dynamically, and creatively in promoting adolescent religious literacy and articulacy. The last section offers practical suggestions on how this model might be implemented in the high school religion classroom in order to promote authentic religious understanding through dialectical and dialogic discourse. Altogether, the chapter presents a pedagogical framework for understanding how religious literacy and articulacy might be cultivated in the Catholic high school religion classroom in order to develop students’ critical thinking abilities as authentic knowing and valuing subjects.

Fostering Religious Literacy and Articulacy in Adolescents

The Cultural Ecology of Contemporary Adolescence

As noted in chapter three, Robert Kegan emphasizes that the human person does not exist as an isolated individual; but rather, the self exists as a self-in-relation to his or her social world. Moreover, this self is evolving as that social world expands and changes throughout the life-cycle. As Kegan (1982, 116) insists, the human person is not just an individual, but also an “embeddual,” situated in various “cultures of embeddedness” that shape and form the self. During adolescence, Kegan argues, the self that emerges is the “interpersonal self” who is “located” in an “interpersonal matrix” of relationships (95-96). Here, identity moves from being role-driven, as it was in childhood, to being relationship-driven. The culture of embeddedness of the adolescent, then, is a “culture of mutuality” that consists of the networks of relationships that help define the adolescent (165).

At the same time, as psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner points out, these cultures of embeddedness are themselves embedded in larger social networks of relations. These networks form the complex sociocultural ecosystem in which individuals are embedded. Hence, “for each individual adolescent, a continuously interacting set of complex social relationships exists” (Muuss 1988, 301). Bronfenbrenner identifies four systemic levels that comprise an individual’s sociocultural ecosystem: the microsystems, the mesosystem, the exosystem, and the macrosystem. Microsystems consist of the immediate social environments of the individual (Muuss 1988, 302). These microsystems are multiple and varied for each person. For adolescents, these microsystems include the proximate social environments of family, peers, school, and various activities to which they belong. They also include their social media networks and various mediated, online friendships. The mesosystem consists of the interrelationship and “meaningful linkages” between the various microsystems that comprise the social world of individuals (Muuss 1988, 305). At the next level, the exosystem comprises the local community and “social structures” that affect the immediate social world of the individual. It includes local political, social, and economic institutions. It includes church, civic, and other organizations. And, for adolescents, it includes the local school system, their parents’ employer(s), and, the local economy. Finally, the macrosystem consists of the wider cultural forces that “underlie the organization of institutions” themselves (Muuss 1988, 307). These are the forces that shape cultural practices, values, and societal norms. The macrosystem includes mass media, technology, and globalization. It includes national, ethnic, and religious traditions. And, it includes societal patterns and shifts, political and economic systems and ideologies, and generational trends and demographic changes. The

macrosystem, then, affects the other systems that constitute the social world of the adolescent: the social structures, the “meaningful linkages” of relationships, and the immediate social environments of family, peers, and school.

At the macro level of contemporary culture in the United States, the cultural forces that affect and shape the social world of adolescents have been broadly described as “postmodern.”¹³ As Harold Daly Horell (2003, 83) points out, “cultural postmodernity” is characterized by greater “ambiguity and confusion” in the face of growing multicultural and globalized awareness and increasing religious and ideological plurality. No longer is identity, including religious identity, taken as a given. Rather, adolescents are forced to construct their identities in the context of a complex matrix of sociocultural forces that challenges the creation of a single, fixed identity. As Friedrich Schweitzer (2004, 55) notes, there is even a blurring of the traditional lines of demarcation for adolescence itself. Adolescent searching for identity may continue well into young adulthood. The establishment of a career path is no longer singular or straightforward, where seemingly there is no single or simple answer to the question “What do you want to do when you grow up?” And, adolescence is no longer simply seen as a preparation for adulthood, but “has become a period of life in its own right.” At the same time, Schweitzer points out, “many things that used to be reserved for adults have now been claimed by adolescents,” including sexual relations and greater degrees of personal autonomy (49). Thus, identity formation is no longer the exclusive task of

13 While the origins of the term “postmodern” are itself ambiguous, it seems to have originated in the world of art in the late nineteenth century to describe new, experimental styles of art that “went beyond” modern, impressionistic art (See Sim 2001, xiii). Subsequently, the term has been applied in various contexts from art and architecture to philosophy and literature. Here, the term “postmodern” is understood in its original usage as a cultural designation that offers a descriptive label for contemporary culture, rather than a justification of that culture. Hence, this study recognizes the distinction between “cultural postmodernity” as a descriptive term and “philosophical postmodernity” as an explanatory one (See Horell 2003, Lakeland 1997).

adolescence; but rather, “identity formation turns out to be a flexible, and most likely, a lifelong process” (49).

Horell (1997, 34) identifies several characteristics of cultural postmodernity that shape and affect the sociocultural world of contemporary adolescents. Chief among these is the recognition of the contextualization of values and beliefs. This is marked by a move away from seeking “meta-narratives” that offer all “inclusive frameworks of meaning and value” (2003, 83). Instead, as Paul Lakeland observes, in the face of cultural and religious plurality and a multiplicity of competing voices there emerges a “sense that no one framework can be taken for granted as the basis for all.” It is against this radically contextualized and highly pluralized cultural backdrop that contemporary adolescents forge their religious identities. It is a cultural backdrop that rejects a one-size-fits-all approach to the formation of values and beliefs. And, it is a backdrop that resists facile answers to questions of commitment, identity, and belonging. On the contrary, such a cultural backdrop invites tentativeness toward totalizing commitments, the non-foreclosure of further exploration of one’s identity, and a desire for more personalized narratives of belonging. Here, another related feature of cultural postmodernity is the recognition that identity is a “project,” not a given (Horell 2003, 84). For contemporary adolescents, this means *searching* for meaning and values, rather than presuming meaning and values. It means negotiating the complexities and contradictions of “various social roles and the interplay among” them in shaping meaning and values (84-85). And, as James Fisher (2001, 11) suggests, it means that contemporary youth have become border crossers who “traverse boundaries between traditions and denominations,” and who “blend multiple elements, including religious loyalties, into an integrated whole.”

This allows for what Lakeland describes as the “playful eclecticism of postmodernity itself” (xiii). It is an eclecticism that invites further playfulness, further discovery, and further reshaping of one’s identity.

Horell (2003, 84) also insists that cultural postmodernity highlights and even embraces the social and cultural situatedness of meaning and values. Cultural postmodernity recognizes that “social identity takes shape or is constructed within the pluriform, often ambiguous, and sometimes conflictual contexts of our lives.” There is a recognition that “we can never step back fully from the specificity of our personal, communal, and sociocultural standpoint” (86). Such acknowledgment of the contingency and specificity of meaning and values invites critical reflection on “how core convictions have been constructed” within the various “social spheres in which we are involved.” It calls for exploration of “how these central convictions have been employed, where they are in conflict with one another, and what their potential uses and limitations are in the present.” And, it underscores “the various strands” of one’s life from which one draws in constructing a basic world-view (87). As contemporary adolescents forge their religious identities they do so within a larger culturally pluralistic framework that confronts them with the apparent contingency of their own values and beliefs. This framework consists of the abandonment of totalizing metanarratives which allows the other to emerge precisely as other. And, it allows for the formation of a provisional identity in the context of a “multivalent and polysemous community” that supports further experimentation, ongoing clarification, and ever more complex distinctions in relation to the other (Lakeland 1997, 32-33).

Finally, Horell (2003, 87-89) identifies skepticism regarding institutions that offer all-encompassing world-visions, coupled with a suspicion of uses of power as other hallmarks of cultural postmodernity. Such skepticism grows out of the recognition that in a multi-platform world no single vision can embrace the totality of meaning and value for everybody. No one voice can claim to speak for everyone. No one perspective can establish itself as a solitary, universal viewpoint. And, no one narrative can pretend to tell everyone's story. Every institutional exercise of power that promotes the hegemony of one particular vision runs the risk of silencing other voices. No institution can claim a neutral exercise of its power. As Thomas Beaudoin (2008, 4) observes, "power is ambiguous, and even the most benevolent exercise of it cannot claim innocence." In negotiating the complexities of shaping their world-views, contemporary adolescents are confronted with the ubiquitous influence of institutions on their lives and the ambiguous exercise of those institutions' power. Such awareness invites a creative tension between institutional and anti-institutional elements as young people bend traditions and break conventions in forging their own identities and in choosing their own paths.¹⁴

Horell (2003, 89) notes that cultural change tends to be marked by "uneven surfaces, rough edges, fissures and gaps." This may be especially true of postmodern cultural change where cultural surfaces seem to shift more suddenly with the eruption of new social, political, and economic forces, where the edges of identity seem more jagged and less certain, and where cultural fissures and gaps seem to abound. The postmodern cultural ecology of contemporary adolescence can create a sense of what Schweitzer

14 A recent example of this creative tension between institutional and anti-institutional elements in contemporary culture is found in the "Uncollege" movement which seeks to create an alternative to traditional higher education by offering traditional classes in a non-institutional format. (See <http://www.uncollege.org/story/#the-book>).

(2004, 50) calls “permanent discontinuity,” where instead of forming a coherent, fixed, overarching “center” at a single point in time, one is drawn into multiple centers, multiple roles, and multiple sources of selfhood over the course of the life-cycle. This “pluriform experience of the self” requires ongoing reintegration, renegotiation, and reimagining of the self-in-relation to the world (50). It requires cultivating the capacity for critical thinking which allows one to examine one’s assumptions critically and reflectively. And, it requires giving adolescents a voice through which to articulate their own deepest yearnings, unexpressed beliefs, and yet-to-be spoken insights in their own search for meaning and values. Taylor (1989, 18) emphasizes that “We find a sense of life through articulating it.” Cultural postmodernity offers a challenge to Christian religious educators not only to speak the language of contemporary culture in mediating the Christian message to young people, but also, to help young people find their own voice in critically and creatively articulating their own most probing questions, their own most pressing concerns, and their own most cherished convictions amidst a world marked by “plurality and ambiguity” (Tracy 1987, ix).

The Need for Fostering the Religious Literacy and Articulacy of Adolescents

The National Study of Youth and Religion (NSYR) is a longitudinal study of contemporary adolescent and young adult religious attitudes, values, and beliefs in the United States.¹⁵ The NSYR found that most adolescents in the United States “hold rather positive general attitudes” toward religion overall and their own denominations, in

15 The NSYR involved an initial telephone survey of a representative sample of 3, 290 adolescents between the ages of thirteen and seventeen from around the country and their parents as well as 267 follow-up, face-to-face interviews. The respondents were then followed for a period of several years as they moved from adolescence into young adulthood (Smith and Snell 2009, 3). Initial surveys and interviews were conducted between 2001 and 2005 (Smith and Lundquist Denton 2005, 4), with follow-up surveys and interviews between 2007 and 2008 (Smith and Snell 2009, 4). Thus, the NSYR roughly spans the ages between thirteen and twenty-three.

particular (Smith and Lundquist Denton 2005, 70). Yet, the study also found that most U.S. teens tend to have only vague notions of what they actually believe. Smith and Denton (2005, 131, emphasis original) claim “the vast majority” of U.S. teens tend to be “*incredibly inarticulate* about their faith, their religious beliefs and practices, and its meaning or place in their lives.” Kenda Creasy Dean (2010, 15-16), who participated in the study as an interviewer, observes, in the context of the study “remarkably articulate young people stammered and groped for words when the conversation turned to religion. . . Many youth said religion was important, though when pressed they generally could not say how.” This finding was also reflected among adolescents who attended religiously affiliated schools, including Catholic high schools, where, in general, attending such a school proved to be statistically non-significant in affecting contemporary adolescents’ religious understandings and outlooks (See Smith and Lundquist Denton 2005, 207-215; Smith and Snell 2009, 218). It is a finding consistent with other recent studies that “found limited effects of Catholic schooling” on adolescents’ religious beliefs and values (D’Antonio et. al. 2007, 159).

Such apparent inarticulacy on the part of contemporary adolescents in the United States concerning religion seems to indicate not simply a lack of religious literacy-knowing *about* religious beliefs, values, practices, and ideas. Rather, it also seems to show a lack of religious articulacy-knowing *how* to give, what Michael Polanyi (1974, 264) calls, “articulate form” to one’s own religious beliefs, values, questions, interpretations, and ideas. While religious literacy equips students with the language of religious tradition(s), religious articulacy enables them to discuss it intelligently. As Smith and Denton (2005, 268, emphasis original) suggest, “a major challenge for

religious educators of youth” seems to be the need for “fostering articulation, helping teens practice *talking about*” matters of faith and religion. This involves the distinction Lonergan (1967a, 185) makes between “possession of the book” and “freedom from the book.” This “enables us to recast definitions, to adjust principles,” and “to throw chains of reasoning into new perspectives.” It allows one “to define, not as a parrot, but intelligently.” And, ultimately, as Dean (2010, 70) observes, it empowers one to claim a “creed” of one’s own as an *owned* set of personally “articulated beliefs.” Moreover, “the assertion of articulate form” allows debate, discussion, and critique, insofar as “it is our personal acceptance of an articulate form that is judged to have been critical or uncritical” (Polanyi 1974, 264). Religious articulacy, then, moves beyond religious literacy by encouraging critical conversations on the meaning of religious language. It requires making critical distinctions. And, ultimately, it supports the critical appropriation of religious values and beliefs for oneself by articulating them more clearly, more critically, and more reflectively.

On the one hand, fostering religious articulacy nurtures critical reflection on values and beliefs at the level of knowing by helping students develop more nuanced understandings. On the other hand, it invites critical appropriation of values and beliefs at the level of valuing by encouraging them to give more nuanced expression to their own valuing and believing. Promoting students’ religious articulacy, then, aids their development as authentic knowing and valuing subjects. In the context of cultural postmodernity, developing such articulacy is necessary for adolescents to negotiate successfully the complexities and ambiguities of finding meaning and value in a multivalent world. It facilitates critical conversations with the other. And, it permits them

to acknowledge “a multiplicity of voices,” and still find their own (Lonergan 1971a, 363). Contemporary adolescents not only need to develop a well-informed religious literacy in the texts, creeds, practices, and symbols of their own religious tradition—as well as more than just a passing familiarity with those of other traditions. Rather, they also need to develop a critically reflective religious articulacy that empowers them to find their own voice, to speak their own truth, and to give “articulate form” to their own deepest questions of meaning and value. This enables them to become active participants in critical conversations with others, both within their own tradition and beyond it. Hence, cultivating religious articulacy invites students to develop their own authentic freedom as knowing and valuing subjects, who constitute their world as a world “mediated by meaning and motivated by value” (Lonergan 1985, 155).

Following Taylor, Smith and Denton (2005, 267) argue “inarticulacy undermines the possibilities of reality.” Or, as Lonergan might suggest, it limits one’s horizon. As Taylor (1989, 91, emphasis original) contends, without articulation the “good,” and by extension the beautiful, the intelligible, and the true “are not even options” within one’s horizon since they “only exist for us through *some* articulation.” This articulation is first given expression through the language of a particular religious tradition which we receive through the “way of heritage.” Thus, religious articulacy builds on religious literacy through the reception of the prior articulations of tradition. As Taylor (1991, 91, emphasis added) notes, “The God of Abraham exists for us (that is, belief in him [*sic*] is a possibility) because he has been *talked about*.” In effect, religious literacy involves inheriting the prior articulate forms of a tradition as embodied in its texts, creeds, symbols, and interpretations.

However, these inherited articulations are not static, but part of a living, historical tradition. They are articulate forms enfolded in history, language, and culture. Moreover, Lonergan (1971a, 327-328) notes, these expressions “vary with cultural differences,” that admit a “pluralism of expression” through the exigencies of history and culture. He argues for the necessity of moving beyond a “classicist” world-view which assumes “there is just one culture” of timeless tradition, where “faith is a matter of everyone subscribing to the correct formulae” (326-327). Such transmission of fixed formulas Lonergan calls a “shabby shell of Catholicism” that lacks depth and richness of meaning (327). Rather, Lonergan calls for acknowledging the “historicity” of inherited articulations, recognizing that “(1) statements have meaning only in their contexts and (2) contexts are ongoing and ongoing contexts are multiple” (326). He calls this a “pluralist” understanding that “acknowledges a multiplicity of cultural traditions” (363). This necessitates ongoing re-expression of inherited forms in new language, new idioms, and new forms of presentation. Promoting an authentic religious literacy, then, involves not simply transmission, but, “*transpositions*” of inherited forms into a whole new key. This is necessary if “a religion is to retain its identity and yet at the same time find access into the minds and hearts” of people “of all cultures and classes” (Lonergan 1971a, 133, emphasis added). Such transpositions rearrange old compositions into new modalities. And, they invite hearing the familiar in a whole new way. These transpositions can result in a “higher synthesis” where “the new is analogous to the old,” preserving “all that is valid in the old,” yet, going beyond it to allow deeper meaning to emerge (Orji 2013, 115).

Teaching for religious literacy involves re-expressing inherited forms in new ways that allow students' genuine apprehension of meaning and value and not simply their passive reception of a "shabby shell." It invites teachers to become interpreters of tradition and not just conveyers of its fixed formulas. And, it encourages teachers to bring renewed vibrancy and fresh vitality to the prior articulate forms of tradition by inviting students to hear the resonant voices from the past in a whole new way. Like a skilled musician, the religion teacher transposes inherited forms into a new key, shaping and reshaping the form, the pattern, and the variation in order to make inherited compositions come alive. In speaking of the artistic element in education, Lonergan (1993, 211) observes, the pattern of a musical score "contains all the notes, but it is not the music." Rather, "the pattern is being realized only when the music is being played." It is the teacher who makes that music come alive for his or her students. And, it is the teacher who draws them into the rhythmic patterns of tradition. Only then, Lonergan (1985, 181) says, has one "found a genuine teacher" who has truly "initiated" them "into the study of the masters of the past."

Tracy (1981, 408) notes that such transpositions take place through the "prime analogue" of a religious tradition, which gives "focal meaning" to all other expressions. It is the signature key that sets the tone for further variation. And, it is "the major clue" for interpreting all other relationships, self, others, world, and God, "by clarifying the relationship of each to the primary analogue," which for Christians is Jesus Christ. Transposition requires both deep knowledge of tradition and a broad knowledge of the culture into which one is transposing. Orji (2013, 115) points out, "one cannot transpose what one does not know." As Lonergan (1985, 181) notes, a teacher who "never really

understood. . . is not capable of giving others the understanding” he or she “lacks.” At best, he or she “can teach the accepted formulations” and “can persuade” others to accept them. At the same time, Lonergan (1971a, 362) insists, “teachers” must develop “an accurate and intimate understanding of the culture and the language of the people they address.” In the context of cultural postmodernity, this requires that religion teachers in Catholic high schools become familiar with the complexities and ambiguities of contemporary culture that shape and form adolescents today. In addition, their task is to help students recover the “empowering images and stories” of the Catholic sacred tradition that can become, what Taylor (1989, 195) calls, “moral sources” in developing their religious identities.

In effect, developing an authentic religious literacy sets the tone for an authentic religious articulacy. It breaks open students’ imaginations and invites them to consider new ways of expressing the old. It helps “restore the power of an older source” that allows “the recasting of our lives in a new narrative” (Taylor 1989, 97). And, it invites a richer use of language in talking about the religious dimensions of human experience. An authentic religious literacy supports the development of an articulate “analogical imagination.” It provides the initial key that allows students to begin to transpose the rich language of analogy themselves by finding “ordered relationships” in “articulating similarity-in-difference” through the “prime analogue” of their own religious tradition (Tracy 1981, 408). And, it allows them to enter into authentic conversations with the other insofar as “each of us understands each other through analogy or not at all” (447). While religious articulacy builds on religious literacy, it moves students beyond literacy to embrace their own articulate virtuosity. It encourages them to give “articulate form” to

their own ideas, values, beliefs, and questions. And, it enables them to express their own transpositions in a new analogical key.

At the same time, fostering religious articulacy trains students' "dialectical imaginations." Tracy (1977, 236-237) distinguishes the two by indicating that, on the one hand, the analogical imagination sees "ordered relationships" as a "clue to the whole of reality." In contrast, the dialectical imagination's task is to "unmask illusions and idolatries" and "to be suspicious of all claims to a vision of the whole." The dialectical mode adopts a "prophetic suspicion" that recovers the "necessity of some confrontational, conflictual *no* to any complacent self, culture, or society" (Tracy 1981, 416-417, emphasis original). Such is the critically reflective language of academic discourse that "turns speech back on itself" (Scott 2005, 69). It is the language of the Catholic intellectual tradition which engages in an ongoing dialectical and dialogic discourse with the world. And, it is the language of an attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible religious articulacy, where one's articulations are always open to revision through ongoing interpretive discourse with others.

At its root, religious articulacy is both dialectical and analogical. It involves distinguishing and relating. The Latin word "*articulare*" means to "divide into joints," and it is related to the Latin word for "joint" (See *American Heritage Dictionary*, s.v. "Articulate;" *The New College Latin and English Dictionary*, s.v. "*Articuulus*"). In English, "to articulate" carries both the meaning of "to joint together" and "to speak distinctly" (*Oxford English Dictionary, Compact Edition*, s.v. "Articulate"). And, "articulation" is "the action or process of jointing together" and "the utterance of distinct elements of speech" (*Oxford English Dictionary, Compact Edition*, s.v. "Articulation").

Facilitating the development of religious articulacy allows young people to make critical religious distinctions in order to relate them. It allows them to utter “distinct elements” of meaning and value. And, it allows them to “joint” those elements together in critical and creative ways. Thus, religious articulacy incorporates both dialectical and analogical modes. As Tracy (1977, 237) notes, the analogical is “not shattered by negative dialectics.” Rather, it is transformed into new and “more complex” patterns of relationships. Tracy argues, this “analogical imagination. . . must appropriate the genuine insights of the dialectical mind” (237). It is a process that involves what Lonergan (1997, 577) calls “the interpenetration” of thought and expression where “expression enters into the very process of learning” through the formulation of insights. This process of formulation and re-formulation remains open-ended, ongoing, and heuristic insofar as “insights only give rise to further questions that lead to further insights and still further questions.” Articulacy, then, is nothing less than giving “articulate form” to critical thinking. It empowers students to ask better questions, to make finer distinctions, and to formulate their own critical and creative insights.

Religious literacy and articulacy, then, are two distinct, though interrelated, aspects in the process of learning the language of the religious. They are two movements that “unite tradition and innovation, gift and achievement, heritage and development” (Crowe 1985, x). And, they open up spaces for critical conversations both within one’s own religious tradition and beyond it. Religious articulacy equips young people with the necessary ability to become skilled interpreters of religious meaning and value through ongoing critical conversations on multiple levels. It empowers them to speak for themselves and with others, encouraging them to find their own voice in the

conversation. And, it urges them to move beyond simply being “consumers of theology” toward becoming “people who help construct religious discourse” (Dean 2001, 30).

Fostering religious articulacy expands one’s world of imaginative possibilities by giving those possibilities “articulate form.” It admits critical distinctions into conversation. And, it prepares adolescents to become active participants in the ongoing interpretive discourse of a living tradition, while enabling them to converse with the multiple voices of others, both past and present.

In his critique of the NSYR, Beaudoin (2008, 80-82) highlights what he sees as the study’s “misreading” of adolescent religiosity that frames “religious identity as derivative of official conceptions of identity” and that fails to take into account new, multiplist ways of being religious in the context of a postmodern ethos. Beaudoin’s critique only serves to underscore the need to develop adolescents’ religious articulacy precisely so that adolescents can articulate their own religious identities for themselves, and not simply as “derivative of official conceptions.” As Taylor (1989, 92) notes, identity and articulacy are closely related insofar as articulacy allows saying “what moves us” and “what are lives our built around.” Articulating “qualitative distinctions” permits one to explore “in a fuller and richer way the meaning” of one’s choices, beliefs, and values (80). It invites one to become more authentically a subject through the critical self-appropriation of one’s own knowing and valuing by giving “articulate form” to one’s values and beliefs. And, it allows one to reject “dead formulations,” “trite” rhetoric, and “counterfeit” propagandizing as inauthentic expressions of one’s own deepest and truest sense of meaning and value (97).

Nurturing the development of adolescents' religious articulacy empowers them to navigate the complexities and ambiguities of contemporary postmodern culture more acutely. It encourages them to reject what John Conley (2014, 34) calls the "most banal" aspects of postmodernity in the form of "subjectivism" and "relativism" as "stances of sloth that exclude critique, repentance, conversion." Instead, it allows them to engage in thoughtful conversations in exploring possibilities of meaning and value for contemporary life. It enables them to lend their voices to discussions that genuinely seek truth, recognizing that in the context of postmodernity "religious truth" is more often "found in cacophony rather than harmony, the unresolved rather than the certain, the jagged rather than the perfect" (34). And, it invites them to find their own religious virtuosity, learning "to live fully and act creatively in the midst of a world we can never control and can only partially understand" (Welch 1999, 51).

Creating Conversational Spaces that Foster Religious Articulacy

Chapter four suggested that critical thinking develops in the context of dialectical and dialogic discourse. Deanna Kuhn (2005, 14) argues critical thinking is "embodied" in "discourse." And, David Moshman (1998, 961) insists critical thinking develops through "a collaborative process in which people formulate, communicate, criticize, justify, and revise their various ideas." One learns more clearly what one thinks, believes, and values only in conversation with the other as one articulates critical distinctions in order to relate them. One adjusts one's position in response to the questions of the other. And, one is brought to reevaluate more critically one's own stance in light of the other. Tracy (1987, 23) insists that encounters with the "other conversation partner, whether it be a person or text" often "challenges our expectations, questions, and interpretations" in ways that

causes one to reflect more critically on one's own position and to articulate it more fully and more clearly.

As Tracy (1987, 20) notes, "Conversation in its primary form is an exploration of possibilities in the search for truth." Through the give and take of questioning, conversations "test, form, and transform" one's understanding through encounters with "difference and otherness." Through these encounters, one can find oneself in a conflict of ideas, stances, and interpretations. Here, Tracy insists, "argument" can be a "vital moment within conversation" to help move conversation forward (23). Thus, engaging in dialectical discourse is an essential component in learning to articulate one's own religious stance in-relation to that of the other. Yet, as Lonergan (1985, 182) observes, it is only part of a wider conversation that must remain open to moving "beyond dialectic to dialogue" in order "to seek understanding, to judge reasonably, to evaluate fairly," and "to be open to friendship" if it is to remain authentic conversation at all.

Cultivating religious articulacy requires creating spaces for dialectical and dialogic encounters with otherness in the religion classroom. These encounters may take the form of discussion, debate, and critique of texts, interpretations, and ideas that offer differing theological opinions. They may involve engaging in conversations with multiple perspectives, both religious and non-religious, on various topics of concern. And, they may invite students into critically reflective dialogue with voices from other religious traditions. Through such encounters, Dean (2010, 160) argues, "we observe ourselves and our situations anew, rethinking our former understandings of God, self, and others." Encounters with the other invite a greater "reflexivity" that allows one to get a glimpse of alternate possibilities, alternate angles of vision, and alternate horizons of understanding

(Dean 2010, 159). As Sharon Welch (1999, 63) notes, these encounters with otherness expand one's horizon through "a process of learning to see the world through multiple lenses." Such encounters help clarify one's own religious stance, allowing one to bring a more nuanced, critically reflected upon articulation to one's own religious questions, beliefs, values, and interpretations. Lonergan (1967b, 238) observes that "subjects are confronted with themselves more effectively by being confronted with others." Through encounters with otherness students are invited to reflect more critically on their own position in-relation to the other, to examine more creatively their own beliefs and values as distinct from, yet related to the other, and to engage more authentically in conversations with the other.

Creating such conversational spaces in the high school religion classroom encourages students to reflect critically on the meaning of religious language through academic discourse to uncover the fullest and richest meaning of that language. It engages their dialectical and analogical imaginations by helping them make critical distinctions and establish creative connections. And, it teaches them to examine their "way of speaking and understanding" about religion in order to "reshape the pattern of their discourse" and "expand their awareness" of the world of the religious (Scott 2005, 69). Such a process involves critically engaging students in an ongoing "reflective use of language" concerning deeper questions of religious meaning and value (70). It draws them into the process of thinking critically about religion by providing multiple "lenses" through which to reflect on their own religious assumptions (Brookfield 2012, 57). And, it brings them into critical conversations that encourage them to continue to rethink and

rearticulate their positions by subjecting their “assumptions to a continuous round of questioning, argument, and counterargument” (Brookfield 2005, 7).

Teaching for religious articulacy in Catholic high schools requires engaging students in the ongoing academic discourse of the Catholic intellectual tradition that invites conversation that is truly “catholic” in scope into the religion classroom. Such conversations draws students into a critically reflective discourse on the language of the Catholic sacred tradition, while at the same time, engaging them in critically reflective discourse on the language of other traditions, both religious and non-religious. This recognizes that “the truth of God and human life can be fully grasped only in dialogue with other religions and cultures” (Orji 2013, 20-21). Borrowing from Lieven Boeve, Haughey (2009, 33) suggests that such conversations invite an “open narrative” that continually unfolds through “new encounters when we are prepared to take the alterity of the other seriously.” It requires cultivating “the open posture” of the subject which entails the risk of transformation (Saracino 2003, 61). And, it requires encouraging “the praxis of hospitality” that sees the other as an authentic partner in conversation (Haughey 2009, 35). Only then, Haughey contends, can the Catholic intellectual tradition truly lay claim to its own “catholicity” as a search for the fullness of meaning and value (2009, 44-45).

Here, Himes’ (2008, 238) image of the teacher in Catholic schools as a good “host or hostess” at a “four-thousand year-old cocktail party” who facilitates students’ conversations with a variety of different voices is *apropos*. When teachers do this in the religion classroom, they open up imaginative spaces for re-envisioning meaning and value. They create interesting “places where insight, reflection, and argument can be found” (Tracy 1987, x). As Maxine Greene (2005, 5) insists, they release new

possibilities for “reshaping the imagination” through multiple forms of discourse.

Opening such conversational spaces for encounters with otherness in the Catholic high school religion classroom initiates students into the ongoing conversation that is the Catholic intellectual tradition, encouraging them to add their own voice, to speak their own truth, and to articulate their own deepest questions of meaning and value. Fostering authentic religious articulacy not only invites students to join the party; but it enables them to join the conversation as well.

Parker Palmer (1993, 99) notes that opening spaces in the classroom for critical conversations with multiple conversation partners, both past and present, moves students beyond “looking at” subject matter “into personal dialogue with it.” It cultivates respect for the “otherness of the subject” that invites students “to interview the subject instead of just viewing it,” allowing “the subject to speak back to us” in surprising ways “independent of our own preconceptions.” William Mathews (2011, 50) suggests that in the classroom such encounters take place when students are awakened to questions that have sparked the interest of others. It is a place for “dwelling with the other together in the presence of the question” (Harris 1987, 73). And, it is a space where one is willing to follow those questions that are worthy of exploration (Tracy 1987, 18). According to Brookfield (2005, 23), inviting critical conversations into the classroom always opens out to further inquiry where more questions are raised than answered. Greene (1995, 19) contends that “when such dialogue is activated in classrooms” it opens the way “for the ability to look at things as if they could be otherwise.” It cultivates the ability to see things from different angles of vision. And, it allows students to suspend their judgments long enough to be surprised by the infinite possibilities of wonder.

Elizabeth Murray (2011, 31) contends that such wonder is best nurtured through adherence to Lonergan's transcendental precepts: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, and be responsible. She notes, "If one is not paying attention when one reads or otherwise encounters the thought of another, one will likely miss the clues, anomalies, and disturbing features that could spark one's interest." Through intelligent inquiry one allows questions to reorient one's whole horizon in new and surprising ways. Through reasonable judgments one must allow reasoning and evidence to guide one's conclusions. And, through responsible deliberation one decides to act with "openness and charity in considering the thought of others" (31). Teachers invite such wonder into the religion classroom when they allow the subject matter to have its own voice (Palmer 93, 98). They encourage such wonder when both teachers and students approach content as "questioners," allowing questions to dominate discussion rather than answers (Harris 1987, 72). And, they cultivate such wonder when they nurture in students a "disposition to dialogue," that not only allows one to begin to understand the other, but also "allows one to grow in appreciation of one's own tradition" through genuine dialectical and dialogic engagement with otherness (Gregson 1981, 151).

Nurturing religious articulacy through engagement with otherness fosters the growth of the developing subject as a subject. It invites students to become active participants in their own religious education. And, it furthers their development as self-transcending and self-appropriating subjects-in-relation. Through encounters with otherness, students are brought to "fuller reflection" on their own subjectivity as "incarnate" and "intersubjective" selves in "becoming 'I' to 'Thou,'" inviting them "to move on to 'We' through acquaintance. . . collaboration," and perhaps even "friendship"

(Lonergan 1968, 30). As Lonergan (1985, 29) notes, “By experience we attend to the other; by understanding we gradually construct our world; by judgment we discern its independence of ourselves” and “by deliberate and responsible freedom we move beyond merely self-regarding norms and make ourselves moral beings.” Through genuine dialectical and dialogic encounters with the other, students are helped to articulate more fully what constitutes their world as a world of meaning and values. They are invited to attend to the complex dimensions of experience, both their own and that of others (Saracino 2003, 145). And, they are encouraged to take greater responsibility for themselves as knowing and valuing subjects who are members of a wider “community” of “freely self-constituting subjects” (Lonergan 1967b, 244). Creating conversational spaces in the religion classroom that facilitate engagement with the other allows students to explore the unexamined edges of their own religious horizons. It equips them to take fuller ownership of their own religious values and beliefs. And, it enables them to articulate those values and beliefs more attentively, more intelligently, more reasonably, and more responsibly in-relation to the other.

Toward a Model for Fostering Religious Literacy and Articulacy

The Movement Downward as the Way of Religious Literacy

Lonergan (1971a, 127-145) proposes eight interrelated “functional specialties” for doing scholarship in theology and religious studies based on the four operations of human consciousness of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. These eight specialties correspond respectively with the educational movement “downward” as the way of “heritage” and the movement “upward” as the “way of achievement.” The movement “downward” consists of “foundations, doctrines, systematics, and

communications,” while the movement “upward” consists of “research, interpretations, history, and dialectics” (127). These are “functionally interdependent” specialties that are “successive parts of one and the same process” that complement and complete each other in a dynamic interplay (126). Lonergan presents this as an educational model for *doing* theology and religious studies that is ongoing, heuristic, and grounded in the operations of human knowing and valuing. As such, this methodological framework can also serve as a model for *teaching* theology and religious studies in the Catholic high school religion classroom.

While theological scholarship usually begins in what Lonergan (1971a, 135) calls the “mediating” phase of theology that starts in research and moves toward the integration of dialectics, the study of religion generally begins in the “mediated” phase of theology that introduces students to the mediation of tradition through its foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications. In practice, however, as “functionally interdependent” movements they work together, dynamically, critically, and creatively. Although they are discussed separately here for the purpose of distinction, the final section of the chapter discusses their ongoing integration through the dynamics of teaching religion.

The movement “downward,” as the “way of “heritage,” involves the handing down of the collective values, judgments, understandings, and experiences of tradition. Pedagogically, it corresponds to the promotion of religious literacy in teaching the particular language of a religious tradition. It concerns communicating religious foundations, doctrines, theological interpretations, and various expressions. Lonergan (1971a, 130) identifies the movement “downward” as beginning in “foundations” at the

deliberative level of consciousness. For Lonergan, foundations begins in “religious conversion,” not as conversion to a religion, but as a basic orientation toward ultimate mystery as thematized in various religious expressions. The functional specialty of foundations makes conversion “thematic” through “theological reflection on religious living” (131). Lonergan points out that while this orientation toward mystery is “intensely personal. . . it is not so private as to be solitary” (130). Rather, it is embodied in the collective historical witness of individuals in the living out of particular religious traditions. Educationally, it includes “values handed down” and incarnated by the living witness of members of a religious tradition (Crowe 1985, 14). It consists in handing down the narratives of persons who embody the values of that tradition. And, it invites identifying the “moral sources” that shape one’s own religious narrative. The functional specialty of foundations, then, orients the whole enterprise of religious and theological studies toward ultimate mystery. It invites further wonder. And, it makes explicit the human search for the divine.

The next level in the educational movement “downward” is the rational level of consciousness where “doctrines” express the collective judgments of a religious tradition as formulated in the language of that tradition through its texts, creeds, practices, and symbols (Lonergan 1971a, 132). It is a thematization of religious living made explicit in religious language. Here, learning the language of a religious tradition involves developing literacy in the prior articulations of that tradition. Yet, Lonergan (1971a, 132) points out, “doctrines stand within the horizon of foundations.” Thus, there is a “pluralism in the expression of the same fundamental stance” that invites “a multiplicity of theologies” in a variety of religious languages (271). Promoting authentic religious

literacy, then, invites a comparative approach in the presentation of doctrinal expressions as “an operative framework” that “acknowledges differences,” that seeks to “define issues with clarity,” and “where they still disagree,” promotes “genuine mutual respect” (Lonergan 2007, 273). As Moran notes, a religious language is best understood in relation to other religious languages to provide a basis for comparison (1989, 230). Adopting this relational approach to teaching doctrinal expressions in the Catholic high school religion classroom provides a richer context for promoting religious literacy that situates the heritage of the Catholic sacred tradition alongside the wider heritage of the Christian tradition as well as the religious heritage of humanity. This invites fuller conversation, further investigation, and ongoing interpretation.

It is this spirit of further inquiry that dominates the next level in the educational movement “downward” at the intellectual level of consciousness which seeks greater understanding. In religious and theological studies, Lonergan (1971a, 132) names this the level of “systematics” which aims at systematic understanding of religious doctrines. It involves the opening up of questions for deeper understanding and further interpretation. Here, Lonergan (1971a, 351) insists, “no repetition of formulas can take the place of understanding.” Rather, it requires breaking open the meaning of doctrines through the asking of questions. It requires inquiry and analysis. And, it requires probing the depths of meaning by examining different interpretations, different translations, and different representations. Citing the example of medieval scholastic disputation, Lonergan notes that in “the instruction of the student,” if the teacher settles questions by appealing to authority, the teacher will only send the student away “empty” of understanding (337). Instead of settling theological questions, then, religion teachers need to encourage

students to ask more probing questions in order to help them come to better understanding. As Tracy (1987, 25) observes, to offer any interpretation is to make a claim that invites questions from a “community of inquiry” that seeks to clarify, distinguish, or even challenge a position. In the context of teaching religion in Catholic high schools, the religion classroom itself becomes such “a community of inquiry” where the functional specialty of systematics invites deeper discussions, fuller understandings, and more nuanced interpretations of religious texts, creeds, practices, and symbols.

Finally, the last level in the educational movement “downward” is the empirical level of consciousness which attends to human experience. According to Lonergan, in terms of religious and theological studies, this involves the functional specialty of “communications” which seeks to relate foundations, doctrines, and systematics to the full range of human experience. It considers “interdisciplinary relations” between theology and “art, language, literature” and “the natural and the human sciences” (Lonergan 1971a, 132). It entails “the transposition” of foundations, doctrines, and systematics into new and varied cultural idioms. And, it incorporates “adaptations” to “make full and proper use of the diverse media of communication” (133). Pedagogically, the functional specialty of communications engages students in multiple conversations between religious texts, creeds, practices, symbols, interpretations and the length and breadth of human experience. It invites them to begin to develop a richer analogical imagination that breaks open the depths of meaning found in “the prime analogue” of the Christian message as expressed through its ongoing mediation in various cultural and historical articulate forms. And, it opens students out to dialogue as they seek to

constitute their world as a world “mediated by meaning and motivated by value” (Lonergan 1985, 155).

Overall, the movement “downward” involves the ongoing mediation of tradition through its foundations, doctrines, systematic interpretations, and communications. Pedagogically, it is not simply passive reception of inherited formulas. Rather, it is the active apprehension of the collective wisdom of tradition on the part of the knowing and valuing subject that fosters growth in religious literacy. It is a process of trying to understand in a systematic way the meaning of inherited articulations. This growth is facilitated by “a genuine teacher” who can help break open the meaning of the texts, creeds, practices, and symbols of tradition. Finally, with “one’s growth in understanding comes experience made mature and perceptive by one’s developed understanding” through the transpositions, adaptations, and relations of foundations, doctrines, and systematic interpretations to various cultural idioms that give them multiple analogical expressions. This “downward” movement increasingly invites students to appropriate religious meaning and value for themselves, “by proceeding as does the original thinker,” by then moving “upward” through the levels of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding toward authentic religious articulacy (Lonergan 1985, 181).

The Movement Upward as the Way of Religious Articulacy

The movement “upward” is the “way of achievement.” It begins at the empirical level of consciousness that attends to the data of human experience. And, it empowers authentic religious articulacy, allowing students to give “articulate form” to their own religious knowing and valuing. For religious and theological studies, it begins in attending to the data of religious experience through research. Research “locates,”

“catalogues,” and “collects” the artifacts of religious experience (Lonergan 1971a, 127). It questions religious texts, creeds, practices, symbols, and interpretations. And, it uncovers contradictions, discovers new evidence, and finds unaccounted for information. Pedagogically, the functional specialty of research in theological and religious studies encourages students to question, probe, and test religious texts, creeds, practices, symbols, and interpretations in order to examine, distinguish, and relate them more fully. It invites students to gather all relevant information in order to identify, compare, and contrast them more adequately. And, it requires students to attend carefully to the data of religious experience in order to describe, characterize, and explain it more completely.

At the intellectual level of consciousness in the educational movement “upward,” Lonergan (1971a, 127) identifies “interpretation” as the next functional specialty which seeks greater understanding of religious texts, creeds, practices, symbols, and systematic interpretations. Interpretation questions these through a continuous “process of learning” where “one discovers more and more the questions that concerned the author(s)” (163). Citing Friedrich Schlegel’s definition of a “classic” to describe religious texts, Lonergan insists that classics can never be “fully understood.” There is always more to learn from them (161). Hence, there is the need for ongoing interpretation. Building on this idea, Tracy (1987, 12) observes that “classics are those texts that bear an excess and permanence of meaning, yet always resist definitive interpretation.” Moreover, Tracy notes, “every classic bears with it the history of its own conflictual history of reception” (14). As Lonergan (1971a, 155) points out, interpretation calls for examining texts in context: that of the text, that of the author, and that of interpreters, including oneself. In teaching religion in Catholic high schools, the functional specialty of interpretation not

only encourages students to ask questions of texts, creeds, practices, symbols, and theological interpretations; but also, it invites them to ask questions of authors, interpreters, and each other. It obliges them to consider multiple and contradictory interpretations. And, it prompts them to continue to search for more relevant questions to uncover the “surplus of meaning” that can never fully be exhausted through encounters with classics (See Ricoeur 1976, vii; Tracy 1981).

The next level in the educational movement “upward” is the rational level of consciousness which involves the operation of judging. Here, Lonergan (1971a, 128) identifies the functional specialty of “history” as consisting of interpretive judgments concerning the history of religious texts, creeds, practices, symbols, and interpretations. As a theological specialty its concern is the history of doctrines as well as the history of Christianity alongside the history of “relations between different religions and the role of Christianity in world history.” Lonergan points out that history is a process continually open to revision insofar as the judgments of historians aspire to be “no more than the best available opinion,” whereby “later discoveries may force a correction and revision” of earlier positions (191-192). According to Lonergan, history is a “cumulative interplay of data, inquiry, insight, surmise, image,” and “evidence” (195). In teaching religion in Catholic high schools, the functional specialty of history promotes greater historical awareness of religious texts, creeds, practices, symbols, and interpretations. It calls for a richer exploration of the historical, social, and cultural contexts of religious foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications. And, it draws students into “the cumulative interplay” of historical investigation that invites them to hypothesize, critique, and formulate historical interpretations of religious traditions.

Lastly, at the deliberative level of consciousness lies the functional specialty of “dialectics” which, as a theological specialty, is concerned with engaging “the conflicts centering in Christian movements” and the “conflicts in historical accounts and theological interpretations of the movements” (Lonergan 1971a, 129). In the area of religious studies this concern widens to include the dialectical relationship between various religions as well as other world-views. By definition, dialectics deals with divergent viewpoints and thus invites a comparative approach to religious and theological traditions. Lonergan observes that “comparing them will bring to light where differences are irreducible” alongside “where they are complementary” (129). Yet, Lonergan argues, “besides comparison there is criticism” to the extent that “not every viewpoint is coherent” and “not every reason is a sound reason” (130). Therefore, dialectics necessitates argument. As Tracy (1987, 25-26) insists, the goal of argument is illumination which analyzes “all claims to consistency” in any position, including one’s own. In teaching religion in Catholic high schools, the functional specialty of dialectics encourages debate, discussion, and critique in the classroom. It highlights the need for developing reasoned opinions that reflect an “evaluativist epistemology” that values critical thinking “as a vehicle that promotes sound assertions and enhances understanding” (Kuhn 2005, 31). And, it opens up conversational spaces that allow authentic conversations to take place “where as many questions are raised as answered,” beckoning students to further inquiry, further discovery, and further insight (Brookfield 2005, 23).

The Dynamics of Teaching Religion as the Way of Integration

While the movement “upward” as the “way of achievement” builds on the movement “downward” as the “way of heritage,” in practice, the two movements are “functionally interdependent,” like the functional specialties of theology themselves and, therefore, they operate together in a dynamic interplay (Lonergan 1971a, 126). Lonergan (1997, 728) insists that the educational movements “downward” and “upward” are not separate, but interrelated in the “self-correcting process of learning” where “personal knowledge and belief practice an unrelenting symbiosis.” On the one hand, “the broadening of individual experience includes hearing the opinions and the convictions of others.” Such is the “way of heritage” which promotes a religious literacy that is broadened not only by studying the richness and diversity of the Catholic sacred tradition, but also, by placing it in the context of the rich heritage of human religious experience. On the other hand, “the deepening of individual understanding includes the exploration of many viewpoints” for oneself through “the formation of *individual judgment* in a process of differentiation, clarification and revision” (1997, 728, emphasis added). Such is “the way of achievement” that fosters a religious articulacy that allows one to make critical, dialectical distinctions for oneself in order to relate them analogically. These two movements continuously work together in a creative tension where “every belief” is subjected to the “test of fresh experiences, of further questions and new insights,” and “of clarifying and qualifying revisions of judgment” (728). Lonergan (1971a, 159) employs this basic heuristic framework in developing his methodological approach to theology as an ongoing “self-correcting process of learning,” where new questions lead to fresh insights, which only lead to further questions, toward infinite horizons of wonder. Tracy

(1981, 15) suggests that this framework offers a collaborative model for approaching “religious and theological studies” that can become the basis for “functional interdisciplinary work.” Hence, the two movements are just that: *movements*, not chronological moments. They are “functionally interrelated” and form a “dynamic unity” (Lonergan 1971a, 138). Lonergan (1984, 10) notes, “such interdependence. . . supposes distinction,” yet “it opposes separation.” In teaching religion in Catholic high schools these two movements function together like the movements of a jazz symphony. They are constantly weaving in and out of each other, playing off of each of other, and testing each other’s limits and boundaries. They create a rhythm and an energy that emerges from the dynamic interplay between the two. The “downward” rhythmic pattern of the “way of heritage interacts, intersects, and interweaves with the “upward” rhythmic pattern of “the way of achievement.” Through variation and modulation, syncopation and improvisation, accent and alternating rhythms they create consonance and dissonance, tension and resolution, harmony and creative clash. Together, they break open conversation between the Catholic sacred tradition and the Catholic intellectual tradition. And, they create conversational spaces for critical, creative, and dynamic interplay.

It is the teacher who brings his or her virtuosity to create this dynamic interplay in the Catholic high school religion classroom. Susanne Langer, whose philosophy of aesthetics influenced Lonergan’s understanding of the artistic element in teaching, stresses that the creation of music “is not a *mechanical* affair, but is part and parcel of the creative drive, controlled entirely, in every detail, by an artistic imagination” (1953, 120, emphasis original; See Lonergan 1993, 211). Such is the artistry of the religion teacher who creatively brings the two movements together, like a jazz musician who plays off

themes and variations, who senses “the need for dissonance and consonance, novelty and reintegration, length of phrase and timing of cadences” in the very act of making inherited compositions come alive (Langer 1953, 123). As Crowe (1985, 104) insists, “it is the teacher who is the real agent. . . in the integration of the way of heritage with the way of achievement.” Yet, Crowe cautions, just as the teacher can be an agent for integration, so too, “the teacher can be a powerful influence for *disintegration*, or for the lopsided stress on one way to the neglect of the other” (104, emphasis added).

The dynamic interplay of Lonergan’s eight functional specialties of theology offers teachers a model for teaching religion that holds these two movements in critical and creative tension. Lonergan (1971a, xii) emphasizes that “by a model is not meant something to be copied or imitated” slavishly. A model is not a mold. Rather, a model is “an intelligible, interlocking set of terms and relations. . . that is something worth keeping in mind when one confronts a situation or tackles a job.” It provides a method for approaching teaching religion, not a procedure. Lonergan insists, a “method offers not rules to be followed blindly;” but rather, it offers “a framework for creativity” (xii). It invites variation and improvisation. It suggests possibilities and directions. And, it encourages freedom of expression in endless variety. While religious articulacy builds on religious literacy, through the virtuosity of the teacher they are interwoven like the two movements of a jazz symphony. Rather than one sequentially following the other, they work together in tandem, playing off of each other to provide a flexible and fluid framework for approaching teaching religion critically and creatively.

Lonergan’s framework for theology provides a basic dynamically interrelated pattern between the two movements, “downward” and “upward,” by integrating the eight

functional specialties on the four levels of consciousness: empirical, intellectual, rational, and deliberative (1971a, 143). At the deliberative level, the dynamic interplay between foundations and dialectics creates a dialectics of values manifested in different value stances. Pedagogically, this dialectic would incorporate various value positions, both religious and non-religious, and include students' own value stances as topics for critical reflection. At the rational level of judgment, the dynamic interplay between doctrines and historical investigation creates a dialectics of beliefs. Pedagogically, it would include not only the historical development of various Christian doctrines, both within the Catholic sacred tradition and among the various Christian churches, but also, it would invite investigations of the beliefs of other religious traditions as they are historically situated in-relation to Christianity. The most obvious example of this would be Judaism in-relation to Christianity. However, it would also include situating Christian doctrines in the wider context of "the relations between different religions" (Lonergan 1971a, 128). At the intellectual level of understanding, the dynamic interplay between systematics and interpretations sets up a dialectics of interpretations. Pedagogically, this invites inquiry into various and conflictual theological positions. It would invite questions and discussions of different theological interpretations. And, it encourages critique, clarification, and deeper analysis. Finally, at the empirical level of experiencing, the dynamic interplay between communications and research invites a dialectics of expressions through the investigation of the data of religious experience in its multiform expressions. Pedagogically, it would invite comparing and contrasting various historical and cultural expressions of particular religious themes. It would encourage exploration of those themes in art, literature, and film. And, it would urge critical investigation of the

contemporary cultural matrix of postmodernity to help find new, more adequate forms of expression.

This basic pattern of the ongoing interrelationship between the two movements as expressed in the dynamic interplay between foundations and dialectics, doctrines and historical investigations, systematics and interpretations, and communications and research provides a starting point for critically and creatively approaching teaching religion in the Catholic high school classroom. Moreover, this basic pattern opens the way for further creativity in teaching religion since not only are the two movements dynamically interrelated; but also, the operations of each of the movements are dynamically interrelated as well. The functional specialties within each of the movements stand in a “reciprocal dependence” with the others. As Lonergan (1971a, 141) notes, “not only does interpretation depend upon research but also research depends on interpretation.” History “depends upon both research and interpretation” and, at the same time, “history supplies the context” for research and interpretation. And, not only does dialectics incorporate history, interpretation, and research as its foundation; but also dialectics provides a “heuristic” structure for the others. At the same time, communications incorporates systematics, doctrines, and foundations as its content, while communications also raises questions for systematics, doctrines, and foundations (142). Accordingly, since the two movements are dynamically interdependent, so too are all eight functional specialties through the “reciprocal dependence” of the specialties within each movement through “an indirect interdependence,” whereby to a large extent each depends on the other. Altogether, they form a dynamic “unity of interdependent parts,

each adjusting to changes in the other, and the whole developing as a result of such changes” (144).

Research, then, is not limited to critical investigation of communications; but also research includes critical investigations of systematics, doctrines, and foundations which are incorporated into communications. Interpretation is not only hermeneutical analysis of systematics, but also hermeneutical analyses of various communicated expressions, doctrines, and foundations. Historical investigation consists not only of historical evaluations of the development of doctrines, but also historical evaluations of the development of communicated forms, theological interpretations, and religious foundations. Finally, dialectics is not just a critical examination of divergent values, but also a critical examination of divergent religious expressions, theological systems, and doctrines. Pedagogically, this dynamic interplay between the two movements allows for multiple entry-points for the study of religious foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications. One could approach this “downward” movement through any one of the four corresponding levels in the movement “upward:” research, interpretations, history, or dialectics.

In approaching a particular theological topic, question, or issue one could approach it from the level of research, interpretations, history, or dialectics. Yet, it would still incorporate the dialectics of the other specialties through the basic interdependent pattern that forms the dynamic relationship between the two movements “downward” and “upward:” foundations-dialectics, doctrines-history, systematics-interpretation, and communications-research. To take one example from the previous chapter, in dealing with the problem of evil, one teacher could take an historical approach as an entry-point.

This would begin at the level of foundations in the movement “downward” as an historical investigation of the dialectics of values concerning the question of evil. More than likely, this would take a chronological approach in examining various historical positions on the same question, both religious and non-religious, up to and including contemporary positions. The next level in the movement “downward,” that of doctrines, would involve historical investigations of the dialectics of beliefs contained in various Christian doctrines concerning the problem of evil. It would examine doctrinal positions in their historical contexts and it might include not just other Christian perspectives, Orthodox and Protestant, but also, the teachings of other religious traditions on evil, perhaps Judaism and Islam. The next level “downward,” systematics, would include historical investigation of various theological opinions concerning evil through the dialectics of interpretations. It would invite discussion of various theological interpretations concerning evil in their historical contexts. Finally, the level of communications would allow an historical investigation into the dialectics of expressions by examining the development of different expressions surrounding the question of evil. It might explore various cultural transpositions of foundations, doctrines, and interpretations. And, it might examine historical representations of evil through art, literature, and film. Throughout, the dialectic of each level would invite debate, discussion, and critique. It would invite critical reflection, critical questioning, and critical conversations. And, it would promote not just a religious literacy in the texts, creeds, practices, symbols, and interpretations of tradition(s); it would also promote religious articulacy as students are invited to question, critique, and clarify their positions in-relation to the other.

At the same time, since the whole framework is dynamically interrelated, incorporating the “reciprocal dependence” of the functional specialties within each movement, another teacher might take the same historical approach, but in reverse order, starting with an historical investigation of cultural expressions and moving toward a dialectics of values through an historical investigation of various positions on the problem of evil. Still, another teacher might approach the same question, not from an historical, but from a dialectical approach. At the level of foundations, the dialectics of value would be framed not in historical terms, but dialectically, with positions and counter-positions being introduced right away. The same would be true throughout the process, setting up a dialectics of beliefs, a dialectics of interpretations, and a dialectics of expressions. Yet, another teacher might approach the same question through the lens of interpretation, framing the dialectics of value as a dialectics of the hermeneutics of value, offering different, and alternative, interpretive lenses, such as feminist, liberation, or Latino/Latina theological hermeneutics, alongside other, more traditional, interpretive stances. These varying lenses could frame the discussion throughout, at the levels of doctrines, systematics, and communications. Finally, another teacher might adopt an investigative, research-based approach. This would bring students more directly into the analysis of foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications. Students would identify, classify, compare, and contrast the various positions at each of the different levels. As with the historical approach, the dialectical, hermeneutical, and investigative approaches could also be developed in reverse order, from the level of communications through the level of foundations. In addition, one teacher may combine different elements from several approaches such as historical and investigative, dialectical and

hermeneutical, or investigative and dialectical. Thus, the dynamic interplay between Lonergan's eight functional specialties of theology offers teachers in Catholic high schools a dynamically interrelated, flexible model for approaching teaching religion, not as "something to be copied or imitated," but as something "worth keeping in mind" as a general framework, inviting them to integrate the two movements critically and creatively in fostering religious literacy and articulacy (Lonergan 1971a, xii).

Applying Lonergan's eight functional specialties of theology to teaching religion in Catholic high schools offers multiple entry-points, multiple approaches, and multiple variations through the ongoing interplay of research, interpretations, history, and dialectics with religious foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications. It provides a "framework for creativity" that opens new spaces for critical conversations in the religion classroom. And, like jazz, the two movements allow "the interplay of structure and improvisation, collectivity and individuality, tradition and innovation" that encourages teachers to explore the limits of theological virtuosity with students, to help students discover the underlying rhythmic patterns of religious meaning and value found in tradition (Welch 1999, 21). As Moira Carley (2005, 15) points out, "in Lonergan's scheme the teacher is an artist creating out of the materials at hand," like a jazz musician playing off of strength and limitation with "all the delicacy and subtlety, all the rapidity and effectiveness with which one incarnate intelligence can communicate its grasp to another by grasping what the other has yet to grasp and what act or sound or sign would make him [or her] grasp it" (Lonergan 1997, 200-201). Adopting such an approach in the Catholic high school religion classroom allows for the creative interplay between what Greene (1995, 138) calls "the pedagogy that empowers students to create" and "the

pedagogy that empowers them to attend.” And, it encourages both teachers and students to converse with past and present voices as attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible subjects-in-relation.

Conclusion

Allowing Lonergan’s eight functional specialties to guide the two movements of teaching religion in promoting religious literacy and fostering religious articulacy engages students in the ongoing conversation between the Catholic sacred tradition and the Catholic intellectual tradition. It embraces “the creative tension of tradition and critique” that fosters “a pedagogy that encourages appropriation of the normative pattern of inquiry in all its complexity” and, at the same time, carries on “dialogue with tradition” through its “classics of impenetrable depth” (McPartland 2001, 139) It cultivates both students’ “analogical imagination” which allows them to see “similarity-in-difference” within and among various theological and religious traditions, and their “dialectical imagination” which allows them to critique, debate, and call into question those same traditions. Through the heuristically interdependent relationship between research, interpretation, history, and dialectics with foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications, students are drawn into the dynamic interplay between the two movements. They are brought into the creative tension that characterizes theological and religious discourse. And, they are reminded that the two movements are “intrinsically related to one another” where each completes and complements the other in an ongoing process of discovery (Lonergan 1971a, 126).

Furthering students’ development of religious literacy and articulacy in the Catholic high school religion classroom requires opening conversational spaces through

encounters with otherness. It requires inviting students into a “community of inquiry” which cultivates “a willingness to follow the question wherever it may go” (Tracy 1987, 18). And, it requires acknowledging that good teaching means facilitating good conversations with voices both past and present. Facilitating such conversations necessitates not only teaching students how to speak in their own voice as knowing and valuing subjects; but also, it requires teaching them how to listen to the voice of the other by engaging them in authentic discourse. It entails nurturing a “disposition to dialogue” as a “growth posture” in the maturing of the developing subject (Gregson 1981, 151). And, it calls for helping students recognize that all genuine conversation includes the risk of changing one’s mind through encounters with the other. As John Dewey (1916, 148) observes, “all thinking involves a risk” insofar as “the invasion of the unknown” is an “adventure” where one’s conclusions cannot be known ahead of time. Such is the social nature of critical thinking which develops through authentic conversations with the other, who may challenge, question, or unhinge one’s original position. Yet, as Lonergan (1971a, 253) insists such conversations remain authentic only to the extent that those who participate in them remain attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible subjects-in-relation. One of the challenges of teaching religion in Catholic high schools, then, is promoting conversation that is authentic by helping students grow as authentic knowing and valuing subjects.

Encouraging such authenticity in the developing subject consists of developing students’ critical thinking capacities through dialectical discourse that includes debate, discussion, and various forms of argumentation. Using the dynamic interrelationship of Lonergan’s eight functional specialties of theology and religious studies as a framework

for approaching teaching religion provides a model for integrating such discourse into the Catholic high school religion classroom. It offers a pedagogical approach that encourages a dialectical and dialogic mode of conversation as the basis for teaching religion through the ongoing interplay between the movement “downward” toward religious literacy as the “way of heritage” and the movement “upward” toward religious articulacy as the way of “achievement.” And, it invites critical and creative virtuosity, not only on the part of teachers, but also, on the part of students as well, as together they seek to “transpose” the rhythmic patterns of the language of tradition into a new key, a new mode, and a whole new set of arrangements.

In the context of cultural postmodernity, cultivating such virtuosity is required to help prepare young people to navigate the complexities, pluralities, and ambiguities of contemporary life in forming their religious identities and in living an intelligent religious life. As Welch (1999, 16) notes, jazz offers a metaphor for the challenge of postmodernity that forces one to work with, not against “obstacles, limits, ambiguity, and transience” in order to release new creative “energy and vitality” in trying to live an authentic life. Cynthia Crysdale (2005, n.2, 85) observes that Lonergan’s work addresses this basic challenge of forming a religious identity in the context of cultural postmodernity by presenting an “anthropology of human discovery” that opens the way for imagining new possibilities, new angles of vision, and new horizons of wonder. Here, Moira Carley (2005, 21) suggests that Lonergan’s philosophy of education brings an “artistic consciousness” to the “learning process” which involves always “reimagining oneself as a learner on the way.” Lonergan’s work highlights that the ongoing conversation of theological and religious studies is never a “permanent achievement”

enshrined in “a set of doctrines and principles” but a continuous “process of questioning and discovery” (Crysdale 2005, 66). It is a conversation of discovery that students are drawn into through the dynamism of the rhythmic movements “downward” and “upward” that releases energy and creativity like the movements of a jazz symphony. Thus, as Lonergan (1993, 217) notes, “there is an artistic element in all conscious living” which is “an exploration of potentiality.” This “exploration of potentiality” is at the center of the dynamism between Lonergan’s two movements in their creative interplay which invites “an artistic element” into the teaching of religion as an ongoing process of discovery. It is a process that allows students to develop their artistry and virtuosity as literate and articulate subjects of their own religious education. And, it is a process that never exhausts the possibilities for rewriting theology in a whole new key.

Chapter 6

An Invitation to Infinite Wonder: Curricular Implications of Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of Education for Teaching Religion in Catholic High Schools

Bernard Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools is grounded in "an anthropology of human discovery" that encourages a developmental, dynamic, and dialectical process in teaching religion in Catholic high schools. It underscores the idea that Catholic schools ought to be places that foster the development of adolescents as knowing and valuing subjects in order to promote their full human flourishing. And, it emphasizes the role of critical thinking in that process as students gradually come to appropriate themselves as authentic knowers and choosers of values. Throughout, this study has engaged the question: *How can Bernard Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools contribute to a revitalized understanding of the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools?*

Chapter two provides a contextual backdrop and intellectual biography of Lonergan's thought on education. Chapters three, four, and five unpack that thought and its implications for teaching religion in Catholic high schools. Chapter three establishes the importance of cultivating critical thinking capacities for the development of the subject as an intelligent, free, and responsible self-in-relation to the world. It locates the development of critical thinking in the context of the self-transcendence and self-appropriation of adolescents, as developing subjects, through their growing metacognitive awareness. And, it emphasizes the need for the continuous scaffolding of that process through the creation of environments that nurture and support the development of adolescents as authentic knowing and valuing subjects. Chapter four highlights the significance of fostering critical thinking capacities for the educational

development of adolescents, in general, and their religious educational development, in particular. It advances the idea that critical thinking is a socially interactive process that develops through dialectical discourse with multiple perspectives. And, it argues that religion classrooms in Catholic high schools ought to be places for such discourse, inviting students to enter the wider conversation of the Catholic intellectual tradition. Finally, chapter five proposes a pedagogical model for teaching religion in Catholic high schools that fosters critical thinking in adolescents based on Lonergan's eight-fold division of the functional specialties of theology. It argues that contemporary adolescents, growing up in the context of cultural postmodernity, need to develop not only religious literacy in the language of religious tradition(s), but also a critically reflective religious articulacy that allows them to articulate more fully their own religious understandings, values, and beliefs. At the same time, they need to be able to engage in critical conversations with others, both within their own tradition and beyond it. It suggests that Lonergan's methodological framework for theology offers a dialectical and dialogic approach to teaching religion that encourages such critical conversations in the high school religion classroom.

The purpose of this final chapter is to explore the wider curricular implications of Lonergan's philosophy of education for teaching religion in Catholic high schools. Its goal is to identify the essential elements of a religion curriculum for Catholic high schools that would promote both adolescents' religious literacy and articulacy. It seeks to provide an assessment of the adequacy of the USCCB's current *Curriculum Framework* for promoting religious literacy and articulacy in adolescents attending Catholic high schools. Finally, it offers recommendations for supplemental curriculum design needs

based on the offered assessment, as well as suggestions for possible areas for further curriculum research and development.

The first section presents four essential elements of a religion curriculum that promotes religious literacy and articulacy, based on Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools. It analyzes the adequacy of the USCCB's current *Curriculum Framework* based on those elements. And, it suggests the need for further development of the *Framework* in light of that assessment. The second section recommends potential areas for further curriculum research and development that grow out of the study. It suggests possible directions for examining the link between articulacy and advocacy in educating students for social justice. It looks at the possibility for further research on promoting critical moral reflection through the dialectical process of fostering moral articulacy. It indicates possible curricular implications for promoting interreligious dialogue through the development of religious articulacy. Finally, the concluding section addresses the limitations of the study and recommends other areas for further research that go beyond the study's application to teaching religion in Catholic high schools.

Developing a Curriculum for Religious Literacy and Articulatory

Essential Elements for a Curriculum that Fosters Religious Literacy and Articulatory

Overall, this study has provided a philosophical rationale for the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools toward fostering both adolescents' religious literacy as the way of "heritage" and adolescents' religious articulacy as the way of "achievement." It shows the need for cultivating critical thinking capacities in adolescents if they are to develop as authentic knowing and valuing subjects. And, it presents a pedagogical model for promoting religious literacy and articulacy in the

Catholic high school religion classroom based on the dynamic interrelationship between Lonergan's eight functional specialties of theology. From this study there emerge four essential elements for developing a curriculum that promotes adolescents' religious literacy and articulacy. Such a curriculum (1) honors the knowing and valuing subject in the process of knowing and valuing, (2) promotes critical thinking as a constitutive dimension of the development of the subject, (3) invites critical conversation between the Catholic sacred tradition and the Catholic intellectual tradition, and (4) adopts an integrated approach that fosters students' literacy in the *content* of religious foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications. At the same time, it develops students' articulacy by cultivating the *skills* of research, interpretation, historical investigation, and dialectics. These essential elements can serve as guideposts for the development of religion curricula that foster the self-transcendence and self-appropriation of adolescents as intelligent, free, and responsible subjects. They can provide direction for designing curricula that follows *Gaudium et Spes*' call to cultivate the human spirit "in such a way that there results a growth in its capacity to wonder, to understand, to contemplate, to make personal judgments, and to develop a religious, moral, and social sense" (Abbott 1966, 265). They can inform curriculum policy decisions that aim at nurturing and sustaining the growth of adolescents attending Catholic high schools in moving them toward greater religious literacy and articulacy.

In exploring each of these elements more fully, it can be noted that, first a religion curriculum that fosters religious literacy and articulacy honors the knowing and valuing subject by promoting authentic knowing, that leads to authentic valuing. It honors the subject in the process of knowing by acknowledging that knowing is not "like looking,"

or simply grasping “what is out there now to be looked at” (Lonergan 1971a, 238). Instead, such a curriculum takes into account the idea that knowing is not passively receiving religious foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications as data to be stored for later retrieval. Rather, it is informed by an epistemology that recognizes that authentic knowing is a dynamic process that involves attentive, intelligent, and reasonable affirmations of meaning as the personally appropriated and individually articulated judgments of the knowing subject. In other words, such a curriculum is informed by an “evaluativist epistemology” that construes knowledge as “judgments that can be evaluated,” rather than adopting an “absolutist epistemology” where knowledge is seen as consisting of “facts” that exist independent of the knowing subject. At the same time, it moves students beyond a “multiplist epistemology” where knowledge is seen as mere subjective opinion (Kuhn 2005, 31). This encourages students to reject the “stances of sloth” of “relativism” and “subjectivism” as well as dogmatism by engaging them in their own process of knowing as authentic knowing subjects (Conley 2014, 34). In addition, such a curriculum honors the subject in the process of valuing by cultivating students’ critically appropriated, responsible freedom in choosing their own religious beliefs and values. It does this by helping them make more critically informed choices, and by empowering them to find their own voice with which to articulate those choices. In effect, honoring the knowing and valuing subject in the religion curriculum invites students beyond mere possession of inherited religious beliefs and values and moves them toward authentic ownership of them. It allows, as Lonergan (1967a, 185) notes, “not possession of the book but freedom from the book.” And, it invites students beyond mere “notional assent” that is “made upon habit and without reflection” toward “real

assent” as the self-appropriated affirmations of meaning and value of the knowing and valuing subject (Newman 1955, 21).

Second, a religion curriculum that nurtures religious literacy and articulacy promotes critical thinking to the extent that it recognizes critical thinking is a constitutive dimension of the growth of adolescents as developing subjects. Promoting such critical thinking capacities in adolescents requires building a process of scaffolding into the religion curriculum that helps students read more reflectively, think more critically, and write more analytically. It supports them in their attempts to “recast definitions” and to articulate meaning and values for themselves. It provides ample room for students to practice thinking critically, recognizing as Kuhn (2005, 35) argues, that “intellectual values. . . cannot be instilled by exhortation,” but only through experience and practice can students be convinced of the value of critical thinking. Supporting the development of critical thinking capacities in adolescents in the religion curriculum introduces them to “the open and unpredictable creation of meaning through collaborative inquiry” (Brookfield 2008, 44). It crafts spaces for such inquiry. It leaves room for more questions than it does for answers. Lastly, promoting critical thinking capacities in the religion curriculum requires cultivating adolescents’ growing metacognitive awareness by creating openings in the curriculum that encourage students to identify their own religious assumptions, check the validity of those assumptions, and imagine alternative possibilities (Brookfield 2012, 1). It designs opportunities that open students out to new vistas, new angles of vision, and new horizons of wonder. It supports them in their growing self-transcendence and self-appropriation as authentic knowing and valuing

subjects. And, it helps them bring “articulate form” to their own religious understanding, valuing, and believing.

Third, a religion curriculum that cultivates religious literacy and articulacy facilitates critical conversations between the Catholic intellectual tradition and the Catholic sacred tradition. It broadens conversation to include multiple conversation partners in the ongoing dialogue of the Catholic intellectual tradition as a “learning tradition” which invites scholarship, inquiry, and debate into the search for meaning and value within Catholicism and beyond it (Haughey 2009, 64). And, it recognizes that these two traditions work together in a creative tension as part of the living tradition of the whole church as a “learning church,” that makes room for questioning, imagining, and wondering (Crowe 1993, 289). Alasdair MacIntyre (1984, 222) contends “a living tradition” is “an historically extended, socially embodied argument. . . about the goods which constitute that tradition.” A curriculum that promotes religious literacy and articulacy invites students into that living conversation between the Catholic intellectual tradition and the Catholic sacred tradition and equips them not only with the language, but also, with the skills necessary with which to help shape that discourse. Haughey (2009, 66) suggests “a Catholic school that has no sense of this compound tradition does a disservice to students, leaving them ill-equipped to deal with the confusions, ephemera, and biases of our contemporary culture.”

Finally, a religion curriculum that promotes religious literacy and articulacy adopts an integrated approach that not only teaches the contents of religious foundations, doctrines, systematic interpretations, and communications, but also develops the skills of theological research, interpretation, historical investigation, and dialectics. Elliot Eisner

(1985, 46) contends, “A curriculum is a program that is intentionally designed to engage students in activities or events that will have educational benefit for them.” These activities not only present the contents of subject matter to be engaged, but also support the development of intellectual skills that help students engage the subject matter and participate in the creation of further knowledge. John Dewey (1916, 259) notes, “Any mode of skill which is achieved with deepening of knowledge and perfecting of judgment is readily put to use in new situations and is under personal control” as the “expression of a trained intelligence.” In the context of teaching religion, a curriculum that aims at fostering religious literacy and articulacy needs to consider not just the “doctrinal elements,” but also the educational elements that promote the development of the knowing and valuing subject. This requires cultivating the skills of research, interpretation, historical investigation, and dialectics, which trains students to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible. Such cultivation promotes the development of “the intellectual skills of inquiry and argument” as a “framework” for further learning (Kuhn 2005, 179). It fosters the self-appropriation of students’ own knowing and valuing. And, it empowers them to continue to grow in their capacity for wonder.

Taken together, these four essential elements can offer guidance for the development of religion curricula that foster adolescents’ religious literacy and articulacy. They can serve as principles that ground curricula in a theological anthropology that takes seriously the development of the human person as an intelligent, free, and responsible subject. They can provide a rationale for developing religion curricula that facilitate an open dialogue between faith, culture, and reason. As the *GDC*

notes, in the context of Catholic schools “religious instruction” ought to help students “understand better the Christian message by relating it to the great existential concerns common to all religions and to every human being” and “to the various visions of life particularly evident in culture,” as well as “those major moral questions which confront humanity today” (1998, 67). A religion curriculum that (1) honors the knowing and valuing subject, (2) promotes critical thinking, (3) facilitates dialogue, and (4) emphasizes both theological skills and content supports the development of adolescents toward an authentic religious literacy and articulacy, allowing them to ask deeper questions, to make more critical connections, and to uncover richer meaning and fuller expressions of value.

The Adequacy of the USCCB’s Curriculum Framework for Fostering Religious Literacy and Articulacy

Following the 1994 publication of the English translation of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) began discussions concerning the possibility of a national curriculum in conformity with the newly released catechism. In 1996, the U.S. bishops established a task force to explore the possibility of a national curriculum from kindergarten through twelfth grade. It concludes that “elementary school texts were not problematic” and “efforts were then refocused on high school texts and curricula” (Ostasiewski 2010, 6). In 1997, the USCCB’s Ad Hoc Committee to Oversee the Use of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* expressed concern over “a pattern of doctrinal deficiencies” in high school religion series which showed a “trend of doctrinal incompleteness and imprecision” (Buechlein 1997). At their 2003 meeting, the USCCB moved closer to recommending a national religion curriculum for high school students. Archbishop Alfred Hughes (2003,

417), then head of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Use of the *Catechism*, reemphasized that “doctrinally deficient texts. . . are still being widely used” in Catholic high schools. He cited some examples of these “deficiencies.” He indicated that “Students. . . are easily led to believe that one religion or church is as good as another.” Hughes (2003, 419) asserts that “Our young people are not learning that what we know and believe is based on objective truth revealed to us by God.” “The approach to church,” he writes, “often overemphasizes the role of the community” without due emphasis on “the role of the hierarchy in the church.” Such concerns led the U.S. bishops to recommend the development of a national religion curriculum for high school students. In 2007 at the USCCB’s November meeting, the bishops’ Committee on Evangelization and Catechesis unveiled the new *Doctrinal Elements of a Curriculum Framework for the Development of Catechetical Materials for Young People of High School Age*. It was “approved by the full body” and authorized for publication the following year (USCCB 2008).

The USCCB’s *Curriculum Framework* is intended “to offer guidance to catechetical publishers in the creation of instructional material” and “to aid those responsible for overseeing catechetical instruction within diocese as well as those responsible for curriculum development” (USCCB 2008, 1). The *Framework* appears to make no distinction between catechesis and religious instruction in schools, a relationship expressed in the *GDC* as “one of distinction and complementarity” (1998, 64). Rather, the *Framework* states that it is “designed to guide catechetical instruction for young people of high school age, *wherever* and *however* it takes place: in Catholic high schools, in parish religious education programs, with young people schooled at home, or within the context of the catechetical instruction which should be part of every youth ministry

program” (USCCB 2008, 1, emphasis added). Here, the term “catechetical instruction” is used broadly as a comprehensive term meant to include both what goes on in a Catholic high school religion classroom and catechetical programs in a parish setting.

Beyond this confusion of the aims of catechesis and academic instruction in religion, there appears to be further confusion in the *Curriculum Framework* regarding the nature of instruction itself. As Nicholas Lash (2010, 17) observes, the word “instruction” can have two meanings, one is “to teach,” while the other is “to command.” He points out that the bishops of the Catholic Church often seem to confuse these two senses insofar as they appear to equate teaching with commanding in their official pronouncements. This confusion of language appears to spill over into the USCCB’s *Curriculum Framework* where “catechetical instruction” seems to mean telling students what to believe. As the *Framework* states, “Within each theme. . . there is a section entitled ‘Challenges’ which raises” questions and “provides direction for ways to answer them.” Moreover, the *Framework* emphasizes that “publishers and teachers or catechists are to strive to provide for a catechetical instruction and formation that is imbued with an apologetical approach” (USCCB 2008, 1).

One example of such a “challenge” is found in the course titled “Jesus Christ’s Mission Continues in the Church” intended for high school sophomores. The course material states that students “will be introduced to the fact that the Church was founded by Christ through the Apostles and is sustained through the Holy Spirit.” The students “will learn not so much about the events in the life of the Church but about the sacred nature of the Church” (USCCB 2008, 15). Here, one “challenge” question is “Why do I have to be a Catholic? Aren’t all religions as good as another?” The answer given, based

on the *Catechism*, is “To be a Catholic is to be a member of the one true Church of Christ. While elements of truth can be found in other churches and religions, the fullness of the means of salvation subsists in the Catholic Church” (USCCB 2008, 18). A similar question appears in a later senior elective course on “Ecumenical and Interreligious Issues.” It asks: “Isn’t one faith or religion as good as any other?” Here, the answer is simply “No, that statement is not true. The fullness of Revelation and truth subsists in the Catholic Church” (USCCB 2008, 53). Thus, rather than encouraging critically reflective, thought-provoking questions that engage students in debate, discussion, and dialectical discourse concerning the meaning of religious doctrines, the *Framework* appears to endorse an apologetical approach that provides ready-made answers for pre-formulated questions.

The USCCB’s *Curriculum Framework* does provide a comprehensive foundation for bolstering students’ religious literacy in the texts, creeds, practices, and symbols of the Catholic sacred tradition. However, in assessing the adequacy of the *Framework* for promoting adolescents’ religious literacy *and* articulacy it is necessary to ask: how does the *Framework* reflect the essential elements of a curriculum for religious literacy and articulacy? To what extent does it honor the knowing and valuing subject in the process of knowing and valuing? To what extent does it encourage critical thinking? To what extent does it facilitate dialogue between the Catholic sacred tradition and the Catholic intellectual tradition? And, to what extent does it emphasize both the content of foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications and the skills of theological research, interpretation, historical investigation, and dialectics?

The *Framework* seems to adopt an “absolutist epistemology” where knowledge is conceived as consisting of “facts” that exist independent of the knowing subject. Throughout, the *Framework* employs the language of this epistemology when it says “students will understand *that*. . .,” “students will learn *that*. . .,” and “they will be introduced to the fact *that*. . .” (USCCB 2008, 6, 11, 15, emphasis added). It is an epistemology that reinforces a “banking” approach to education “in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filling, and storing the deposits” (Freire 1992, 58). As indicated above, such an epistemology fails to honor the knowing subject in the process of knowing. It fails to recognize that knowing is a dynamic process that consists of the “intelligibly grasped and reasonably affirmed” judgments of the knowing subject (Lonergan 1997, 499). It fails to assist students in moving toward “real assent” as the self-appropriation of their own believing and valuing. To the extent that the USCCB’s *Curriculum Framework* is guided by an “absolutist epistemology,” it is ill-equipped to help students develop an authentic religious articulation that allows them to claim a creed of their own, to give “articulate form” to their own questions of meaning and value, and to invite them to become not “consumers of,” but active participants in religious discourse (Dean 2001, 30).

At the same time, the *Curriculum Framework* appears to leave little room for critical thinking. It seems to provide pre-packaged answers, rather than providing adequate space for more questions. It seems to endorse a narrow format for questioning which presumes that the teacher has all the answers-or, at least access to all the answers-to the questions that students pose. Rather than approaching the subject together as questioners, there appears to be a presupposition that “the teacher knows everything and

the students know nothing” (Freire 1992, 59). Instead of adopting a heuristic process for the ongoing discovery of meaning, the *Curriculum Framework* seems to encourage a closed system in the religion classroom, where meaning is fixed, already assumed, and pre-determined. For example, many of the questions in the “challenge” sections are framed in either/or terms and give a correct, often negative, answer: “Isn’t it better to worship God in my own way, when and how I want?,” “Can’t God forgive us directly when we are sorry for sin?,” or “Isn’t it wrong for the Church to impose her views of morality on others?” (USCCB 2008, 19, 25, 30). Such questions seem as if they are framed in a way not to spark critically nuanced discussion, thoughtful reflection, or debate, but rather to provide simple answers. For instance, the answer given to the question above regarding forgiveness is “While God can forgive us however and whenever he wants, he knows what is best for us and has taught us through Jesus that he wants to forgive us through the Sacrament of Penance and Reconciliation” (USCCB 2008, 25). In his critique of the *Framework* William O’Malley (2009, 10) observes that it appears “inflexibly top down, prescriptive,” and “rigorously certain” in its presentation of the Catholic faith. On the other hand, in defending the *Framework*, Alfred McBride (2009, 11) claims that “It provides our God-given intelligence with the tools to communicate and defend the faith,” in a way that is “resolutely and correctly doctrinal.” Yet, it must be asked, does the *Framework* allow for thinking that is not “resolutely and correctly doctrinal?” Does it invite students to consider multiple perspectives and alternative angles of vision? Does it encourage students to test assumptions, biases, and presuppositions? Only to the extent that the *Framework* actually encourages critical

thinking as a constitutive dimension of “our God-given intelligence,” does it fully support students’ development as authentic knowing and valuing subjects.

The *Curriculum Framework* insists that it seeks to “authentically and completely define and present the teaching of the Church” (USCCB 2008, 1). Thus, it emphasizes the presentation of the contents of the Catholic sacred tradition. By comparison, however, the *Framework* appears to place little emphasis on the Catholic intellectual tradition and its ongoing dialogue of scholarship with the world. For example, in a section titled “Understanding Scripture” within the course “The Revelation of Jesus Christ in Scripture,” primary emphasis is given to the role of “the teaching office of the Church” as the “authentic” interpreter of Scripture. In contrast, “research done by scholars” is listed at the bottom as an “ancillary” approach to Scripture (USCCB 2008, 3). Consider another example: in discussing the book of Genesis in a section titled “The Creation of the World and Our First Parents,” the *Framework* asserts “the book reveals truth about which science and history can only speculate” (USCCB 2008, 11). Rather than adopting a dialogic approach which invites academic discourse with multiple disciplines that can inform the study of religion, the *Framework* appears to downplay the role of scholarship and academic discourse in fostering students’ religious understanding in favor of an emphasis on “the doctrinal content of catechetical instruction” (USCCB 2008, 1). It seems to presume that a doctrinal presentation alone is sufficient to nurture adolescents’ abilities to make authentically informed decisions concerning their own believing and valuing. And, it would appear that the *Framework* does not fully take into account the *GDC*’s recommendation “that religious instruction in schools. . . should engage in a

necessary interdisciplinary dialogue” as part of the ongoing discourse of the Catholic intellectual tradition between faith, culture, and reason (1998, 65, emphasis added).

Finally, the *Curriculum Framework* seems to overemphasize content to the neglect of skills. While it presents a large body of doctrinal content, drawn mostly from the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, it appears to ignore the pedagogical principle that more information does not necessarily translate into academic rigor. Rather, academic rigor includes breadth and depth, content and skills, literate understanding and articulate analysis. The *GDC* suggests “It is necessary. . . that religious instruction in schools appear as a scholastic discipline with the same systematic demands and the same rigor as other disciplines” (1998, 65). This requires fostering both students’ knowledge of religious content and the “intellectual skills” of sustained inquiry and argumentative discourse necessary for their growth as intelligent, free, and responsible subjects (Kuhn 2001, 179). The *Framework* claims that “In addition to providing guidance about the doctrinal content of catechetical instruction for high-school-age young people,” it also is “designed to help those same young people develop the necessary skills to answer or address the real questions that they face in life and in their Catholic faith.” Yet, the *Framework*’s suggestion for the development of those “skills” is the inclusion of its “Challenges” section within each course “which raises examples of these questions and provides *direction* for ways to answer them” (USCCB 2008, 1, emphasis added). Rather than encouraging discussion, debate, and dialectical discourse which helps develop students’ skills for critical theological reflection, the *Framework*’s “Challenges” sections seem to foreclose discussion by providing facile answers to profoundly theological questions.

By itself, the USCCB's *Curriculum Framework* appears inadequate for fostering adolescents' religious literacy and articulacy. While it does provide a foundation for doctrinal literacy, it seems to lack the necessary essential elements for fostering religious articulacy and a broader religious literacy. Truly honoring students as knowing and valuing subjects, requires reconsidering the *Framework*'s underlying "absolutist epistemology" that encourages a "banking" approach to teaching religion. It requires helping students move toward an "evaluativist epistemology" which cultivates critical thinking in order to allow them to reject both relativism and dogmatism (Kuhn 2005, 31). It requires engaging students as attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible subjects of their own religious education. Fostering critical thinking necessitates reexamining the place of thinking in the *Curriculum Framework*. It involves reclaiming the role of questions in teaching religion as open-ended, ongoing, and as a genuine source of wonder. And, it entails reevaluating the *Framework* in light of "an anthropology of human discovery" that invites the self-transcendence and self-appropriation of the knowing and valuing subject. Expanding awareness of the role of the Catholic intellectual tradition as an authentic dialogue partner with the Catholic sacred tradition in the religion classroom requires reimagining spaces in the curriculum for ongoing academic discourse. It invites rediscovery of the rich heritage of the Catholic intellectual tradition. It calls for a retrieval of a "hermeneutic of appreciation" of both traditions in the Catholic high school religion curriculum (Haughey 2009, 77). Lastly, integrating skills more fully with content in teaching religion necessitates a recommitment to help "young people develop the necessary skills to answer or address the real questions that they face in life," not by providing them with ready answers, but by helping them articulate their own deepest

questions (USCCB 2008, 1). It requires reinvigorating conversation in the religion classroom by promoting authentic dialogue, rather than presenting a monologue. And, it encourages redesigning the curriculum to foster not only religious literacy, but also religious articulacy.

Areas for Further Curriculum Research and Development

The study's findings have implications for several curriculum areas and their development. These could become potential areas not only for further curriculum research, but also for significant curriculum development. One area for additional research into the study's applicability could be how the model for fostering religious articulacy might be used to promote adolescents' participation in the ministry of advocacy. The U.S. bishop's *Renewing the Vision* emphasizes that "the ministry of advocacy" is a key "component" of the Church's ministry with adolescents (NCCB 1997, 26). It includes "empowering young people by giving them a voice and calling them to responsibility and accountability around the issues that affect them and their future." These include issues of social justice, education, economic and cultural development, in addition to making sure that "the voices of young people" are "honored and heard in the Church" (28). The study raises further questions regarding how advocacy might be fostered through the development of religious articulacy.

One possible avenue for consideration is to explore how the pedagogical model based on Lonergan's functional specialties of theology can be adapted to develop students' skills for advocacy. What implications does the basic dialectical pattern have for teaching advocacy? How can that model be adapted for a multidimensional advocacy that includes issues of social justice in the public square and, at the same time, gives

students a greater voice within the Church? Here, the basic heuristic pattern of research, interpretation, historical investigation, and dialectics has general application beyond the study of religious foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications. Moreover, the fundamental dialectical pattern at each level may have applicability beyond the study of Church teaching. Thus, the study raises questions about how that pattern could be broadened to include an analysis of political, economic, social, and cultural issues that could then become the basis for cultivating a more nuanced, critically reflected upon, and more fully articulated voice for advocacy in adolescents.

Such research might investigate how the basic pattern of dialectics at each level can be adapted as a pedagogical framework for promoting an articulacy that empowers advocacy for justice. At the empirical level of consciousness, rather than a dialectics of expressions, how can a dialectics of experience be used to attend to various political, social, cultural, or economic experiences that require advocacy for justice? How can a dialectics of interpretations be used to investigate how political, social, cultural, or economic interpretations promote justice or injustice? How can a dialectics of beliefs be used to weigh the veracity of certain political, social, cultural, or economic beliefs as supporting just or unjust policies? And, how can a dialectics of values help students in choosing political, social, cultural, or economic values that promote justice? Taken together, how can this framework help students approach these questions through the lenses of research, interpretations, historical investigation, and dialectics? Finally, how can this empower them to move toward a more critically nuanced and articulate advocacy for justice?

Another area for further curriculum research and development suggested by the study is its potential application in fostering critical moral reflection. Harold Daly Horell (2013, 384, emphasis original) suggests that critical moral reflection is a two-fold process that involves both “*stepping back*” to gain a “critically distanced stance” from moral issues, and “*stepping in*” to understand “how those issues *connect* with our *life story*.” Horell argues that critical moral reflection goes beyond moral reasoning and “involves a dialectical analysis. . . going back and forth between (1) attending carefully to our specific life experiences and (2) critically distanced analysis of the meaning of those experiences” (383). He observes that this dialectical approach to moral reflection is like “a two-step dance” which involves “a sometimes delicate balancing of stepping back. . . and stepping in.” It involves teaching both the skills of critical analysis and critical reflection and helping students develop “narrative and relational skills” that allows “critical attending” to one’s own life context (386). Given this dialectical dance between “stepping back” and “stepping in,” how might fostering *moral* articulacy support both critical analysis and critical attending in the process of critical moral reflection? How might promoting moral articulacy assist students in attending to their own moral experience in a more critically nuanced way, helping them develop “narrative and relational skills?” And, how can pedagogy better foster students’ self-appropriation of their own moral knowing and valuing?

Another possible area for further research into the curricular implications of the study may be to examine how the basic dialectal pattern of the study’s pedagogical framework could be adapted to help students engage in the dialectic between critical distancing and critical attending. How could the basic dialectical pattern help students

hold this two-fold process in critical and creative tension? At the level of experiencing, how could the dialectic of experience help students attend more carefully to their own moral experience, and also step back to see that experience in relation to the moral experiences of others? At the level of understanding, how could the dialectic of interpretation help students reflect on their own moral interpretive stance, and intelligently inquire into the moral interpretive stances of others to gain a broader perspective? At the level of judging, how might a dialectics of judgments and beliefs allow students to reflect critically on their own moral judgments and beliefs, and also reflect on their judgments and beliefs in relation to those of others? At the level of deciding, how might a dialectics of values and decisions invite students to reflect on their own values and moral decisions, while reflecting on them in relation to those of others? And, how might Lonergan's transcendental precepts-be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, and be responsible-guide the whole process of critical moral reflection?

Finally, one additional area for further curriculum research concerns the implications of the study for the role of interreligious dialogue in the Catholic high school religion classroom. The study argues that religious articulacy best develops through discourse with the other. Through such encounters students encounter themselves as they examine, clarify, and critically articulate their own stance in-relation to the other. Such encounters not only include engagement with historical, theological, and cultural otherness, but also include engagement with the religiously other. Thus, interreligious engagement is a constitutive dimension of teaching for religious literacy and articulacy. The study, then, raises the question: How can teaching for religious literacy and

articulacy not only help foster interreligious awareness, but also help promote interreligious dialogue?

The study suggests that promoting religious literacy alone is insufficient to help students negotiate the complexities of constructing a religious identity in the context of a religiously pluralistic and ambiguous postmodern culture. Rather, the study argues for cultivating a critically reflective religious articulacy that allows students to give “articulate form” to their own religious questions, understandings, values, and beliefs, which, in turn, empowers them to engage more fully in dialogue with others. As noted earlier, David Tracy (1981, 408) points out that one approaches conversations with the other only through analogy which allows one to see “similarity-in-difference.” Tracy (1987, 93) suggests that cultivating such an “analogical imagination” may be helpful as a “heuristic and pluralistic strategy” for facilitating interreligious conversations that allows one to find similarity, while honestly acknowledging differences. As Paul Lakeland (1997, 78) notes, authentic interreligious dialogue begins by “emphasizing the value and the richness of the pluralist abundance of ways of wisdom, while insisting on the hermeneutical necessity of maintaining a specific, particular, context- and history-bound way into the diversity of religions.” He recognizes that one only encounters other traditions through the lens of one’s own. How might fostering religious articulacy better prepare students to enter more fully into such conversations by helping them claim their own religious identities, while empowering them to give more critically nuanced expression to the analogous language that allows them to converse with the other? How might it nurture their ability to see “similarity-in-difference?” And, how might it help them “move beyond dialectic to dialogue” as a genuine “encounter of persons?”

(Lonergan 1985, 182). Thus, the study opens the door for further research on the role of religious articulacy in promoting authentic interreligious dialogue.

Conclusion

This study presented a philosophical vision for teaching religion in Catholic high schools that promotes the development of adolescents as authentic knowing and valuing subjects, based on Lonergan's philosophy of education for schools. It also proposed a pedagogical model and a set of principles to guide the implementation of this vision. It is the hope of the researcher that the study finds practical application in Catholic high school religion classrooms and informs not only the theory and practice of teaching religion, but also, policy decisions regarding curriculum that shape and affect the religious educational development of students attending Catholic schools.

While the study provides a philosophical rationale for the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools and offers a pedagogical and curricular framework for its implementation, the researcher is aware that the study also has both theoretical and practical limitations. One critique of the study may be its emphasis on critical thinking itself. Does the study adequately account for other ways of knowing: somatic knowing, intuitive knowing, or what Michael Polanyi calls "tacit knowing?"¹⁶ Does the study overemphasize cognitive development to the detriment of emotional development? Does the study place emphasis on critical thinking abilities in religious education in a way that excludes persons with diminished thinking capacities?

¹⁶ Polanyi suggests that "tacit knowing" is "personal knowing" that involves "an intellectual commitment" as "a responsible decision, in submission to the compelling claims of what in good conscience I conceive to be true" (1962, 65). Polanyi's notion of the commitment of the knower to the act of knowing finds resonance with Lonergan's notion of knowing as the personally affirmed judgments of the knowing subject (See Kumfer 1982).

Admittedly, these are limitations to the applicability of the study. Yet, the work does not pretend to offer a comprehensive vision for religious education. Nor, does the researcher suggest that the study's applicability is universal, even for Catholic schools. It recognizes that there are students with a range of varying abilities attending Catholic schools today. Instead, the study sought to demonstrate that fostering critical thinking is *one* necessary component for teaching religion in Catholic high schools if students are to develop the fullness of their potential as knowing and valuing subjects, whatever that potential might be. The researcher also recognizes that there are other significant dimensions of human development, besides the intellectual, that need to be cultivated in the context of teaching religion as well, dimensions which the study did not address. These include moral, spiritual, and emotional development. However, in spite of these limitations, the study sought to establish the importance of critical thinking as one dimension that needs to be fostered in the specific context of teaching religion in Catholic high schools.

Another limitation to the study may be to its seemingly overly optimistic assessment of adolescents' capacity and motivation for thinking critically. Does the study presume too much of adolescents? Does it overestimate the adolescent's abilities and interest? And, does it adequately take into account the practical challenges of motivating students to think critically? Critiquing Lonergan's notion of the human person's "unrestricted" desire to know, Donald Gelpi (2007, 20) observes, "I have been teaching all my life and have never encountered such a mind, including my own." As Deanna Kuhn's (2005, 32) research indicates, students need to have a reason to think critically in order to engage in the process of critical thinking. Without such motivation, students are unlikely to develop as critical thinkers since they "lack a reason to engage in sustained

intellectual inquiry.” This presents both a challenge and a limitation for the study. While the study addresses how critical thinking might be implemented in the Catholic high school religion classroom, it does not address how students might be motivated to think critically. The study stresses the need to cultivate the habit of critical thinking as an intellectual virtue, but it does not answer the question of how that might be done. While it does provide a framework for initiating critical conversations in the religion classroom intended to stimulate students’ critical thinking, the study does present a challenge to the creativity and virtuosity of religion teachers in implementing its recommendations.

The study may also lack attention to students’ own experience as a source for religious education. Does it adequately consider their experience as a starting point for teaching religion? Does it assume “top-down” pedagogy as normative? And, does it invite a teacher-centered approach to teaching religion? The study does present a pedagogical model that is designed to be flexible in its implementation. It allows for a variety of approaches to teaching religion that permits a range of teaching styles. The study neither endorses nor excludes an experientially based approach to teaching religion. At the level of foundations, for example, students’ own value stances could be incorporated into the dialectic of values, which would include their own experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. Likewise, at the level of communications, students are invited to attend to a variety of religious expressions in human experience which may include their own. However, the study does not attempt to develop an explicitly experientially based model for teaching religion, and thus may be limited in its applicability for those whose practice is largely informed by Thomas Groome’s “shared

praxis” approach (See Groome 1991). Still, the study can inform aspects of such an approach and may provide ideas for the teacher’s further creativity.

Yet, in spite of the study’s limited applicability, it also has possible implications beyond teaching religion in Catholic high schools. Other potential areas for further research, in addition to the curriculum areas indicated earlier, are real possibilities. One area where the study may have applicability beyond the Catholic high school religion classroom is in parish religious education programs. How might the study inform catechetical approaches to teaching adolescents, young adults, and even adults? What do the study’s findings regarding the role of critical thinking in promoting adolescents’ religious articulacy imply for teaching adolescents in a parish setting? And, how might the two movements of fostering religious literacy and articulacy apply to catechesis with adolescents?

Further research suggested by the study may include its pedagogical implications for teaching theology and religious studies at the college level. How might the study’s proposed pedagogical approach for teaching religion in Catholic high schools, based on Lonergan’s eight functional specialties of theology, inform the practice of teaching religion or theology in Catholic colleges and universities? To what extent does critical thinking need to continue to be nurtured through scaffolding at the college level as students move into young adulthood? And, what does the study imply concerning the need to foster religious literacy and articulacy among the young adults in college religion and theology classrooms?

Finally, the study may have broader philosophical implications for developing a philosophy of education for Catholic schools. What do the study’s findings (regarding the

role of critical thinking in the development of adolescents as knowing and valuing subjects) suggest for a vision of Catholic schools that takes seriously the human person as an intelligent, free, and responsible subject? What does the study imply regarding the mission of Catholic schools, as part of the ongoing conversation of the Catholic intellectual tradition, to be places that foster critical conversations that are international in scope, interdisciplinary in practice, and interreligious in concern? And, how might the study inform a philosophy of education for Catholic schools that promotes the growth of students as attentive, intelligent, reasonable, and responsible subjects-in-relation? Hence, the study points to the potential for developing a philosophical vision for Catholic schools based on Lonergan's philosophy of education.

Allowing Lonergan's philosophy of education to inform the theory and practice of teaching religion in Catholic high schools invites a transformation in understanding what it means to "know" one's faith. It invites an epistemological shift, or what Lonergan calls "intellectual conversion," that expands the very meaning of knowing to include experiencing, understanding, and judging. And, it holds the possibility of leading students to grasp more fully the intrinsic and dynamically oriented relationship between knowing and valuing through the self-transcendence of the subject as he or she, ultimately, comes to decide questions of belief and value for him or herself. Coming to "know" the Catholic sacred tradition, then, involves engaging in a developing, dynamic, and dialectical process of critically attending, inquiring, and judging for oneself its foundations, doctrines, systematic interpretations, and historically and culturally situated communications. It involves attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly participating in the ongoing academic conversation of the Catholic intellectual tradition

through research, interpretations, historical investigations, and dialectical discourse that allows the dynamic transposition of a living, vibrant tradition into a whole new key. In sum, it involves remaining radically open to transformation through encounters with the other, encounters that continue to shape and reshape one's world of meaning and value through a never-ending process of discovering a God whose mystery continuously unfolds toward infinite horizons of wonder.

References

- Abbott, Walter, ed. 1966. *The Documents of Vatican II*. Translated by Joseph Gallagher. NY: Herder and Herder.
- Aquinas, Thomas. 1947. *Summa Theologiae*, Vol. I. Translated by Dominican Fathers of the English Province. NY: Benzinger.
- Aristotle. 2001. *Poetics*. In *The Basic Works of Aristotle*. Edited by Richard McKeon. NY: Modern Library.
- Berchmans, Thomas. 1999. "A Framework for Christian Anthropology: A Study of Lonergan's Self-Transcending Subject and Kegan's Evolving Self." Ph.D. diss., Marquette University.
- Boys, Mary. 1989. *Educating in Faith: Maps and Visions*. Kansas City: Sheed and Ward.
- Braio, Frank. 1995. "Towards the Re-Horizoning of Subjects: Re-Structuring Classical-Modern Educational Perspectives." *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 13, no. 1 (Spring): 99-109.
- Braman, Brian. 2008. *Meaning and Authenticity: Bernard Lonergan and Charles Taylor on the Drama of Authentic Human Existence*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Brookfield, Stephen. 1987. *Developing Critical Thinkers*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- . 1995. *Becoming a Critically Reflective Teacher*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- . 2005. *Discussion as a Way of Teaching: Tools and Techniques for Democratic Classrooms*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- . 2008. "How Do We Invite Students into Conversation?" Teaching Dialogically. In *Teaching Reflectively in Theological Contexts*, edited by Mary Hess and Stephen Brookfield, 32-47. Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing.
- . 2012. *Teaching for Critical Thinking: Tools and Techniques to Help Students Question their Assumptions*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Browne, Neil and Stuart Keeley. 2010. *Asking the Right Questions: A Guide to Critical Thinking*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Buechlein, Daniel. 1997. "Oral Report to the General Assembly of Bishops." <http://usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/catechism/archbishop-daniel-buechlein-report-june-1997.cfm>.

- Byrne, Patrick. 2007. "The Passionateness of Being: The Legacy of Bernard Lonergan, S.J." In *Finding God in All Things: Celebrating Bernard Lonergan, John Courtney Murray, and Karl Rahner*, edited by Mark Bosco and David Stagaman, 35-51. NY: Fordham University Press.
- Carmody, Brendan. "2011. Towards a Contemporary Catholic Philosophy of Education." *International Studies in Catholic Education* 3, no. 2 (October): 106-119.
- Carley, Moira. 2005. *Creative Learning and Living: The Human Element*. Montreal: Thomas More Institute Papers.
- Congregation for the Clergy. 1998. *General Directory for Catechesis*. Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference.
- Congregation for Catholic Education. 1988. *The Religious Dimension of Education in a Catholic School*. Boston: St. Paul Books and Media.
- . 1997. *The Catholic School on the Threshold of the New Millennium*. http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ccatheduc/documents/rc_con_ccatheduc_doc_27041998_school2000_en.html.
- . 2009. *Circular Letter to the Presidents of Bishops' Conferences on Religious Education in Schools* http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ccatheduc/documents/rc_con_ccatheduc_doc_20090505_circ-insegn-relig_en.html.
- Conley, John. 2014. "Postmodern Catholicism." *America*, February 3.
- Conn, Walter. 1986. *Christian Conversion: A Developmental Interpretation of Autonomy and Surrender*. NY: Paulist Press.
- Cote, Richard. 2003. *Lazarus! Come Out! Why Faith Needs Imagination*. Ottawa: Novalis.
- Cox, Harvey. 1965. *The Secular City*. NY: Macmillan.
- Crowe, Frederick. 1985. *Old Things and New: A Strategy for Education*. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press.
- . 1992. *Lonergan. Outstanding Christian Thinkers Series*. Edited by Brian Davies. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press.
- . 1993. "The Spectrum of Communication in Lonergan." In *Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for Forging the New Age*, edited by Thomas Farrell and Paul Soukup, 67-86. Kansas City, MO: Sheed and Ward.

- . 2004. *Developing the Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes*. Edited by Michael Vertin. Buffalo, NY: University of Toronto Press.
- Crysdale, Cynthia. 1997. "Women and the Social Construction of Self-Appropriation." In *Lonergan and Feminism*, edited by Cynthia Crysdale, 88-113. Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.
- . 2005. "Expanding Lonergan's Legacy: Belief, Discovery, and Gender." In *Christian Identity in a Postmodern Age: Celebrating the Legacies of Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan*, edited by Declan Marmion, 65-90. Dublin: Veritas.
- Daly, Thomas. 1993. "Learning Levels." In *Australian Lonergan Workshop*, edited by William Danaher, 243-247. NY: University Press of America
- Dean, Kenda Creasy. 2001. "Fessing Up: Owning Our Theological Commitments." In *Starting Right: Thinking Theologically About Youth Ministry*, edited by Kenda Creasy Dean, Chap Clark, and Dave Rahn, 27-39. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House.
- . 2010. *Almost Christian: What the Faith of Our Teenagers is Telling the American Church*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Dewey, John. 1938. *Experience and Education*. NY: Collier Books.
- . 1959. "My Pedagogic Creed." In *Dewey on Education: Selections*, edited by Martin Dworkin, 19-32, NY: Teacher's College Press.
- Doorley, Mark. 2004. "In Response to the Other: Postmodernity and Critical Realism." In *In Deference to the Other: Lonergan and Contemporary Continental Thought*, edited by James Kanaris and Mark Doorley, 121-140. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Doran, Robert. 1981. *Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations: Toward a Reorientation of the Human Sciences*. Chico, California: American Academy of Religion.
- . 1988. "Lonergan: An Appreciation." In *The Desires of the Human Heart: An Introduction to the Theology of Bernard Lonergan*, edited by Vernon Gregson, 1-15. NY: Paulist Press.
- . 1994. *Subject and Psyche*, 2nd ed. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
- Doran, Robert and Frederick Crowe. 1993. Editor's Preface to *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*. Edited by Robert Doran and Frederick Crowe. Vol. 10, *Topics in Education*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

- Duckworth, Eleanor. 1978. "The Having of Wonderful Ideas." In *Stage Theories of Cognitive and Moral Development: Criticisms and Applications*, edited by Deanna Kuhn, 108-122. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Educational Review.
- Eisner, Elliot. 1985. *The Educational Imagination: On the Design and Evaluation of School Programs*. 2nd ed. NY: Macmillan Publishing Company.
- Elias, John. 1999. "Whatever Happened to Catholic Philosophy of Education?" *Religious Education* 94, no. 1 (Winter): 92-110.
- Elkind, David. 1978. "Piagetian and Psychometric Conceptions of Intelligence." In *Stage Theories of Cognitive and Moral Development: Criticisms and Applications*, edited by Deanna Kuhn, 89-107. Cambridge: Harvard Educational Review.
- Ennis, Robert. 1996. *Critical Thinking*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Erikson, Erik. 1968. *Identity: Youth and Crisis*. NY: W. W. Norton & Co.
- . 1993. *Childhood and Society*. NY: W. W. Norton & Co.
- Farrell, Thomas. 1993. "Writing, the Writer, and Lonergan: Authenticity and Intersubjectivity." In *Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for Forging the New Age*, edited by Thomas Farrell and Paul Soukup, 23-47. Kansas City, MO: Sheed and Ward.
- Felton, Mark and Deanna Kuhn. 2007. "How Do I Know? The Epistemological Roots of Critical Thinking." *Journal of Museum Education* 32, no. 2 (Summer): 101-123.
- Fowler, James. 1981. *Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for Meaning*. NY: Harper Collins.
- Flanagan, Joseph. 2002. *Quest for Self-Knowledge: An Essay in Lonergan's Philosophy*. Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.
- Freire, Paulo. 1992. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Translated by Myra Bergman Ramos. NY: Continuum.
- . 2009. *Education for Critical Consciousness*. NY: Continuum.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 2004a. *Truth and Method*. Second, Revised Edition. Translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall. NY: Continuum.
- . 2004b. *Philosophical Hermeneutics*. Translated by David Linge. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Gallagher, Michael Paul. 2005. "Christian Identity in a Postmodern Age: A Perspective from Lonergan." In *Christian Identity in a Postmodern Age: Celebrating the Legacies of Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan*, edited by Declan Marmion, 145-159. Dublin: Veritas Publications.
- Gelpi, Donald. 2007. "Learning to Live with Lonergan." In *Finding God in All Things: Celebrating Bernard Lonergan, John Courtney Murray, and Karl Rahner*, edited by Mark Bosco and David Stagaman, 15-34. NY: Fordham University Press.
- Girle, Roderic. "Dialogue and the Teaching of Reasoning." *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 23, no. 1 (1991): 45-55.
- Greene, Maxine. 1995. *Releasing the Imagination: Essays on Education, the Arts, and Social Change*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Gregson, Vernon. 1981. "The Historian of Religions and the Theologian: Dialectics and Dialogue." In *Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan*, edited by Matthew Lamb, 141-151. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
- Groome, Thomas. 1991. *Sharing Faith: A Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and Pastoral Ministry*. San Francisco: Harper San Francisco.
- . 1998. *Educating for Life: A Spiritual Vision for Every Teacher and Parent*. NY: Crossroad Publishing.
- . 2011. *Will There Be Faith? A New Vision for Educating and Growing Disciples*. NY: Harper One.
- Hanford, George. 1993. "Critical Thinking: a Field, a Discipline, a Subject, Or a Competency?" *Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines* 11, no. 4 (May): 13.
- Haight, Roger. 2012. *Christian Spirituality for Seekers: Reflections on the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius Loyola*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press.
- Harris, Maria. 1991. *Teaching and Religious Imagination: An Essay in the Theology of Teaching*. NY: Harper Collins.
- Harris, Maria and Gabriel Moran. 1998. *Reshaping Religious Education: Conversations on Contemporary Practice*. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press.
- Haughey, John. 2009. *Where is Knowing Going? The Horizons of the Knowing Subject*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Heft, James. 2011. *Catholic High Schools: Facing the New Realities*. NY: Oxford University Press.

- Himes, Michael. 2008. "Living Conversation: Higher Education in a Catholic Context." In *An Ignatian Spirituality Reader*, ed. George Traub, 225-241. Chicago: Loyola Press.
- Hopkins, Gerard Manley. 1983. Excerpt from *God's Grandeur*. In *The Norton Anthology of Poetry*, 3rd ed. shorter, edited by Alexander Allison, Herbert Barrows, Caesar Blake, Arthur Carr, Arthur Eastman, and Hubert English, 502. NY: W. W. Norton.
- Horell, Harold Daly. 2003. "Cultural Postmodernity and Christian Faith Formation." In *Horizons and Hopes: The Future of Religious Education*, edited by Thomas Groome and Harold Daly Horell, 81-107. NY: Paulist Press.
- . 2004. "Fostering Hope: Christian Religious Education in a Postmodern Age." *Religious Education* 99, no. 1 (Winter): 5-22.
- . 2013. "Liberating Moral Reflection." *Religious Education* 108, no. 4 (July-September): 378-391.
- Huebner, Dwayne. 1974. Curriculum: With Liberty and Justice for All. A Paper Presented to the Conference on Craft, Conflict and Symbol: Their Import for Curriculum and Schooling, at Tennessee Technological University. April 25-26, 1974.
- Hughes, Alfred. 2003. The State of High School Catechetical Texts, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Use of the Catechism to the USCCB, Washington, D.C., November 10.
- John Paul II. 1998. *Fides et Ratio: On The Relationship Between Faith and Reason*. Boston: Pauline Books and Media.
- Jones, Howard Mumford. 1960. "Development in Humanistic Scholarship." In *Both Human and Humane*, edited by C.E. Bowe and R.F. Nichols, 81-95. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Kanaris, James. 2002. *Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of Religion: From Philosophy of God to Philosophy of Religious Studies*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Kegan, Robert. 1976. *The Sweeter Welcome: Voices for a Vision of Affirmation-Bellows, Malamud, and Martin Buber*. Needham Heights, MA: Humanitas Press.
- . 1982. *The Evolving Self: Problem and Process in Human Development*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

- . 1994. *In Over Our Heads: The Mental Demands of Modern Life*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Kerr, Fergus. 2007. *Twentieth-Century Catholic Theologians*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Kreeft, Peter, ed. 1990. *Summa of the Summa*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press.
- Kuhn, Deanna. 1999. "A Developmental Model of Critical Thinking." *Educational Researcher* 28, no. 2 (March): 16-25.
- . 2000. "Metacognitive Development." *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 9, no. 5 (October): 178-181.
- . 2001. "How Do People Know?" *Psychological Science* 12, no. 1 (January): 1-8.
- . 2003. "Understanding and Valuing Knowing as Developmental Goals." *Liberal Education* (Summer): 16-21.
- . 2005. *Education for Thinking*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 2006. "Do Cognitive Changes Accompany Developments in the Adolescent Brain?" *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 1, no. 1 (March): 59-67.
- Kuhn, Deanna, Richard Cheney, and Michael Weinstock. 2000. "The Development of Epistemological Understanding." *Cognitive Development* 15: 309-328.
- Kuhn, Deanna and Seung-Ho Park. 2005. "Epistemological Understanding and the Development of Intellectual Values." *International Journal of Educational Research* 43: 111-124.
- Kuhn, Deanna and Maria Pease. 2006. "Do Children and Adults Learn Differently?" *Journal of Cognition and Development* 7, no. 3: 279-293.
- LaCapra, Dominick. 1983. *Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- . 2000. *History and Reading*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Lakeland, Paul. 1997. *Postmodernity: Christian Identity in a Fragmented Age*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
- Langer, Susanne. 1953. *Feeling and Form*. NY: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Lash, Nicholas. 2010. "Teaching or Commanding? When Bishops Instruct the Faithful." *America*, December 13.

- Lawrence, Frederick. 1993. "The Human Good and Christian Conversation." In *Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for Forging the New Age*, edited by Thomas Farrell and Paul Soukup, 248-268. Kansas City, MO: Sheed and Ward.
- . 1993. "The Fragility of Consciousness: Lonergan and the Postmodern Concern for the Other." In *Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for Forging the New Age*, edited by Thomas Farrell and Paul Soukup, 173-211. Kansas City, MO: Sheed and Ward.
- . 2004. "Lonergan's Postmodern Subject: Neither Neoscholastic Substance nor Cartesian Ego." In *In Deference to the Other: Lonergan and Contemporary Continental Thought*, edited by James Kanaris and Mark Doorley, 107-119. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Leicester, Mal. 2010. *Teaching Critical Thinking Skills*. NY: Continuum.
- Leinsle, Ulrich. 2010. *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*. Translated by Michael Miller. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press.
- Liddy, Richard. 2007. *Startling Strangeness: Reading Lonergan's Insight*. NY: University Press of America.
- . 2008. *Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan*. South Orange, NJ: Bernard Lonergan Institute, Seton Hall University.
- . 2009. "The Catholic Intellectual Tradition: Where is it Today?" *Conversations on Jesuit Higher Education* 36 (Fall): 2-6.
- Livingston, James, et. al. 2006. "The New Theology and Transcendental Thomism." In *Modern Christian Thought: The Twentieth Century*, edited by James Livingston, et. al., 197-232. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
- Lonergan, Bernard. 1961a. "System and Isomorphism," lecture notes for "*De Intellectu et Methodo*," translated and transcribed by Robert Doran, SJ. In The Digital Lonergan Archives of Marquette University, <http://bernardlonergan.com>
- . 1961b. "Advancing positions and reversing counter-positions," lecture notes for "*De Intellectu et Methodo*," translated and transcribed by Robert Doran, SJ. In The Digital Lonergan Archives of Marquette University, <http://bernardlonergan.com>
- . 1961c. "Criteria for Judging," lecture notes for "*De Intellectu et Methodo*," translated and transcribed by Robert Doran, SJ. In the Digital Lonergan Archives of Marquette University, <http://bernardlonergan.com>.

- . 1967a. *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*. Ed. David Burrell. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- . 1967b. *Collection: Papers of Bernard Lonergan, S.J.* Edited by Frederick Crowe. Montreal: Palm Publishers.
- . 1968. *The Subject*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
- . 1971a. *Method in Theology*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- . 1971b. *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Edited by J.P. Burns. NY: Herder and Herder.
- . 1973. *Philosophy of God and Theology*. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press.
- . 1974. *A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J.* Edited by William Ryan and Bernard Tyrrell. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- . 1978. "Theology in its New Context." In *Conversion*, ed. Walter Conn, 3-21. NY: Alba House.
- . 1980. "Reality, Myth, Symbol." In *Myth, Symbol, and Reality*. Edited by Alan Olson. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- . 1982. *Caring About Meaning: Patterns in the Life of Bernard Lonergan*. Edited by Pierrot Lambert, Charles Tansey, and Cathleen Going. Montreal: Thomas More Institute.
- . 1985. *A Third Collection. Papers by Bernard Lonergan, S.J.* Edited by Frederick Crowe. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.
- . 1990. *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*. Edited by Elizabeth Morelli and Mark Morelli. Vol. 5, *Understanding and Being, The Halifax Lectures on INSIGHT*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- . 1993. *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*. Edited by Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran. Vol. 10, *Topics in Education*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- . 1997. *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*. Edited by Frederick Crowe and Robert Doran. Vol. 3, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- . 2002. *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*. Translated by Michael Shields. Vol. 7, *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

- . 2004. *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*. Edited by Robert Croken and Robert Doran. Vol. 17, *Philosophical and Theological Papers: 1965-1980*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- . 2007. *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*. Edited by Robert Croken, Robert Doran, and Daniel Monsour. Vol. 20, *Shorter Papers*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- . 2010. *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*. Edited by Robert Doran and Robert Croken. Vol. 22, *Early Works on Theological Method 1*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- MacCulloch, Diarmaid. 2003. *The Reformation: A History*. NY: Penguin.
- MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1984. *After Virtue*, 2nd ed. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Maher, Michael. 2005. *The Educational Philosophy of the American Catholic Hierarchy in the 20th Century: An Analysis of Vatican and American Official Statements*. NY: The Edwin Mellen Press.
- Maréchal, Joseph. 2005. "Transcendental Thomism." In *The Sheed and Ward Anthology of Catholic Philosophy*, edited by James Swindal and Harry Gensler, 318-325. NY: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Marsh, James. 2004. "Self-Appropriation: Lonergan's Pearl of Great Price." In *In Deference to the Other: Lonergan and Contemporary Continental Thought*, edited by James Kanaris and Mark Doorley, 53-63. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Matthews, William. 2005. "The Mystery of the Human: A Perspective from Lonergan." In *Christian Identity in a Postmodern Age: Celebrating the Legacies of Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan*, edited by Declan Marmion, 27-45. Dublin: Veritas Publications.
- . 2011. "Kant, *Insight*, and the Life Context." In *Fifty Years of Insight*, edited by Neil Ormerod, Robin Koning, and David Braithwaite, 37-71. Sydney: ATF Press.
- McBride, Alfred. 2009. "A Sturdy Framework: A Defense of the Bishop's New High School Catechesis." *America*, September 28.
- McCool, Gerald. 1977. *Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism: The Search for a Unitary Method*. NY: Fordham University Press.
- Miller, Mark. 2013. *The Quest for God and the Good Life: Lonergan's Theological Anthropology*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press.

- Moran, Gabriel. 1988. "Of a kind and to a Degree." In *Does the Church Really Want Religious Education*, edited by Marlene Mayr, 15-31. Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press.
- . 1989. *Religious Education as a Second Language*. Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press.
- . 1997. *Showing How: The Act of Teaching*. NY: Continuum.
- . 2002. *Both Sides: The Story of Revelation*. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.
- Morelli, Elizabeth and Mark Morelli. 1990. Editor's Preface to *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan*. Ed. Elizabeth Morelli and Mark Morelli. Vol. 5, *Understanding and Being, The Halifax Lectures on INSIGHT*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Moshman, David. 1998. "Cognitive Development Beyond Childhood." In *The Handbook of Child Psychology*, 5th ed. Edited by Deanna Kuhn and Robert Siegler. Vol. 2, *Cognition, Perception, and Language*. NY: John Wiley & Sons: 947-973.
- Murray, Elizabeth. 2007. "Lonergan and the Key to Philosophy." In *Finding God in All Things: Celebrating Bernard Lonergan, John Courtney Murray, and Karl Rahner*, ed. Mark Bosco and David Stagaman, 52-69. NY: Fordham University Press.
- . 2011. "Rational Self-Consciousness: A Peak Above the Clouds." In *Fifty Years of INSIGHT*, edited by Neil Ormerod, Robin Koning, and David Braithwaite, 17-35. Sydney: ATF Press.
- Muuss, Rolf. 1988. *Theories of Adolescence*. 5th ed. NY: Random House.
- Naickamparambil, Thomas. 1997. *Through Self-Discovery to Self-Transcendence: A Study of Cognitional Self-Appropriation in Bernard Lonergan*. Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana.
- NCCB. 1972. *To Teach as Jesus Did: A Pastoral Message on Catholic Education*. Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference.
- NCEA. 2013. Position Statement on Common Core State Standards.
http://www.ncea.org/sites/default/files/documents/ncea_commoncorestatestandards_053113.pdf
- Nehamas, Alexander. 2007. *Only a Promise of Happiness: The Place of Beauty in a World of Art*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Newman, John Henry. 1955. *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*. NY: Image Books.

- Nichols, Aidan. 2011. *Conversation of Faith and Reason: Modern Catholic Thought from Hermes to Benedict XVI*. Chicago: Liturgy Training Publications.
- O'Malley, John. 2008. *What Happened at Vatican II*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- O'Malley, William. 2009. "Faulty Guidance: A New Framework for High School Catechesis Fails to Persuade." *America*, September 14.
- Orji, Cyril. 2013. *The Catholic University and the Search for Truth*. Winona, MN: Anselm Academic Press.
- Ormerod, Neil. 2013. "Bernard Lonergan and the Recovery of a Metaphysical Frame." *Theological Studies* 74, no. 4 (December): 960-982.
- Ostasiewski, Danita. 2010. "Looking for Love: A Critique of Doctrinal Elements of a Curriculum Framework for the Development of Catechetical Materials for Young People of High School Age." Published by the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina at Greensboro.
- Palmer, Parker. 1993. *To Know as We are Known: Education as a Spiritual Journey*. NY: Harper Collins.
- . 2007. *The Courage to Teach*, 10th Anniversary ed. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
- Penaskovic, Richard. 1997. *Critical Thinking and the Academic Study of Religion*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.
- Piaget, Jean. 1985. *The Equilibration of Cognitive Structures: The Central Problem of Intellectual Development*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Piaget, Jean and Barbel Inhelder. 1958. *Growth in Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence*. Trans. Anne Parsons and Stanley Milgram. NY: Basic Books.
- Plants, Nicholas. 2000. "From the Disengaged Subject to the Subject as Subject in Taylor and Lonergan." Ph.D. diss., St. Louis University.
- . 2004. "Decentering Inwardness." In *In Deference to the Other: Lonergan and Contemporary Continental Thought*, ed. James Kanaris and Mark Doorley, 13-29. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Polanyi, Michael. 1974. *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Rogoff, Barbara. 1998. "Cognition as a Collaborative Process." In *The Handbook of Child Psychology*, 5th ed. Edited by Deanna Kuhn and Robert Siegler. Vol. 2, *Cognition, Perception, and Language*. NY: John Wiley & Son: 679-729.
- Rossiter, Graham. 1982. "The Need for a "Creative Divorce" Between Catechesis and Religious Education in Catholic Schools." *Religious Education* 77 (January/February): 21-40.
- Rusembuka, Muhigirwa. 2001. *The Two Ways of Human Development According to Bernard Lonergan: Anticipation in Insight*. Rome: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana.
- Rymarz, Richard. 2010. "Conversion and the New Evangelization: A Perspective From Bernard Lonergan." *The Heythrop Journal* 51: 753-767.
- Saracino, Michele. 2003. *On Being Human: A Conversation with Lonergan and Levinas*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
- . 2004. "Subject for the Other: Lonergan and Levinas on Being Human in Postmodernity." In *In Deference to the Other: Lonergan and Contemporary Continental Thought*, edited by James Kanaris and Mark Doorley, 65-89. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Schweitzer, Friedrich. 2004. *The Postmodern Life Cycle: Challenges for Church and Theology*. St. Louis: Chalice Press.
- Scott, Kieran. 2005. "The Schoolteacher's Dilemma." In *Critical Issues in Religious Education*. Ed. Oliver Brennan. Dublin: Veritas.
- Siegel, Harvey. 1991. "The Generalizability of Critical Thinking." *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 23, no. 1: 18-33.
- Siejak, Catherine. 1999. "Learning to Love the Questions." *Religious Education* 94, no 1 (Winter): 175-92).
- Sierra-Gutiérrez, Francisco. 1993. "Communication: Mutual Self-Mediation in Context." In *Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for Forging the New Age*. Kansas City, MO: Sheed and Ward: 269-293.
- Sim, Stuart. 2005. Preface to *The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism*, 2nd ed. In *The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism*, 2nd ed. NY: Routledge.
- Smith, Christian and Melinda Lundquist Denton. 2005. *Soul Searching: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of American Teenagers*. NY: Oxford University Press.

- Stagaman, David. 2007. "Postscript: 1904 was a Wonderful Year." In *Finding God in All Things: Celebrating Bernard Lonergan, John Courtney Murray, and Karl Rahner*, edited by Mark Bosco and David Stagaman, 182-193. NY: Fordham University Press.
- Streeter, Carla Mae. 1993a. "Preaching as a Form of Theological Communication: An Instance of Lonergan's Evaluative Hermeneutics." In *Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for Forging the New Age*, edited by Thomas Farrell and Paul Soukup, 48-66. Kansas City, MO: Sheed and Ward.
- . 1993b. "Glossary of Lonerganian Terminology." In *Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for Forging the New Age*, edited by Thomas Farrell and Paul Soukup, 315-329. Kansas City, MO: Sheed and Ward.
- Stewart, John Alexander. 1909. *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Quoted in Richard Liddy, *Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan* (South Orange, NJ: Bernard Lonergan Institute, Seton Hall University, 2008).
- Sullivan, John. 2011a. "From Formation to the Frontiers: The Dialectic of Christian Education." In *Communicating Faith*, edited by John Sullivan, 3-15. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press.
- . 2011b. "Text and Context: Mediating the Mission in Catholic Schools." In *Communicating Faith*, edited by John Sullivan, 101-116. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press.
- Sumner, William Graham. 1906. *Folkways*. Boston: Ginn and Company.
- Tekippe, Terry. 1996. *What is Lonergan up to in INSIGHT?* Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press.
- . 2003a. *Bernard Lonergan: An Introductory Guide to INSIGHT*. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.
- . 2003b. *Bernard Lonergan's INSIGHT: A Comprehensive Commentary*. NY: University Press of America.
- Thompson, Loren. 1995. *Habits of the Mind: Critical Thinking in the Classroom*. Lanham: University Press of America.
- Topley, Raymond. 2004. "Bernard Lonergan's Levels of Consciousness applied to Christian Religious Education." Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Graduate Theological Foundation, Indiana.

- . 2011. "Questioning for Faith Commitment." In *Communicating Faith*, ed. John Sullivan, 165-179. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press.
- Towns, Elmer. 1972. "Method in Philosophical Inquiry for Christian Education." *Religious Education* 64 (July/August): 259-267.
- Tracy, David. 1970. *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan*. NY: Herder and Herder.
- . 1977. Presidential Address: The Catholic Analogical Imagination. *Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America* 32 (1977): 234-244.
- . 1981. *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism*. NY: Crossroads.
- . 1987. *Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, and Hope*. NY: Harper and Row.
- USCC/NCCB. 1997. *Renewing the Vision: A Framework for Catholic Youth Ministry*. Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference.
- USCCB. 2005a. *National Directory for Catechesis*. Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.
- . 2005b. *Renewing Our Commitment to Catholic Elementary and Secondary Education in the Third Millennium*. Washington, D.C.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.
- . 2008. *Doctrinal Elements of a Curriculum Framework for the Development of Catechetical Materials for Young People of High School Age*. Washington, DC: USCCB.
- Veverka, Fayette. 2004. "Practicing Faith: Negotiating Identity and Difference in a Religiously Pluralistic World." *Religious Education* 99, no. 1 (Winter): 38-55.
- Walker, Decker and Jonas Soltis. 2009. *Curriculum and Aims*, 5th ed. NY: Teachers College Press, Columbia University.
- Walsh, John. 1985. *Evangelization and Justice*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Press.
- Walmsley, Gerard. 2008. *Lonergan on Philosophic Pluralism: The Polymorphism of Consciousness as the Key to Philosophy*. Buffalo, NY: University of Toronto Press.
- Welch, Sharon. 1999. *Sweet Dreams in America: Making Ethics and Spirituality Work*. NY: Routledge.

Wicks, Robert. 1988. "Clarity and Obscurity: Critical Thinking and Cognitive Therapeutic Principles in the Service of Spiritual Development." *Thought* 248, (March): 77-85.

ABSTRACT

This study examines how Bernard Lonergan's philosophy of education can provide a fuller understanding of the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools. It offers a philosophical rationale for the incorporation of critical thinking into the Catholic high school religion classroom and it suggests a pedagogical model for that incorporation, using Lonergan's educational model of theological studies found in *Method in Theology*. The study employs a philosophical methodology to demonstrate the need for developing adolescents' critical thinking capacities in the context of teaching religion in order to help them grow as authentic knowing and valuing subjects. It not only highlights the importance of promoting adolescents' religious literacy in the texts, creeds, practices, and symbols of the Catholic sacred tradition; but also, it emphasizes the need to cultivate students' religious articulacy, which allows them to give more critically nuanced, articulate form to their own religious questions, understandings, values, and beliefs. The study argues that cultivating such articulacy is best done through dialectical and dialogic discourse in the religion classroom, inviting students to become active participants in the ongoing conversation of the Catholic intellectual tradition. The study shows how Lonergan's eightfold division of the functional specialties of theology into two dynamic movements, downward as the "mediated" phase of theology and upward as the "mediating" phase of theology, can be used to create such dialectical conversations in the religion classroom in order to foster students' authentic knowing and valuing. Finally, the study offers an analysis and a critique of the USCCB's current *Curriculum Framework* for teaching religion in Catholic high schools, using the essential elements of a curriculum that would promote religious literacy and articulacy, based on the study's findings. It recommends a redesign of the *Curriculum Framework* that would invite more authentic discourse into the religion classroom in order to help students grow as authentic knowing and valuing subjects. Overall, the study demonstrates the need for a revitalized understanding of the role of critical thinking in teaching religion in Catholic high schools and it offers practical suggestions for implementing that vision.

VITA
DENNIS GUNN

Date of Birth	June 2, 1966
Place of Birth	Brooklyn, NY
High School	A.G Berner HS Massapequa, NY August, 1983
Bachelor of Arts	Iona College New Rochelle, NY May, 1993
Master of Education	Boston College Chestnut Hill, MA May, 2001
Doctor of Philosophy Religious Education	Fordham University Bronx, NY May, 2014